People v. Coon

2025 IL App (4th) 251033-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 19, 2025
• Docket: 4-25-1033
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 251033-U FILED This Order was filed under December 19, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender not precedent except in the NO. 4-25-1033 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Livingston County RYAN E. COON, ) No. 25CF231 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Jennifer H. Bauknecht, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Doherty and Grischow concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the threat defendant posed to the community.

¶2 Defendant, Ryan E. Coon, appeals the denial of his pretrial release pursuant to

article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2024)).

He argues that his pretrial detention was not warranted because there were conditions of pretrial

release that were sufficient to mitigate any threat he posed.

¶3 We disagree and affirm.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 On September 11, 2025, defendant was charged by information with one count of

traveling to meet a child, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/11-26(a), (b) (West 2024)), and one count

of indecent solicitation of a child, also a Class 3 felony (id. § 5/11-6(a), (c)(3)). The same day, the State filed a verified petition to detain defendant pretrial.

¶6 At a hearing on the petition, the State proffered that on September 8, 2025,

Detective Drew Chase, who was operating a Facebook account as a fictitious 15-year-old girl,

received a message from defendant. After being told the girl was 15 years old, defendant stated

that he was 32 years old and suggested they move the discussion to another social media platform,

Snapchat. On Snapchat, defendant indicated that he wanted to engage in sexual conduct with the

girl and wished to meet up with her in person. Chase arranged a meeting with defendant near a

Taco Bell restaurant. Defendant asked if the two could engage in intercourse and advised that he

would bring a condom. Defendant was later observed entering the area behind the specified Taco

Bell and was immediately taken into custody.

¶7 The State proffered that officers found photos of “several blond girls who appeared

to be under the age of 18” on defendant’s phone but noted that the girls were clothed in the photos.

Officers were also told by a resource officer at the local high school that defendant had social

media conversations with six other teenage girls. The youngest of these girls was 13. Defendant

told the girls they were “smoke shows” and “knock-out gorgeous,” and he asked to hang out with

them at football games. Defendant also told the fictitious Facebook account run by Chase that he

drove these girls to school. The State proffered that the girls had interviews scheduled as part of

an ongoing investigation. However, no charges had been filed against defendant regarding his

contact with them at the time of the hearing.

¶8 As its only exhibit, the State presented a four-page document detailing the

capabilities of the Office of Statewide Pretrial Services (OSPS) in monitoring defendants who had

been granted pretrial release. The document specifically noted that OSPS officers had no real way

to monitor a defendant’s online activity and instead relied on self-reporting. Defense counsel did

-2- not object to the admittance of the exhibit but noted that the document provided only “the State’s

view of that.” The trial court responded, “Understand. Yeah, and I would weigh it accordingly that

this is the State’s position *** based on conversations and communications with OSPS, but

ultimately [the State’s] viewpoint on that.”

¶9 Defendant’s criminal history included a stalking conviction in 2021, for which he

received 24 months’ conditional discharge, and a battery conviction in 2012, for which he received

24 months’ probation. Based on his prior convictions, defendant received a score of 2 out of 14 on

the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument-Revised (VPRAI-R), placing him in the category

with the lowest risk of violating conditions of pretrial release.

¶ 10 The State argued that the proof was evident and the presumption great that

defendant committed the offenses of indecent solicitation of a child and traveling to meet a child.

Relying in part on the ongoing investigations against defendant, the State further argued that he

posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community and that no condition or combination

of conditions of release could mitigate the threat he posed. Referencing its exhibit, the State argued

that OSPS did not have the ability to monitor defendant’s electronic communications and, further,

defendant had demonstrated a willingness to make use of events such as high school football games

and driving minors to school in order to prey on them. The State concluded, “So, [defendant] has

put himself in a position to have direct contact with minors in multiple ways, and that level of

supervision is not provided for by the OSPS.”

¶ 11 Defense counsel took issue with the State’s reference to the ongoing investigation

regarding the other six teenage girls, arguing the trial court should consider only the facts and

circumstances of the instant case. He further asserted that conditions such as GPS monitoring,

mental health treatment, and a prohibition on contact with female minors would successfully

-3- mitigate any threat defendant posed.

