People v. Cruz

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2

3 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM0446-12 4 vs. ) 5 ) DECISION AND ORDER JOSEPH SAN NICOLAS CRUZ, ) 6 ) Defendant. ) 7 _____________________________) 8 INTRODUCTION 9 This matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on Defendant's motion to 10 suppress, filed November 19, 2012. Oral arguments were heard on December 17, 2012. 11 Assistant Attorney General Gabrielle L. Rossi, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Government and 12 Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath, Esq. represented the Defendant. Having considered 13 the parties' briefs, oral arguments, and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following

14 Decision and Order. 15 BACKGROUND 16 Defendant is charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, inter alia, based upon 17 the following events. On May 5, 2012, Port Authority Police Officer Benny M. Quinata 18 observed Defendant's vehicle swerve twice as it passed him on the road. (Testimony of Benny 19 M. Quinata, Record Log at 3:33, Dec. 17, 2012.) Officer Quinata was off-duty and not in a 20 police vehicle but he was in uniform and he honked his horn until Defendant pulled his vehicle 21 to the side of the road at approximately 10:40-10:45 p.m. Id. Officer Quinata approached 22 Defendant and identified himself as a Port Authority Police Officer. Id. Officer Quinata 23 observed that Defendant smelled of alcohol and looked like he was going to fall asleep. Id. 24 Defendant affirmed that he drank a six pack of beer and Officer Quinata contacted the Guam

25 Police Department. Id. 26 Guam Police Officer John A. Bagaforo arrived at approximately 10:56 p.m. and 27 observed that Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes and smelled of alcohol. (Testimony of 28 John A. Bagaforo, Record Log at 3:47, Dec. 17, 2012.) According to Officer Bagaforo,

Page I of9 Defendant could not maintain his balance to safely complete a standardized field sobriety test 2 and he was arrested at 11 :04 p.m. !d. Defendant was thereafter transported to the police station 3 where he allegedly refused to participate in alcohol testing and revealed contraband on his 4 person during an inventory search prior to confinement. 5 On November 19, 2012, Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the 6 investigative detention because it lasted longer than fifteen (15) minutes, in violation of 8 GCA 7 § 30.30. Defendant asserts that his initial detention was an unreasonable seizure and that all 8 evidence obtained during or as a result of the seizure must be suppressed. 9 The Government opposes suppression on the bases that: 1) the Defendant consented to 10 an extended detention when he participated in field sobriety tests; 2) probable cause to arrest 11 appeared before 15 minutes of alleged detention; and 3) suppression should be limited to 12 evidence obtained after 15 minutes of detention and before arrest. 13 DISCUSSION 14 1. The Stop and Frisk Statutes 15 The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative detentions that are based upon a 16 reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct. People v. Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 ~ 4 (citing Terry v. 17 Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)). This principle is codified in the "Stop and Frisk" 18 statutes at 8 GCA Chapter 30. See People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 40. 19

20 Title 8 GCA § 30.10 states: 21 Whenever a peace officer encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing or is about to 22 commit a criminal offense, the peace officer may detain such person. 23 Title 8 GCA § 30.20 states: 24 Detention pursuant to § 30.10 shall be for the purpose of ascertaining the 25 identity of the person detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which lead the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, 26 or was about to commit a criminal offense, but such person shall not be 27 compelled to answer any inquiry of the peace officer.

Page 2 of9 Title 8 GCA § 30.30 states: 2 No person shall be detained under the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of that section, and in no event 3 longer than fifteen (15) minutes. Such detention shall not extend beyond the 4 place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof.

5 Title 8 GCA § 30.40 states: 6 If at any time after the onset of the detention authorized by § 30.1 0, probable cause for arrest of the person shall appear, the person shall be arrested. If after 7 an inquiry into the circumstances which prompted the detention, no probable 8 cause for the arrest of the person shall appear, he shall be released.

