NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250658-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0658 April 17, 2026 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County ANTWIONE E. CRAIG, ) No. 19CF517 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Jack D. Davis II, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices DeArmond and Vancil concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) Defendant failed to establish that the trial court committed reversible error by considering an improper sentencing factor.
(2) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 12 years in prison.
¶2 Defendant, Antwione E. Craig, pleaded guilty to driving while his driver’s license
was revoked (DWLR) (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a), (d-5) (West 2018)), as a Class 2 felony, and was
sentenced to 36 months’ probation. His probation was later revoked and he was resentenced to 12
years in prison. Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court relied on an improper consideration
at his resentencing and (2) his 12-year prison sentence was excessive and manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In August 2019, the State charged defendant with DWLR (id.), a Class 2 felony. The charge was based on allegations that on or about March 30, 2019, defendant drove a motor
vehicle at a time when (1) his driving privileges were revoked for driving under the influence
(DUI) pursuant to section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (id. § 11-501) or a statutory
summary suspension or revocation under section 11-501.1 of the Vehicle Code (id. § 11-501.1)
and (2) he had previously committed the same violation “on 16 or more prior occasions.”
¶5 In June 2023, defendant pleaded guilty to the charged offense. In exchange for his
plea, he received a sentence of 36 months’ probation and the dismissal of other pending charges
against him. But see id. § 6-303(d-5) (providing that the charged offense was “not eligible for
probation or conditional discharge”). Conditions of his probation included that he complete a drug
and alcohol evaluation and any recommended treatment, complete anger management counseling,
continue with mental health treatment, and refrain from driving without a valid driver’s license.
During defendant’s plea hearing, the State presented a factual basis, asserting its evidence would
show that on March 30, 2019, a police officer with the City of Springfield conducted a traffic stop
of a vehicle being driven by defendant and that the underlying offense was defendant’s “21st
conviction for [DWLR].”
¶6 In July 2024, the State filed an amended petition to revoke defendant’s probation.
It alleged defendant violated his probation by (1) committing additional offenses, including
DWLR in June 2023, August 2023, February 2024, and April 2024, and aggravated DUI in
February 2024 and April 2024 (paragraph 4a); (2) failing to report to various probation
appointments from July 2023 to March 2024 (paragraph 4b); (3) testing positive for alcohol,
marijuana, and fentanyl in August 2023 and alcohol and marijuana in January 2024 (paragraph
4(c); (4) failing to pay monthly probation fees (paragraph 4d); (5) failing to promptly undergo a
drug and alcohol assessment, engage in anger management, or verify his ongoing mental health
-2- treatment (paragraph 4e); and (6) driving without a valid driver’s license (paragraph 4f).
¶7 In March 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s amended petition
to revoke. The State presented testimony from Sangamon County Probation Officer Kristy Metz
and Illinois State Police Trooper Andrew Cox. Metz testified that while on probation, defendant
was required to attend scheduled meetings with court services, refrain from using controlled
substances, undergo drug screenings, and engage in anger management treatment and mental
health treatment. However, he missed several scheduled appointments with court services, had
drug screens that were positive for controlled substances in August 2023 and January 2024, and
failed to provide documentation showing that he had engaged in either anger management
treatment or mental health treatment.
¶8 Cox’s testimony showed that in February 2024, he initiated a traffic stop of a
vehicle after observing that the male driver was not wearing a seat belt. He identified defendant as
the driver of the vehicle and stated he ultimately arrested defendant for DUI. Cox testified that
defendant submitted “to an evidential breath test” and that his breath alcohol result of 0.262 was
over the legal limit.
¶9 The trial court found the State presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden of
proof in establishing one or more of the allegations in its amended petition to revoke. It made
express oral findings that the State had proved paragraphs 4b, 4c, 4e, and 4f of the amended
petition. The court then revoked defendant’s probation and set the matter for resentencing.
¶ 10 In May 2025, defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSI) was filed, showing
he was 44 years old at the time of the charged offense and 50 years old at the time of resentencing.
Defendant had a lengthy criminal history, with a prior adult record dating back to 1992. His history
included misdemeanor convictions for “Mob Action/Fail to Withdraw” (May 1992), resisting or
-3- obstructing a peace officer (May 1992, May and June 1993, January 1995, March 1998, and
September 2011), criminal trespass to land (October 1994), possession of cannabis (September
1999 and December 2005), battery causing bodily harm (October 2001), DUI (December 2005
and April 2007), “Fail/Return From Furlough” (September 2008), theft (January 2013), and
domestic battery (August 2016).
