2020 IL App (1st) 171283-U No. 1-17-1283 Second Division September 8, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT __________________________________________________________________________
) Appeal from the THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Circuit Court of ILLINOIS, ) Cook County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) No. 11 CR 12305 ) v. ) Honorable ) Geary W. Kull, JERROD CROCKETT, ) Judge, presiding. ) Defendant-Appellant. ) __________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Ellis and McBride concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court is affirmed where it denied defendant’s motion to suppress his inculpatory statement to law enforcement because it was not coerced and where defendant’s motion in limine was denied because the evidence was cumulative.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant, Jerrod Crockett, was found guilty of first-degree murder
in connection with the shooting of Demetrius Delacy and sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motions to (1) No. 1-17-1283
suppress his statements to law enforcement and (2) admit a co-defendant’s statement to a
psychologist that the co-defendant lied to the police. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Pretrial Proceedings
¶5 On July 9, 2011, Delacy was shot and killed following a house party in Maywood, Illinois.
The following day defendant was arrested and charged with the shooting. Upon his arrest,
defendant was transported to the Maywood Police Department and interrogated by Detectives
Dennis Diaz and Charlie Porter. Lashon Bumpers, Cardell Fails, Darrius Ferguson, and Michael
Smith were also arrested and charged with the shooting.
¶6 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made while being
interrogated. He claimed that the statements were a result of psychological and mental coercion,
and that he made the statements in the process of plea negotiations because he was led to believe
that he would receive a lesser sentence if he told the detectives what they wanted. The State, on
the other hand, argued that the detectives never engaged in plea negotiations and defendant did not
assert his right to remain silent.
¶7 A suppression hearing took place before the court on August 19, 2015, wherein the State
submitted the video record of defendant’s interrogation via Maywood Detective Dennis Diaz’s
testimony. Detective Diaz testified that in the early morning hours of July 9, 2011, he and his
partner, Detective Porter, responded to the shooting of Sherrod Drane near 2nd Avenue and
Harvard Street in Maywood. At approximately 2:20 a.m., they received a call that another
individual, who turned out to be Delacy, had been shot near 1012 South 14th Avenue. The
detectives went to the scene of Delacy’s shooting and learned that Randy Caldwell was a witness
to the shooting. They spoke with Caldwell at the scene and conducted a photo array, from which
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he picked out defendant as the individual who shot Delacy and also Fails as being involved in the
shooting.
¶8 The detectives then located Fails who told them that defendant, Lashon Bumpers, Michael
Smith, and Darrius Ferguson were involved in the shooting. In separate interviews, Bumpers,
Smith, and Ferguson all stated that defendant was involved in the shooting, with Smith and
Ferguson claiming that defendant pulled the trigger.
¶9 Detective Diaz located defendant at about 6:44 p.m. on July 10 and transported him to the
police station. Defendant’s first interview was recorded. Defendant was read his Miranda rights
and defendant signed a Miranda waiver. Detective Diaz testified that at no point during the
interview did defendant state that he did not want to talk anymore or that he wanted to remain
silent.
¶ 10 Detective Diaz continued that after the first interview, a lineup was conducted at the police
station and Caldwell identified defendant as the individual that shot Delacy. A second interview
with defendant, which lasted approximately 40 minutes, was conducted and was also recorded.
Detective Diaz testified that defendant did not indicate that he wished to invoke his right to remain
silent and also affirmed that defendant was not spoken to off camera at any point. On cross-
examination, Detective Diaz confirmed that defendant was 18 years old at the time he was arrested.
¶ 11 The discs containing the interviews were admitted into evidence for the court to review.
The videos, which have been made a part of the record on appeal, show the following:
¶ 12 During the first interview, defendant acknowledged that he was given water to drink, food
to eat (as evidenced by McDonald’s wrappers on the table) and was permitted to use the restroom.
Defendant was also given cigarettes to smoke during the interviews. At the beginning of the
interview, defendant agreed that he had been treated well. Detective Porter reviewed the Miranda
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waiver form with defendant, who then signed and initialized the form where designated. He stated
that he did want to speak with the detectives.
¶ 13 Defendant stated that Ferguson picked him up from his house about 10:30 p.m. on the night
of the shootings to go to the party on 2nd Avenue. They also picked up Smith on the way. They
paid to get into the party, where they danced and drank liquor. Defendant stated that Drane, at first,
could not get into the party because he did not have any money, though he did get in later. At some
point, defendant went outside and observed his friends speaking to the driver of a white Chrysler
Concorde. Shortly thereafter, a shooting occurred. Defendant ran to Eric Bynum’s house near 17th
Avenue. While there, Bumpers received a phone call that Drane had died. Defendant stated that
everyone there started crying. He stated that he was very close with Drane. At some point, a white
Ford Thunderbird drove down the street and the people outside threw bottles and bricks at the car.