9 Thus under Guam law, a police officer having a reasonable suspicion regarding criminal 10 activity by a particular individual may detain that person to investigate said suspected criminal 11 activity. 8 GCA §§ 30.10 & 30.20. When this investigative detention reveals probable cause 12 for arrest, "the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. However, "in no event [shall a 13 person be detained] longer than fifteen (15) minutes," and the person "shall be released," if no 14 probable cause for arrest appears. 8 GCA §§ 30.30 and 30.40. 15 In this case, the parties dispute the application and effect of the 15 minute time limit for 16 investigative detentions. The Government argues that any appearance of probable cause to 17 arrest within 15 minutes removes the need to apply the time limitation. Alternatively, the 18 Govemment contends that any suppression applies only to evidence obtained after 15 minutes 19 and before arrest. Defendant asserts that if he is not arrested or released within 15 minutes 20 pursuant to the Stop and Frisk statutes, then all evidence from the investigative detention must 21 be suppressed unless it comes from an independent source. 22

23 2. Violation of the 15-Minutc Time Limit 24 a. Meaning of the "Stop and Frisk" Act. 25 Title 8 GCA Chapter 30 and the 15-minute time limit are derived from former Penal 26 Code Sections 735 through 736.4. See 8 GCA § 30.1 0, COMMENT; Guam Pub. L. 10-99 (June 27 19, 1969). Former Sections 735 through 736.4 were enacted as original statutes and without 28 any statement of legislative findings or intent. P .L. 10-99. There is an absence of controlling

Page 3 of9 authority to interpret the 15 minute time limit. 1 Without clear legislative intent or authority to 2 the contrary, the Court shall interpret the Stop and Frisk statutes according to their plain 3 meaning. See Guam Resorts, Inc. v. G.C Corporation, 2012 Guam 13 ~ 7 ("When the plain 4 reading of a statute is 'clear on its face' and yields to an unambiguous definition, we will not 5 look past that plain reading."); Castino v. G.C Corp., 2010 Guam 3 ~ 29 ("A plain reading 6 construction is appropriate where the statute lays out specific requirements and indicates exactly 7 what is necessary for compliance without ambiguous terms."); People v. Lau, 2007 Guam 4 ~~ 8 11-14. 9 An examination of the plain language of the 15-minute time limit within the context of 8 10 GCA Chapter 30 does not reveal ambiguity or absurd and unworkable consequences. See 11 Sumitomo Canst., Co., Ltd. v. Government of Guam, 2001 Guam 23 ~ 17; People v. Flores, 12 2004 Guam 18 ~ 18. The Stop and Frisk statutes state that a person shall be detained, "in no 13 event longer than fifteen (15) minutes." 8 GCA § 30.30. If probable cause to arrest appears, "at 14 any time after the onset of the detention ... the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. If 15 probable cause does not appear, "he shall be released." !d. This language clearly contemplates 16 that any investigative detention must end by arrest or release within 15 minutes. Even where 17 probable cause to arrest appears within 15 minutes of detention, the plain language of 8 GCA § 18 30.30 does not allow the detention to continue beyond 15 minutes. When a person is detained 19 without arrest for more than 15 minutes, although probable cause to arrest may appear, the Stop 20 and Frisk statutes are violated. 21

23 1 For example, Guam law does not explicitly discredit any detention beyond the time limit nor does it converse! hold that the time limit is merely a guide for law enforcement. Compare Florida v. Royer, 460, U.S. 491, 500, 103 24 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) ("[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary t effectuate the purpose of the stop."), and US. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985) ("I 25 assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider i appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm o 26 dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant."), with US. v. Place, 46 U.S. 696, 709 n.IO, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2646 (1983) ("We understand the desirability of providing law enforcemen 27 authorities with a clear rule to guide their conduct. Nevertheless, we question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation. Such a limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to th 28 demands of any particular situation.").

Page 4 of9 To posit that probable cause ansmg before the expiration of 15 minutes somehow 2 negates the statute's time limit is to say that an officer may detain an individual indefinitely 3 without an arrest just because probable cause arose within the first 15 minutes. This would be 4 an illogical reading of the statute that subverts its entire purpose, and one which this Court 5 cannot reasonably adopt. The Guam Legislature has apparently narrowed the ability of any 6 officer to graduate an investigative detention according to the demands of a particular situation, 7 as the U.S. Supreme Court might otherwise afford in the absence of an explicit time limit. See, 8 e.g., US. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-87, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (1985). Based upon the plain 9 meaning of the Stop and Frisk statutes, the Court holds that an investigative detention must 10 cease by arrest or release within 15 minutes of its initiation? 11 The Government argues that Defendant's voluntary consent to undergo a Standardized 3 12 Field Sobriety Test vitiates the effect of 8 GCA § 30.30, tolling the 15-minute clock. However, 13 the plain language of the statute is inescapable. It states in pertinent part: "No person shall be 14 detained ... longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of [Section 30.1 0], and in 15 no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes. 8 GCA § 30.30 (emphasis added). This 16 unconditional language unequivocally imparts that no circumstance may serve as an exception 17 to the time limit, be it exigency or even an express waiver by the detainee. 18 b. Application to the Facts of this Case. 19 In order to apply this rule to the present case, the Court must further examine the 20 difference between an investigative detention and an arrest. Under Guam law, "a person has 21 been seized under the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding 22 the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Cundiff, 23 2006 Guam 12 at~ 21 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 24