¶ 11 Defendant also had multiple prior felony convictions. In July 1993, he was
convicted of possession of a controlled substance, a Class 4 felony, and sentenced to 30 months’
probation. His probation was later revoked and, in December 1993, he was resentenced to 30
months in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC). In August 2004, defendant was convicted
of possession of a controlled substance, a Class 4 felony, for a second time and sentenced to two
years in DOC. In September 2004, he was paroled but, in January 2005, he returned to DOC on a
parole violation. In February 2009, defendant was, again, convicted of possession of a controlled
substance, a Class 4 felony, and sentenced to 30 months in DOC. Further, in August 2016,
defendant was twice convicted of “Other Amount Narcotic,” a Class 2 felony, in Sangamon
County case Nos. 13-CF-1138 and 15-CF-776. He was sentenced to three years in DOC in each
case. Defendant’s criminal history also included multiple convictions for DWLR. Prior to the
underlying felony DWLR charge, which arose in March 2019, he had 20 previous convictions for
that offense. Those prior convictions included a Class 4 felony DWLR conviction in August 2004,
for which defendant was sentenced to two years in DOC.
¶ 12 Additionally, according to the PSI, defendant had seven pending Sangamon County
cases. Since April 2024, he had been incarcerated in the Sangamon County jail.
¶ 13 The PSI further showed that defendant reported having a poor relationship with
both of his parents and that he was raised by his maternal grandmother, who passed away in 2024.
-4- He stated he had no contact information for his parents or any of his four half-siblings. Defendant
had never been married but was the father of six adult children, ranging from 21 to 34 years in age.
He reported having a girlfriend but declined to provide “further information regarding his
girlfriend or children.”
¶ 14 The PSI stated that defendant dropped out of high school during the tenth grade.
He had not obtained his GED but, in 2011, he did complete one class through Lincoln Land
Community College for “Basic Auto Body Repair.” As an adult, defendant had lengthy periods of
unemployment. Although he reported that he had worked at Dollar General, “doing stocking and
security,” for approximately one year before his arrest and incarceration in April 2024, he
“declined to sign a release of information” so that his employment information could be verified.
The PSI also noted that “the Sangamon County Court Services file” otherwise showed that
“defendant was not employed when he was sentenced on June 13, 2023[,] or up until his
incarceration on April 13, 2024.”
¶ 15 Regarding defendant’s emotional and physical health, the PSI showed that in
November 2014, defendant voluntarily admitted himself to the hospital “due to ‘having thoughts
of hurting himself or his grandmother[’]” and “was diagnosed with mood disorder, NOS,
intermittent explosive disorder, rule out bipolar disorder, antisocial personality disorder, alcohol
and marijuana dependence, hypertension, and glaucoma.” Defendant was discharged two days
later and advised where to follow up with his care. At the time of discharge, he “refused to be on
any medication.” The PSI also stated that DOC records from August 2016 to February 2018,
showed defendant was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and insomnia. He was prescribed
Geodon and trazadone while in prison but refused to take the trazadone because it made “him feel
like he did not want to get out of bed in the morning.” Defendant continued with the Geodon, but
-5- by the time of his release from DOC in April 2018, he “was not prescribed any medication for his
mental health issues.” Records from Memorial Behavioral Health showed defendant was
“admitted to [that] agency” in November 2014 and “discharged from the agency” in November
2022. He was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and, ultimately, failed to “follow up” with the
agency after his release from prison. Additionally, Sangamon County Jail records showed that
defendant had been diagnosed with glaucoma and depression and that he had been prescribed
medication.
¶ 16 Finally, the PSI showed that defendant acknowledged a history of substance abuse.
He reported that he first drank alcohol and used marijuana at the age of 12 or 13. He identified
April 2024 as the last time he drank alcohol or used marijuana. Defendant also acknowledged
using heroin from January to April 2024, and the PSI noted that in August 2023, he tested positive
for alcohol, marijuana, and fentanyl. Following his positive test, defendant was referred for a
substance abuse evaluation and treatment. However, defendant stated he never obtained an
evaluation or completed any treatment.
¶ 17 In June 2025, the trial court conducted defendant’s sentencing hearing. On the
State’s motion, the court made minor amendments to defendant’s PSI. It also noted that it had
reviewed the PSI “carefully and in great detail” and stated that although defendant had “a host of
pending matters,” it would not consider “allegations that ha[d] not been proved.” The record
further reflects that the court and the parties agreed that defendant faced extended-term sentencing
for a Class 2 felony, which subjected him to a sentencing range of 3 to 14 years in prison “to be
served at 50[%].” The court noted that while defendant had previously received a sentence of
probation, he was ineligible for probation under the relevant statutory provisions.