Smith and Ferguson got in Ferguson’s car and unsuccessfully chased after the Thunderbird.
Defendant then went to his house and charged his phone. Subsequently, Devonte Halem picked up
defendant and took him to Halem’s house where they sat outside talking until 6 a.m.
¶ 14 At this point, the detectives interrupted defendant and stated that he was lying about what
occurred following the phone call that Drane had died. Detective Diaz asked defendant multiple
times how defendant felt when he learned of Drane’s death and he asked him several times, “Were
you pissed off?” Defendant responded that he could not believe that it happened and that he was
sad. Detective Diaz told defendant that he could understand what defendant did and that he was
not going to judge defendant for how he reacted but that they knew the truth of what occurred from
his co-defendants. Defendant told detectives that he was not in Fails’ car that night. Detective
Porter informed defendant that several people placed defendant in Fails’ car, and they fingered
defendant as the individual with the gun who shot Delacy. Detective Porter stated that they were
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going to go with the co-defendants’ version, rather than defendant’s. The detectives also informed
defendant that they were told that defendant urinated on his hands to get rid of the gunshot residue
and that he burned his clothing at 2nd Avenue and Green Street. Detective Porter stated that none
of defendant’s “boys” were going to lie for him. Detective Porter told defendant to “help himself”
and to stop lying. Detective Porter then left the interview room for a few minutes. Upon his return,
he stated that he just spoken with Halem, who told him that defendant showed up at his house on
a bicycle around 7:30 a.m. and that he did not pick up defendant, as defendant claimed. Defendant
insisted he told the truth, and the detectives ended the interview.
¶ 15 A second interview with defendant occurred approximately 16 hours later, which was also
recorded and lasted approximately 40 minutes. Defendant, again, was read his Miranda rights,
signed a second waiver form, and did not indicate that he wished to invoke his right to remain
silent. Defendant was given food and drink and was permitted to use the restroom.
¶ 16 Detective Porter then told defendant that the police had the bicycle he rode to Halem’s
house and that his co-defendants were sticking with their stories. Porter stated that defendant was
going to serve some prison time, but his honesty during the interview would determine how much
time.
¶ 17 Defendant stated that after the Thunderbird drove by, he rode a bicycle to Halem’s house
and slept outside until morning.
¶ 18 The detectives told defendant that he was still lying and that he was facing a lifetime in
prison because he was still lying. They explained that they had independent witnesses placing
defendant at Delacy’s murder; gas station videos; the burnt clothes that defendant dumped at 2nd
and Green; and the bicycle from Halem’s house. Detective Porter continued that the State was
probably going to cut a deal with his co-defendants because they were honest, and that he was
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trying to help defendant get “up out from some of this time” and “get some of these years knocked
off” and that defendant was looking at some “major f*** time” by claiming that he was not even
there. Both detectives continued for several minutes to urge defendant to stop thinking, tell the
truth, and help himself.
¶ 19 Detective Porter stated that defendant was going to jail regardless and Detective Diaz stated
that it was up to defendant to determine how long. Defendant asked what charges he was facing,
and in response Detective Porter stated that he was going with “the maximum.” Detective Diaz
commented that it was not up to them how many years defendant was going to be sentenced.
Detective Porter stated that the State’s Attorney was going to ask for his opinion though and he
was going to tell the State’s Attorney that defendant lied the entire time. Detective Diaz then stated:
“Eventually you’ll get out, depending you know, how much time you get. I don’t know. That’s not
really up, up to us man. It’s not up to me.” Defendant interjected “I know.” Detective Diaz
continued, “It’s not up to Porter. So I couldn’t tell you. It’s not, it’s not my position to tell you.”
¶ 20 Detective Diaz then asked defendant if he killed Delacy and defendant nodded in
agreement. Detective Diaz told defendant that he needed to respond verbally, and defendant
responded, “yes.” The detectives asked defendant what happened, and he told them that he was
“not thinking straight.” Defendant then stated that they all got into Fails’ car, saw Delacy on 13th
Avenue, and “did that to him, they stomp him, and it was over with after that.” The detectives
asked for defendant to explain what happened after he learned that Drane had died. Defendant
stated that he was “all mad” and he went to Ferguson’s to get the gun and then they found Delacy
on 13th Avenue. He stated that the shooting did not happen from the car; that they “got Delacy on
foot;” and that Fails stayed in the car. Defendant stated that he did not know how many times he
pulled the trigger; when “it was done,” he ran away; and when he looked back, he saw the others
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kicking Delacy. They all ran back to Maywood Drive where Fails was waiting. They went back to
Ferguson’s house, and defendant gave Ferguson the gun. He also took off his clothes at Ferguson’s
and, after going to the gas station, Ferguson burned the clothes. They then went back to Bynum’s
house and drank some liquor. Defendant denied urinating on his hands and stated that he did not
think urine could remove gunshot residue.