25 2 The Court recognizes this law's possibly impairing effect upon meaningful law enforcement investigatio technique; however, this Court is duty-bound to administer the law as the Legislature intended and may do no more. 26 The only alternative is for the Legislature to re-examine whether the statute indeed withstands an effectiv application to real-world circumstances within the reasonable balance between individual liberty interests and th 27 Government's law enforcement interests. 3 See generally, People v. Santos, 1999 Guam I ~,!33-37; People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 ~~ 14-15 28

Page 5 of9 1877 (1980)). An investigative detention under 8 GCA Chapter 30 is consistent with a Fourth 2 Amendment seizure. See e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~ 40; Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 ("It must be 3 recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to 4 walk away, he has 'seized' that person."). For this reason, an investigative detention occurs 5 when a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave under the circumstances. 6 Guam law defines an arrest as "an actual restraint of the person, or ... submission to the 7 custody of the person making the arrest." 8 GCA § 20.10. An officer must announce the arrest 8 pursuant to 8 GCA § 20.25, but the declaration is not an absolute requirement for a lawful arrest 9 based upon probable cause. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~~ 35-36 and 25-26 (quoting People v. lO Maddox, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal. 1956); and Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225 Il (1964)). Any physical restraint that curtails movement constitutes an arrest. /d. at ~~ 19-20 4 12 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67, 88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968)). Even without physical 13 restraint, a severely intrusive detention may constitute an arrest. /d. at ~~ 21-22 (quoting 14 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979) (custodial interrogation is an 15 arrest and requires probable cause)). 16 In this case, Officer Quinata stopped Defendant's vehicle at approximately 10:40-10:45 17 p.m. because it repeatedly swerved on the road. A traffic stop is "unquestionably a seizure 18 within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." People v. Rasauo, 2011 Guam 1 ~ 26 (citing 19 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-439 (1984)). See also People v. Chargualaf, 2001 20 Guam 1 ~ 17. Under the circumstances of a traffic stop, Defendant was detained pursuant to 8 21 GCA Chapter 30 because he could not reasonably believe that he was free to disregard Officer 22 Quinata and drive away. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (no detention if person can disregard 23 and walk away). Defendant was not physically restrained or interrogated under custody until 24 11 :04 p.m. when he was formally arrested. The detention lasted approximately nineteen to 25

27 4 People v. Farata, 2007 Guam 8 11 44-45; People v. Santos, 2003 Guam l 1 51 (police custody ultimate! 28 detennined by use of physical restraint comparable to fonnal arrest).

Page 6 of9 twenty-four (19-24) minutes before it ended with an an-est. For this reason, the investigative 2 detention violated the 15-minute time limit of the Stop and Frisk statutes. 3

4 3. The Exclusionary Remedy 5 The Stop and Frisk statutes do not provide an explicit remedy for a person who is 6 detained by law enforcement for more than 15 minutes. See 8 GCA Chapter 30. However, an 7 unreasonable investigative detention implicates the Fourth Amendment under Guam law. See 8 e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at , 40; Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 at , 20 ("[T]he Fourth 9 Amendment is only at issue where the police detain or seize an individual while posing 10 investigative questions.") (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 11 (1983)). When the Fourth Amendment is violated by an unlawful seizure or investigative 12 detention, evidence obtained during the detention must be suppressed pursuant to the 13 exclusionary rule. See e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at, 51; Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-15. Evidence 14 that is obtained during or derived from an unlawful detention must be suppressed pursuant to 15 the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at , 41 (citing Wong Sun v. 5 16 United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 , 64). On this basis, the 17 Court shall apply the ordinary exclusionary rule and fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to the 18 Stop and Frisk statutes and suppress all evidence obtained or derived from an unlawful 19 detention that exceeds the time limit; specifically meaning any and all evidence obtained during 20 the entire detention, and not just that evidence obtained after the 15-minute time limit has 21 elapsed. 22 In order to suppress evidence under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the Court 23 must determine, "whether the challenged evidence was come at by exploitation of the initial 24