¶ 18 At the outset of the hearing, the trial court and the parties also discussed the State’s
-6- plea offer to defendant in his other pending cases. In doing so, the court questioned defendant
regarding his ability to understand the proceedings, resulting in the following colloquy between
the court and defendant:
“THE COURT: *** [Defendant], can you hear and understand everything
that is happening right now?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any type of alcohol or drugs
or other substance that’s affecting your ability to understand this proceeding today?
[DEFENDANT]: No, sir.
THE COURT: And do you have any type of disability or any type of
condition, in your opinion, that is causing you to be unable to understand or
appreciate what is happening today?
[DEFENDANT]: Well, I got bipolar disorder and a few other things, and I
ain’t took my medicine today.
THE COURT: Do you understand despite that what is happening today?
Are you understanding this proceeding?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.”
“Defendant further represented to the court that he had “an ample opportunity to talk with [his]
attorneys” regarding what was occurring and the plea offer that had been conveyed to him. He
stated he understood the terms of the State’s offer and rejected it.
¶ 19 The matter then proceeded with sentencing. The State attempted to call Trooper
Cox as a witness to testify regarding defendant’s commission of “other offenses.” However,
defendant objected, arguing it was improper for the trial court to consider evidence of his pending
-7- charges in aggravation. Ultimately, the court sustained defendant’s objection.
¶ 20 The State then presented a certified copy of defendant’s driving abstract from the
Office of the Secretary of State, which was admitted into evidence without objection. The driving
abstract included the following suspensions and revocations of defendant’s driver’s license: (1)
suspension for driving without a valid license or permit, effective August 29, 1995; (2) revocation
for driving without a valid license or permit, effective September 23, 1995; (3) “Safety
Responsibility Suspension” for “Uninsured Crash,” effective May 31, 1996; (4) statutory summary
suspension for failing or refusing an alcohol or drug test, effective June 27, 1997; (5) revocation
for DUI, effective June 28, 1998; (6) statutory summary suspension for failing or refusing an
alcohol or drug test, effective April 13, 2005; (7) revocation for DUI, effective January 19, 2006;
(8) statutory summary suspension for failing or refusing an alcohol or drug test, effective March
26, 2007; (9) a revocation for DUI, effective May 16, 2007; (10) statutory summary suspension
for failing or refusing an alcohol or drug test, effective April 4, 2024; (11) statutory summary
suspension for failing or refusing an alcohol or drug test, effective June 5, 2024; and (12) statutory
summary suspension for failing or refusing an alcohol or drug test, effective July 29, 2024. The
driving abstract also showed that defendant had 21 DWLR convictions. Four of those convictions
occurred between January 1996 and May 1997, prior to defendant’s first statutory summary
suspension in June 1997 or DUI revocation in June 1998. The remaining 17 DWLR convictions
occurred between March 22, 2001, and March 30, 2019 (the date of the underlying offense).
¶ 21 Defendant gave a statement in allocution. He apologized to his family for being in
jail and out of their lives. He also apologized to the trial court and his probation officer for “not
attending [the recommended] drug and mental health evaluation[s].” Defendant represented that
he had mental health issues and “drug and alcohol addiction.” He suggested that he had not been
-8- receiving treatment while incarcerated, despite requesting a mental health assessment. He also
asserted that he suffered from bipolar disorder and “wasn’t taking [his] meds like [he] was
supposed to have been.” Defendant maintained that his substance abuse problems “got worse”
after his grandmother died, which caused him to “make the wrong choices.”
¶ 22 Defendant further stated that he “had plenty of time to think about the wrong
choices [he] made.” He indicated that he had been incarcerated for “a year and two months for
driving,” which he found embarrassing. Defendant further stated as follows:
“I haven’t been charged with reckless homicide, I did not hurt nobody, I haven’t
shot or robbed anybody or did I touch a child, so I’m really not understanding why
the State is trying to offer me so much time. I made a lot of bad decisions when I
was younger, mostly driving. Only violence was aggravated battery or domestic
battery that was either dropped or dismissed or time served.”
Defendant maintained that he had “learned [his] lesson” since being incarcerated. He pointed out
that while in jail, he had earned an Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) certificate and a domestic
violence certificate, and he was “on a list for [a] life skills class.” Defendant asked the trial court
for leniency and maintained he would not drive without a driver’s license in the future.