¶ 21 In the final moments of the interview, Detective Diaz asked defendant if he was sorry, to
which defendant responded that he was sorry that he “f*** up.” Defendant then asked if the
confession would “make it better.” Detective Porter responded that “it makes it a whole lot better”
and that defendant did not need to spend his whole life in prison. The detectives then ended the
interview.
¶ 22 Prior to ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial court confirmed with the parties that no
discussion occurred that was not shown on the discs and that the representations that the detectives
made to defendant regarding the other evidence they had were all accurate. The court then denied
the motion. In so ruling, the court made the following factual findings: plea negotiations did not
occur during the interview, defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent, and the interview
was not particularly coercive in nature.
¶ 23 On December 2, 2015, defendant filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the detectives’
offers of leniency rendered his statements involuntary. The court denied the motion, reasoning that
there was no specific promise of leniency and that the questioning did not “cross[ ] over a boundary
that the courts do not permit.”
¶ 24 On August 29, 2016, defendant filed a motion in limine seeking, inter alia, to admit medical
and mental health evidence of co-defendants, Lashon Bumpers and Michael Smith, at trial. As
related to this appeal, defendant specifically requested that the court allow a statement Smith made
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to a Cook County psychologist that he lied to the detectives about being present at the murder
scene. At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel informed the court that it was going to
introduce similar statements Smith made to his brother during a jail phone call denying his
presence at Delacy’s shooting.
¶ 25 The court ruled that Smith’s diagnosis and the medication he was taking at the time of the
shooting and interrogation were relevant. The court ruled that nothing that occurred in the jail or
years prior to the shooting were relevant. As to Bumpers, the court ruled that any medical diagnosis
would be relevant and that he could be questioned about his use of marijuana but only if he denied
it first. Finally, as to Smith’s statement that he lied to the police about being present at the shooting,
the court stated that the statement would be cumulative and that it may be privileged as a
communication between Smith and a psychiatric social worker.
¶ 26 B. Trial
¶ 27 The following evidence was adduced at trial.
¶ 28 Maywood police officer Eric Dent testified that around 2:24 a.m. on July 9, 2011, he
received a report of a man shot near 1012 South 14th Avenue. At that location, he found an
unresponsive black male laying on his back in the alley.
¶ 29 Maywood police officer Donna Lewis, an evidence technician, testified that she was
assigned to process the scene near the 1000 block of South 14th Avenue on July 9. She found two
rifle shell casings and photographed the body.
¶ 30 Maywood police sergeant Wayne Welch testified as an evidence technician that he went to
the scene of the shooting about 2:30 a.m. on July 9. Later that day, he was also assigned to process
a vehicle, a white Buick Regal, at the Maywood Police Department. After photographing the
vehicle, he searched it pursuant to a warrant. In the trunk, he observed a Winchester .308 rifle.
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¶ 31 Detective Diaz testified consistent with his testimony from the suppression hearing. He
further testified that Ferguson’s white Buick Regal was taken to the Maywood Police Department
when Ferguson was taken into custody. He testified that Bumpers took him to an alley where he
observed a small pile of what appeared to be burnt clothing. Testing was not conducted on the
material recovered from the alley. Detective Diaz also summarized defendant’s videotaped
confession during the second interview conducted on July 11, 2011.
¶ 32 On cross-examination, Detective Diaz acknowledged that defendant, in his confession, did
not reveal any details of the shooting that detectives had not already told him.
¶ 33 The parties stipulated that forensic scientist, Fred Tomasek, a firearms identification
expert, examined the recovered rifle and the two shell casings from the scene and concluded, to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that the shell casings were fired from the rifle.
¶ 34 The parties stipulated that Cook County Medical Examiner Doctor Ponni Arunkumar 1
would testify that Delacy’s autoposy revealed gunshots wounds to the chest and left side of the
face, as well as several other injuries to the head and neck that were consistent with blunt force
trauma and possible kicking. Dr. Arunkumar concluded that the cause of death was multiple
gunshots wounds.
¶ 35 Smith testified at trial and stated that his testimony was pursuant to a plea agreement, under
which he would receive a 15-year sentence to be served at 50% for conspiracy to commit murder.
Smith testified that he was taking the antidepressant Effexor twice a day. On the night of July 8,
2011, Smith, who was then 17 years old, went to a party in Maywood with Ferguson and defendant.
