NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2026 IL App (3d) 250173-U
Order filed April 1, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) Appeal No. 3-25-0173 v. ) Circuit No. 25-DT-64 ) ISMAEL CORNEJO, ) Honorable ) Colette Safford, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE ANDERSON delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Hettel and Justice Peterson concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court erred in granting defendant’s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license where the officer had reasonable grounds to believe defendant was driving while under the influence of alcohol.
¶2 The State appeals the order of the Will County circuit court that granted the petition of
defendant, Ismael Cornejo, to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license.
The State argues that the court erred in finding that there were no reasonable grounds for the officer
to believe that defendant was driving while under the influence of alcohol. We reverse. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On January 25, 2025, defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol
(DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2024)) and disobeying a traffic control signal (id. § 11-
306). He was served with a statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license for refusing to
submit to chemical testing. Defendant filed a petition to rescind the suspension, arguing that the
officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe defendant was driving while under the influence.
The matter proceeded to a hearing where the following evidence was presented.
¶5 Officer John Beck testified he was employed by the Joliet Police Department. On January
25, 2025, at approximately 2:50 a.m., Beck observed a vehicle directly in front of him stop at a red
traffic light then proceed through the intersection while the light was still red. Beck initiated a
traffic stop. Beck approached the vehicle and spoke with defendant, who was the driver. Beck
informed defendant of the reason for the stop, and defendant appeared confused and stated he
stopped at the traffic light and asked how long he needed to stop. Beck explained defendant needed
to remain stopped until the light turned green as it was a traffic light and not a stop sign. Beck
asked for defendant’s driver’s license and insurance, and defendant fumbled with his wallet.
Defendant provided he was coming from downtown and had consumed a couple of alcoholic
beverages. Beck asked defendant for more specific information regarding the quantity of alcoholic
beverages defendant consumed. Defendant stated he did not know, then that maybe he had one or
two beers, and then provided he consumed two beers two hours prior. Beck observed defendant’s
eyes were bloodshot and watery, his speech was thick and slurred and at times he mumbled, and a
strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emanated from his breath.
¶6 Defendant denied having any physical impairments that would prevent him from
performing field sobriety tests but stated he was not going to do anything. Beck asked defendant
2 to exit the vehicle, and defendant held onto the door as he exited. Beck asked defendant why he
was refusing the field sobriety tests and defendant rambled about a friend who had consumed wine
and was arrested after submitting to field sobriety tests. Defendant was concerned the same would
happen to him if he performed poorly. Beck continued to smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage
emanating from defendant’s breath during this conversation outside the vehicle. Defendant
confirmed with Beck that he was refusing to submit to field sobriety tests. Beck then asked
defendant to submit to a preliminary Breathalyzer test. Defendant declined, stating that he did not
trust the machine because it was inaccurate. Defendant began to explain why the machines were
not accurate and gave an example about Beck and another officer consuming alcoholic beverages
after work. Beck stated defendant was rambling and these statements did not make any sense.
¶7 Beck arrested defendant for DUI based on defendant’s driving and confusion related to
treating a traffic light as if it were a stop sign, admission to consuming alcoholic beverages,
bloodshot and watery eyes, thick slurred and mumbled speech, breath emanating the strong odor
of an alcoholic beverage, and refusal to perform standardized field sobriety tests. Beck detailed his
training and experience in detecting impaired drivers, which included the completion of various
courses, certification as a drug recognition expert, a license as a breath analysis operator, and that
he served as a standardized field sobriety test instructor. Beck opined defendant could not safely
operate a motor vehicle. Beck’s body camera and dash camera footage were admitted into
evidence.
¶8 The State moved for a directed verdict and argued Beck had probable cause to arrest
defendant. The court denied the motion, finding that defendant met his initial burden of no
reasonable grounds and the burden had shifted to the State. The State rested. The court granted the
3 petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension on the basis that defendant met his initial
burden and the State failed to refute it. The State appeals.
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, the State argues that the court erred in finding defendant established a
prima facie case and ultimately granting the recission of defendant’s statutory summary
suspension because Beck had reasonable grounds to believe defendant was driving while under
the influence. Defendant did not file an appellee’s brief in this appeal. However, we will proceed
with this appeal as the record is simple and the issue can be easily decided without the aid of an
appellee’s brief. See People v. Kavanaugh, 2016 IL App (3d) 150806, ¶ 24.