¶ 23 Defendant submitted an exhibit that contained the various certificates he had
received while incarcerated. The certificates demonstrated his attendance at AA meetings in March
and April 2025 and his completion of a domestic violence and anger management class in May
2025.
¶ 24 The State argued that defendant should receive a 12-year prison sentence, noting
his “extensive criminal history” that extended “all the way back to *** 1992.” It also asserted that
the underlying offense was defendant’s twenty-first DWLR conviction that was “related to [DUI]
-9- dispositions.” The State further pointed out that despite initially getting “the benefit of probation
on a nonprobationable offense,” defendant failed to successfully complete his probation. It
maintained that anything other than “a double-digit” sentence would deprecate the seriousness of
the offense.
¶ 25 Defendant’s counsel asked the trial court to impose a minimum sentence of three
years in prison. He acknowledged that defendant’s prior probation sentence had been “inconsistent
with the law.” However, he asserted that sentence was “well thought out” and closer to an
appropriate sentence for a “driving case with no victim” than the 12-year sentence requested by
the State. Counsel also argued that defendant clearly “suffer[ed] from mental illness,” stating he
had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, and antisocial personality
disorder, and he pointed out that defendant had “taken steps to improve” while in jail.
¶ 26 The trial court agreed with the State’s recommendation and sentenced defendant to
12 years in prison. In aggravation, the court relied on defendant’s lengthy criminal history, which
it found demonstrated that he had “zero willingness to conform to society’s standards, laws,
expectations, and norms,” as well as the need for deterrence. In commenting on the factors in
aggravation, the court pointed to defendant’s 21 DWLR convictions, stating at various times that
(1) defendant’s criminal history included “21 occasions of convictions of driving while license
revoked, DUI-related [DWLR],” (2) “on 21 occasions [defendant] operated motor vehicles without
a license,” and (3) defendant had “been convicted 21 times of this offense, DUI-related [DWLR].”
Additionally, the record reflects the court also relied on its finding that defendant’s statement in
allocution was “indignant” and indicated his belief that the underlying offense “really wasn’t
essentially a big deal.”
¶ 27 As factors in mitigation, the trial court explicitly noted defendant’s struggles with
- 10 - addiction and his “mental health issues.” However, it pointed out that defendant had been given
the opportunity to undergo a mental health evaluation while on probation but “[d]idn’t do it.” The
court stated it had “low confidence” that defendant would engage in either substance abuse or
mental health services unless he was in “an environment where that was all [he] had to do.”
Additionally, it noted defendant’s evidence that he attended AA meetings and participated in
domestic violence and anger management classes while in jail but also pointed out that such
attendance and participation did not occur until March 2025, the same month that defendant’s
probation was revoked.
¶ 28 On June 16, 2025, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his 12-year prison
sentence. He argued (1) the trial court failed to adequately consider and weigh mitigating factors
and placed excessive weight on aggravating factors, (2) the sentence imposed was excessive
considering the nature and circumstances of the offense and his individual characteristics, and
(3) the court failed to weigh or consider the fact that he accepted responsibility “at the initial plea.”
Following a hearing the same month, the court denied defendant’s motion, stating it “took careful
consideration of the totality of the circumstances” and “all the applicable factors in aggravation
and mitigation” and that it believed defendant’s 12-year sentence was “absolutely appropriate.”
¶ 29 This appeal followed.
¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 31 On appeal, defendant argues his 12-year prison sentence was excessive and
manifestly disproportionate to the seriousness of the underlying offense. He also contends the trial
court committed reversible error by misstating his criminal history and relying on that
misstatement in aggravation.
¶ 32 A. Applicable Law and Standards of Review
- 11 - ¶ 33 The Illinois Constitution provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both
according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful
citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. “The trial court must base its sentencing determination
on the particular circumstances of each case, considering such factors as the defendant’s
credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.”
People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999). “The trial court has broad discretionary powers in
imposing a sentence, and its sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference.” People v.
Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010).
¶ 34 “The standard of review when a defendant contends his sentence is excessive is
whether the trial court’s sentencing determination constituted an abuse of discretion.” People v.
Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 99. “An abuse of discretion will be found where the
sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law[ ] or manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Snyder,
2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36; see also Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 54 (“A sentence within statutory limits will not
be deemed excessive unless it is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or
manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.”).
