FOURT, J.
After a trial by jury defendant was found guilty of violating the provisions of Health and Safety Code section 11530 (possession of marijuana). His motion for new trial was denied and he was sentenced to the state prison for the term prescribed by law. The sentence was suspended and probation was granted for five years on condition that he spend the first year in the county jail. Defendant appeals from the order denying the motion for new trial and from the judgment.
During the trial defendant on direct examination admitted that he obtained and had in his possession at the time of his arrest the marijuana cigarettes which were the subject of the prosecution. He relied upon the defense of entrapment. He
does not assert that there was entrapment as a matter of law.
The gist of the three contentions raised on this appeal relates to purported errors committed by the trial court in ruling against the admissibility of certain evidence which defendant asserts was necessary to present adequately the defense of entrapment.
Defendant, who was a college student and part-time employee with the Los Angeles County Probation Department, testified that he met Dina Ray (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Mrs. Ray) on May 28, 1961, approximately four weeks prior to the arrest. Mrs. Ray was employed by the Los Angeles District Attorney’s office as a clerk-typist. Defendant further testified that following the meeting of May 28, defendant and Mrs. Ray became friends and saw each other frequently up to the time of the arrest on June 24, 1961; that the relationship between the parties became very intimate and on several occasions Mrs. Ray spent the night with the defendant at his
apartment, and that on at least two occasions prior to the arrest, defendant and Mrs. Ray engaged in sexual relations.
According to the defendant, on the occasion of their second visit together, Mrs. Ray told him that she reported lectures on narcotics at the Sheriff’s Academy and that she transcribed and took statements in narcotics cases as part of her work in the district attorney’s office. On or about the third or fourth visit Dina Ray, in the course of her general discussion, told defendant of various aspects of her background which involved contact with narcotics. Although she had been in an environment in which narcotics had been used she, herself, denied to defendant that she had ever used any. In the course of this discussion between defendant and Dina Ray defendant admitted to her that when he was in high school he had tried marijuana.
Mrs. Ray asked defendant what the use of narcotics was like.
Defendant further testified that on the Sunday or Monday preceding the Saturday of the arrest Mrs. Ray asked him if he could obtain some marijuana for her. Following this conversation defendant obtained a marijuana cigarette for Mrs. Ray and gave it to her.
Deputy Sheriff Copping testified that on Tuesday or Wednesday, prior to the arrest (i.e., subsequent to the time that defendant gave the marijuana cigarette to Mrs. Ray), he had a conversation with Mrs. Ray; that Mrs. Ray was not at that time in the employ of the sheriff’s office; and that to his knowledge this was the first time that the sheriff’s narcotic detail had any conversation with Mrs. Ray with reference to defendant’s activity.
Deputy Sheriff Burley commenced his investigation of defendant on June 21, 1961, after receiving information about the case from Deputy Copping. He then had a telephone conversation with Mrs. Bay in which he discussed the case. On Thursday the deputy had a meeting at the Firestone Sheriff’s Station with other officers. Mary K. Waters, a deputy sheriff assigned to the narcotic detail, was present. At that meeting Mrs. Ray told the group that she had been over to defendant’s apartment on Tuesday “or Tuesday night” and that he produced a marijuana cigarette and asked her to smoke it with him; that he had instructed her in the method of smoking a marijuana cigarette. Deputy Waters and Mrs. Ray were given instructions on how to proceed with the investigation.
Later, on Thursday, Deputy Waters and Mrs. Ray went to defendant’s apartment. Mrs. Ray introduced Deputy Waters to defendant as her cousin. Mrs. Ray also suggested to defendant that she, defendant, Deputy Waters, and someone that defendant could get for Deputy Waters, could go together to a party that they were planning to attend. There was mention about “smoking marijuana” at this time.
Deputy Waters returned to defendant’s apartment on Friday, near midnight. Defendant, Mrs. Ray and Deputy Waters went from defendant’s apartment to a bar. Codefendant Plummer was there.
