People v. Corzine

2026 IL App (5th) 230163-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 13, 2026
• Docket: 5-23-0163
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 230163-U NOTICE Decision filed 01/13/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0163 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Wabash County. ) v. ) No. 20-CF-5 ) RUBEN A. CORZINE, ) Honorable ) Michael J. Valentine, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BOLLINGER ∗ delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Boie and Sholar concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s sentence, as the circuit court properly considered mitigating factors, appropriately assessed statutory aggravating factors, defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance, and the claim of double enhancement was waived. Even if defendant had not waived the double enhancement issue on appeal, no plain error occurred.

¶2 Defendant, Ruben A. Corzine, entered a plea of guilty to first degree murder and was

subsequently sentenced to a prison term of 50 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. On

appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court failed to consider certain mitigating factors and

improperly considered some statutory aggravating factors. Furthermore, defendant argues that the

circuit court, during the sentencing process, considered an element inherent in the offense of first

∗ Justice Welch was originally assigned to the panel before his death. Justice Bollinger was later substituted on the panel and has listened to oral arguments and read the briefs. 1 degree murder. Additionally, he asserts that his defense counsel was ineffective for neglecting to

object to this consideration and for failing to raise this issue in a postsentencing motion. For the

reasons outlined herein, we affirm the sentence imposed by the circuit court.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On January 30, 2020, defendant was charged with first degree murder pursuant to section

9-1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2018)). The information

alleged that without lawful justification and with the intent to kill, defendant stabbed Jennifer L.

Phelps with a knife, thereby causing her death.

¶5 On February 13, 2020, defense counsel submitted an amended motion for fitness, asserting

generally that defendant had previously been diagnosed with “mental illnesses.” It further claimed

that defendant had previously been sentenced to the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

for incidents related to his mental health. The petition stated that defendant had not been taking

his prescribed medication, and immediately prior to the current incident, he was taken to Wabash

General Hospital for concerns regarding his mental health. The amended motion also noted that

defendant informed defense counsel of a suicide attempt while detained at the Wabash County jail.

The motion was granted on the same day.

¶6 A fitness evaluation prepared by Dr. Victoria Codispoti was submitted on May 31, 2020.

The record on appeal includes only the final page of Dr. Codispoti’s report, which included her

findings. She concluded, within a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty, that defendant was

fit to stand trial.

¶7 On June 11, 2020, defendant requested a second fitness evaluation and the State did not

object. On July 21, 2020, Dr. Daniel Cuneo was appointed to evaluate defendant.

2 ¶8 A letter from Dr. Cuneo detailing his evaluation of defendant was filed on August 24, 2020.

The correspondence indicated that he inquired of defendant concerning the charges against him,

and the following was defendant’s response:

“First Degree Murder. Killed my fiancée. I never denied doing it. I don’t understand why.

They keep saying I had to go to the hospital. I went to the hospital. I hearing voices and I

going to a friend’s house. Crashed and police officer let me go and I went to a friend’s

house. They took me to a hospital. I got scared and took off. Officer let me go. I still hearing

voices. There was a plot to kill me. I made it to the house. She (his fiancée) glad I made it

to the house. I still hearing stuff. Hear my name being called. I went back to the house

again. Fiancée telling me I had to go to work. I still hearing things. I took a knife and went

to the basement. I couldn’t get the light to come on. Went back upstairs. I wanted to leave.

I going to take off again. When I trying to leave, she saw the knife in my back pocket. She

grabbed the knife and I kinda blacked out. I been up for two days.”

¶9 Dr. Cuneo stated that he reviewed the charging documents, police reports, statements,

discovery materials, records from the Wabash County Health Department, criminal history, Dr.

Codispoti’s fitness evaluation dated May 31, 2020, and correspondence from defendant’s

counselor. He determined that defendant was oriented to person, time, and place. Dr. Cuneo’s

report indicated that defendant admitted experiencing auditory and visual hallucinations. The

report also noted that defendant was delusional and believed that others were attempting to harm

him. Furthermore, the report stated that defendant informed Dr. Cuneo that he had dropped out of

high school due to his placement in a disciplinary school for fighting.

¶ 10 Dr. Cuneo observed that defendant’s long- and short-term memory functions were intact

and that defendant acknowledged experiencing feelings of depression and anxiety. Defendant

3 informed Dr. Cuneo that he had attempted suicide on two occasions since he killed Phelps, both

instances occurred while he was incarcerated at the Wabash County jail. He further stated that he

began drinking alcohol at approximately 10 or 11 years of age, though he asserted that his last

intake was one week prior to his incarceration. Defendant disclosed his history of substance abuse,

including methamphetamine, opiates, and cocaine use, with the most recent use of opiates

occurring two weeks prior to incarceration, and the last use of cocaine approximately 10 years ago.

The report indicated that defendant denied receiving any mental health treatment; however,

defendant noted that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia during his last imprisonment, but he did

not pursue any treatment for the condition. Dr. Cuneo’s belief was that defendant’s mental illness

did not substantially impair his ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings

against him or his ability to assist in his own defense.

¶ 11 An agreed order was issued on September 10, 2020, wherein both defendant and the State

agreed defendant was fit to stand trial. The order noted that (1) on May 31, 2020, Dr. Codispoti

submitted a fitness evaluation indicating, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that

defendant was fit to stand trial; (2) defendant requested, and the State did not object, that Dr. Cuneo

conduct an evaluation regarding defendant’s fitness to stand trial; and (3) on August 20, 2020, Dr.

Cuneo provided a report to the court affirming, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty,

that defendant was fit to stand trial.

¶ 12 On October 8, 2020, defendant filed a motion for a mental illness evaluation. He reiterated

that he suffered from severe mental illnesses that had previously gone undiagnosed but persisted.

He requested that Dr. Cuneo conduct the evaluation so that defendant can be “diagnosed and

evaluated for a mental illness.” The State expressed no opposition to the motion, and it was granted

the same day.

4 ¶ 13 On January 21, 2021, Dr. Cuneo submitted an additional letter. In this correspondence, Dr.

