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8 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM
10 PEOPLE OF GUAM, CRIMINAL CASE NO.: CF0237-17
ll vs. 12 DECISION AND ORDER PRUDENCIO JOHN CRUZ (aka "Pru") (Defendant's Motion to Suppress) 13 DOB: 0510111990
14 DEI<'ENDANT. 15
17 INTRODUCTION 18 This matter last came before the Honorable Anita A. Sukola on March 2. 2018 on
19 Prudencio John Cruz's ("Defendant") Motion to Suppress. A Suppression Hearing was held on
20 February 16, 2018. The Defendant was represented by Attorney Gloria Lujan Rudolph. Assistant
21 Attorney General Matthew A. Phelps appeared on behalf of the People of Guam ("People"). Upon
22 review of the evidence and testimony offered during the Suppression Hearing, and the oral
23 arguments and legal authorities presented by the Parties, the Court hereby DENIES the
24 Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
25 III
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CF0237-17 People of Guam vs. Prudencio John Cru;: Page l of 10 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendant's Motion to Suppress) BACKGROUND 2 The Court finds the following facts from the testimony and evidence offered during the
3 . Suppression Hearing on February 16, 2018. On the evening of April 26, 2017, Guam Police
4 Department Officers Troy B.S. Lizama and Jason M. Dodd were conducting burglary suppression
5 operations in the Dededo area. At approximately ll :44 p.m., the officers were traveling in an
6 unmarked police vehicle near the intersection of Ysengsong Road and Route I. The officers both
7 I testified that at this time, their attention was drawn to a dark colored, single-cab pickup truck 8 because one of the headlights and the vehicle's rear license plate light were not illuminated. The
9 pickup was being driven by the Defendant. The officers also testified there was rain that evening,
I0 so they followed the vehicle but did not activate their emergency lights until they found
ll somewhere safe for the vehicle to pull over. They eventually followed the vehicle onto Route 16
12 heading away from the Dededo/Harmon area. After following for a short period the rain started to
13 lighten. The officers then activated their vehicle's emergency lights and sirens while following the
14 pickup. The pickup complied and pulled over into the Barrigada Submarina parking lot.
IS Officer Lizama testified that after pulling the vehicle over, he approached the driver's side.
16 Officer Lizama used his light to illuminate the interior of the vehicle, though he testified that he
17 shined the light at the steering wheel and not at the Defendant. Officer Dodd stated he took a
18 ! position at the right side rear of the vehicle to get a view of the Defendant. The emergency lights
19 on the officers' vehicle were still on, and remained on throughout their interaction with the
20 Defendant. The Defendant allegedly admitted to Officer Lizama that he knew of the equipment
21 failures on his vehicle. The Defendant stated he was coming from a cockfight where the headlight
22 was turning on and off, and he was not able to fix it. Officer Lizama then took the Defendant's
23 license and vehicle registration and relayed the Defendant's biographical information over his
24 radio to dispatch personnel. The Defendant's name came back clear of any warrants or other
25 indicators which would prolong the vehicle stop. Officer Lizama testified that he then returned the
26 Defendant's license and vehicle registration, and gave the Defendant a verbal warning for the
27 headlight failure.
CF0237-17 People of Guam vs. Prudencio John Cruz Page 2 of 10 I DECISION AND ORDER (Defendant's Motion to Supprc") After Officer Lizama gave the Defendant the verbal warnmg, he testified that he then
2 engaged in a conversation with the Defendant about whether the Defendant won at the cockfight.
3 The Defendant allegedly stated that he won a little and lost a little. Officer Lizama explained that
4 there are several ways to bet including inside and outside side bets, and derby betting, all of which
5 he allegedly discussed with the Defendant.
6 After some discussion about how much the Defendant lost and won, Officer Lizama asked
7 if the Defendant had anything illegal in the car or any firearms. The Defendant allegedly
8 responded, "no, go ahead and check." Officer Lizama then asked if he could make a check of the
9 vehicle to which the Defendant asked if he could put his money away before the officer searched.
10 Officer Lizama requested that the Defendant move slow. The Defendant retrieved the money from
II behind the seat and put the money in the vehicle's glove compartment.
