People v. Coulier

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 4, 2026
• Docket: 24CA1716
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY June 4, 2026

2026 COA 45

No. 24CA1716, People v. Coulier — Crimes — Impersonating a Police Officer

In this criminal impersonation of a peace officer case, and as a

matter of first impression, a division of the Court of Appeals

interprets the phrase “an act” in the statutory element “perform[ed]

an act in that pretended capacity.” § 18-8-112(1), C.R.S. 2025.

The division holds that “an act” may constitute any conduct that is

done while in that pretended capacity and that this interpretation is

consistent with federal case law requiring a defendant to engage in

conduct that is more than mere bravado, puffery, or bragging. The

division further concludes that sufficient evidence of the

defendant’s conduct constituting “an act” supported his conviction,

and thus, the judgment is affirmed. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026 COA 45

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1716 El Paso County District Court No. 23CR5191 Honorable Robert L. Lowrey, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Richard James Coulier II,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Johnson and Kuhn, JJ., concur

Announced June 4, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Trina K. Kissel, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Jeffrey Parsons, Alternate Defense Counsel, Broomfield, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Richard James Coulier II, appeals his conviction

for impersonating a peace officer. As a matter of first impression,

we are asked to interpret the phrase “an act” in the statutory

element “perform[ed] an act in that pretended capacity,” § 18-8-

112(1), C.R.S. 2025, and to decide whether sufficient evidence of

Coulier’s conduct constituting “an act” supported his conviction.

We conclude that “an act” may constitute any conduct that is done

while in that pretended capacity and that this interpretation is

consistent with federal case law requiring a defendant to engage in

conduct that is more than mere bravado, puffery, or bragging. We

further conclude that sufficient evidence supports Coulier’s

conviction and affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 In November 2023, Coulier and Ann Marie Lopez met at her

home to discuss his purchase of an inoperative vehicle that sat in

Lopez’s front yard. Coulier said he wished to purchase the vehicle

to fix it up for his son. The two agreed that Coulier would pay

Lopez $200 for the vehicle and that payment and title would be

exchanged once the vehicle became operable. Lopez gave Coulier

the keys, and Coulier began making repairs that same day.

1 ¶3 By evening, Coulier was able to start the engine but could not

complete all the needed repairs. Without consulting Lopez, Coulier

pushed the vehicle from Lopez’s property to his property down the

street so he could continue the repairs. When Lopez discovered the

vehicle missing the next morning, she called the police and reported

it stolen. Coulier continued working on the vehicle until it was

operable and then gave the car to his son.

¶4 Shortly thereafter, Coulier’s son was stopped by police officers

for driving a stolen vehicle. Coulier’s son directed the police to his

father. When police arrived at Coulier’s house to ask him about the

stolen vehicle, Coulier told officers about his purchase agreement

with Lopez and that he had not had a chance to reconnect with

Lopez due to the Thanksgiving holiday.

¶5 In an effort to clear up any misunderstanding, Coulier went to

Lopez’s house the next day and repeatedly knocked on her front

door. Lopez refused to talk to Coulier and stated that she was

scared to answer the door because Coulier “was knocking

aggressively on the door and not leaving.” Believing he had no

other option, Coulier obtained the phone number for Lopez’s spouse

through an internet search and placed a call to Lopez’s residence.

2 In the phone call, Coulier identified himself as “Detective Rich of the

Colorado Springs Police Department,” requested that Lopez permit

the “detective” be allowed to bring Coulier to her house to talk

about the stolen vehicle because “it was all a misunderstanding.”

Lopez did not believe the call was from the police and hung up.

Lopez then redialed the number and asked Coulier follow-up

questions, such as “Detective Rich[’s]” badge number, to confirm

her suspicions that it was not the police calling her. Coulier

refused to provide any badge number upon Lopez’s request.

Believing she recognized his voice, Lopez demanded that Coulier

cease trying to contact her.

¶6 Lopez then contacted the police, and an officer was dispatched

to her home because Lopez was “worried for her safety” and her

family’s safety due to Coulier’s repeated attempts to contact her.