¶ 35 Additionally, “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when it considers an improper
factor in aggravation.” People v. Musgrave, 2019 IL App (4th) 170106, ¶ 55. “Whether the trial
court relied upon an improper factor during sentencing is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Id.
¶ 36 Notably, “reliance on an improper factor in aggravation does not always necessitate
remandment for resentencing.” People v. Bourke, 96 Ill. 2d 327, 332 (1983). “Where the reviewing
court is unable to determine the weight given to an improperly considered factor, the cause must
be remanded for resentencing.” Id. “However, where it can be determined from the record that the
- 12 - weight placed on the improperly considered aggravating factor was so insignificant that it did not
lead to a greater sentence, remandment is not required.” Id.; see People v. Valadovinos, 2014 IL
App (1st) 130076, ¶ 47 (“Even if the sentencing court mentions the improper fact, a defendant
must show that the court relied on the particular improper fact when imposing the sentence.”).
Further, “there is a strong presumption that the trial court’s sentence was based on proper legal
reasoning, and a reviewing court should consider the record as a whole rather than a few isolated
statements.” Musgrave, 2019 IL App (4th) 170106, ¶ 55.
¶ 37 B. Improper Sentencing Factor
¶ 38 Initially, we address defendant’s contention that the trial court considered improper
evidence at sentencing. Defendant acknowledges that he failed to properly preserve this issue for
review. However, he contends the error may be reviewed under the plain-error doctrine because a
clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence at his resentencing was closely balanced.
¶ 39 Generally, a defendant forfeits a claim of sentencing error by failing to preserve the
error through “both a contemporaneous objection and a written postsentencing motion raising the
issue.” People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544 (2010). However, the plain-error doctrine provides
“a narrow and limited exception” for the review of forfeited claims. Id. at 545. To obtain relief
under the plain error doctrine, a defendant must “show that a clear or obvious error occurred” and
“either that (1) the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was
so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” Id. “In addressing an assertion of
plain error, it is appropriate to determine whether reversible error occurred at all,” as “[w]ithout
reversible error, there can be no plain error.” People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶¶ 81, 88.
¶ 40 Here, defendant is correct that the trial court misstated his criminal history at
sentencing. Specifically, the court twice indicated that all 21 of defendant’s DWLR convictions
- 13 - were “DUI-related” when the evidence at sentencing showed that only 17 of those convictions
could be attributed to a DUI-related suspension or revocation. We note that defendant’s driving
abstract showed that in 1995 and 1996, his driver’s license was suspended and revoked for driving
without a valid license or permit. Effective May 1996, defendant also had a “Safety Responsibility
Suspension.” Following those suspensions and revocations, defendant was arrested four times
between January 1996 and May 1997 for DWLR. Defendant’s first DUI-related suspension was
not effective until June 1997, after his first four DWLR arrests. Subsequently, defendant had
several other DUI-related suspensions or revocations (in June 1998, April 2005, January 2006,
March 2007, and May 2007), and he was arrested 17 more times for DWLR. Thus, contrary to the
State’s assertions on appeal, the record supports a finding that the court did incorrectly attribute
all 21 DWLR convictions to a DUI-related suspension or revocation.
¶ 41 Despite the trial court’s misstatement, however, we find no reversible error. First,
defendant’s criminal history was a proper factor for the court’s consideration. See 730 ILCS 5/5-
5-3.2(a)(3) (West 2024) (providing that a factor in aggravation is that the defendant “has a history
of prior delinquency or criminal activity”). Moreover, in this instance, the conviction for which
defendant was being sentenced was, in fact, his twenty-first DWLR conviction. It was also one of
17 DWLR convictions attributable to a DUI-related suspension or revocation.
¶ 42 Second, as indicated, where the record shows that the weight placed on improperly
considered evidence “was so insignificant that it did not lead to a greater sentence, remandment is
not required.” Bourke, 96 Ill. 2d at 332. In this case, when considering the trial court’s comments
at resentencing in their entirety, the record shows the clear significance of its references to
defendant’s DWLR convictions was the repeated nature of the underlying criminal conduct—
driving a vehicle while not authorized to do so—and not on the underlying basis for the revocation
- 14 - or suspension. Specifically, in discussing the evidence, the court found that defendant’s criminal
history showed that he was unwilling to conform his conduct “to society’s standards, laws,
expectations, and norms.” In so finding, it emphasized that defendant had “repeatedly on 21
occasions operated motor vehicles without a license.” The court’s comments on deterrence
similarly reflect that it was the repeated nature of defendant’s decision to drive without a license
that was the court’s focus.
