2022 IL App (2d) 210483-U No. 2-21-0483 Order filed August 31, 2022
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 19-CF-1201 ) REINALDO ALONSO CORONA, ) Honorable ) Alice C. Tracy, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hudson and Brennan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court fulfilled its duties under People v. Krankel where (1) one of defendant’s ineffectiveness claims did not implicate trial counsel’s performance and, thus, the court had no duty to conduct a Krankel inquiry; and (2) the trial court’s inquiry into the remaining ineffectiveness claims was sufficient to establish their lack of merit.
¶2 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Kane County, defendant, Reinaldo Alonso
Corona, was found guilty of a single count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720
ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018)) and three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (id.
§§ 11-1.60(c)(1)(i), 11-1.60(d) (2018)). The court sentenced defendant to a six-year prison term 2022 IL App (2d) 210483-U
for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and a three-year prison term for each count of
aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The sentences for aggravated criminal sexual abuse were to be
served concurrently with one another, but consecutively to the sentence for predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court did not conduct an
adequate inquiry into his pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant was represented at trial by two attorneys: Michael Combs and Todd Cohen.
J.G., who was born on March 22, 2006, testified for the State that in May 2019, she attended a
family party at the home of her cousin, M.A., to celebrate M.A.’s confirmation. J.G. slept over at
the party in M.A.’s bedroom. There were several adults at the party including defendant, who was
born in 1989. J.G. testified that at some point she woke up and found defendant with one hand on
her thigh and the other on her chest. He was trying to squeeze her breast over her clothes. When
he saw that she was awake, he left the room. About a week later, she told her French teacher what
had happened.
¶5 M.A. testified that she was born on February 22, 2005. She recounted an incident that
occurred when she was about eight years old. She and her family lived in St. Charles at the time.
Defendant, who was a cousin, also lived with the family. Defendant took M.A. into his bedroom,
where he removed her clothes, touched inside and around her vagina with his fingers, and touched
and tried to squeeze her breasts.
¶6 Before the close of the State’s case-in-chief, the trial court advised defendant that he had
the right to testify, that no one could prevent him from doing so, and that the decision to testify
was his and his alone. Defendant confirmed that he understood those rights and that he had enough
time to consult with his attorneys about his decision whether to testify. However, he accepted the
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trial court’s offer for more time to consult before making his final decision. After a recess, the
following exchange occurred between the trial court and defendant:
“THE COURT: ***
So, sir, we’ve had a little break here and I want to go over your right to testify or
not testify. We went over that pretty thoroughly before the break and you asked for a little
bit more time to talk to your attorneys. Have you had enough time to talk to them about
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And what is your decision, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: I’m not going to testify.”
¶7 The State’s last witness was J.G.’s French teacher, Julia Thornton. Thornton testified that
in May or June of 2019 she had a conversation with J.G. Thornton relayed the conversation to
J.G.’s school counselor. Thornton and the counselor then made a report of suspected abuse to the
Department of Children and Family Services.
¶8 The defense rested without presenting any evidence. The jury returned a guilty verdict on
all counts. The matter was continued for sentencing, and a presentence investigation report (PSI)
was prepared. As pertinent here, the PSI stated, “[Defendant] maintains his innocence in this case.
He said he wanted to testify and his attorneys did not allow him.”
¶9 Combs was present at the sentencing hearing. Cohen was not. Defendant spoke in
allocution, stating, inter alia, “I am not guilty. I didn’t do what I am accused of. I would like to
see if you could give me another opportunity so I could defend myself that my attorney did not
defend me the way I thought, because he did not present witnesses.”
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¶ 10 Before pronouncing sentence, the trial court expressed concern about both defendant’s
statement in the PSI that (1) his counsel did not allow him to testify and (2) in his statement in
allocution, counsel did not present witnesses. Regarding defendant’s statement in allocution, the
trial court asked defendant what he wanted “another opportunity” to do. Defendant responded,
“Another opportunity, another trial, a new trial with a new jury, because as a part of the jury, I
would like Hispanic jurors because there were only American jury members in that jury.”