Cuneo inquired of defendant regarding the offense, to which defendant responded:

“I worked that day doing a remodel job. I was hearing voices that day. I hearing my name

- Ruben, Ruben. At about 1:00 - 2:00 p.m. I hearing voices saying she was leaving

(Jennifer). I went home and she was sleeping. I went back to the job site. Then I don’t

remember much till dark. I cooked two New York strips for her and me. I couldn’t sleep

because I heard voices saying she was against me and she was going to Arkansas. Her son

took me to the hospital. I still not getting any rest. We both told the doctors on January 28

that I couldn’t get any sleep and the doctor told me to just take Ibuprofen. We (Jennifer

and he) were not arguing about anything. I had already left once. I heard voices in the

basement. I put the knife in my back pocket. I came to and I had blood on the knife. I was

over the top of her when I came to. I could never hurt anyone. It was just me and her against

the world. I just remember me having blood on me.”

¶ 14 Dr. Cuneo’s letter noted that, in his video-recorded statement to the police, defendant

indicated that he and Phelps were arguing at the time of the offense, subsequently describing the

stabbing. Dr. Cuneo inquired about this, to which defendant replied that he did not understand why

he would have informed the police that he was arguing with Phelps. Furthermore, Dr. Cuneo stated

that, although defendant repeatedly asserted that he was hallucinating at the time of the incident,

he never disclosed these hallucinations to the police. Instead, he merely stated “that they were

arguing and Jennifer ‘pushed’ his buttons.” Dr. Cuneo also observed that defendant told the police

he had grabbed the kitchen knife and that they “got into it,” and he claimed to have blacked out

during the attack.

5 ¶ 15 Dr. Cuneo opined that defendant was suffering from a substantial disorder of thought,

mood, and behavior which “afflicted him at the time of the alleged offense which impaired his

judgment and negatively affected his behavior, but not to the extent that he was unable to

appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”

Dr. Cuneo further stated that defendant’s accounts of hallucinations at the time of the offenses

were “extremely suspect.” Dr. Cuneo concluded:

“While Mr. Corzine denied taking any type of drugs at the time of the alleged

offense to me, in his videotaped statement he spoke of how he was using methamphetamine

and opioids at that time. While these drugs may very well have increased his paranoia,

further impaired his judgment, decreased his already poor impulse control, and greatly

increased his potential for acting out; *** these drugs were taken willingly. He is not

intellectually limited and knows that stabbing an individual can cause death. Therefore, it

would be my opinion that Mr. Ruben Corzine was legally sane at the time of the alleged

offense.

It would also be my opinion that Mr. Corzine’s mental illness did play a

substantial role in his actions. He does have a personality disorder and has many symptoms

consistent with Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders. He

has repeatedly self medicated with drugs and alcohol as a means of dealing with his mental

health problems. These drugs clearly increased his potential for acting out. His mental

illness played a major role in his actions at the time of the alleged offense. Therefore, it

would be my opinion that Mr. Ruben Corzine would qualify for a Guilty But Mentally Ill

Plea.”

6 ¶ 16 On July 15, 2021, defendant entered a plea of guilty and waived his right to a jury trial. On

September 1, 2021, probation officer Judy Lewis submitted a presentence report. It outlined

defendant’s family background, educational history, and physical health status. The report also

provided a detailed discussion of Dr. Codispoti’s report and Dr. Cuneo’s report and

correspondence. Defendant informed Lewis that he had been prescribed medication for the past

year; however, despite Lewis’s request, no records of such medication were provided to her.

¶ 17 The report expounded upon defendant’s criminal history. In 2007 defendant was convicted

of failure to identify a fugitive from justice. In 2012, defendant was charged with a DUI and

careless driving and was placed on supervision. A petition to revoke supervision was filed, and he

was placed on another year of supervision. In 2016, he was convicted ex parte of the crimes of

possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of cannabis. Additionally, in 2016, defendant was

sentenced to two years of probation following a conviction for possession of a controlled

substance. In 2017, defendant received a two-year sentence in IDOC for the crimes of possession

of weapons by a felon and reckless discharge of a firearm. Lastly, in 2019, defendant was placed

on one year of court supervision for the improper use of a vehicle title. Defendant also had an order

of protection issued against him in 2011.

¶ 18 Lewis observed that the discharge instructions dated January 28, 2020, from Wabash

General Hospital indicated that defendant was assessed for atypical chest pain and idiopathic

insomnia. It was advised that defendant refrain from stimulants, and additional evaluations were

deemed necessary.

7 ¶ 19 A sentencing hearing was held on September 10, 2021. The State observed that the hearing

served two purposes: (1) a sentencing hearing, and (2) a hearing regarding defendant’s mental

condition to assist the circuit court in evaluating the guilty but mentally ill request. 1

¶ 20 Mary Sweppy testified first on behalf of the State. She was a 911 dispatcher in Mt. Carmel

and was performing her duties on January 29, 2020. The sheriff’s department and the police

department share a lobby, so her work area is accessible to individuals entering that lobby. On that

date, she came into contact with Teena Perry, who was highly distressed. Perry entered hurriedly

with her cellphone in hand and displayed it to Sweppy. Perry informed Sweppy that her friend told

her he stabbed his girlfriend, and that she did not know the address. As she inquired about Perry’s

name, she received a 911 call from defendant. A recording of this call was played. 2

¶ 21 Sergeant Kyle Adams of the Mt. Carmel Police Department testified next. He served as

sergeant for over four years at the time of his testimony. On January 29, 2020, during the day shift,

Sweppy dispatched him to 909 North Cherry Street. He was informed that an individual called and

reported that he had stabbed his girlfriend. Sergeant Adams was dispatched at 8:39 a.m. and arrived

at the residence at 8:41 a.m. Upon arrival, he encountered defendant at the rear door of the

residence. Defendant had blood on his sleeves, shirt, pants, and boots. Defendant appeared calm

and did not communicate much with Sergeant Adams. He was detained and handcuffed.

¶ 22 Subsequently, Sergeant Adams entered the residence and located Phelps in the northeast

bedroom. She was lying face down beyond the bedroom door, which prevented the door from

opening fully. Phelps had multiple cuts along her back, arms, face, and hands, and was covered in

blood; the carpet and walls around her were also bloodstained. Sergeant Adams attempted to elicit

1 We note this is the first time in the record that a guilty but mentally ill request is mentioned by either party. 2 The 911 call recording was not included as part of the record on appeal. 8 a response from Phelps by calling to her and shaking her, but there was no response. He placed his

hands on her body and observed that she was becoming cold and stiff, indicating no signs of life.