Lopez provided the officer with the number used to contact her.

That number matched Coulier’s personal phone number. The

officer then called Coulier, who confirmed that he had identified

himself as “Detective Rich.”

¶7 Coulier was charged with one count of motor vehicle theft in

violation of section 18-4-409(3), C.R.S. 2025, and one count of

3 impersonating a peace officer in violation of section 18-8-112.

During deliberations, the jury asked, “[W]hat constitutes

[‘]performed an act[’] per criteria number [four], the impersonating

an officer charge?” The court replied,

You have all of the evidence and instructions you may properly rely upon in reaching your verdict. You should use reason and common sense in your deliberations. You may also refer to the definition of voluntary act included in the jury instructions.

The jury acquitted Coulier of motor vehicle theft but found him

guilty of impersonating a peace officer.

II. Impersonating a Peace Officer

¶8 Coulier contends that the impersonation statute requires an

overt act and that the prosecution produced insufficient evidence of

an overt act to support his conviction. We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶9 We review the record de novo in sufficiency of the evidence

claims. People v. Donald, 2020 CO 24, ¶ 18. To determine whether

the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support a

conviction, we evaluate “whether the relevant evidence, both direct

and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most

4 favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support

a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of

the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Clark v. People,

232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010)).

¶ 10 Coulier’s contention also presents a question of statutory

interpretation, which we review de novo. People v. Coleman, 2018

COA 67, ¶ 40. When interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect

to the legislature’s intent. Id. at ¶ 41. We begin with the statute’s

language, giving words and phrases their ordinary meanings. Id. If

the statute is unambiguous, our analysis ends there. See id. But if

the statute is ambiguous, we may seek guidance from, among other

sources, prior law, legislative history, the consequences of a

particular construction, and the statute’s underlying policy or

purpose. People v. Turecek, 2012 COA 59, ¶ 11, overruled on other

grounds by, People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 47 n.16; § 2-4-203,

C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 11 As relevant here, “[a] person who falsely pretends to be a peace

officer and performs an act in that pretended capacity commits

impersonating a peace officer.” § 18-8-112(1).

5 B. Analysis

¶ 12 Whether sufficient evidence of “an act” exists requires us to

define “an act” under section 18-8-112(1), which presents an issue

of first impression. Neither section 18-8-112(1), or Colorado case

law, nor comments to the model criminal jury instructions define

“an act” as that phrase is used in the statute. When the jury asked

what constituted “an act,” the trial court referred the jury to the

statutory definition of “voluntary act” in the jury instructions and

told the jury that it “should use reason and common sense in [its]

deliberations.”1 “Voluntary act” is defined as “an act performed

consciously as a result of effort or determination.” § 18-1-501(9),

¶ 13 Coulier argues that this definition, coupled with the dictionary

definition of “act” — “the doing of a thing” or “something done

voluntarily,” and “the process of doing something.” Merriam-

Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/S97R-CZP3 —

“contemplate[s] some action beyond mere speech.” He reasons that

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1 Coulier does not challenge the court’s response to the jury

question on appeal.

6 simply misrepresenting one’s identity verbally improperly collapses

the two statutory elements — assuming a false identity and doing

an act in that pretended capacity — into one, and, therefore, that

the statute requires an overt act beyond the verbal

misrepresentation.

¶ 14 In construing a statute, we seek to effectuate the legislature’s

intent. McBride v. People, 2022 CO 30, ¶ 23. We first consider the

statute’s language, “assigning its words and phrases their plain and

ordinary meanings.” Id. In our interpretation, we avoid construing

a statute in a way that would render part of it superfluous. Id.

¶ 15 Because the word “act” is not defined by statute, we begin with

the dictionary definition to discern the term’s plain and ordinary

meaning. See People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68, ¶ 31. Merriam-Webster

defines “act” as “the doing of a thing”; “something done voluntarily”;

and “the process of doing something.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,

https://perma.cc/S97R-CZP3. This definition is consistent with

the definition of “voluntary act” to which the trial court referred the

jury.