¶ 11 The trial court then asked Combs to address defendant’s statement in allocution that
counsel did not present any witnesses. Combs replied as follows:
“Illinois law does not allow me to call a witness to say that they never saw [defendant]
abuse children. That’s improper character evidence, and I did explain that to him. I can’t
bring in witnesses to say, ‘I know him, and I have never seen him touch a child.’ That
doesn’t disprove the allegations in the indictment. And I had that conversation with him.
So that’s all I would say about that.”
The trial court asked Combs whether defendant named any specific witnesses whom he wanted
Combs to call. Combs replied, “No.”
¶ 12 Concerning defendant’s statement in the PSI that counsel did not allow defendant to testify,
the trial court remarked that it recalled having advised defendant that it was his decision whether
to testify and that defendant confirmed that he had decided not to testify. The trial court asked
Combs to respond to defendant’s allegation that he was not allowed to testify. Combs replied,
“Judge, Mr. Cohen and I specifically discussed that with him, and you discussed it with him in
open court on the record. So, no, I have nothing to say about that.” The trial court then had the
following exchange with Combs:
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“THE COURT: And I recall that maybe I gave you more time to go out in the
hallway to talk to him about that again.
MR. COMBS: Yes. Correct, Judge, you did.
THE COURT: So you talked about that with him; is that correct, Mr. Combs?
MR. COMBS: Yes, as did Mr. Cohen.
THE COURT: And that was ultimately your client’s decision, correct?
MR. COMBS: Correct.”
Shortly thereafter, defendant addressed the trial court, stating, “I talked to [Cohen] about me being
able to testify, and we agreed that I was going to testify on that day, and [Cohen] told me that I
didn’t have to say anything at all, that everything was okay.” The trial court reminded defendant
that it had given him a long time to talk with his attorneys about the decision to testify. Defendant
responded, “That’s why we went out. I just wanted to make sure the way I was going to talk to
the jury.”
¶ 13 The trial court concluded that neither of defendant’s attorneys had neglected the case. The
trial court then imposed sentence, and this appeal followed.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 Defendant argues on appeal that he advanced pro se posttrial claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel and that, as a result, the trial court was obligated to conduct an inquiry under
People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and its progeny to determine whether to appoint new
counsel to represent defendant on those claims. Defendant claims the inquiry conducted by the
trial court was deficient.
¶ 16 In People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 77-79 (2003), our supreme court explained the Krankel
procedure as follows:
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In [Krankel,] the defendant’s trial counsel failed to contact an alibi witness or to
present an alibi defense at trial. The defendant raised a pro se posttrial challenge to his
attorney’s competence at trial. The parties agreed that the trial court should have appointed
counsel, other than his originally appointed counsel, to represent defendant at the posttrial
hearing regarding his claim of ineffective assistance. This court remanded the matter for a
new hearing on the defendant’s motion with newly appointed counsel. [Citation.]
In interpreting Krankel, the following rule developed. New counsel is not
automatically required in every case in which a defendant presents a pro se posttrial motion
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather, when a defendant presents a pro se
posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court should first examine the
factual basis of the defendant’s claim. If the trial court determines that the claim lacks
merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new
counsel and may deny the pro se motion. However, if the allegations show possible neglect
of the case, new counsel should be appointed. [Citations.] The new counsel would then
represent the defendant at the hearing on the defendant’s pro se claim of ineffective
assistance. [Citations.] The appointed counsel can independently evaluate the defendant’s
claim and would avoid the conflict of interest that trial counsel would experience if trial
counsel had to justify his or her actions contrary to defendant’s position. [Citations.]
The operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted
an adequate inquiry into the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel. [Citation.] During this evaluation, some interchange between the trial court and
trial counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective
representation is permissible and usually necessary in assessing what further action, if any,
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is warranted on a defendant’s claim. Trial counsel may simply answer questions and
explain the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s allegations. [Citations.]
A brief discussion between the trial court and the defendant may be sufficient. [Citations.]
Also, the trial court can base its evaluation of the defendant’s pro se allegations of
ineffective assistance on its knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the
insufficiency of the defendant’s allegations on their face. [Citations.]”
¶ 17 The pro se allegations need not appear in a formal written motion. “[A] pro se defendant
is not required to do any more than bring his or her claim to the trial court’s attention.” Id. at 79.