There was a conversation at the bar concerning a party that was to be had that morning (i.e., Saturday morning). Deputy Waters thought there was going to be a marijuana party because she had received information from a Sergeant Berteaux that defendant was dealing in marijuana and that Mrs. Ray had previously been invited to attend a party that week-end with defendant and that marijuana' probably would be smoked there.
Between 2 and 2:30 a. m. (Saturday morning) Deputy Waters, defendant and Mrs. Ray went to defendant’s apartment from the bar. When Deputy Waters went into defendant’s apartment she had a broadcasting device in her purse. The receiver was in the possession of surveillant officers. When they arrived at defendant’s apartment defendant poured the two girls a glass of wine, changed clothes, turned on the radio, and produced a marijuana cigarette from underneath a hat that was on a cedar chest. He smoked some of the marijuana cigarette and gave it to Mrs. Ray. She smoked
some of it and gave it to Deputy Waters, then Plummer arrived.
When Plummer arrived he entered the living room, then went to the kitchen, came back into the living room, lit a cigarette, inhaled it and handed it to Deputy Waters. The cigarette smelled the same as the marijuana that Deputy Waters had smelled before in the narcotic laboratory; it was long and resembled a marijuana cigarette in the way it was rolled, i.e., loosely, very thin, and pinched at the ends. Deputy Waters appeared to smoke it, leaving her lipstick on it. She then gave it back to Plummer who inhaled it again and he then gave it to defendant, who placed it to his lips and inhaled it. After that cigarette (People’s Exhibit 1) diminished in size it was placed in an ash tray on the floor between the four people. Defendant then stated, “ I can make rabbits out of a hat. ’ ’ He stood, walked over to a chest, lifted his hat and said, “I can make rabbits come out of a hat.” Under the hat were approximately four or five cigarettes similar to the one they had just smoked. People’s Exhibit 3, consisting of three cigarettes, was on the chest on which defendant’s hat was at the time Deputy Waters related the incident about the hat. Plummer went back into the kitchen and came out with another cigarette. He lit it and started to pass it around. It was handed around between Plummer, defendant and Deputy Waters. The cigarette had a similar odor.
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FOURT, J.
After a trial by jury defendant was found guilty of violating the provisions of Health and Safety Code section 11530 (possession of marijuana). His motion for new trial was denied and he was sentenced to the state prison for the term prescribed by law. The sentence was suspended and probation was granted for five years on condition that he spend the first year in the county jail. Defendant appeals from the order denying the motion for new trial and from the judgment.
During the trial defendant on direct examination admitted that he obtained and had in his possession at the time of his arrest the marijuana cigarettes which were the subject of the prosecution. He relied upon the defense of entrapment. He
does not assert that there was entrapment as a matter of law.
The gist of the three contentions raised on this appeal relates to purported errors committed by the trial court in ruling against the admissibility of certain evidence which defendant asserts was necessary to present adequately the defense of entrapment.
Defendant, who was a college student and part-time employee with the Los Angeles County Probation Department, testified that he met Dina Ray (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Mrs. Ray) on May 28, 1961, approximately four weeks prior to the arrest. Mrs. Ray was employed by the Los Angeles District Attorney’s office as a clerk-typist. Defendant further testified that following the meeting of May 28, defendant and Mrs. Ray became friends and saw each other frequently up to the time of the arrest on June 24, 1961; that the relationship between the parties became very intimate and on several occasions Mrs. Ray spent the night with the defendant at his
apartment, and that on at least two occasions prior to the arrest, defendant and Mrs. Ray engaged in sexual relations.
According to the defendant, on the occasion of their second visit together, Mrs. Ray told him that she reported lectures on narcotics at the Sheriff’s Academy and that she transcribed and took statements in narcotics cases as part of her work in the district attorney’s office. On or about the third or fourth visit Dina Ray, in the course of her general discussion, told defendant of various aspects of her background which involved contact with narcotics. Although she had been in an environment in which narcotics had been used she, herself, denied to defendant that she had ever used any. In the course of this discussion between defendant and Dina Ray defendant admitted to her that when he was in high school he had tried marijuana.