12 Officer Lizama then asked the Defendant to step out of his vehicle and the Defendant
13 complied. The Defendant stood with Officer Dodd at the back of the Defendant's vehicle, and in
14 front of the officers" police vehicle. Officer Dodd testified that he and the Defendant engaged in
15 conversation while Officer Lizama conducted the search. The Defendant allegedly told Officer
16 I Dodd that it was cold that night. 17 Officer Lizama searched the vehicle, starting on the driver's side and eventually made his
18 way to the passenger side. He allegedly found a clear Ziploc bag under the passenger seat. The bag
19 had a substance inside that Officer Lizama suspected to be methamphetamine. Officer Lizama
20 went to the rear of the vehicle and informed the Defendant that he found something. The
21 Defendant returned with Officer Lizama to the passenger door. Officer Lizama had the Defendant
22 look under the scat. The Defendant allegedly stated "wow, you [referring to Officer Lizama] put
23 that there so fast" or words to that effect. Officer Dodd then secured the Defendant and Officer
24 Lizama secured the suspected drug substance.
25 A sample of the substance found under the passenger seat was subjected to a field test
26 which returned a presumptive positive reaction for the presence of methamphetamines. The weight
27 of the substance in the bag was approximately twenty-five (25) grams. That amount of
CF0237-17 People of Guam vs. Prudcncio John Cru1: Page 3 of 10 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendant's Motion to Suppress) methamphetamine would have had a street value of approximately Six Hundred Dollars (S600.00)
2 a gram at the time the Defendant was pulled over, according to Officer Lizama.
3 On May 16, 2017, a Grand Jury returned an indictment against the Defendant charging him
4 with POSSESSION OF A SCHEDULE II CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT
5 TO DELIVER (As a 1'' Degree Felony), POSSESSION OF A SCHEDULE II 6 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (As a 3'd Degree Felony), and DRIVING WITH
7 DEFECTIVE HEADLIGHTS (As a Violation). 8 The Defendant filed the instant Motion to Suppress on October 17,2017. The People filed
9 an Opposition on November I, 2017. The Defendant replied to the Opposition on November 7,
10 2017. This Court was assigned to this matter when the Court inherited the Adult Drug Court
II Docket on January 3, 2018. This Court promptly set a suppression hearing for February 16,2018.
12 The Court took the matter under advisement on March 2, 2018.
13 DISCUSSION 14 In the Motion to Suppress, the Defendant argues suppression of the substance seized under
15 the seat is appropriate because the drugs were seized "as the fruit of an unjustified detention and
16 search and seizure .... " Def's Mot. Suppress 5 (Oct. 17, 2017). Specifically, the Defendant argues
17 the officers continued to detain him after giving the verbal warning in violation of the Fourth
18 Amendment. Id. at 3-4. Importantly, the Defendant only contests the alleged extension of the
19 traffic stop, not the officer's initiation of the traffic stop. In opposition, the People argue that the
20 Defendant was not unconstitutionally seized and further, that the Defendant consented to the
2I search of his vehicle. See People's Opp'n Mot. Suppress 2-5 (Nov. I, 2017).
22 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from
23 unreasonable searches and seizures. The Amendment's protections arc extended to Guam via the
24 Organic Act of Guam. See 48 U.S.C.A. ~ 142lh (West 2017). Every seizure or search of a person,
25 or their house, papers, and effects, must be reasonable to be constitutionally permissible. See
26 People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam I 'll 14. A search or seizure that is not authorized by a duly
CF02~7-17 People of Guam vs. Prudcncio John Cru7 Page 4 of 10 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendant's Motion to Suppress) issued warrant is presumed unreasonable. People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam I 'II 14 (citing
2 Pennsylvania v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (Pa. 2000)).
3 When police pull a vehicle over, a seizure occurs for the purposes of the Fourth
4 , Amendment. See Id. at 'j[ 17. However, there is an exception to the warrant requirement which
5 allows police to pull a vehicle over without a warrant "where the police merely have reasonable
6 suspicion to believe the driver has committed a traffic violation." J..i. at 'II 17. Once a seizure of a
7 , vehicle based on reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation occurs, the seizure must "last no longer
8 than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop and be carefully tailored to its underlying
9 justification." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983 ).
10 Courts have recognized that where the reason for a traffic stop was legitimate, the driver
II must be allowed to leave "if a license and registration check reveal no reason to detain the driver
12 unless the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion of other crimes or the driver consents to
13 further questioning." U.S. v. West, 219 F. 3d 1171, 1176 (lOth Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). A
14 traffic stop could cease to be a seizure and become a consensual encounter "if the officer returns
15 the license and registration and asks questions without further constraining the driver by an
16 overbearing show of authority." ld. (reasoning "a consensual encounter is the voluntary
17 cooperation of a private citizen in response to non-coercive questioning by a law enforcement
18 officer"). Therefore, once a traffic stop is completed, if a consensual encounter occurs between an
19 officer and defendant, there is no longer a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See
20 U.S. v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382,388 (3d Cir. 2005).
21 The test for whether an encounter is consensual or constitutes a seizure is, considering the
22 totality of the circumstances, "whether the police conduct would have conveyed to a reasonable
23 person that he or she was not free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the
24 encounter." See West, 219 F.3d at 1176; see also Chargualaf, 2001 Guam I at 'j[ 21. There is no
25 I requirement that the officer tell a defendant that he does not have to respond or is free to leave. ' 26 West, 219 F.3d at 1176.