A knife was observed between Phelps’s legs on the floor; it was covered in blood and appeared to

be bent. A checkered jacket was seen on Phelps’s back, which had been used to apply pressure to

her wounds. Throughout this observation, defendant remained in the residence, silent and calm.

Medical professionals arrived and confirmed Phelps’s death. The coroner’s office and the Illinois

State Police Forensic Services Unit also arrived to process the scene, including photographing it.

The photographs were admitted as evidence and depicted the room and Phelps as they appeared at

the scene.

¶ 23 Following his departure from the residence, Sergeant Adams obtained surveillance footage

from the date of the incident from the Wagon Wheel Liquor Store, which was two blocks west of

the residence. This action was taken in response to information indicating that defendant had exited

the residence prior to the emergency call to 911. Sergeant Adams testified that he reviewed the

footage and observed defendant walking to the establishment, pacing, smoking a cigarette, making

a telephone call, and subsequently returning in the direction of the residence. Defendant was

recorded entering the footage at 8:08 a.m. and leaving at 8:15 a.m.

¶ 24 Shaun Keepes, the Coroner of Wabash County, testified next. He served as the coroner on

January 29, 2020, and a representative from his office was dispatched to 909 North Cherry Street

to verify the death of Phelps. The body was then transported to the coroner’s office, where Dr.

James Jacobi conducted an autopsy. Photographic documentation of the autopsy was submitted as

exhibits. The autopsy diagram indicated that Phelps suffered from 37 stab wounds, 17 of which

were on her face.

9 ¶ 25 Victim impact statements were presented by Phelps’s sisters, niece, and mother. They

articulated how their lives have been profoundly affected and diminished by the loss of Phelps,

and they expressed that defendant ought to be incarcerated for the remainder of his life.

¶ 26 Chief Michael McWilliams, the chief of police, testified for defendant. On the morning in

question, the grandmother of defendant’s son, Teena Perry, received a telephone call from

defendant. Subsequently, Chief McWilliams spoke with Perry later that day, during which she

informed him that defendant had contacted her to inform her of the incident involving Phelps. She

proceeded to the police station at the same time defendant placed a 911 call. Perry informed Chief

McWilliams that defendant had a history of making irrational remarks.

¶ 27 Chief McWilliams was aware of a prior arrest of defendant in 2017, when he was

apprehended with a firearm. During that incident, defendant discharged shots towards the walls

while inside a house. Defendant’s children were present in the home during this shooting. Prior to

that event, defendant had been awake, unable to sleep for several days, and had been hearing

voices. At that time, Phelps transported defendant to the Wabash General Hospital emergency

room to seek assistance.

¶ 28 On the same day of Phelps’s death, Phelps took defendant to the emergency room due to

concerns regarding his mental health. Several hours later, this incident transpired. Chief

McWilliams’s report documented a video and an audiotaped statement of defendant; additionally,

the report noted that at the conclusion of the statement, defendant expressed love for Phelps and

remorse for the incident. Chief McWilliams testified that defendant appeared very “plain” and

“very flat.”

¶ 29 Chief McWilliams conducted interviews with Bryson Phelps and Dayton Brimm, two of

Phelps’s sons. They stated that Phelps took defendant to the emergency room two days prior due

10 to hearing voices and experiencing insomnia. Chief McWilliams stated that his report documented

an argument between defendant and Phelps, noting that both boys overheard the argument and

commented that such disagreements were unusual, as they typically did not argue. Furthermore,

Chief McWilliams testified that Brimm mentioned that defendant’s behavior was abnormal. Both

boys left shortly before the incident. Chief McWilliams further testified that, when he interviewed

defendant, defendant acknowledged having been involved in an argument with Phelps on that

morning. He also indicated that on January 28, Phelps made two attempts to persuade defendant

to visit the hospital.

¶ 30 Chief McWilliams testified that he interviewed Dustin Kieffer, who was defendant’s best

friend. Kieffer informed Chief McWilliams that defendant was not under the influence of any

substances. He stated that, in the days prior, he and defendant had been working together, and that

defendant was experiencing auditory hallucinations again, which were typically indicative of

substance abuse by defendant. Kieffer further stated that he inquired of defendant regarding drug

use, given defendant’s history of consumption and the typical auditory hallucinations experienced

during such activity. Defendant, however, firmly denied any such use. Kieffer noted that,

generally, if defendant were using drugs, he would be honest and admit to it. Finally, Kieffer

expressed concern that defendant’s behavior was abnormal and that he had reservations regarding

his driving.

¶ 31 Judy Lewis testified next. She served as a probation officer for Wabash County and was

responsible for preparing the presentence report. She indicated that defendant did not complete

high school and was employed in the construction and roofing industries. He also conveyed to her

that he was engaged in a construction-related occupation at the time of his arrest.

11 ¶ 32 Lewis testified that defendant was incarcerated in 2017 for a period of two years.

Additionally, he received a sentence of probation related to a first offender substance abuse case

in 2016. She served as his probation officer during that period and testified that his conduct was

satisfactory.

¶ 33 Lewis stated that defendant informed her that he had resided with Phelps for approximately

one and a half years and that they had known each other for many years. Defendant conveyed to

Lewis that he suffered from cancer in his jaw in the past and was currently in remission. She

testified that when defendant spoke to her, he appeared to be open, honest, and as helpful as

possible. She noted that his demeanor was somewhat flat. She was unaware whether he was taking

any medications. Additionally, she testified that her report indicated that defendant was seeing a

physician at the Egyptian Health Department but she was unaware that he was receiving a monthly

injection for his medication.

¶ 34 Lewis testified that defendant did not discuss hearing voices extensively with her. Lewis

stated that she reviewed medical reports concerning defendant’s mental health evaluations and was

aware that these reports indicated that defendant was fit to stand trial. She further testified that

during her conversations with defendant, he understood her questions and was able to provide

appropriate responses. She testified that at no point did he become agitated to an extent that would

impair his ability to understand or respond.

¶ 35 The initial report she reviewed was authored by Dr. Cuneo, who stated that he had received

reports indicating that defendant had been hearing voices since 2017. Dr. Cuneo diagnosed

defendant with a schizophrenia-type disorder. The second evaluation was also conducted by Dr.

Cuneo, who opined that defendant exhibited a substantial disorder affecting thought, mood, and

behavior. He stated that defendant qualified for a verdict of guilty but mentally ill.