Mrs. Ray asked defendant what the use of narcotics was like.
Defendant further testified that on the Sunday or Monday preceding the Saturday of the arrest Mrs. Ray asked him if he could obtain some marijuana for her. Following this conversation defendant obtained a marijuana cigarette for Mrs. Ray and gave it to her.
Deputy Sheriff Copping testified that on Tuesday or Wednesday, prior to the arrest (i.e., subsequent to the time that defendant gave the marijuana cigarette to Mrs. Ray), he had a conversation with Mrs. Ray; that Mrs. Ray was not at that time in the employ of the sheriff’s office; and that to his knowledge this was the first time that the sheriff’s narcotic detail had any conversation with Mrs. Ray with reference to defendant’s activity.
Deputy Sheriff Burley commenced his investigation of defendant on June 21, 1961, after receiving information about the case from Deputy Copping. He then had a telephone conversation with Mrs. Bay in which he discussed the case. On Thursday the deputy had a meeting at the Firestone Sheriff’s Station with other officers. Mary K. Waters, a deputy sheriff assigned to the narcotic detail, was present. At that meeting Mrs. Ray told the group that she had been over to defendant’s apartment on Tuesday “or Tuesday night” and that he produced a marijuana cigarette and asked her to smoke it with him; that he had instructed her in the method of smoking a marijuana cigarette. Deputy Waters and Mrs. Ray were given instructions on how to proceed with the investigation.
Later, on Thursday, Deputy Waters and Mrs. Ray went to defendant’s apartment. Mrs. Ray introduced Deputy Waters to defendant as her cousin. Mrs. Ray also suggested to defendant that she, defendant, Deputy Waters, and someone that defendant could get for Deputy Waters, could go together to a party that they were planning to attend. There was mention about “smoking marijuana” at this time.
Deputy Waters returned to defendant’s apartment on Friday, near midnight. Defendant, Mrs. Ray and Deputy Waters went from defendant’s apartment to a bar. Codefendant Plummer was there.
There was a conversation at the bar concerning a party that was to be had that morning (i.e., Saturday morning). Deputy Waters thought there was going to be a marijuana party because she had received information from a Sergeant Berteaux that defendant was dealing in marijuana and that Mrs. Ray had previously been invited to attend a party that week-end with defendant and that marijuana' probably would be smoked there.
Between 2 and 2:30 a. m. (Saturday morning) Deputy Waters, defendant and Mrs. Ray went to defendant’s apartment from the bar. When Deputy Waters went into defendant’s apartment she had a broadcasting device in her purse. The receiver was in the possession of surveillant officers. When they arrived at defendant’s apartment defendant poured the two girls a glass of wine, changed clothes, turned on the radio, and produced a marijuana cigarette from underneath a hat that was on a cedar chest. He smoked some of the marijuana cigarette and gave it to Mrs. Ray. She smoked
some of it and gave it to Deputy Waters, then Plummer arrived.
When Plummer arrived he entered the living room, then went to the kitchen, came back into the living room, lit a cigarette, inhaled it and handed it to Deputy Waters. The cigarette smelled the same as the marijuana that Deputy Waters had smelled before in the narcotic laboratory; it was long and resembled a marijuana cigarette in the way it was rolled, i.e., loosely, very thin, and pinched at the ends. Deputy Waters appeared to smoke it, leaving her lipstick on it. She then gave it back to Plummer who inhaled it again and he then gave it to defendant, who placed it to his lips and inhaled it. After that cigarette (People’s Exhibit 1) diminished in size it was placed in an ash tray on the floor between the four people. Defendant then stated, “ I can make rabbits out of a hat. ’ ’ He stood, walked over to a chest, lifted his hat and said, “I can make rabbits come out of a hat.” Under the hat were approximately four or five cigarettes similar to the one they had just smoked. People’s Exhibit 3, consisting of three cigarettes, was on the chest on which defendant’s hat was at the time Deputy Waters related the incident about the hat. Plummer went back into the kitchen and came out with another cigarette. He lit it and started to pass it around. It was handed around between Plummer, defendant and Deputy Waters. The cigarette had a similar odor. Deputy Waters then either said, “I now have two cigarettes in my hand” or “I have a cigarette in each hand, ready on the firing line,” or “I’ve got a cigarette in both hands, ready on the firing line. Light me up.” In any event her statement was a signal for the surveillant officers to enter the apartment. The officers entered and placed defendant and Plummer under arrest.