CF0237-17 Pcoph: of Guam vs. Prudcncio John Cruz Page 5 of 10 DEC IS tON AND ORDER (Defendant's Motion to Suppress) A reasonable person would feel free to decline an officer's engagement in a conversation
2 after the conclusion of a traffic stop, where the officer returns a defendant's documents: does not
3 block, detain or hold the defendant's vehicle: does not act in a commanding or threatening manner
4 or use such a tone of voice: does not display his weapon: and does not touch the defendant. See
5 West, 219 F.3d at 1177 (holding a traffic stop turned into a consensual encounter where, after the
6 officer issued a warning and returned the defendant"s documents, the officer asked (I) about the
7 defendant's travel plans, (2) whether the defendant had any firearms or drugs, and (3) whether the
8 , officer could search the vehicle): sec also, Chargualaf, 200 I Guam I at 'II 24 (holding a reasonable I 9 I person would feel free to leave after a traffic stop even if the police still held the defendant's 10 I identification and registration documents, where the officer: (I) did not act or speak in an overly II aggressive manner: (2) did not draw his firearm: (3) did not block the defendant's vehicle, and (4)
12 did not otherwise engage in coercive behavior that would indicate to a reasonable person that they
13 were not free to end the encounter and leave).
14 A reasonable person would not feel free to end an encounter with police and leave, for
15 purposes of the Fourth amendment, where an officer take>. and retains a defendant's identification
16 and registration papers, initiates inquiry while retaining such papers, and keeps a hand on his
17 firearm throughout the interaction. See U.S. v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997) ' 18 I (reasoning a defendant was seized where an officer ( l) approached the defendant and a stalled 19 vehicle on the side of a highway, (2) with his hand on his revolver, (3) asked for and retained the
20 defendant's identification and registration documents, and (4) asked the defendant questions while
21 continuing to keep his hand on his revolver).
22 A reasonable person may also be seized, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, simply by
23 the language used by an officer. Sec U.S. v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2004)
24 (holding the defendant was seized where (I) the officer handed a defendant his registration and
25 identification documents, (2) shook the defendants hand, and (3) said "okay, just hang out right
26 here for me okay,"" notwithstanding the fact that the officer did not speak in an intimidating tone
CF0237-17 People of Guam vs. Prudcncio John Crut: Page 6 of 10 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendant's Motion to Suppre") because a reasonable person would not feel free to leave in contravention of an order from a law
2 enforcement officer).
3 Here, the Defendant does not challenge the constitutionality of the initial stop for the
4 defective headlight and license plate light The Defendant only attacks the portion of the
5 interaction after Officer Lizama handed the defendant his identification and registration documents
6 and issued a verbal warning for the equipment failures. The Court finds that even though Officer
7 · Lizama did not tell the Defendant he was free to go at that point, the Defendant was not seized for
8 purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
9 Similar to the facts in West and Chargualaf, Officer Lizama and the Defendant were
10 engaged in a consensual interaction. Officer Lizama asked about the Defendant's time at the
II cockfight, which was neither accusatory, intimidating, or coercive, Further, the Defendant engaged I
12 I in conversation with Officer Lizama discussing the money he won and lost at the cockfight 13 Nothing about the conversation suggests that Officer Lizama or Dodd engaged in conduct that
14 would indicate the Defendant was not free to leave. The officers' actions also do not support a
15 finding that they attempted to intimate or coerce the Defendant into remaining at the scene. Similar
16 to the facts in West and Chargualaf, and unlike the facts in Chan-Jimenez, there is no indication
17 that Officers Lizama or Dodd ever touched or otherwise used the presence of their firearms to even
18 imply that the Defendant was not free to leave or otherwise coerce or intimidate the Defendant.
19 Additionally, unlike the facts in Richardson, there was no testimony that Officer Lizama or
20 Dodd suggested by their speech, implicitly or expressly, that the Defendant was not free to leave
21 after Officer Lizama returned the Defendant's identification and registration documents. The
22 Defendant responded to the question of whether he had anything illegal such as drugs in the car
23 stating, no you can check, The Officer then asked for consent to search again. The Defendant also
24 had permission to move certain items before the search was conducted, The fact that the officer
25 asked for permission to search is in and of itself evidence which supports the conclusion that the
26 officers gave the Defendant the option to consent to the search. This conclusion supports a finding
CF0237-17 People of Guam vs. Prudencio John Cru7 Page 7 of 10 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendant's Motion to Suppress) that a reasonable person in the Defendant's position would have understood he had the option to
2 decline the request, end the interaction, and leave.