12 ¶ 36 Lewis testified that she received a one-page report from the January 28 Wabash General

Hospital visit. The report she reviewed stated that defendant was being evaluated for chest pains

and insomnia, but she testified that if the emergency room report indicated that defendant stated

he had been hearing voices and experiencing dreams and visions, she would not dispute those

records. Lewis did not receive the report indicating that defendant tested negative for all illegal

substances. Defendant was discharged from the hospital on January 28.

¶ 37 Lewis did not receive a report concerning defendant’s emergency room visit on January

29, 2020. She was unaware that defendant returned to the emergency room at 4:01 a.m. Lewis was

provided with the report while testifying, which indicated that another toxicology test was

performed and showed that defendant tested negative for all illegal substances. The two emergency

room reports were subsequently appended to the presentence report without any objection from

the State.

¶ 38 The second clinical report from January 29, 2020, stated upon discharge:

“Condition at departure: stable. The patient left prior to discharge education being

provided. The patient left the Emergency Department against medical advice and without

completion of treatment; patient was unaccompanied. The patient appears to be alert,

oriented x4, coherent and in no acute distress. The patient stated is leaving due to personal

reasons. Notified of patient departure. Prior to leaving, he was advised to stay for

completion of treatment. He was informed of the risks of leaving and verbalized

understanding of these risks. Patient signed form prior to leaving. He left the Emergency

Department ambulatory and via private vehicle. (pt came to nurse’s station and voiced he

was going to go ahead and head out. encouraged pt to stay as exam results were pending.

pt turned around headed back into room put coat on and said he was ‘just going to leave.’

13 Dr. Israelsen and this RN informed of risk ‘delay of treatment’ and to not take unknown

substances).”

¶ 39 During cross-examination, Lewis stated that the 2021 report authored by Dr. Cuneo

indicated that defendant informed him of having used methamphetamine fewer than 30 times since

relocating to Illinois 10 years prior. Conversely, in her report, defendant reported that he had used

methamphetamine on a few occasions. Lewis acknowledged that she regarded this as a

discrepancy.

¶ 40 Defendant indicated that he did not wish to testify and did not wish to make a statement in

allocution. This concluded defendant’s evidence. During closing arguments, the State requested

that defendant be sentenced to 60 years of incarceration. Defendant did not propose a specific

sentence but requested that the circuit court consider the guilty but mentally ill plea.

¶ 41 The circuit court indicated that under section 5-4-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730

ILCS 5/5-4-1 (West 2018)), it was to consider the evidence received at trial, but noted that no trial

occurred, and that defendant pleaded guilty. The circuit court indicated that it reviewed and

considered the autopsy report, the exhibits, the hospital reports, and the cases cited by the State

during closing arguments. The circuit court indicated that it considered the presentence report and

the financial impact of incarceration. It stated that it was to consider the evidence offered by the

parties in aggravation and mitigation, and found no factors in mitigation.

¶ 42 The circuit court then reviewed the factors in aggravation pursuant to section 5-5-3.2 of the

Unified Code of Corrections (id. § 5-5-3.2). The circuit court stated, “the Court finds, number one,

that the defendant’s conduct caused the death of Jennifer Phelps. Thirty-seven stab wounds

resulted in her death.” The circuit court discussed the third statutory factor in aggravation,

defendant’s criminal history. It included a minor ordinance violation, a possession of a controlled

14 substance in which defendant successfully completed probation, and possession of a weapon by a

felon and reckless discharge of a firearm for which he received two years in IDOC.

¶ 43 The circuit court reviewed the seventh statutory factor in aggravation and acknowledged

that a sentence is essential to deter others from committing the same offense. The circuit court

indicated that it considered arguments regarding sentencing alternatives and noted that defendant

elected not to make a statement on his own behalf. The circuit court stated that it considered the

victim impact statements that were read and filed.

¶ 44 The circuit court determined that defendant was guilty but mentally ill, as he visited

Wabash General Hospital on January 28, 2020. The circuit court stated that defendant informed

authorities of hearing voices and experiencing dreams and visions. Additionally, the circuit court

observed that no drugs were present in defendant’s system.

¶ 45 The circuit court discussed the early morning hospital visit on January 29, 2020, and

reaffirmed that no drugs were found in defendant’s system during that time. The circuit court noted

that Dr. Codispoti’s report dated May 31, 2020, indicated that defendant denied any history of

psychiatric treatment, psychiatric hospitalization, or suicide attempts. However, defendant

admitted to experiencing episodes of auditory hallucinations in the past while using drugs and

alcohol. The report further stated that defendant reported hearing thoughts that he could not

suppress, which advised him not to trust anyone and suggested that someone would be killed and

someone would receive money from the situation. The circuit court additionally observed that Dr.

Codispoti concluded that defendant was fit to stand trial.

¶ 46 The circuit court discussed the fitness examination report submitted by Dr. Cuneo on July

21, 2020, and acknowledged that Dr. Cuneo found defendant fit to stand trial. Furthermore, the

circuit court stated that “[a]nd at that time it was his opinion that mental illness does not, at present,

15 substantially impair his ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against

him or his ability to assist in his defense. And it was his opinion that Mr. Ruben Corzine was fit to

stand trial.”

¶ 47 The circuit court noted that a motion for evaluation of mental illness was filed, which

resulted in Dr. Cuneo filing another report on January 18, 2021, noting:

“At that time it was his opinion that Mr. Corzine’s mental illness did not

substantially impair either his ability to understand the nature and purpose of the

proceedings against him or his ability to assist in his defense. He noted that he never

mentioned hallucinations when he recanted his incident to the police.

Dr. Cuneo stated in his opinion that Mr. Corzine was suffering from a substantial

disorder of thought, mood and behavior, rule out unspecified schizophrenia spectrum, other

psychotic disorders, alcohol use disorder, opioid use disorder, methamphetamine use

disorder, cocaine use disorder and unspecified personality disorder which afflicted him at

the time of the alleged offense, which impaired his judgment and negatively affected his

behavior, but not to the extent that he was unable to appreciate the criminality of his

conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”

¶ 48 The circuit court acknowledged that Dr. Cuneo observed that defendant’s account of

hallucinations during the time of the offense appeared suspect and Dr. Cuneo “concluded that he

was sane at the time of the alleged offense.” The circuit court further noted that Dr. Cuneo opined

that defendant’s mental illness played a substantial role in his actions. The circuit court stated:

“He has a personality disorder and has many symptoms consistent with

unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders. He has repeatedly self-

medicated with drugs and alcohol as a means of dealing with his mental health problems,

16 which have increased his potential for acting out. His mental illness played a major role in

his actions at the time of the alleged offense; therefore, he believes that Mr. Corzine would

qualify for a guilty but mentally ill plea. Detective now Chief McWilliams testified that

the defendant’s friend, Dustin Kieffer, told him that days prior to the murder, he said he

was hearing voices.”