At the party, Smith drank two cups of liquor and smoked marijuana. As he was leaving the party,
1 In the transcript, Dr. Arunkumar’s first name was identified as Tony, but documents in the record indicate that it is, in fact, Ponni.
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shooting began and Drane was shot. Later, Smith went to Bynum’s house because “that’s where
everybody was at.” When he arrived, he saw defendant, Fails, Ferguson, and Bumpers. While
there, he learned that Drane had died. Sometime after, as Smith was riding a bicycle down the
street to purchase cigarettes, a white car drove by and tried to hit him. Smith stated that the men in
the car were “the dudes who shot at us[.]” Smith, Bumpers, Ferguson, Fails, and defendant decided
to go look for Delacy because they heard that he was involved in Drane’s death. They all rode
together in Fails’ vehicle to defendant’s house. Defendant entered his house and returned after a
couple minutes with a large gun. They continued driving around until they found Delacy, who was
with Caldwell. Fails dropped them off at the corner of 14th Avenue and Maywood Drive. Caldwell
left, and they walked towards Delacy. Smith, Bumpers, and Ferguson all punched Delacy. Then,
defendant shot Delacy twice and hit him with the end of the gun. Smith and the others punched
and kicked Delacy as he was laying on the ground. They then met up with Fails, went to his house,
and transferred to a pickup truck. Eventually, Smith went home and later learned that the police
were looking for him.
¶ 36 On cross-examination, Smith acknowledged that during a phone call from the jail with his
brother he stated that he had nothing to do with Delacy’s murder, that he was forced to make a
statement at the police department, and that he was in a car with Fails but he was not involved in
the shooting. Smith confirmed that he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. He also stated that at
the time of his interview with law enforcement he was not taking any medication but now takes
Effexor twice daily.
¶ 37 On redirect examination, Smith stated that he did not tell his brother that he was present at
the shooting because he did not want him to be disappointed in Smith.
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¶ 38 Bumpers’ testimony was also pursuant to a plea agreement wherein he would receive a 15-
year sentence to be served at 50% for conspiracy to commit murder. He stated that on July 8, 2011,
he attended the 2nd Avenue party with “Bam” and Drane. While there, he drank alcohol and
smoked marijuana. Eventually, he lost Drane and began looking for him when he received a phone
call informing him that Drane had been shot. Bumpers went outside and observed Drane on a
stretcher being placed in an ambulance. He later received a phone call from Drane’s brother
informing him that Drane had died. While outside, a white car drove by the house, the individuals
in the car yelled something “disrespectful,” and tried to knock Smith off a bicycle. He, Smith,
Ferguson, and defendant then followed the white car in Fails’ car and eventually saw Delacy and
Caldwell walking on the street. At that point, he believed that Delacy was involved in Drane’s
murder. They drove to defendant’s house, and defendant went inside and came out with a rifle.
Near 13th Avenue and Maywood Drive, everyone except Fails exited the car. He stated that no
one, other than defendant, had a weapon. They began walking towards Delacy and Caldwell. He
observed Caldwell and Delacy shake hands and then Caldwell walked away. He stated that
defendant raised the gun and Delacy tried to run away. Defendant shot three times at Delacy. One
of the shots struck Delacy and he fell to the ground. Bumpers stated the gun jammed and defendant
hit Delacy in the face with it. Bumpers then kicked Delacy several times, as did Smith and
Ferguson. They got back into Fails’ car and drove to Ferguson’s house. Defendant put the gun in
the trunk of Ferguson’s car, a white Buick Regal. At some point, they switched from Fails’ car to
a pickup truck and drove to an alley where defendant took off his pants and burned them in a
garbage can. Ferguson then dropped Bumpers off at Drane’s house.
¶ 39 On July 10, 2011, Bumpers went to the Maywood Police Department because they called
his mother and said they wanted to question him about the murder. He testified that during his
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interview with the detectives, he did not tell the whole story because he wanted to limit his
involvement. He also took detectives to the location where the clothes were burned and helped
them locate defendant.
¶ 40 On November 8, while Bumpers was in Cook County Jail, defendant told Bumpers to
testify that Delacy was armed to help him get second degree murder. Defendant also told Bumpers
to relay the same message to Smith.
¶ 41 On cross-examination, Bumpers stated that he drank two or three cups of Cognac and
smoked marijuana on the night of the shooting. He denied that after his arrest he was prescribed
Haldol, Lorazepam, Risperidone, or Depakote. He stated he was only prescribed medication for
migraines and acid reflux.
¶ 42 The State rested its case, and defendant moved for a directed finding, which the court
denied.
¶ 43 The parties stipulated that Bumpers was diagnosed with substance-related disorders,
marijuana dependence, and an unspecified mood disorder. He was prescribed Risperidone, an
antipsychotic medication, and Divalproex, a medication to treat the manic phases of bipolar
disorder. These were later discontinued, and Bumpers was prescribed Haldol and Lorazepam.