Defendant’s first contention is that the trial court erred in refusing to admit in evidence all the conversations between defendant and Dina Ray relating to narcotics.
The reporter’s transcript discloses that defendant testified on direct examination that he was 25 years old, married, and a full time student at Pepperdine College, working towards a master’s degree in psychology; that when he met Mrs. Ray he was working part time for the Los Angeles Probation Department; that he and Mrs. Ray discussed various things such as politics, literature,1 ‘ a number of topics, personal things in our lives, our backgrounds, where we had been raised, and things of this nature.” Defendant further testified that Mrs. Ray was very curious about narcotics and that she “asked
me what it was like, what it did, the effect of it, and how many times I had used it.” That Mrs. Ray said that “she had always been curious to try narcotics, and she would very much like to try some.” Defendant further stated that he had not had any connection with marijuana or any other type of narcotic at any time prior to meeting Mrs. Ray, other than when he had been in high school. The reporter’s transcript then discloses further questions, answers and statements.
Entrapment is a positive defense as "to which a de
iendant asserting it has the burden of showing that he was induced to commit the act for which he is on trial.
(People
v.
Jones,
176 Cal.App.2d 743, 749 [1 Cal.Rptr. 637];
People
v.
Terry,
44 Cal.2d 371, 372 [282 P.2d 19].)
It is stated in
People
v.
Contreras,
201 Cal.App.2d 854, 856 [20 Cal.Rptr. 551], as following in pertinent part:
“It is obvious that the defendant was endeavoring to present evidence to show why he changed his mind from not wanting to assist in obtaining any narcotics to a willingness to participate in the events which later occurred. The statements made by Tucker to the defendant were part of the transaction which resulted in the sale for which he later was convicted, and were admissible as such. [Citations.] [2] Where the commission of an offense is solicited by an officer of the law, a primary issue presented is whether the accused had a pre-existing intent to commit the same, or whether the criminal design was conceived in the mind of the officer and, through him, the accused, who had no intent to commit an offense, was lured into its commission. [Citations.] Of necessity the statements of the officer at the time are material to a determination of this issue; the contents thereof are admissible to prove what was said rather than the truth of what was said . . . .”
In determining whether the trial court erred the first question to be resolved may be stated as follows: assuming that the conversations between Dina Ray and defendant relative to the Wednesday cigarette support a determination that defendant was induced against his intent to procure the Wednesday cigarette, is the inducement which culminated in the Wednesday cigarette material on the question of whether defendant was induced against his intent to procure the narcotics which he had in his possession on Saturday, the Saturday cigarettes constituting the subject matter of the present offense? Or, to state the question differently, does the fact (assuming it to be a fact) that defendant was induced to commit an act (possess marijuana on Wednesday) taint and
thereby constitute a defense (entrapment) to the prosecution for a subsequent violation of the law (possess marijuana on Saturday) where it is the subsequent violation of the law which constitutes the offense for which he is on trial?
Defendant takes the position that the original source of the inducement is material. He asserts that “Whether the ‘inducer, ’ so to speak, had the defendant commit one crime and had him arrested or had him commit a series of crimes before having him arrested does not alter the fact of the entrapment if such was the intent of the inducer from the beginning of the association.” Defendant relies upon
Sherman
v.