¶ 49 The circuit court sentenced defendant to 50 years of incarceration in IDOC with 3 years of

mandatory supervised release.

¶ 50 On September 11, 2021, defendant filed a handwritten note requesting an appeal. He

expressed that a 50-year sentence was unjust. He conveyed that he had previously sought help

before someone was harmed and that he did not wish for Phelps to die. He emphasized his love

for her. Furthermore, he claimed that the State attempted to portray him as a cold-blooded killer,

whereas he considered himself a good man with a mental disability. He asserted that he did not

believe he should spend his life incarcerated simply “because I’m different than other people.” He

stated that he did not receive a fair trial and conveyed his remorse for his actions.

¶ 51 On September 23, 2021, defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence, asking that

defendant be allowed to make a statement in allocution. Defense counsel also filed a certificate of

compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 52 The matter was scheduled for a hearing on the same day. Defense counsel indicated that

defendant did not make a statement in allocution because he was nervous, scared, and suffered

from a “mental situation” that heightened his anxiety levels. Defense counsel acknowledged that

he was not asserting any additional inaccuracies concerning the sentencing hearing and stated that

he was “very appreciative on Ruben’s behalf that the Court took such good notice of his mental

health issues and the circumstances of the tragedy when you came up with your sentence.” The

17 State objected, asserting that the motion for reconsideration was improper as it failed to allege any

errors committed by the circuit court. The State emphasized that defendant had the opportunity to

address the circuit court during the sentencing hearing in the presence of the family, and that

permitting a statement now would be inappropriate. The circuit court allowed defendant to make

a statement in allocution.

¶ 53 Defendant expressed a desire to apologize to the family, saying he had been reflecting on

the situation for two years. He stated it was not his intention to cause these events and wanted to

convey his remorse for what happened. He stated, “I tried to get help, but I just didn’t. I didn’t get

it.” He stated that Phelps was his best friend and that he loved her.

¶ 54 No argument of counsel was made. The circuit court denied the motion to reconsider.

¶ 55 On October 4, 2021, defendant filed a handwritten note to the circuit court, indicating his

intention to appeal. He expressed that his attorney “must have done something wrong, or he didn’t

do all that he could have done for me. He must have missed something.” Subsequently, a notice

of appeal was filed on October 19, 2021. On August 23, 2022, we issued a summary order

remanding the matter for a preliminary inquiry regarding defendant’s posttrial claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel, in accordance with People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984).

¶ 56 A Krankel hearing was conducted on December 22, 2022. After hearing from defendant

and defense counsel, the circuit court stated that defendant’s assertions were without merit and

related solely to trial strategy. It concluded that defendant’s allegations did not demonstrate any

potential neglect of the case. The circuit court further stated that defense counsel went above and

beyond and handled and represented defendant appropriately. On January 26, 2023, defendant

filed a handwritten note indicating his desire to appeal.

18 ¶ 57 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 58 Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the sentence was excessive

because he took responsibility for his crime by entering into a guilty plea, he had a history of

mental issues, and the circuit court’s emphasis on defendant’s criminal history and the need for

deterrence was misplaced. Second, he argues the circuit court erred because it improperly relied

on a factor inherent in the offense of first degree murder. For the following reasons, we disagree

with defendant.

¶ 59 The Illinois Constitution of 1970, article I, section 11, requires that “[a]ll penalties shall be

determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the

offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. “A sentencing court must not only

consider rehabilitative factors in imposing a sentence, it must also make rehabilitation an objective

of the sentence.” People v. Wendt, 163 Ill. 2d 346, 352-53 (1994). In fashioning an appropriate

sentence, the trial court must consider defendant’s “ ‘credibility, demeanor, general moral

character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age’ ” and impose a sentence based on the

circumstances of each case. People v. Pina, 2019 IL App (4th) 170614, ¶ 19 (quoting People v.

Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999)). The court must also carefully consider the statutory factors in

mitigation and aggravation. People v. Center, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 1033 (1990). The court is not,

however, required to recite and assign a value to each factor considered. Pina, 2019 IL App (4th)

170614, ¶ 19. There is a presumption that a circuit court considers all mitigating evidence

presented. People v. Abrams, 2015 IL App (1st) 133746, ¶ 33.

¶ 60 A trial court’s sentencing decision is entitled to great deference. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill.

2d 203, 209 (2000). Such deference is granted “because the trial court is generally in a better

position than the reviewing court to determine the appropriate sentence.” Id. “If a sentence falls

19 within the statutory limits, it will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”

People v. Bunning, 2018 IL App (5th) 150114, ¶ 16. “An abuse of discretion occurs only if a

sentence greatly varies from the spirit and purpose of the law or where it is manifestly

disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” Id.

¶ 61 A. Mitigating and Aggravating Factors

¶ 62 1. Guilty Plea and Remorse

¶ 63 Defendant contends that the circuit court failed to appropriately consider his open plea of

guilty and his expressions of remorse when evaluating mitigating factors. He maintains that he

pleaded guilty to first degree murder and threw himself on the mercy of the court “in order to do

the right thing.” Nonetheless, this claim is not supported by defendant’s own statements.

¶ 64 First, during the plea hearing, when questioned about whether his medication might have

influenced his capacity to sign a plea of guilty and waive his right to a jury trial, defendant

responded, “I’m not sure exactly what to do, Your Honor. I’ve been thinking about it quite a bit. I

just want the best outcome for me. I have children I’d like to make it back home to some day. And

as far as the law goes, I’m not 100 percent sure on my decision.” His remorse was notably absent

here, as he referenced himself eight times and did not mention Phelps or her family. Subsequently,

at the sentencing hearing, he did not make a statement in allocution. However, upon receiving a

50-year sentence, defendant filed a motion to reconsider, indicating that he now wished to make

an allocution statement. Despite the State’s objection, defendant was permitted to proceed;

however, by that time, he had already been sentenced, and his intention to deliver an allocution to

demonstrate remorse may no longer be regarded as the primary motivation for his action. He

claimed that his failure to make an allocution statement during the original sentencing was due to

20 nervousness and anxiety. Nonetheless, after the sentence was imposed, he expressed remorse to

Phelps’s family.