¶ 16 Next, we consider what the statute does not say. Coulier asks

us to read the word “overt” into the statute and argues that

7 something intentional, beyond the mere misrepresentation is

required. But we may not add words to a statute, see People v.

Diaz, 2015 CO 28, ¶ 12, and we must respect the legislature’s

choice of language, People v. Jaramillo, 183 P.3d 665, 671 (Colo.

App. 2008).

¶ 17 We also are not persuaded that the federal cases on which

Coulier relies require a different result. The federal impersonating

an officer statute, 18 U.S.C. § 912, provides as follows:

Whoever [1] falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and [2] acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

Some federal courts have also required proof of a third element —

“that the impersonator act with fraudulent intent, that is, intent to

deceive another to act differently than he would have acted absent

the deception.” United States v. Ferris, 52 F.4th 235, 239 (5th Cir.

2022) (quoting United States v. Tullos, 356 F. App’x 727, 728 (5th

Cir. 2009)). These courts have held that “[m]erely falsely pretending

to be an officer or employee of the United States with intent to

8 defraud is not enough. An overt act is necessary to complete either

offense.” Id. (quoting Baas v. United States, 25 F.2d 294, 294 (5th

Cir. 1928)); United States v. Neidlinger, 354 F. App’x 357, 361 (10th

Cir. 2009) (“‘[T]o act as such’ . . . requires something beyond the

false pretense with intent to defraud; there must be some act in

keeping with the pretense . . . . ” (quoting United States v. Barnow,

239 U.S. 74, 77 (1915))).

¶ 18 We see little distinction between this case and the federal

cases on which Coulier relies or between “an act” and an “overt act.”

For example, in Neidlinger, the defendant pretended to be a United

States Marshal, showed a badge, and forced his way into a mayor’s

office. Id. The court found these facts constituted sufficient “overt

act[s]” that went beyond “mere bragging, bravado, or puffery.” Id. at

361-62. Additionally, in United States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 652, 657

(D.C. Cir. 1976), the court affirmed the defendant’s conviction when

he pretended to work for the Internal Revenue Service and

“‘solicited information about gasoline sales’ and ‘arranged for

gasoline sales and service.’” It concluded that the solicitation of

information constituted sufficient evidence of an overt act under the

statute. Id.

9 ¶ 19 Similarly, in Tullos, 356 F. App’x at 728, the court found

sufficient evidence of an overt act when the defendant “acted as a

member of the Coast Guard [by] prominently display[ing] clothing

bearing the Coast Guard insignia in the front seat of his truck and

[telling] agents that he was traveling on official orders from the

Coast Guard.”

¶ 20 Here, Coulier called Lopez and pretended to be “Detective

Rich” of the Colorado Springs Police Department, thereby satisfying

the first element of the statute — falsely pretending to be a police

officer. In this pretended capacity, he encouraged Lopez to allow

the “detective” to bring Coulier to her house to clear up a

misunderstanding about the missing vehicle, thereby satisfying the

second element of the statute — performing an act in that

pretended capacity. Similar to the Rosser case, we conclude that

Coulier’s attempt to have Lopez meet with him at her house to

resolve a misunderstanding constituted an act under the statute

that satisfies the second element. And while we agree with Coulier

that simply pretending to be an officer, without more, would be

insufficient to sustain a conviction, we conclude that any act done

in the pretended capacity, whether verbal, as is the case here and

10 was the case in Rosser, or more physical, as was wearing the badge

in Neidlinger or the uniform in Tullos, satisfies the statutory

element of “an act” under section 18-8-112. Therefore, we

necessarily conclude that sufficient evidence supported Coulier’s

conviction for impersonating a peace officer.2

III. Disposition

¶ 21 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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2 Additional evidence supporting the conviction includes Coulier’s

admissions to the police that he introduced himself as a police officer and solicited Lopez’s agreement to meet with him during the phone call.