¶ 43 Even defendant’s four DWLR convictions that were not DUI-related were evidence
of his repeated failure to conform his conduct to what the law requires and supported the trial
court’s rationale. Ultimately, we find any weight that the court placed on its erroneous belief all
21 of defendant’s DWLR convictions were DUI-related was insignificant and did not result in a
greater sentence. Because defendant cannot demonstrate that there was reversible error, he also
cannot demonstrate plain error.
¶ 44 C. Excessive Sentence
¶ 45 We next address defendant’s contention that his 12-year prison sentence was
excessive and manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. In challenging his sentence,
defendant argues the trial court failed to consider the nature of his underlying conduct, which he
contends was “no more serious than the minimal conduct necessary to satisfy the present offense.”
Defendant also complains that both statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors applied to warrant
a shorter sentence and that the court otherwise erred in its consideration of the evidence presented,
including his criminal history.
¶ 46 The record shows defendant pleaded guilty to DWLR as a Class 2 felony (625 ILCS
5/6-303(a), (d-5) (West 2018)). DWLR, which is typically a Class A misdemeanor, becomes a
Class 2 felony when a person is “convicted of a fifteenth or subsequent” DWLR violation and both
- 15 - the current violation and prior convictions were DUI-related. Id. § 6-303(d-5). The sentencing
range for a Class 2 felony is three to seven years in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2024).
However, because defendant was previously convicted of a Class 2 felony, he was also eligible for
an extended-term sentence of up to 14 years in prison. Id. §§ 5-4.5-35(a), 5-8-2(a), 5-5-3.2(b)(1).
¶ 47 Here, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. In setting forth its sentencing
decision, the court stated that it had considered the evidence presented and that it gave “careful[ ]”
consideration to defendant’s PSI. It also explicitly stated that it had considered “all of the statutory
factors in aggravation and mitigation.” The record shows the court relied on defendant’s lengthy
criminal history, noting that it “date[d] back 30-plus years.” It referenced defendant’s numerous
DWLR convictions and pointed out that his history showed he received various sentencing
dispositions, including many jail sentences, opportunities for probation and conditional discharge,
and three separate terms of imprisonment in DOC. As noted, the court concluded that defendant’s
record showed his repeated unwillingness to conform his conduct to the law, indicating a lack of
rehabilitative potential. It found that the factor of deterrence warranted a lengthy sentence. The
court also considered defendant’s comments at sentencing, finding they demonstrated his failure
to appreciate the seriousness of his conduct. The record contains sufficient support for the court’s
findings.
¶ 48 On review, defendant suggests the offense at issue and his underlying conduct was
not serious, or not serious enough to warrant his 12-year prison sentence. In particular, he asserts
that the record contains no evidence that, at the time of his offense, he consumed any alcohol while
driving, transported weapons or contraband, committed a traffic violation, or posed any threat to
others. Notably, however, the underlying offense did involve defendant’s repeated commission of
the same type of criminal conduct—DWLR. In fact, the record indicates the charged offense was
- 16 - defendant’s seventeenth DUI-related DWLR conviction, two more convictions than the statutory
minimum for charging DWLR as a Class 2 felony.
¶ 49 Additionally, as indicated, a trial court does not view the charged offense in
isolation. See People v. Garcia, 2018 IL App (4th) 170339, ¶ 37 (“An appropriate sentence must
be based upon the particular circumstances of an individual case, including (1) the defendant’s
history, character, and rehabilitative potential; (2) the seriousness of the offense; (3) the need to
protect society; and (4) the need for deterrence and punishment.”). Here, the court clearly
considered the particular circumstances of defendant’s case in imposing his sentence, and we can
find no error.
¶ 50 Regarding mitigating evidence, defendant argues there were statutory and
nonstatutory factors that applied to warrant the imposition of a shorter sentence. He contends the
statutory factors in mitigation included that (1) his “criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened
serious physical harm to another” and (2) he “did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would
cause or threaten serious physical harm to another.” 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(1)-(2) (West 2024). He
argues the nonstatutory mitigation factors included (1) his employment prior to his arrest,
(2) support from family members who lived in the community, (3) his glaucoma, which could not
be adequately treated while in custody, (4) his substance abuse addiction, (5) his mental health
issues, and (6) his guilty plea to the underlying offense.
¶ 51 Initially, we note that “[a]bsent explicit evidence to the contrary, we *** presume
the [trial] court considered all mitigating factors.” People v. Page, 2022 IL App (4th) 210374, ¶ 52.