United States,
356 U.S. 369 [78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848], in support of his position.
In the
Sherman
case a government informer first met petitioner at a doctor’s office where apparently both were being treated for narcotics addiction. Several accidental meetings followed, either at the doctor’s office or at the pharmacy where both filled their prescriptions from the doctor. From mere greetings the conversations progressed • to a discussion of mutual experiences and problems, including their attempts to overcome addiction to narcotics. Finally the informer asked petitioner if he (petitioner) knew of a good source of narcotics. He asked petitioner to supply him with a source because he was not responding to treatment. From the first, petitioner tried to avoid the issue. Not until after a number of repetitions of the request, predicated upon the informer’s presumed suffering, did petitioner finally acquiesce. As stated by the court at pages 852-853 [2 L.Ed. 2d) :
“. . . Kalchinian [i.e., informer] not only procured a source of narcotics
but apparently also induced petitioner to return to the habit.
Finally, assured of a catch, Kalchinian informed the authorities so that they could close the net. The Government cannot disown Kalchinian and insist it is not responsible for his actions.
. . . It makes no difference that the sales for which petitioner was convicted occurred after a series of sales. They were not, independent acts subsequent to the inducement but part of a course of conduct which was the product of the inducement. . . .
( (
“The ease at bar illustrates an evil which the defense of entrapment is designed to overcome.
The government informer entices someone attempting to avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an illegal sale but also into returning to the habit of use.
Selecting the proper time, the informer then
tells the government agent. The setup is accepted by the agent without even a question as to the manner in which the informer encountered the seller. Thus the Government plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiles him into eommiting crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted. Law enforcement does not require methods such as this.” (Emphasis added.)
Defendant by his own testimony shows that possession of the Saturday narcotics was an independent act subsequent to the purported inducements which supposedly culminated in the Wednesday cigarette.
Defendant testified that he and Dina Ray smoked a marijuana cigarette on Wednesday. The reporter’s transcript discloses the statements set forth in the footnote.
Even if it be assumed that defendant was induced against his intent to procure the Wednesday cigarette it was clear from the testimony, if he was to be believed, that he was reluctant to procure any narcotics subsequent to the Wednesday cigarette and that he obtained the narcotics which served as the subject matter of the within prosecution only because Dina Ray, subsequent to the Wednesday cigarette, induced him to do so.
The trial court permitted the defendant to go into great detail as to the purported conversations between Dina Ray and defendant which were material to the Saturday narcotics episode (i.e., those conversations which occurred subsequent to the Wednesday cigarette).
Under the circumstances the conversations relating to the Wednesday cigarette would be immaterial on the issue of whether defendant was induced against his intent to possess the Saturday narcotics. The case at bar is in nowise comparable to
Sherman
v.
United States, supra,
356 U.S. 369 [78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848]. Also, contrary to the federal rule, evidence of the Wednesday cigarette is not admissible on the issue of entrapment in this state.
(People
v.
Benford,
53 Cal.2d 1, 11 [345 P.2d 928].)
The fact of the matter is defendant did get considerable evidence before the jury relating to the purported inducements on the part of Dina Ray which culminated in the Wednesday cigarette. Excerpts from the reporter’s transcript set forth in footnote 6 serve as an illustration.
Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to introduce evidence of his disassociation from marijuana following high school and his occupation and attainments between that period and the time of meeting Dina Ray.
Defendant’s position cannot be sustained. First, the transcript discloses that he did introduce evidence of his occupation and that he was a student at Pepperdine College working towards a master’s degree in psychology. Other statements of defendant are set forth in footnote 7.
In addition to defendant’s testimony relative to his dis
association with narcotics, he also called two character witnesses—Mr. Vernon L. Horn, who was a deputy probation officer with the County of Los Angeles, assigned to the group guidance section, and Dr. Robert Holland, a teacher at Pepper-dine College.
The real gist of defendant’s contention is that the trial court erred in rejecting defendant’s offer of proof relative to the schools he had attended and the marks and honors he had received. The reporter’s transcript of the offer of proof discloses the following in part:
“Mr. Thorpe: .......