¶ 65 At times, defendant expressed remorse; at other moments, he demonstrated self-interest.

On appeal, defendant now claims altruism as his motivation for pleading guilty; however, he

simultaneously reveals that his purported altruistic intentions are ultimately a strategy to reduce

his sentence. Considering the nature and timing of defendant’s purported “remorse,” the circuit

court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence, as it could reasonably conclude that

defendant had not demonstrated any remorse at that time. The only instance during the proceedings

in which defendant referenced Phelps and his remorse was when he was under the circuit court’s

scrutiny, pleading for a reduced sentence. “[T]he court can consider defendant’s remorse, or lack

thereof ***.” People v. Nussbaum, 251 Ill. App. 3d 779, 781 (1993). As it stands, the circuit court

made no mention of defendant’s remorse one way or another, and it can be assumed his silence

neither helped nor hurt him.

¶ 66 Defendant further asserts that the circuit court committed error by not explicitly stating that

it took into account his guilty plea as a mitigating factor. While “[a]dmission of fault has been

recognized as a first step toward rehabilitation and should be treated as a factor in mitigation”

(People v. Pippen, 324 Ill. App. 3d 649, 653 (2001)), it is not obligatory and is not enumerated as

a factor in the statutory provisions. “The fact that the defendant pleaded guilty is not a statutory

factor in mitigation.” People v. Hernandez, 204 Ill. App. 3d 732, 740 (1990). The circuit court

imposed a sentence of 50 years, which was 10 years less than the maximum and the State’s

requested term. “The trial court is not required to articulate each and every factor that it considers

in rendering a sentence. However, that does not mean that it did not take all of the important and

relevant factors into account.” People v. Villalobos, 2020 IL App (1st) 171512, ¶ 74. “There is a

21 strong presumption that the sentencing court has considered all evidence of mitigation brought

before it.” People v. Deaton, 236 Ill. App. 3d 530, 547 (1992). The absence of specific mention by

the circuit court indicating that it considered defendant’s guilty plea does not equate to a failure to

consider it.

¶ 67 In this case, contrary to the arguments presented on appeal, defendant did not reference

Phelps or her family at any point before or during the sentencing hearing, but only did so during

the hearing for his motion to reconsider his sentence. It was during that hearing, which aimed at

seeking a reduction of his sentence, that defendant finally acknowledged Phelps and her family.

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by failing to mention defendant’s remorse and guilty

plea as mitigating factors, where his remorse is not evident in the record, and his guilty plea does

not, in and of itself, necessitate a consideration of a specific mitigating factor.

¶ 68 2. Mental Health

¶ 69 Defendant next contends that the circuit court failed to acknowledge his history of mental

health issues as a mitigating factor. The mitigation statute states in part, “At the time of the offense,

the defendant was suffering from a serious mental illness which, though insufficient to establish

the defense of insanity, substantially affected his or her ability to understand the nature of his or

her acts or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law.” 730 ILCS 5/5-5-

3.1(a)(16) (West 2018). In the present case, there was insufficient evidence indicating that

defendant’s mental illness substantially affected his ability to understand the nature of his acts or

to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

¶ 70 First, defendant’s account of the event to Dr. Cuneo significantly diverged from his account

given to the police shortly after the incident. Dr. Cuneo conducted two interviews with defendant,

in each of which defendant stated that, on the day in question, he had been hearing voices.

22 However, upon reviewing the police reports, Dr. Cuneo observed that during his interview with

the police on the day of the incident, defendant did not mention hearing voices or hallucinations.

Instead, he reported that he and Phelps became involved in an argument, during which Phelps

“pushed his buttons.” Defendant also stated that he grabbed a knife from the kitchen, and they “got

into it.” Notably, this initial account is corroborated by interviews with two of Phelps’s sons, who

were present prior to the incident and reported hearing an argument between Phelps and defendant.

In any event, defendant’s accounts of the events are inconsistent, he never informed Dr. Cuneo

that he and Phelps argued, and he never told the police that he heard voices.

¶ 71 Dr. Cuneo, who conducted two interviews with defendant, expressed the opinion that

defendant’s claims of hallucinations during the incident “appeared extremely suspect.” Moreover,

he deduced that although defendant exhibited “a substantial disorder of thought, mood, and

behavior” that affected him at the time of the incident and impaired his judgment, as well as

negatively influencing his conduct, it was not to an extent that rendered defendant “unable to

appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”

Dr. Cuneo further concluded that defendant was legally sane at the time of the incident.

¶ 72 Furthermore, the medical records from four hours prior to the incident do not support

defendant’s assertion. Defendant arrived at the hospital after ingesting unidentified pills provided

by Phelps, believing he was experiencing a reaction. During his examination at the hospital, he

was observed to be alert and oriented. The documentation for that visit does not indicate any

complaints of hearing voices or hallucinations. Subsequently, 56 minutes after arriving at the

emergency department, defendant left against medical advice. The report stated that defendant was

alert, oriented, and coherent, and that he was leaving for personal reasons. Less than five hours

later, following a dispute with Phelps, defendant killed her.

23 ¶ 73 Although the circuit court did not explicitly identify defendant’s mental health issues as a

statutory mitigating factor, it allocated substantial time in its discussion to address them. It

reviewed the fitness evaluations and Dr. Cuneo’s reports, employing all pertinent information to

substantiate a finding of guilty but mentally ill. In essence, the circuit court conducted a

comprehensive analysis of the evidence submitted and utilized the information in a manner it

deemed appropriate. As previously stated, a strong presumption exists that the circuit court

considered all mitigating evidence brought before it. Deaton, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 547.

¶ 74 The circuit court’s determination that there was no medical evidence indicating that

defendant’s mental illness substantially impaired his capacity to comprehend the nature of his

actions in stabbing Phelps is substantiated by Dr. Cuneo’s interview with defendant, police reports,

and medical records. The statements made by defendant both prior to and following the incident

lack any reference to hearing voices or hallucinations. It is only during his interviews with Dr.