Here, the trial court repeatedly stated that it had considered “all of the statutory factors in
aggravation and mitigation whether [it] specifically mention[ed] those enumerated factors or not,”
and the record contains no explicit evidence that the court failed to consider any relevant factor.
- 17 - The record also suggests that the court simply gave more weight to the aggravating factors, which
was within its discretion. It is not the function of this court to reweigh the evidence on review. See
People v. Lawson, 2018 IL App (4th) 170105, ¶ 28 (“A trial court’s sentencing decision is entitled
to great deference, and we may not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s merely because we
might have weighed the sentencing factors differently.”).
¶ 52 Also, we find that the record contains conflicting evidence regarding several of the
nonstatutory mitigating factors that defendant points to on appeal. Defendant first asserts that his
“recent employment in the community” should have been viewed in mitigation. However, the PSI
showed defendant had lengthy periods of unemployment as an adult. Although he reported that he
worked at Dollar General for approximately one year prior to his arrest in April 2024, he declined
to sign a release so that his employment information could be verified. Additionally, the PSI stated
that “[a]ccording to the Sangamon County Court Services file, *** defendant was not employed
when he was [originally] sentenced [in June 2023] or up until his incarceration [in April 2024].”
¶ 53 Defendant next argues that a nonstatutory factor in mitigation was that he had
“family living in the community to support him in his rehabilitation.” However, the PSI showed
the grandmother who raised defendant was deceased, defendant had a poor relationship with his
parents, and defendant reported having no “contact information” for his parents or his four half-
siblings. Additionally, although defendant had six adult children and a girlfriend, he declined to
provide “any further information” about those individuals.
¶ 54 Defendant further argues that he suffers from glaucoma and that there was a dispute
as to whether he could be adequately treated while in custody. The PSI reflects that defendant was
diagnosed with glaucoma and prescribed medication. However, to support his claim that he could
not receive adequate treatment in custody, defendant cites a September 2024 hearing on a motion
- 18 - to reconsider his pretrial detention. He does not point to any evidence or argument presented at his
resentencing hearing regarding that condition or how it might be affected by a term of
imprisonment in DOC.
¶ 55 Defendant also points to his substance abuse and mental health issues, which he
acknowledges the trial court found were mitigating factors. We note, however, that the court also
pointed out that defendant had failed to avail himself of previous opportunities to engage in
substance abuse and mental health services or treatment. It noted that defendant had failed to
undergo a mental health evaluation while on probation. Additionally, although defendant
submitted evidence at his resentencing hearing that he had attended AA meetings and other classes
in jail, his participation was only recent, occurring around the same time as the revocation of his
probation and just a few months prior to his resentencing hearing. The court indicated its belief
that defendant was unlikely to engage in substance abuse services or mental health treatment unless
he was incarcerated in a facility where such services were available. We find no error in that
determination.
¶ 56 Finally, as a nonstatutory factor in mitigation, defendant points out that he pleaded
guilty to the underlying offense, which he claims shows he accepted legal responsibility for his
conduct. While true, as the trial court found, defendant’s comments at sentencing also indicated
that he did not view the underlying offense as serious or “a big deal,” which the court could
properly have viewed as contradictory to defendant taking full responsibility for his conduct.
¶ 57 On appeal, defendant argues that it was “unfair” for the trial court to penalize him
for his comments when he suffered from mental illness and reported that he had not taken his
medication on the day of his resentencing. The record shows, however, that defendant explicitly
stated during his resentencing hearing that he understood the proceedings. Additionally, comments
- 19 - that he did not find the underlying offense to be serious were borne out by his criminal history and
repeated commission of the same or similar offense. As stated, the March 2019 DWLR offense
was defendant’s twenty-first DWLR conviction, and the record showed his original probation
sentence was revoked, in part, because of yet another DWLR violation. See People v. Pina, 2019
IL App (4th) 170614, ¶ 30 (stating a trial court may consider a defendant’s conduct on probation
in assessing his potential for rehabilitation); see also People v. Jackson, 149 Ill. 2d 540, 548 (1992)
(holding “outstanding indictments or other criminal conduct for which there has been no
prosecution or conviction may be considered in sentencing” when presented by witnesses who can
be confronted and cross-examined and the defendant has an opportunity to rebut the testimony).
¶ 58 As indicated, defendant further complains that the trial court erred in its
consideration of his criminal history. According to defendant, the court overlooked the fact that
his criminal history was already used to elevate his DWLR offense to a Class 2 felony and to make
him eligible for extended-term sentencing. Notably, though, this court has held that predicate
offenses may be considered at sentencing “in the context of [a] defendant’s criminal history.”