¶ 44 The parties also stipulated that Smith was diagnosed with substance-related disorders and
mood disorders. He was prescribed Risperidone and Divalproex.
¶ 45 The court ultimately found defendant guilty of 12 counts of first-degree murder. The court
stated that although there were inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony, it believed that
defendant shot Delacy. The court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. Following a
sentencing hearing, the court merged the twelve counts into one and sentenced defendant to
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consecutive prison sentences of 25 years for first-degree murder and 25 years for the discharge of
a firearm.
¶ 46 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 47 A. Motion to Suppress
¶ 48 On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to
suppress his inculpatory statements because they were involuntary and coerced. For that reason,
defendant asserts that we must reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial. The State
responds that the court properly denied the motion to suppress where, under the totality of
circumstances, his statement was voluntary, and the detectives did not make a specific promise of
leniency.
¶ 49 A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is subject to a bifurcated standard of review.
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); People v. Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 88 (2010).
Under this standard, a reviewing court first accords great deference to the trial court’s findings of
fact and disregards those findings only where they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d at 88. However, the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion as to whether
suppression is warranted is subject to de novo review. People v. Colyar, 2013 IL 111835, ¶ 31.
Consequently, a reviewing court “remains free to engage in its own assessment of the facts in
relation to the issues presented and may draw its own conclusions when deciding what relief should
be granted.” People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51 (2001). In reviewing a ruling on the suppression
of inculpatory statements, we may consider all the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing
and at trial. People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008).
¶ 50 Both the federal and state constitutions prohibit the admission of a defendant’s statement
that was made involuntarily. People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 118 (2005). The State has the
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burden of proving that the confession was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. Slater,
228 Ill. 2d at 149. As set out by our supreme court, the basic test for determining the voluntariness
of a statement, based upon the totality of the circumstances before the court, is whether “it has
been made freely, voluntarily[,] and without compulsion or inducement of any sort or whether the
defendant’s will was overcome at the time he confessed.” People v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62, 70 (1972).
More recently, Illinois courts have further delineated this basic test to include a specific set of
factors to consider in the voluntariness assessment. These factors are: (1) the presence of Miranda
warnings; (2) the defendant’s personal characteristics, including his age, intelligence, background,
experience, mental capacity, and physical condition at the time of questioning; (3) the legality and
duration of the detention and questioning; (4) the conditions of detention; and (5) whether any
threats, promises deception, guilty or other coercive tactics were used in inducing the confession.
Slater, 228 Ill. 2d at 160.
¶ 51 Defendant does not allege that his age, intelligence, background, experience, mental
capacity, education, physical condition, or the circumstances of his detention affected the
voluntariness of his confession. Moreover, as we will explain later in this order, based on the
record, none of those factors appear to be applicable under the circumstances before us. Instead,
defendant solely alleges that his confession was involuntary because the detectives made
representations to him that his sentence would be reduced if he confessed. Thus, defendant relies,
for his argument, on the fifth factor listed above: whether any promises were used in inducing the
confession.
¶ 52 Evidenced by its inclusion in the list of factors above, Illinois courts have long recognized
offers of leniency as “a factor to be considered in determining whether a statement is voluntary.”
People v. Ruegger, 32 Ill. App. 3d 765, 769 (1975). “To constitute a promise of leniency, the
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statement must be coupled with a suggestion of a specific benefit that will follow if defendant
confesses.” People v. Johnson, 285 Ill. App. 3d 802, 808. This, however, does not make the
statement per se inadmissible where the totality of the circumstances suggest that it was made
voluntarily. People v. Lee, 2012 IL App (1st) 101851, ¶ 34; see also People v. Jones, 8 Ill. App.
3d 849, 853 (1972) (stating that confessions may be admissible, despite promises of leniency,
where the evidence as a whole demonstrates that the statement was voluntary) and People v.
Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 30 (stating that no single factor is dispositive).
¶ 53 Because the court’s factual findings upon which it made its decision to admit the confession
as a voluntary statement were based solely on facts gleaned from the interviews and did not require
any credibility determinations, we review de novo whether the court’s application of the facts in
the record to the law correctly resulted in a denial of defendant’s motion to suppress. But see
People v. Valle, 405 Ill. App. 3d 46, 56-58 (2010) (refusing to apply this standard where “the trial
court [ ] heard live testimony relating to a disputed issue of fact”). During the interviews, the
detectives repeatedly implored defendant to help himself, to stop lying, and to tell them the truth.
