People v. Coppedge (Samuel)

70 Misc. 3d 139(A), 2021 NY Slip Op 50103(U)

• Court: Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York
• Decided: February 11, 2021
• Docket: 16-169
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

People v Coppedge (2021 NY Slip Op 50103(U)) [*1]

People v Coppedge (Samuel)

2021 NY Slip Op 50103(U) [70 Misc 3d 139(A)]

Decided on February 11, 2021

Appellate Term, First Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on February 11, 2021

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT
PRESENT: Edmead, P.J., Higgitt, Brigantti, JJ.
16-169

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Samuel Coppedge, Defendant-Appellant.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Erika M. Edwards, J.), rendered September 14, 2015, convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of assault in the third degree, and imposing sentence.

Per Curiam.

Judgment of conviction (Erika M. Edwards, J.), rendered September 14, 2015, affirmed.

Since defendant waived prosecution by information, the accusatory instrument only had to satisfy the reasonable cause requirement of a misdemeanor complaint (see People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]). So viewed, the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally valid because it described facts of an evidentiary nature establishing reasonable cause to believe that defendant was guilty of third-degree assault (see Penal Law § 120.00[1]). The "physical injury" element of the offense was satisfied by allegations that defendant "str[uck] [the victim] in the face with a closed fist, causing swelling and bruising to his lip, a scratch on his cheek, and substantial pain." Based on these allegations, a reasonable person could infer that the victim felt "substantial pain" (Penal Law § 10.00[9]; see People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680 [1999]; People v Lang, 81 AD3d 538 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 896 [2011]), a term which simply means "more than slight or trivial pain" (People v Chiddick, 8 NY3d 445, 447 [2007]). Defendant's intent to cause physical injury was readily inferable from his actions (see Matter of Edward H., 61 AD3d 473, 473 [2009]; Matter of Marcel F., 233 AD2d 442, 442-443 [1996]).

All concur.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Clerk of the Court
Decision Date: February 11, 2021