People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220476, ¶ 52.
¶ 59 In this case, defendant’s criminal history also included more than just the
convictions used to elevate the charged offense or to impose his extended-term sentence. The
evidence showed that defendant had several prior drug-related convictions, as well as multiple
convictions for resisting or obstructing a peace officer, convictions for battery and domestic
battery, three DUI convictions, and a conviction for theft. His history further included more DUI-
related DWLR convictions than the 15 that were minimally required to elevate the charged offense,
as well as 4 DWLR convictions that were not DUI-related. Further, the PSI indicated defendant
had at least two prior Class 2 felony convictions upon which his extended-term sentence could
- 20 - have been based. See 730 ILCS 5/5-3.2(b)(1) (West 2018) (providing an extended-term sentence
may be imposed where the defendant has previously been convicted of the same, similar, or greater
class felony and “when such conviction has occurred within 10 years after the previous conviction,
excluding time spent in custody, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out
of different series of acts”).
¶ 60 Defendant contends that the trial court “disregarded” that many of his prior offenses
were nonviolent and misdemeanor convictions and that most of his felony convictions were clearly
connected to his substance abuse struggles. Ultimately, we find the record fails to reflect that the
court disregarded any evidence. Rather, the court noted that it had “carefully” reviewed
defendant’s PSI, which contained evidence of his criminal history. Although the court commented
that defendant’s substance abuse struggles were mitigating, it was also clearly concerned with both
his failure to meaningfully engage in treatment and his continuous violations of the law.
¶ 61 We note “the trial court is not required to view drug addiction as a mitigating
factor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Musgrave, 2019 IL App (4th) 170106, ¶ 60. “Instead,
a history of substance abuse is a double-edged sword that the trial court may view as a mitigating
or aggravating factor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. A sentencing court may properly
conclude “that [the] defendant’s drug addiction lessened his rehabilitative potential, increased the
seriousness of the offense, increased the need to protect society, and increased the need for
deterrence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The trial court’s comments in this case, when
viewed in their entirety, indicated that it reached such conclusions, and we find no error.
¶ 62 Defendant further contends that the trial court erred in focusing on the length of his
criminal history and not the nature of his prior offenses, and he suggests the court “disregarded”
the fact that the PSI listed several criminal cases against him that had been dismissed. Again, the
- 21 - record does not reflect that the court disregarded evidence and, instead, shows the court “carefully”
considered defendant’s PSI and its contents. Moreover, at various points during the sentencing
hearing, the court clearly stated that it would only consider offenses of which defendant had been
proven guilty. Also, even without consideration of the dismissed cases, defendant had a lengthy
criminal history with numerous misdemeanor and felony convictions. The court could have
properly found, and did find, that defendant’s lengthy criminal history demonstrated his
unwillingness to follow the law and lack of rehabilitative potential.
¶ 63 In arguing that the trial court erred in finding that he could not conform his conduct
to society’s expectations, defendant argues the court failed to consider that at the time of the
underlying offense in March 2019, he “had not received a driving conviction or violation in over
[seven] years.” The record shows, however, that defendant committed other offenses during that
time and spent a large portion of those seven years in custody. Specifically, prior to defendant’s
commission of the underlying offense, his last conviction for DWLR was in September 2011. He
was placed on 12 months’ probation for that offense, which resulted in a petition to revoke filed
only a few months later, in January 2012. In January 2013, that petition was withdrawn per a plea
agreement in defendant’s 2012 theft case. The PSI then showed that defendant was charged with
drug-related felonies in both 2013 and 2015. In August 2016, he was sentenced to three years in
prison in both of those cases. The PSI showed that when sentenced, defendant was given credit for
451 days served in the 2013 case and 416 days served in the 2015 case, indicating he spent a
substantial amount of time in custody prior to his 3-year prison sentences. The PSI also showed
that defendant was “paroled” from DOC in April 2018. Less than a year later, he committed the
underlying offense while still on “parole.”
¶ 64 Here, the record shows the trial court properly considered the evidence presented
- 22 - and that its findings were supported by the record. Defendant’s 12-year sentence was well within
the applicable statutory range and, given the evidence presented, was neither “greatly at variance
with the spirit and purpose of the law” nor “manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36. Accordingly, we find
no abuse of discretion by the court.
¶ 65 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 66 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 67 Affirmed.
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