The detectives relayed to defendant the evidence they had that suggested that he shot Delacy. They
also repeatedly told him that his co-defendants had already helped themselves and fingered
defendant as the shooter. Detective Porter told defendant that there was going to be some “major
f*** time” involved but that the interview was going to determine how much time. He also stated
that he was trying to help defendant “get up out from some of this time” and “get some of these
years knocked off.” Detective Diaz was quick to follow up Detective Porter’s comments to
defendant regarding doing time with a clarifying statement that defendant’s sentence was not up
to them. At one point, Detective Diaz stated: “Eventually you’ll get out, depending you know, how
much time you get. I don’t know. That’s not really up, up to us man. It’s not up to me.” Defendant
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then interjected “I know.” Detective Diaz continued, “It’s not up to Porter. So I couldn’t tell you.
It’s not, it’s not my position to tell you.”
¶ 54 The State contends that the detectives’ statements were not specific promises of leniency
but were more akin to “mere exhortation[s] to tell the truth” (People v. Wipfler, 68 Ill. 2d 158, 173
(1977)) and “advisements to make statements” (Jones, 8 Ill. App. 3d at 852), which do not
necessarily make the confession involuntary. The tapes of defendant’s interrogation sessions have
been made a part of the record on appeal. In addition to the record, we have reviewed those tapes
in their entirety. Having completed our review, we agree with the State’s assessment. The
detectives’ suggestions that defendant might receive less jail time if he told the truth does not
constitute a specific promise but is more akin to an advisement to tell the truth. Their statements
tend to imply that honesty would help defendant in the situation in which he found himself. The
detectives also qualified their statements by adding that defendant’s sentence was ultimately not
up to them to decide, and at one point, defendant indicated that he knew that the detectives could
not decide his sentence. This qualifier, and defendant’s express understanding of it, significantly
lessened the alleged coercive nature of the detectives’ statements. Additionally, the detectives
never misrepresented to defendant that he could avoid serving any time in jail if he confessed; to
the contrary, the detectives told defendant that he needed to “forget about walking out of here” and
that whether he confessed or not, defendant would be spending time in jail based on the evidence
they already had that pointed to him as the shooter. See People v. Kronenberger, 2014 IL App
(1st) 110231, ¶ 47 (finding that the confession was voluntary where the detectives advised the
defendant repeatedly to tell the truth but never made any suggestion that he would “escape legal
consequences if he confessed”).
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¶ 55 Nonetheless, in support of his argument, defendant cites to several cases in which the
reviewing court held the confession was made involuntarily. However, each case is
distinguishable.
¶ 56 In both People v. Ruegger, 32 Ill. App. 3d 765 (1975), and People v. Phillips, 2018 IL App
(3d) 130270, the reviewing court held that the defendants’ confessions were involuntary because
the interviewers made specific offers to help the defendants. In Ruegger, defendant’s interrogator
was a relative who offered to “go to bat” for the defendant on such matters as a recognizance bond
and probation if he confessed. 32 Ill. App. 3d at 771. Here, in contrast, Detectives Diaz and Porter
made no specific promise of special treatment. See People v. Eckles, 128 Ill. App. 3d 276, 279
(1984) (distinguishing Ruegger where the police did not make a specific promise of leniency, but
simply told the defendant they would inform the prosecutor and court of his cooperation).
Similarly, in Phillips, during the defendant’s questioning, the detective informed the defendant
that “[a] lot of things can change, including that charge, if the truth *** comes out of your mouth.”
2018 IL App (3d) 130270, ¶ 47. The reviewing court found the defendant’s statement to be
involuntary because the detective specifically stated that the defendant’s charge could change if
he confessed and the detectives did not clarify that they had no power over the charges levied
against the defendant. Id. ¶ 51. In contrast, here, the detectives did not suggest that defendant could
receive a lesser charge for telling the truth and the detectives clarified their statements more than
once that they were not the ones who would determine defendant’s sentence.
¶ 57 Lastly, in People v. Heide, 302 Ill. App. 624, 628 (1922), the record showed that police
officers stated to defendant that “the best thing would be for him to tell the truth; that if he did he
would be taken to the [S]tate’s [A]ttorney’s Office and the [S]tate’s [A]ttorney would do the best
for him" and that “the [S]tate’s Attorney might show him leniency; that if there was any leniency
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to be shown it would be shown at the [S]tate’s [A]ttorney’s office, and if they told the truth he
would take them to the [S]tate’s [A]ttorney’s office.” The reviewing court found the defendant’s
confession to be inadmissible under these circumstances because “the effect and influence of their
statements were to raise a hope of leniency in the [mind] of [the defendant].” Id. at 629. Several
decades later, our supreme court in People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375, 381 (1964), distinguished
its facts from the facts in Heide. In Hartgraves, the police officer told the defendant “[i]t would go
easier on him in court if he made a statement.” Id. at 381. The court held that the officer’s statement
was “in no way [a] direct promise of leniency[.]” Id. “Such a mere suggestion of the advisability
of making a statement does not in itself render a confession involuntary.” Id. We find Hartgraves
instructive. Like in Hartgraves, the statements made here are more akin to advising defendant that
telling the truth could help him when his sentence is decided. See also People v. Johnson, 285 Ill.