“We intend to also offer evidence to the effect that ... he had pursued a course of studies, had received an exemplary scholastic record at City College; that he graduated with Phi Beta Kappa at U.S.C. He had gone to Pepperdine and
maintained practically a straight A there. . . ,
< <
“The Court: ........
“Tour offer of proof is rejected, that is, as to his scholastic record. ...”
Defendant’s argument that evidence of defendant’s education and scholastic honors is material because it “is certainly reasonable to conclude that a person who has applied himself to his studies in such fashion as to acquire Phi Beta Kappa standing in his undergraduate work and practically a straight A standing in his graduate school work is not likely to have a pre-existing attempt towards smoking marijuana” is devoid of merit.
It is established that defendant may not utilize specific acts to establish his good character. It is stated in Within, California Evidence (1958) section 129, page 153, as follows:
“(1)
Reputation.
As already pointed out
(supra,
§125) the ordinary method of proving either good or bad character
is by reputation in the place where the defendant lives or works. [Citations.] ....
“(2)
Specific Acts Not Admissible.
The acts of a defendant are inadmissible to prove either his good or bad character.” (Italics shown.)
The remarks of the trial judge in denying defendant’s offer of proof are most apt:
“The Court: The question of whether or not he is a Phi Beta Kappa or whether he graduated from one college or another or what his scholastic record is hasn’t a thing to do with this case. It is of interest, yes, but it does not contribute anything to the materiality. ’ ’
' Lastly, defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to establish the connection between Dina Bay and the sheriff’s narcotic squad.
This contention stems from what occurred during the cross-examination of Deputy Sheriff Burley.
Defendant indicates in his opening brief that he desired to show: (1) that Dina Bay worked in the district attorney’s office taking down statements in criminal cases involving narcotics and had worked there for about one and one-half years; (2) that she had asked the narcotic squad officers to take her on raids; (3) that she made a thorough study of narcotics and claimed to have more information in the files than the narcotic officers had; and (4) that she wanted to be an undercover agent for the narcotic squad and told people that she in fact worked as an undercover agent on other cases. He asserts that the above facts were material to his presentation of the defense of entrapment because " the motives and intentions of Dina Bay were an essential issue in the case. If Dina Bay, in fact, thought that she was working as an undercover agent for the Narcotic Squad that would have great bearing upon the credibility of the defendant’s testimony as to the inducements he claimed she used. But the court by declaring that Dina Bay’s connection with the Narcotic Squad was immaterial, took that issue out of the case and prevented the defendant from offering evidence to corroborate his own testimony. ’ ’
Defendant’s contention must of necessity relate to the purported connection between Dina Bay and the sheriff’s narcotic squad up to the time of the Wednesday cigarette. The evidence is clear that Dina Bay was, in effect, a decoy for the narcotic squad
subsequent
to the Wednesday cigarette.
We have already determined (under defendant’s first contention) that Dina Bay’s purported conduct which culminated in the Wednesday cigarette was immaterial on the question of whether defendant was entrapped relative to the Saturday narcotics. In addition, the case at bar does not present a situation where the prosecuting authority attempts to disown Dina Bay and insist that it is not responsible for her conduct. (See
Sherman
v.
United States, supra,
356 U.S. 369 [78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848, 852].) And, as indicated in
People
v.
Benford, supra,
53 Cal.2d 1, 13 [345 P.2d 928] footnote 5, the primary inquiry is directed towards the conduct of the
purported entrapper—not her state of mind. Also, Deputy Burley had already testified that the 11 only time that Mrs. Ray has been involved with the Sheriff’s Narcotics Detail, as far as I know, is on this particular case that we have in question here now.” And finally, the record discloses that Dina Ray was available as a witness and could have been called by defendant.
Penal Code section 1237 now provides that “upon appeal from a final judgment the court may review any order denying a motion for a new trial . . . . ”
The order denying the motion for a new trial and the judgment are and each is affirmed.
Wood, P. J., and Lillie, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 4, 1962.