The defendant may raise the claim orally or in a letter or a note. People v. Bates, 2019 IL 124143,
¶ 15. Additionally, a defendant’s statements in a PSI may obligate the trial court to conduct a
Krankel inquiry. People v. Craig, 2020 IL App (2d) 170679, ¶ 18. However, failure to conduct a
proper Krankel inquiry will be deemed a harmless error if the record positively rebuts the
defendant’s pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Palomera, 2022 IL App
(2d) 200631, ¶¶ 63-64 (claim that the defendant was coerced to waive his right to a jury trial was
positively rebutted by the record, which showed that, before accepting the waiver, the trial court
twice asked the defendant whether anyone was forcing him to waive his jury right and the
defendant indicated that he was not being forced and that he believed a bench trial was his best
choice).
¶ 18 We turn to defendant’s arguments. He first contends that the trial court failed to conduct a
proper Krankel inquiry into his complaint that there were no Hispanics on the jury. According to
defendant, his complaint is “reasonably read” as a claim that his right to a jury drawn from a fair
cross-section of the community was violated, “and by implication, a claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the venire on those grounds.” The State disputes that
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implication. According to the State, defendant’s complaint about the jury was not related to
counsel’s performance and, therefore, did not trigger the duty to conduct a Krankel inquiry. We
agree with the State.
¶ 19 To trigger the trial court’s duty to conduct a Krankel inquiry, a defendant “ ‘does not need
to explicitly label his claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel’ ” and does not need to
“ ‘explicitly state he is dissatisfied with counsel’s performance.’ ” In re Johnathan T., 2022 IL
127222, ¶ 53 (quoting People v. Banks, 2021 IL App (5th) 190129-U, ¶ 30 (Wharton, J.,
dissenting)). Nonetheless, the defendant must “ ‘clearly raise[] the issue of counsel’s performance
with the court.’ ” Id. In cases cited by the State, courts refused to characterize the defendants’
claims as ones of ineffective assistance of counsel where the defendants did not mention counsel.
People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 68 (“Typically, a defendant must at least mention
his attorney in connection with his complaints for them to be considered ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.”); People v. Thomas, 2017 IL App (4th) 150815, ¶ 31 (“[F]or a defendant to make
a clear claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must at least mention his attorney.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted)). Accord People v. King, 2017 IL App (1st) 142297, ¶ 18
(reference to a witness who did not testify was not a “clear claim asserting ineffective assistance
of counsel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶ 20 Defendant argues that, unlike the cases cited by the State, “[his] claim arose in the context
of his complaining about counsel’s performance.” Defendant insists that he “brought his
complaint about the racial composition of the jury to the trial court when asked by the court why
he wanted ‘another opportunity,’ which moments earlier he had said he wanted due to his
attorney’s ineffectiveness.” In the earlier statement, however, defendant was quite specific that
his grievance against counsel stemmed from counsel’s failure to call witnesses. We see no basis
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for expanding the scope of that specific claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Here, although
defendant complained that there were no Hispanic jurors, he did not link his complaint to counsel’s
performance. Accordingly, that complaint did not trigger a duty to conduct a Krankel inquiry.
¶ 21 Defendant next challenges the adequacy of the Krankel inquiry into his claim that counsel
did not present witnesses. The trial court asked Combs about that allegation and Combs explained
that he told defendant that Illinois law did not permit him to call witnesses to testify that they never
saw defendant abuse children. Combs stated that he told defendant that that would be improper
“character evidence.” Defendant argues that, “[w]hile counsel’s statement that he explained to
[defendant] that he could not present improper character evidence implies that those were the only
witnesses [defendant] told counsel about, counsel never explicitly stated that was the case.”
Defendant argues that the trial court therefore should have asked defendant whether he provided
the names of any specific witnesses to his attorneys and what their testimony would have been.