Cuneo, conducted seven months later and a year later, that defendant claims to have been hearing

voices at the time of the incident, a claim that Dr. Cuneo remarked was “suspect.” Having

considered the totality of the evidence and defendant’s history, the circuit court found him guilty

but mentally ill. Defendant’s assertion that the circuit court did not take his mental health issues

into account is unfounded and not supported by the record, and the circuit court’s imposed sentence

was not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 75 3. Criminal History and Deterrence

¶ 76 Defendant contends that the circuit court improperly considered defendant’s criminal

history and the necessity for deterrence as aggravating factors. The statute enumerating

aggravating factors specifies these two considerations for the circuit court in determining an

24 appropriate sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(3), (7) (West 2018). We find that the level of

consideration the circuit court gave to these two factors did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

¶ 77 “The defendant’s prior criminal history is *** relevant.” People v. Mitchell, 213 Ill. App.

3d 1078, 1081 (1991). Defendant possesses a criminal history, commencing with a 2007

conviction for failing to identify a fugitive from justice. He has accumulated multiple drug-related

charges and was incarcerated in IDOC in 2017 for possession of a weapon by a felon and reckless

discharge of a firearm. An examination of his criminal history indicates a progressive escalation

in the severity and violent nature of his offenses over the years.

¶ 78 The circuit court, during its recitation, explicitly articulated certain statutory aggravating

factors, including deterrence. “[A] court may logically give reasonable consideration to the need

for deterrence as a factor in the imposition of a sentence.” People v. Harris, 231 Ill. App. 3d 876,

881 (1992). In the present case, Dr. Cuneo opined that defendant was sane at the time of the

incident. In other words, Defendant was aware that his actions were unlawful. Medical records

from a mere five hours prior to the incident further demonstrate that defendant was alert and

oriented. Defendant inflicted 37 stab wounds upon Phelps and, rather than seeking immediate

assistance, proceeded to a nearby convenience store where he smoked a cigarette, all while she

was bleeding to death. It is appropriate to seek to deter others from committing knowing acts such

as the homicide defendant stands convicted of, and to that end, the trial court appropriately

concluded that a substantial sentence was warranted.

¶ 79 Defendant essentially asks this court to reweigh the sentencing factors, claiming that his

50-year sentence for first degree murder is excessive. While it is true a circuit court’s sentencing

discretion is “not unfettered” (People v. O’Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 297 (1988)) and that the appellate

court was never meant to be a “rubber stamp” for the sentencing decisions of the circuit court

25 (People v. Woodson, 2024 IL App (1st) 221172, ¶ 89), it is also axiomatic that this court “must not

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because [we might] have weighed” the

pertinent sentencing factors differently. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209. A reviewing court’s role is not

to reweigh the sentencing factors or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. People v.

Klein, 2022 IL App (4th) 200599, ¶ 37. Here, the record reflects that the circuit court considered

the evidence and arguments of the parties, the factual basis, the PSI, the history, character, and

attitude of defendant, and the relevant statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation. The factors

considered by the sentencing court provide a sufficient basis for the sentence imposed in this

matter, and the circuit court’s sentence was within the statutory sentencing range. For these

reasons, we do not find that defendant’s sentence was excessive or that the circuit court abused its

discretion in sentencing defendant.

¶ 80 B. Double Enhancement

¶ 81 Defendant contends that the circuit court erred by relying on an element inherent in the

offense of first degree murder in fashioning its sentence. Specifically, defendant argues that the

court erroneously considered an aggravating factor as an element inherent in the offense of murder

when it stated that defendant’s conduct “caused the death of Jennifer Phelps. Thirty-seven stab

wounds resulted in her death.” One of the elements of first degree murder, as delineated in section

9-1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2018)), is that defendant

caused the death of another individual. As such, defendant asserts that the circuit court’s statement

constituted an impermissible double enhancement and thus warrants a reduction in sentence or a

remand for a new sentencing hearing. We, however, disagree.

¶ 82 “A double enhancement occurs when either (1) a single factor is used both as an element

of an offense and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been

26 imposed, or (2) the same factor is used twice to elevate the severity of the offense itself.” People

v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 545 (2005). “Generally, a factor implicit in the offense for which the

defendant has been convicted cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that

offense, absent a clear legislative intent to accomplish that result.” People v. Ferguson, 132 Ill. 2d

86, 97 (1989). The reasoning for the rule against double enhancement is “premised on the

assumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in determining the

appropriate range of penalties for that offense.” People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 390 (1995). We

review complaints of double enhancement de novo. People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (2004).

¶ 83 1. Waiver

¶ 84 We observe initially that defendant did not raise an objection at the time the statement was

made, nor was the issue articulated in a postsentence motion. “It is well settled that, to preserve a

claim of sentencing error, both a contemporaneous objection and a written postsentencing motion

raising the issue are required.” People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544-45 (2010). Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 604(d) states that if a sentence is challenged, the defendant must file a motion to

reconsider the sentence, which “shall state the grounds therefor,” and that “[u]pon appeal any issue

not raised by the defendant in the motion to reconsider sentence *** shall be deemed waived.” Ill.

S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). Neither defendant’s handwritten letter nor defense counsel’s

motion address the statements made by the circuit court during its judgment as being improper.

Rather, defendant solely claimed that he wished to make a statement in allocution.

¶ 85 As discussed by the Illinois Supreme Court, any issue not raised in a postplea motion is

waived on appeal. People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 26. Because defendant did not challenge

the circuit court’s statement in his motion to reconsider, “the trial court did not have the

27 opportunity to address and correct any errors. Thus, the defendant’s omission of that issue in his

postplea motions waived consideration of it on review.” Id. ¶ 28.

¶ 86 2. Plain Error

¶ 87 While this issue is waived, we will briefly address defendant’s contention under the plain-

error doctrine. “The plain-error doctrine is a narrow and limited exception.” People v. Hillier, 237

Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). To obtain relief under the plain-error doctrine, a defendant must first show

that a clear or obvious error occurred. Id. “In the sentencing context, a defendant must then show

either that (1) the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so

egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” Id. The defendant bears the burden

of persuasion under both prongs of the plain-error doctrine. Id.

¶ 88 We first examine whether the alleged error can be reviewed under the second prong of a

plain error analysis. “ ‘[S]econd-prong plain error can be invoked only for structural errors ***.’ ”

People v. Johnson, 2024 IL 130191, ¶ 91 (quoting People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 49).