¶ 12 The trial court found the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant

had committed a detainable offense. In addressing defendant’s dangerousness and whether any

conditions could mitigate the threat he posed, the court stated that it would consider the ongoing

investigation against defendant because this information was relevant to defendant’s character, his

mental condition, his community ties, his prior criminal history, and “things of that nature.” The

court found that neither home confinement nor GPS monitoring would mitigate the threat

defendant posed, as neither condition would prevent defendant from speaking with underage girls

online. Similarly, it found that OSPS’s monitoring of online activity was “based on self-reporting”

and was therefore also inadequate to mitigate defendant’s dangerousness, specifically given his

established pattern of preying on young girls. The court stated,

“[F]or this particular defendant, a defendant who has shown the ability or at least

the desire to, starts on Facebook conversations and then says, lets move it to a more

private conversation, to a different online forum altogether; just very concerned

about this. If this was potentially just a one-off, if I only have one victim, maybe

this is, well, it definitely would be a different analysis; but I have multiple potential

victims here, I have a defendant who has a history of targeting victims in a particular

age range, and the State is absolutely correct, the speed at which this, I hate to even

use the word, relationship, but that this relationship with this fictitious 15-year-old

girl, the speed with which it escalated is very, very concerning for this Court.”

¶ 13 Ultimately, the trial court found that defendant posed a real and present threat to

the community and that no conditions of release could mitigate that threat. It therefore granted the

State’s petition to deny defendant pretrial release.

-4- ¶ 14 Defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule

604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024), arguing that the trial court should not have considered the ongoing

investigation in making its decision and that less restrictive conditions of pretrial release could

mitigate the danger he posed to the community. The court denied the motion for relief.

¶ 15 This appeal followed.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 On appeal, defendant argues that the State did not meet its burden of proving that

no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the threat he posed.

Specifically, he argues that his history of compliance with court orders and his low score on the

VPRAI-R showed that he would be compliant with any conditions the trial court wished to impose.

¶ 18 In Illinois, all persons charged with an offense are presumed eligible for pretrial

release. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2024). The fact that a defendant has been charged with a

detainable offense and deemed to pose a threat to public safety is not enough to order detention.

People v. Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 18. Rather, a court must additionally determine,

by conducting an individualized assessment, that no possible conditions of release could mitigate

the threat the defendant poses. Id. In making this determination, a court must consider factors such

as the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; the weight of the evidence against the

defendant; the history and characteristics of the defendant, including his character, family ties,

employment, community ties, conduct, criminal history, and record concerning appearances at

court proceedings; and the nature and seriousness of the real and present threat to the safety of any

person or the community. Id. ¶ 15. When the parties to a detention hearing proceed solely by

proffer, our review is de novo. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 51.

¶ 19 We begin by noting that although defendant previously argued that the trial court

-5- erred in considering the ongoing investigation in denying him pretrial release on the instant

charges, he does not reassert this argument on appeal. Indeed, such an argument would be without

merit, as a court may consider uncharged conduct in evaluating the propriety of granting or denying

pretrial release. See People v. Popovich, 2025 IL App (4th) 250196, ¶ 21 (considering images of

possible child sexual abuse material on the defendant’s phone for which there was an ongoing

investigation); People v. Dunn, 2024 IL App (1st) 240306, ¶ 32 (holding that uncharged allegations

are properly considered in denying a defendant pretrial release because they demonstrate the

defendant’s history and characteristics and the nature and seriousness of the threat he poses to the

community). Instead, defendant asserts that the State “provided very little detail about the

circumstances of these ongoing investigations,” and thus, it did not provide any further justification

for denying him pretrial release. As discussed below, we disagree.

¶ 20 Defendant provides us with two factors that weigh in favor of his pretrial release:

his previous compliance with court orders and his relatively low score on the VPRAI-R. However,

neither of these factors is solely determinative, and we find more significant factors favor his

detention. Specifically, the circumstances surrounding defendant’s current charges, combined with

the investigations into his contact with six underage girls, as well as the number of photos found

on his phone of seemingly more underage girls, evince a striking pattern of predatory behavior.

Minors are a vulnerable group, and the State proffered evidence that defendant utilized multiple

avenues to prey on them. He not only allegedly contacted minors on at least two different social

media sites, but it appears he also attempted to meet with them offline, either at high school

sporting events, through rides to school, or, as alleged here, behind a Taco Bell. Whether he

actively sought out this contact or merely took advantage of any opportunity that came his way,

we find it unlikely that defendant would abstain from this well-established pattern. Indeed, as the

-6- State pointed out, defendant showed very little hesitation in allegedly committing the actions that

comprise his current charges, moving from casual conversation with what he believed to be a 15-

year-old girl to a request for sex very quickly.