App. 3d 802, 809 (1996) (confession was not rendered involuntary by officers’ statement that if
the defendant told the truth the judge would see he cooperated and might take that into
consideration); People v. Makes, 103 Ill. App. 3d 232, 240 (1981) (confession was not excluded
where police told the defendant “things may go easier” if she made a statement).
¶ 58 Having determined that there was no specific promise of leniency, our analysis does not
end there. We are mindful that “[n]o one factor can be relied upon in determining the voluntariness
of the statement, but such must be determined from all the circumstances surrounding its making.”
Jones, 8 Ill. App. 3d at 852-53. The ultimate question on a motion to suppress an inculpatory
statement is “whether, considering the totality of attendant circumstances, the defendant’s will was
overcome at the time he confessed.” Eckles, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 278-79. Thus, we consider the
following additional factors as set out in Slater: (1) the advisement of Miranda rights; (2) the
defendant’s personal characteristics, including his age, intelligence, background, experience,
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mental capacity, and physical condition at the time of questioning; (3) the legality and duration of
the detention and questioning; and (4) the conditions of detention. 228 Ill. 2d at 160.
¶ 59 Defendant was advised of and waived his Miranda rights before each interview. He was
asked if he wanted to speak to the detectives, which he answered affirmatively. Defendant’s
characteristics and condition at the time of the interviews do not suggest that his will would be
more easily overborne or that he was prone to any coercive tactics. The record shows that
defendant was 18 years old at the time of his arrest, he had finished only his first year of high
school, and he had no known behavioral or learning disorders. Though he was young, he was not
unfamiliar with the criminal justice system as he had a prior felony conviction on his record. See
People v. Walker, 2012 IL App (1st) 083655, ¶ 42 (noting that the defendant was familiar with the
criminal justice system in finding that his statement was voluntary). The interviews also
demonstrate that defendant was able to understand and follow the detectives’ line of questioning
without issue and he was able to give coherent responses to the questions posed to him. At no point
does defendant appear confused by his Miranda rights or the questions. See Murdock, 2012 IL
112362, ¶ 44 (finding that the defendant appeared “to be of normal intelligence and mental
capacity for someone his age”); People v. Kochevar, 2020 IL App (3d) 140660-B, ¶ 25 (finding
the defendant to be an “18-year-old high school senior of average or better intelligence”).
Moreover, the detectives did not physically injure or threaten defendant at any point during the
interviews and there is no sign in the interviews that defendant is suffering from any physical
impairment that would affect the voluntariness of his statement. See id. ¶ 46 (finding that the
defendant was “in good physical condition during his detention and interview” and did “not appear
to be in any type of distress”).
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¶ 60 Additionally, the detention itself weighs in favor of a finding of voluntariness. For instance,
defendant was questioned twice over the course of 23 hours; the interviews lasted less than two
hours each; defendant was given food, drink, and cigarettes; and he was allowed to use the
restroom. Defendant also agreed at the beginning of the interview that he had been treated well. In
view of these facts, we cannot say that the environment in which defendant was questioned was
coercive.
¶ 61 Based upon our review of the record, we do not believe that defendant’s will was in anyway
overborn or that his statement was inappropriately coerced. Instead, it appears to us that defendant
made his confession, voluntarily, after being confronted with the vast amount of evidence that
specifically contradicted his original version of what occurred. See Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d at 381
(“A reading of the entire record indicates by overwhelming weight of the evidence that defendant
voluntarily confessed after being confronted with accusatory statements of two other persons
involved in the crime.”). Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the
trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. Finding no error, we need not address
the parties’ arguments as to whether the admission of defendant’s statement constituted harmless
error.
¶ 62 B. Motion in Limine
¶ 63 Next, defendant contends that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court
erred in barring Smith’s statement to his psychologist that he lied to law enforcement about being
present during the murder. He maintains that the court ruled “in part” that the evidence was not
admissible because the communication was privileged. He argues that the court committed error
because the statement was admissible under a statutory homicide exception to the confidentiality
of mental health records. Defendant claims this error denied him his constitutional right to confront
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witnesses against him, requiring reversal. Alternatively, he claims that error regarding privilege,
coupled with the court’s erroneous denial of his motion to suppress, cumulatively denied him a
fair trial requiring remand for a new trial. The State responds that the trial court correctly denied
defendant’s motion because the evidence was cumulative.