¶ 11 A defendant who receives notice of a summary suspension of his driver’s license may
request a hearing to rescind the statutory summary suspension. 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West
2024). One of the grounds that may be argued is “[w]hether the officer had reasonable grounds to
believe that the person was driving *** while under the influence.” Id. § 2-118.1(b). The circuit
court may utilize a probable cause analysis in these instances. People v. Acevedo, 2017 IL App
(3d) 150750, ¶ 17. To determine whether probable cause existed, “the trial court must determine
whether a reasonable and prudent person, having the knowledge possessed by the officer at the
time of the arrest, would believe the defendant committed the offense.” People v. Fortney, 297 Ill.
App. 3d 79, 87 (1998). This standard requires the officer to have more than a mere suspicion but
need not rise to a level of evidence sufficient to convict. People v. Fonner, 385 Ill. App. 3d 531,
540 (2008).
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NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2026 IL App (3d) 250173-U
Order filed April 1, 2026 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) Appeal No. 3-25-0173 v. ) Circuit No. 25-DT-64 ) ISMAEL CORNEJO, ) Honorable ) Colette Safford, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE ANDERSON delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Hettel and Justice Peterson concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court erred in granting defendant’s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license where the officer had reasonable grounds to believe defendant was driving while under the influence of alcohol.
¶2 The State appeals the order of the Will County circuit court that granted the petition of
defendant, Ismael Cornejo, to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license.
The State argues that the court erred in finding that there were no reasonable grounds for the officer
to believe that defendant was driving while under the influence of alcohol. We reverse. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On January 25, 2025, defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol
(DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2024)) and disobeying a traffic control signal (id. § 11-
306). He was served with a statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license for refusing to
submit to chemical testing. Defendant filed a petition to rescind the suspension, arguing that the
officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe defendant was driving while under the influence.
The matter proceeded to a hearing where the following evidence was presented.
¶5 Officer John Beck testified he was employed by the Joliet Police Department. On January
25, 2025, at approximately 2:50 a.m., Beck observed a vehicle directly in front of him stop at a red
traffic light then proceed through the intersection while the light was still red. Beck initiated a
traffic stop. Beck approached the vehicle and spoke with defendant, who was the driver. Beck
informed defendant of the reason for the stop, and defendant appeared confused and stated he
stopped at the traffic light and asked how long he needed to stop. Beck explained defendant needed
to remain stopped until the light turned green as it was a traffic light and not a stop sign. Beck
asked for defendant’s driver’s license and insurance, and defendant fumbled with his wallet.
Defendant provided he was coming from downtown and had consumed a couple of alcoholic
beverages. Beck asked defendant for more specific information regarding the quantity of alcoholic
beverages defendant consumed. Defendant stated he did not know, then that maybe he had one or
two beers, and then provided he consumed two beers two hours prior. Beck observed defendant’s
eyes were bloodshot and watery, his speech was thick and slurred and at times he mumbled, and a
strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emanated from his breath.
¶6 Defendant denied having any physical impairments that would prevent him from
performing field sobriety tests but stated he was not going to do anything. Beck asked defendant
2 to exit the vehicle, and defendant held onto the door as he exited. Beck asked defendant why he
was refusing the field sobriety tests and defendant rambled about a friend who had consumed wine
and was arrested after submitting to field sobriety tests. Defendant was concerned the same would
happen to him if he performed poorly. Beck continued to smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage
emanating from defendant’s breath during this conversation outside the vehicle. Defendant
confirmed with Beck that he was refusing to submit to field sobriety tests. Beck then asked
defendant to submit to a preliminary Breathalyzer test. Defendant declined, stating that he did not
trust the machine because it was inaccurate. Defendant began to explain why the machines were
not accurate and gave an example about Beck and another officer consuming alcoholic beverages
after work. Beck stated defendant was rambling and these statements did not make any sense.
¶7 Beck arrested defendant for DUI based on defendant’s driving and confusion related to
treating a traffic light as if it were a stop sign, admission to consuming alcoholic beverages,
bloodshot and watery eyes, thick slurred and mumbled speech, breath emanating the strong odor
of an alcoholic beverage, and refusal to perform standardized field sobriety tests. Beck detailed his
training and experience in detecting impaired drivers, which included the completion of various
courses, certification as a drug recognition expert, a license as a breath analysis operator, and that
he served as a standardized field sobriety test instructor. Beck opined defendant could not safely
operate a motor vehicle. Beck’s body camera and dash camera footage were admitted into
evidence.