¶ 21 Considering this pattern of behavior, we conclude that no conditions of release

could reasonably mitigate the threat defendant poses. GPS monitoring and home confinement

would not stop him from contacting minors online. Moreover, while a prohibition on Internet usage

and interaction with minor girls would mitigate the threat defendant poses if complied with,

defendant’s pattern of repeatedly seeking out virtual and real-life contact with underage girls is

sufficient to think that he would not abide by these conditions.

¶ 22 As a final matter, we address defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly

decided to deny him pretrial release based on OSPS’s perceived inadequacies in providing

supervision. Defendant relies on Atterberry for this argument. However, a closer look at our

decision in Atterberry illustrates not only the precise reasoning underlying our statements therein,

but also how the instant case is distinguishable.

¶ 23 Atterberry was decided in 2023, when the current statutory scheme regarding

pretrial release was relatively new. See Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 13. The defendant

there was charged with traveling to meet a child and indecent solicitation of a child, and the State

filed a petition to detain him pursuant to the new provisions of the Code. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Although the

defendant had no criminal history and scored a 0 out of 14 on the VPRAI-R, the trial court denied

him pretrial release. Id. ¶ 7. In a ruling that contained “a lengthy and biased commentary about the

wisdom of Illinois’s recent bail reform” (id. ¶ 16), the trial court concluded that because conditions

of pretrial release were “ ‘loosely monitored,’ ” they were insufficient to mitigate the threat the

defendant posed. Id. ¶ 7.

-7- ¶ 24 The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that no

conditions of pretrial release would mitigate the threat he posed to the community. Id. ¶ 10. We

agreed, finding, “[T]he totality of the trial court’s comments compels the conclusion that the court

failed to, and refused to, consider and apply the proper statutory criteria in finding that no

conditions could mitigate the threat defendant poses to minors.” Id. ¶ 16. We noted that decisions

to grant or deny pretrial release must be individualized, and a trial court must determine “based on

the specific facts of the case and the defendant’s individual background and characteristics,

whether any combination of conditions can mitigate the threat and allow the defendant’s release.”

Id. ¶ 18. However, in contrast to this requirement, the trial court in Atterberry “never articulated

why there [was] reason to believe this particular defendant would not comply with any conditions

of release.” (Emphasis in original) Id. ¶ 19. Instead, its comments suggested “it believed there

[were] no conditions of release other than monetary bail that [could] mitigate the threat posed by

anyone who is charged with the offenses at issue.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. Because the trial

court did not consider the defendant’s individual circumstances and instead based its decision only

on “a general perception that conditions of release are loosely monitored,” we found it had abused

its discretion. Id. ¶¶ 18, 20.

¶ 25 It is clear, then, that our decision in Atterberry was not based on the trial court’s

consideration of the limits of OSPS’s capabilities and how they might relate to a particular

defendant. Indeed, we note that the Code requires a court to assess the adequacy of pretrial release

conditions (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (3) (West 2024)), which necessarily involves an assessment of

OSPS’s limits. Rather, our criticism of the Atterberry trial court was based on its failure to consider

the specific circumstances of that particular defendant’s case in reaching its decision. As we

explained, the court’s statements about loosely monitored conditions of pretrial release would have

-8- applied to every defendant that came before it equally, regardless of the individual defendant’s

circumstances. Id. This ran afoul of the Code’s requirement that the decision to grant or deny a

defendant pretrial release be individualized. See id.

¶ 26 In contrast to Atterberry, in the instant case, the trial court discussed the specific

characteristics of defendant, noting in particular his pattern of predatory behavior. It discussed

possible conditions of pretrial release, like electric home monitoring and GPS monitoring, and

explained why they would be inadequate to mitigate the threat this specific defendant posed to

underage girls. Notably, although the court found that OSPS could only monitor defendant’s

Internet usage by way of his self-reporting, it did not conclude that this would be insufficient in

every possible scenario. Rather, it stated that self-reporting would be insufficient to monitor

someone with the demonstrated behavior of this particular defendant. This was proper. See

Popovich, 2025 IL App (4th) 250196, ¶ 21 (discussing OSPS’s inability to monitor the defendant’s

Internet use and concluding that self-reporting by the defendant was inadequate to prevent the

threat he posed, given his pattern of predatory behavior).

¶ 27 Finally, we note that our review here is de novo. See Morgan, 2025 IL 130626,

¶ 51. Even if the trial court had failed to make an individualized assessment of defendant’s case,

it would not impact our own review of the issue.

¶ 28 In sum, we find the State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that no

condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the threat defendant

posed.

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 31 Affirmed.

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