3 Thus, having considered the relevant facts adduced at the Suppression hearing, the Court
4 finds the Defendant was not seized for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment after Officer
5 Lizama returned the Defendant's documents and gave the Defendant a verbal warning. Because
6 the Court finds the seizure was from that point a consensual encounter between the Defendant and
7 the officers, the Court finds the case relied on by the Defendant, Rodriguez v. United Stales, is
8 inapplicable to the facts herein. See Rodriguez v. U.S., 135 S.Ct 1609 (2015) (holding "a police
9 stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the slop was made violates the
10 Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures"). Therefore. to the extent the Defendant
11 argues for suppression under the Fourth Amendment because of an unconstitutional seizure, the
12 Defendant's motion is DENIED.
13 However, finding no seizure occurred does not end the Court's inquiry. The Court must
14 also consider whether the search of the Defendant's vehicle was constitutionally permissible.
15 There is no dispute that the search of the vehicle here occurred without a duly executed warrant.
16 Thus, the search must fall within an exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a
17 warrant to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
18 Voluntary consent is an exception to the warrant requirement, See Chargualaf, 2001 Guam
19 1 at 9! 14. The government has the burden of proving the consent to the search was voluntary under
20 the totality of the circumstances. ld. at'[[ 25. The Supreme Court of Guam has listed the following
21 factors that could assist trial courts in determining whether consent to a search is voluntary:
22 ( 1) Whether the defendant was detained and the length of time of the questioning; (2) whether the defendant was threatened or intimidated by the police; (3) whether 23 the defendant relied on misrepresentations or promises made by the police; (4) whether the person was in custody or under arrest when the consent was given; (5) 24 whether the person was in a public or a secluded place; and (6) whether the 25 defendant objected to the search.
26 Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 at 'j[25 (citing People v. Santos. 1999 Guam I 'j[36).
CF0237-17 People of Guam vs. Prudencio John CruL Page 8 of 10 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendant's Motion to Suppress) Consent to search is given voluntarily where an officer does not engage in coerCJve
2 behavior, did not make any representations to the defendant, where the defendant is neither in
3 custody nor under arrest, and where the defendant makes no objection to the search. See I 4 Chargualaf, 2001 Guam I at'![ 27 (holding under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's
5 consent to a search of his vehicle was voluntary because there was no indication that the officer's
6 did or attempted to coerce the defendant, and the defendant was not in custody at the time the
7 officer requested consent to search the vehicle).
8 Here, similar to the reasoning of whether the Defendant was seized for the purposes of the
9 Fourth Amendment, the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that the Defendant
I0 voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. The Defendant was pulled over in a public
II place: a shoulder of a highway in plain view of passersby. There was no testimony that the initial
12 detention and consensual encounter together lasted an unreasonable amount of time. Further,
13 Officer Lizama was speaking with the Defendant in a normal tone. There is no evidence that
14 Officer Lizama employed any tactics that were intimidating or coercive. There was also no
15 evidence of any threats made by either officer to the Defendant.
16 Rather, Officer Lizama testified that after discussing the Defendant's activities at the
17 cockfight earlier in the evening, he asked the Defendant whether he had anything illegal or
18 firearms in the vehicle. The Defendant then replied that there were none and offered the Officer
19 the option to check. Officer Lizama testified that he then asked if the Defendant consented to a
20 search of the vehicle and the Defendant replied in the affirmative. There was no testimony that the
21 Defendant objected to the search, rather the testimony was that he offered the option to search,
22 which Officer Lizama confirmed. The Defendant was also not in police custody and there is no
23 evidence Officer Lizama made any representations the Defendant relied on in consenting to the
24 search.
25 Therefore, the Court finds the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the
26 Defendant's consent to the search of his vehicle was voluntarily given. Thus, to the extent the
CF0237-17 People of Guam vs. PrudL:ncio John Cruz Page 9 of 10 DECISION AND ORDER !Defendant's Motion to Suppress) Defendant argues suppress10n of the drugs found in his vehicle is appropriate because of an
2 unconstitutional search of his vehicle, the Defendant's motion is DENIED,
3 CONCLUSION
4 By preponderance of the evidence and based on the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's
5 Motion to Suppress is hereby DENIED,
7 A Criminal Trial Setting is set for t; /;r ~at 8 I I 9
ll The Honorable Anita A Sukola 12 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 13
14 :ORVICE VIA COURT BOX 15 1acknowledge that a copy of the original hereto was placed in the court box~ ; J• _,.._-.. 16 &} 'i vv;J r~ 17
23 24
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CF0237-17 People of Guam vs. Prudcncio John Cruz Page 10 of 10 DECISION AND ORDER (Defendant's Motion to Suppress)