¶8 The State moved for a directed verdict and argued Beck had probable cause to arrest
defendant. The court denied the motion, finding that defendant met his initial burden of no
reasonable grounds and the burden had shifted to the State. The State rested. The court granted the
3 petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension on the basis that defendant met his initial
burden and the State failed to refute it. The State appeals.
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, the State argues that the court erred in finding defendant established a
prima facie case and ultimately granting the recission of defendant’s statutory summary
suspension because Beck had reasonable grounds to believe defendant was driving while under
the influence. Defendant did not file an appellee’s brief in this appeal. However, we will proceed
with this appeal as the record is simple and the issue can be easily decided without the aid of an
appellee’s brief. See People v. Kavanaugh, 2016 IL App (3d) 150806, ¶ 24.
¶ 11 A defendant who receives notice of a summary suspension of his driver’s license may
request a hearing to rescind the statutory summary suspension. 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West
2024). One of the grounds that may be argued is “[w]hether the officer had reasonable grounds to
believe that the person was driving *** while under the influence.” Id. § 2-118.1(b). The circuit
court may utilize a probable cause analysis in these instances. People v. Acevedo, 2017 IL App
(3d) 150750, ¶ 17. To determine whether probable cause existed, “the trial court must determine
whether a reasonable and prudent person, having the knowledge possessed by the officer at the
time of the arrest, would believe the defendant committed the offense.” People v. Fortney, 297 Ill.
App. 3d 79, 87 (1998). This standard requires the officer to have more than a mere suspicion but
need not rise to a level of evidence sufficient to convict. People v. Fonner, 385 Ill. App. 3d 531,
540 (2008). This determination is a practical, commonsense decision that requires consideration
of the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
¶ 12 “A statutory summary suspension hearing is a civil action where the defendant motorist, as
the petitioner, requests the judicial rescission of a suspension, and the State is placed in the position
4 of a civil defendant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Araiza, 2020 IL App (3d)
170735, ¶ 15. Thus, the defendant has the burden of establishing a prima facie case for recission.
Fonner, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 539. If a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the State
to justify the suspension. People v. Helt, 384 Ill. App. 3d 285, 287 (2008). A reviewing court gives
deference to the circuit court’s factual findings and will only reverse if they are against the manifest
weight of the evidence. People v. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d 545, 561 (2008), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295 (2021). A finding is against the manifest weight of
the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent, or its finding is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. People v. Sanchez, 2021 IL App (3d) 170410, ¶ 25. We
review de novo the ultimate legal ruling on the petition. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d at 562.
¶ 13 Here, the evidence established that at approximately 2:50 a.m. defendant (1) disobeyed a
traffic light when he stopped at a red light then proceeded through the traffic light while it was
still red; (2) was confused about the explanation of the traffic infraction as he seemed to
understand the traffic light was a stop sign instead of a traffic light; (3) stated he was coming
from downtown where he had consumed alcoholic beverages; (4) wavered regarding how many
alcoholic beverages he consumed when he stated he did not know and then stated he had two
beers; (5) fumbled with his wallet; (6) held onto his door as he exited his vehicle; (7) had the
odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from his breath while he was in the vehicle and again
when he was outside; (8) had a thick and slurred speech and at times mumbled; and (9) rambled
and made nonsensical statements when asked to perform field sobriety tests and submit to a
preliminary Breathalyzer test. Defendant refused all proposed testing (field sobriety and a
preliminary Breathalyzer test).
5 ¶ 14 Taking a commonsense approach, the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that Beck
had more than a mere suspicion that defendant committed a DUI. To find otherwise would be
unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on the evidence presented. Therefore, the court’s
determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the court erred as a matter of
law in granting the recission petition. For these reasons, the court also erred in finding defendant
established a prima facie case and the burden had shifted to the State.
¶ 15 As a final matter, we note the record is devoid of the factual findings that the court made
in reaching its determination that defendant established a prima facie case for recission and
granting the petition. We nonetheless have made our determination based on the record before us
and there are no reasons apparent on the record to disregard the evidence presented, which we
conclude clearly demonstrated Beck had reasonable grounds to believe defendant was driving
while under the influence of alcohol.
¶ 16 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 17 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed.
¶ 18 Reversed.