¶ 22 Defendant ignores Combs’s express statement that defendant did not identify any specific
witnesses he wanted to call. In any event, under the circumstances here, the distinction between
what Combs implied and what he expressly stated is of no consequence. Combs’s statement to
the trial court did, indeed, imply that there were no witnesses who could give admissible evidence
favorable to defense. Combs surely understood that implication, and he would be guilty of a lie
by omission if he knew such witnesses existed. As an officer of the court, Combs had a duty to be
honest and forthright in his dealings with the court. See Semmons v. Semmons, 77 Ill. App. 3d
936, 940 (1979). When questioning defense counsel as part of a Krankel inquiry, a trial court is
entitled to rely on counsel to fulfill that ethical duty. Accordingly, the trial court’s exchange with
Combs was a sufficient basis for the trial court to conclude that there was no merit to defendant’s
complaint about the failure to call witnesses.
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¶ 23 In his reply brief, defendant mischaracterizes the argument in his opening brief. Defendant
contends that he argued that “[defendant’s] claim involved conversations [he] had with his two
attorneys outside of court, only one of those attorneys was present for the Krankel inquiry, and the
court only ascertained, from the attorney present, that [defendant] had not provided a list of
witnesses to that attorney.” (Emphasis in original.) Thus, according to defendant, the trial court
should have asked defendant whether he provided a list of witnesses to his other attorney. That is
an entirely new argument; nowhere in his opening brief did defendant suggest that he might have
discussed certain witnesses with Cohen but not Combs. It is well established that “an appellant
forfeits points not raised in the initial brief and cannot argue them for the first time in the reply
brief.” Sellers v. Rudert, 395 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1046 (2009); see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff.
Oct. 1, 2020). Accordingly, we do not consider the argument.
¶ 24 Finally, defendant contends that the trial court did not conduct an adequate Krankel inquiry
into his claim that counsel did not permit him to testify. Defendant contends that Combs’s
statement that he discussed the right to testify with defendant did not contradict defendant’s claim.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, however, Combs not only indicated that he had discussed the
right to testify with defendant, but Combs also confirmed the trial court’s statement that it “was
ultimately [defendant’s] decision.”
¶ 25 According to defendant, his statements during the Krankel hearing “imply that he ***
wanted to testify and needed more time to discuss his testimony with his attorneys.” Defendant
argues that the trial court should have asked defendant for clarification. Be that as it may, any
error in the failure to do so was harmless because the record positively rebuts defendant’s claim.
See Palomera, 2022 IL App (2d) 200631, ¶¶ 63-64. People v. Palmer, 2017 IL App (4th) 150020,
is instructive. In that case, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition claiming that he
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was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel refused to allow him to
testify. The Palmer court affirmed the summary dismissal of the petition. In doing so, the Palmer
court distinguished cases cited by defendant on the basis that “none of them involve[d] a
circumstance where the defendants’ allegations were positively rebutted by the record.” Id. ¶ 22
The Palmer court explained:
“Essentially, defendant’s overarching premise is that he was denied his constitutional right
to testify. The record contradicts that assertion. After the first day of trial, the trial court
(1) admonished defendant regarding his right to testify, (2)encouraged defendant to speak
with defense counsel for advice, and (3) specifically told defendant, ‘ultimately, it’s your
decision to make as to whether you testify or not.’ The next day, after the State rested and
it was time for defendant to present his evidence, the court admonished defendant at length
regarding his right to testify. The court again reminded defendant that the decision to
testify belonged solely to him. The court stated, ‘Do you understand it’s your decision to
make as to whether you testify or you don’t?’ Defendant responded, ‘Yes.’ Throughout
the admonishments, the record demonstrates no equivocation or misunderstanding on
defendant’s part as he waived his right to testify, nor did defendant bring his concerns to
the attention of the trial court at any time during the proceedings.” Id.
¶ 26 Here, defendant was advised by the trial court of his right to testify and was told that the
decision to do so was his and his alone. Defendant acknowledged that he understood. Defendant
confirmed that he had spoken with his attorneys about testifying and accepted the trial court’s offer
for more time to consult with his attorneys. After defendant did so, the trial court specifically
asked defendant “what is your decision, sir?” (Emphasis added.) Defendant responded, “I’m not
going to testify.” Just as the record in Palmer positively rebutted defendant’s postconviction claim
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that counsel did not allow him to testify, the record here positively rebuts defendant’s pro se
posttrial claim (as reflected in the PSI) that counsel did not allow him to testify.
¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 29 Affirmed.
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