People v. Crawford (Andre)

75 Misc. 3d 128(A), 2022 NY Slip Op 50371(U)

• Court: Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York
• Decided: April 22, 2022
• Docket: 2019-594 Q CR
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

People v Crawford (2022 NY Slip Op 50371(U)) [*1]

People v Crawford (Andre)

2022 NY Slip Op 50371(U) [75 Misc 3d 128(A)]

Decided on April 22, 2022

Appellate Term, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on April 22, 2022

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, P.J., MICHELLE WESTON, WAVNY TOUSSAINT, JJ
2019-594 Q CR

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Andre Crawford, Appellant.

Appellate Advocates, David Fitzmaurice of counsel, for appellant. Queens County District Attorney, Johnnette Traill and Nancy Fitzpatrick Talcott of counsel, for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Jerry M. Iannece, J.), rendered February 27, 2019. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of driving while ability impaired and driving a motor vehicle with an inoperable stop lamp, and imposed sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, insofar as it convicted defendant of driving while ability impaired, on the facts, and, insofar as it convicted defendant of driving a motor vehicle with an inoperable stop lamp, on the law, the accusatory instrument is dismissed and the fine, if paid, is remitted.

Defendant was charged in an accusatory instrument with common-law driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]), driving while ability impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [1]), and driving a motor vehicle with an inoperable stop lamp (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 [40] [b]).

At a jury trial, the arresting officer testified that he did not observe defendant's vehicle swerve or speed, nor did he observe defendant fail to properly use signals or a seatbelt. Additionally, he testified that he observed an inoperable stop lamp on defendant's vehicle from 1,000 feet away. The officer further testified that, after having pulled defendant over, he smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from defendant's breath and noticed that defendant [*2]was unsteady on his feet after exiting the vehicle. He arrested defendant and observed that defendant's eyes were watery and bloodshot. Defendant was taken to the precinct where standardized field sobriety tests were administered to defendant, which he did not successfully perform. A video recording of defendant performing these tests was shown to the jury. Defendant could be heard explaining to the officers that he had a leg and eye injury, and he displayed a brace he was wearing on his leg. When performing the field sobriety tests, defendant exhibited great difficulty in doing so, as he was unable to bear weight on the injured leg. The jury acquitted defendant of common-law driving while intoxicated and found him guilty of driving while ability impaired and driving a motor vehicle with an inoperable stop lamp.

Upon the exercise of our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]), we accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their demeanor, and assess their credibility (see People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 890 [2006]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). The officer described the manner in which defendant was properly operating his vehicle, and the video showed that defendant's speech was not slurred and that he was coherent and understood the officer's field sobriety test instructions. Additionally, the video revealed that defendant's leg injury prevented him from bearing weight on his leg and caused him pain when doing so during the field sobriety tests. After weighing "the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" (People v Zephyrin, 52 AD3d 543, 543 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and "determin[ing] firstly, that an acquittal . . . would not have been unreasonable based upon the evidence presented, and secondly, that the [jury] failed to accord the evidence the weight it should have been accorded" (id.; see Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348; People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 643-646 [2006]), we find that the verdict convicting defendant of driving while ability impaired was against the weight of the evidence.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's guilt of driving a motor vehicle with an inoperable stop lamp. The officer's testimony failed to establish that he observed an inoperable stop lamp from 500 feet or less, as is required to support a conviction under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (40) (b).

In view of the foregoing, we pass on no other issues.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the accusatory instrument is dismissed.

ALIOTTA, P.J., WESTON and TOUSSAINT, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: April 22, 2022