“[S]tructural errors affect the very framework within which the sentencing hearing proceeds, rather

than mere errors in the sentencing process itself.” Id. ¶ 89. “Because a sentencing court is required

to weigh all the evidence and factors in aggravation and mitigation to determine a defendant’s

culpability in imposing the sentence (see 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1 (West 2018)), a structural error at

sentencing is an error that renders the sentencing hearing itself an unreliable means of

implementing that balance.” Id. Here, the circuit court’s alleged error of considering an improper

factor in aggravation does not satisfy that standard because it did not affect the framework within

which the sentencing hearing proceeded, but was at most an error in the sentencing process itself.

Id.; see People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 29. “Nor did the error undermine the integrity of the

28 judicial process or render the sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair.” Johnson, 2024 IL 130191,

¶ 90.

¶ 89 Additionally, second-prong plain error is not subject to harmless error analysis. Id. ¶ 91

(quoting Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 49). “In contrast, ‘errors reviewable under the first prong of

the plain error rule are the type of errors that are subject to harmless error analysis, and a defendant

must establish prejudice resulting from the error to excuse his forfeiture of such an error.’ ” Id.

(quoting Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 23). Our Illinois Supreme Court has previously found that

“ ‘the admission of improper aggravation evidence during a sentencing proceeding is subject to

harmless-error analysis and reversal is not mandated in every instance.’ ” Id. (quoting People v.

Banks, 237 Ill. 2d 154, 197 (2010)). Because defendant’s assertion that the circuit court erred in

considering an aggravating factor “is amenable to harmless error analysis, it follows that it is not

a structural error and may not be reviewed under the second prong of the plain error rule, but it is

reviewable under the first prong of plain error analysis.” Id. ¶ 92. As a result, we turn to a first-

prong plain error analysis—addressing first whether there was a clear and obvious error before

determining whether a prejudice analysis is warranted.

¶ 90 When delivering its sentence, the circuit court initially referenced the mitigating factors

statute and explicitly stated that none of the enumerated mitigating factors were applicable.

Subsequently, it addressed the aggravating factor statute, commencing with the first factor listed

therein, namely “the defendant’s conduct caused or threatened serious harm.” 730 ILCS 5/5-5-

3.2(a)(1) (West 2018). More specifically, the circuit court articulated, “number one, that the

defendant’s conduct caused the death of Jennifer Phelps. Thirty-seven stab wounds resulted in her

death.” The defendant contends that this statement indicates the circuit court considered an

inherent factor, thereby constituting error.

29 ¶ 91 We initially observe that, when deciding whether the circuit court relied on an improper

aggravating factor in its sentencing, our analysis considers “ ‘the record as a whole, rather than

focusing on a few words or statements by the trial court.’ ” People v. Denniston, 2025 IL App (4th)

240381-U, ¶ 43 (quoting People v. Dowding, 388 Ill. App. 3d 936, 943 (2009)). Immediately

following the contested statement, the circuit court noted, “[n]umber three, the defendant has a

history of prior delinquency or activity, criminal activity.” Subsequently, the court proceeded to

number seven. In essence, the circuit court was simply listing the aggravating factors it considered

relevant in the order they appear in the statute. A comprehensive reading of the court’s recitation

suggests that it systematically reviewed the statute and noted those factors it regarded as

significant.

¶ 92 We recognize that “[i]t is impermissible for the circuit court to impose a more severe

sentence on the ground that defendant caused the victim serious bodily harm, namely, death,

because death is inherent in the offense.” People v. Benford, 349 Ill. App. 3d 721, 734 (2004).

Nevertheless, as previously noted, a court may consider the aggravating factor that “defendant’s

conduct caused or threatened serious harm.” 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West 2018). “Where a

court applies this aggravating factor, it may consider the force employed and the physical manner

in which the victim’s death was brought about, which comprehends the degree or gravity of

defendant’s conduct rather than the end result, that is, the victim’s demise.” Benford, 349 Ill. App.

3d at 734-35. This is precisely what occurred in the present case. Based upon a comprehensive

review of the circuit court’s remarks at the sentencing hearing, the court’s reference to Phelps’s

death was an acknowledgment of the occurrence of a serious offense, given that defendant stabbed

her 37 times. Defendant stabbed Phelps so hard that the knife bent. He then left her there to bleed

to death while he went outside to take a walk and smoke a cigarette. “The reference by the court

30 does not reflect that it considered the murder as an aggravating factor; rather, the court merely was

noting that ‘defendant’s conduct caused *** serious harm.’ See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West

20[18]).” Id. at 735. Consequently, we determine that the circuit court “did not violate the principle

that a factor inherent in an offense should not be considered as a statutory aggravating factor” (id.),

and thus its statement was not clear and obvious error. “[W]ithout a finding of clear or obvious

error, there can be no reversal under the plain-error doctrine.” People v. Anaya, 2017 IL App (1st)

150074, ¶ 99. Therefore, had this issue not been waived, defendant still would not have received

recourse under the plain-error doctrine.

¶ 93 3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 94 Defendant next asserts that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because

defense counsel failed to object to the circuit court’s statement regarding the stabbing of Phelps

and failed to include the contested statement in the motion to reconsider. “The benchmark for

judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just

result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). “[T]he proper standard for attorney

performance is that of reasonably effective assistance.” Id. at 687. “When a convicted defendant

complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687-88. “[T]he

performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the

circumstances.” Id. at 688.

¶ 95 “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate

the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. “Because

31 of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is,

the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action

‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ [Citation.]” Id. “There are countless ways to provide

effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend

a particular client the same way.” Id. “An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable,

does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on

the judgment. *** Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to

the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.” Id. at 691-92.

¶ 96 “When addressing a claim of plain error and an alternative claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, appellate courts first consider whether the defendant has established a clear or obvious

error. ‘Absent a clear or obvious error ***, neither the doctrine of plain error nor a theory of

ineffective assistance affords any relief from the forfeiture.’ ” People v. Gilker, 2023 IL App (4th)

220914, ¶ 78 (quoting People v. Jones, 2020 IL App (4th) 190909, ¶ 179). Therefore, since we

determined that there was no clear or obvious error in the circuit court’s statement regarding the

gravity of defendant’s actions, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel similarly

provides him no relief, as there was no error to object to or to include in his motion.

¶ 97 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 98 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence imposed by the Wabash County circuit

court.

¶ 99 Affirmed.