5 26 See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-443, I 04 S.Ct. 250 I, 2508 (1984) ("The core rationale consistent! advanced by this Court for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduc 27 has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations o constitutional and statutory protections. This Court has accepted the argument that the way to ensure sue 28 protections is to exclude evidence seized as a result of such violations notwithstanding the high social cost of lettin

Page 7 of9 illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 2 Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~ 41; Santos, 2003 Guam 1 at~ 65 (quoting Segura v. United States, 3 468 U.S. 796, 805-805, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3385 (1984)). See also Segura, 468 U.S. at 815 4 ("[E]vidence will not be excluded as 'fruit' unless the illegality is at least the 'but for' cause of 5 the discovery of the evidence."). The coercive effect of an illegal seizure may attenuate and 6 dissipate with the passage of time. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 at~ 65 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 7 U.S.298,311-312, 105 S.Ct 1285, 1294(1985)). 8 In this case, the unlawful Stop and Frisk detention ended when Defendant was arrested 9 at 11 :04 p.m. Defendant was subsequently transported to the police station where he refused to 10 participate in alcohol testing and revealed contraband on his person during an inventory search 11 prior to confinement. The short passage of time between the illegal detention and the evidence 12 collected at the police station by itself does not likely dissipate and purge the taint of the 13 illegality. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604-605, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2262 (1975) (statement 14 separated from illegal arrest by less than two hours does not purge the taint of illegal arrest). 15 Furthermore, an implied consent warning alone does not purge the taint of the illegal detention. 16 !d. at 601-603. In order to determine whether Defendant's test refusal and contraband discovery 17 are purged of the taint of the illegal detention, the Court should consider the totality of the 18 circumstances, including: 1) the temporal proximity between the illegal detention and the 19 evidence; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and 3) particularly, the purpose and 20 flagrance of the illegal conduct. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 at~ 53 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 21 603-604). 22 As discussed above, the close temporal proximity between the illegal detention and the 23 evidence collected at the police station does not purge the taint of illegality. Furthermore, there 24 are no intervening circumstances to purge the taint of the illegal detention. See Johnson v. 25 Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1626 (1972) (lineup identification is purged of 26

27 persons obviously guilty go unpunished for their crimes. On this rationale, the prosecution is not to be put in a bette 28 position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired.").

Page 8 of9 illegal arrest when conducted with counsel and after magistrate hearing to advise rights and 2 commit under bail). However, it is particularly important here that the illegal detention did not 3 have an illegal purpose or constitute flagrant illegal conduct. During the period of unlawful 4 detention Officers Quinata and Bagaforo observed indicators of Defendant's intoxication, 5 questioned Defendant about intoxication and arrested Defendant when he could not complete 6 standardized field sobriety tests. These actions are reasonably tailored to quickly confirm or 7 dispel the suspicion that Defendant drove under the influence of alcohol. See U.S v. Sharpe, 8 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985). On this basis, the detention was not conducted 9 for an illegal purpose nor did it constitute flagrant illegal conduct and the evidence obtained 6 10 under custody at the police station is purged of the taint of the illegal detention. 11 For all of these reasons, the police obtained evidence at the police station by means 12 sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint of the illegal detention, and that 13 particular evidence shall not be excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. See 14 Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at ~ 41. 15 CONCLUSION 16 Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby GRANTED and all 17 evidence obtained from the onset of the detention up until the time of his arrest at 11 :04 p.m., 18 May 5, 2012, shall not be admissible against Defendant. 19

20 SO ORDERED this / 2-rH day of March, 2013. 21

23 HON. JAMES L. CANTO II Judge, Superior Court of Guam 24

26 6 One example of an illegal purpose or flagrant illegal conduct under the Stop and Frisk statutes is a detention an investigation that exceeds the scope of the officer's reasonable suspicions, and which reveals evidence of wholl) 27 unrelated conduct after more than 15 minutes, only because the detention continued indefinitely. See general!) Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218-219 (confession inadmissible where defendant was seized without probable cause in th 28 hope that something might turn up).

Page9of9