¶ 64 “A motion in limine is addressed to a trial court’s power to admit or exclude evidence or
argument.” In re Commitment of Lingle, 2018 IL App (4th) 170404, ¶ 47. A trial court’s ruling on
a motion in limine is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion (id.), which occurs only when the
trial court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or such that no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the trial court (People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 455 (2001)). Here, however,
defendant claims that the standard of review is de novo because the court’s evidentiary ruling was
“ ‘frustrated by an erroneous rule of law.’ ” People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89 (2001) (quoting
People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369 (1999)). Specifically, defendant contends that the court
based its decision in part on an erroneous belief that Smith’s statement to his psychologist was
privileged. Under either standard, defendant’s argument fails. Having determined that no error
occurred in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his confession, we need not
address his cumulative error argument and focus our analysis instead, on defendant’s claim that he
was denied the right to confront a witness.
¶ 65 In considering defendant’s motion, the court stated, “It becomes *** cumulative. And ***
because of the psychiatric nature of it and my hesitancy because of the fact that it may be, in fact,
privileged communication between [Smith] and the psychiatric social worker *** and he says that
to someone who can perfect your impeachment on, you don’t have to do this again by this
conversation.”
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¶ 66 Before proceeding, we set out the applicable legal principles relevant to defendant’s claims.
Both the United States and the Illinois constitutions guarantee every defendant the right to confront
witnesses against him. U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8. The right includes the
right to cross examine a witness as to the witnesses’ biases, interests, or motives to testify. People
v. Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d 463, 486 (1995). Denial of the right is reversible error. See id.
¶ 67 “Cumulative evidence is additional evidence of the same kind bearing upon the same
point[.]” People v. Nahas, 9 Ill. App. 3d 570, 578 (1973). Evidence is considered cumulative when
it adds nothing to what was already before the trier of fact. People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 335
(2009). Admissibility of such evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and
absent an abuse, the court’s ruling will not be reversed. People v. Tolliver, 347 Ill. App. 3d 203,
227 (2004).
¶ 68 Finally, under the Medical Health and Developmental Disabilities Disclosure Act, mental
health records may be disclosed in the investigation of trials for homicide when the disclosure
relates directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of the homicide. See 740 ILCS 110/10(a)(9)
(West 2011).
¶ 69 Regardless of whether the court denied defendant’s motion “in part” because it believed
the statement was privileged, the court also clearly ruled that the statement was cumulative in light
of the other evidence that was to be admitted at trial, namely Smith’s nearly identical statement on
the jail phone call to his brother. We know of no requirement that a court allow evidence merely
because it is admissible, especially when, like here, that evidence is merely cumulative. On the
contrary, it is within the trial court’s discretion to limit the number of impeaching witnesses.
People v. Van Zile, 48 Ill. App. 3d 972, 979 (1997); see, e.g., People v. Montague, 182 Ill. App.
3d 737, 750 (1989).
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¶ 70 Defendant maintains, however, that Smith’s statement to his psychologist was not
cumulative of other trial evidence. Further, he argues that Smith would have had no reason to lie
to his psychologist, which enhanced the statement’s credibility regarding Smith’s absence during
the shooting but diminished it regarding his identification of defendant as the shooter. We disagree
with defendant’s characterization of Smith’s barred testimony as noncumulative and further that
he was denied his right to confront this witness. In presenting the motion defense counsel indicated
to the court that it intended to introduce similar statements that Smith had made to his brother
during a jail phone call and, on cross examination, that testimony was in fact elicited. That
defendant was not permitted to further impeach Smith with the same statement was not a denial of
his confrontation rights. Further, that an identical statement made to two different individuals
might conceivably increase the statement’s weight and credibility does not render the statement
non-cumulative. Testimony that Smith had made a statement to his treatment provider similar to
the statement he made to his brother would have added nothing to what was already before the
trier of fact. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude Smith’s
statement to his treatment provider and, thus, in denying defendant’s motion.
¶ 71 Further, and contrary to defendant’s assertion otherwise, the evidence of defendant’s guilt
was overwhelming. In addition to defendant’s uncoerced confession, there was testimony from
Detective Diaz that Caldwell identified defendant in a photo array and later in a line-up as the
shooter. Additionally, Bumpers and Smith, both of whom, with the trial court’s knowledge,
testified pursuant to plea deal, testified that defendant shot Delacy. Further, the forensic evidence
presented at trial, which included the recovered rifle and shell casings, not only corroborated
defendant’s confession but also the testimony at trial. Thus, even if the trial court’s denial of the
motion in limine was error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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¶ 72 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 73 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 74 Affirmed.
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