s
FILED l
supEamacauRr 1
GFGUAM I
1 I
2a19 FEB 19 PM 36 2 BLERK OFCGURT 3
4 By! 009 5
7 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) Case No. CF0027-18 ) 1
8 > 9 Plaintiff, ) ) 10 v. ) DECISION & ORDER ) 11 ) BEOM SEOK CHEON, ) 12 DOB: 10/16/1999 ) ) 13 Defendant. ) ) 14 ) 15 I NTRO D U CTI O N
16 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena, III on November 21, 2018 17 on a submission by Beom Seok Cheon ("Defendant") of a Motion to Strike Felony Charge. 18 Def endant i s represent ed by At t orney Curt i s Van de Veld and the People o f G u a m a r e 19
20 represented by Assistant Attorney General Rolland Wimberley. After hearing the arguments of V 1 i 21 the parties and considering the applicable law, the Court issues its Decision and Order.
22 BACKGROUND r
; Defendant was charged with Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol with kljluries
25 (as a Third Degree Felony), Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol (as a Misdeme or ), \
26 and Reckless Driving with Property Damage (as a Petty Misdemeanor). (Indictment, Fe . 02,
27 2018). In October 2018, Defendant tiled a Motion to Strike Felony Charge, seeking dismiss al of 28 the first charge of the indictment. (Mot. Strike Felony Charge ("Mot. Strike"), Oct. 26, 2b18).
K Decision and Order CF0027-18, People v. Cheon
The People filed an opposition to the motion. (People's Opposition to Mot. Strike Flony l 2 Charge, Nov. 07, 2018). On November 21, 2018 the Court heard arguments on the Defenclant's
3 motion and took the matter under advisement. (Minute Entry, Nov. 21, 2018). 4 DISCUSSION 5 The Defendant asserts that the first charge of the indictment, Driving While Under the 6
7 Influence of Alcohol with Injuries (as a Third Degree Felony), should be dismissed from the
8 indictment. (Mot. Strike at 7). In his motion, the Defendant appears to argue that 16 G CA §§
9 18104(a) and 18110 ambiguously prescribe two different punishments for the same conduct 10 i.e., driving under the influence of alcohol and causing injuries to another person. See id. at 5 l1 Defendant asserts that under the rule of lenity the Court would be required to resolve this 12
13 ambiguity in the Defendant's favor by following the less severe punishment guidelines in §
14 18104(a) and, as such, we should preemptively strike the felony chargefrom the indictment
15 See id. at 5, 7. The Defendant's arguments fail for two reasons: 1) the Defendant misapplies the 16 authority he cites; and, 2) there is no statutory ambiguity requiring us to apply the rule of lerrity 17 First, the Defendant misapplies Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), and Brown v. Uhio 18
19 432 U.S. 161 (1977), in arguing that the felony charge should be preemptively struck. Both of
20 the Defendant's cited cases concern the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against 21 cumulative punishments or subsequent prosecution for the same criminal conduct. Bldckburger 22 v. U.5., 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 s. Ct. 180 (1932) (A Defendant may not be punished Finder 23
separate statutes for a single act when the statutes punish the same offense), Brown v. ohioL 432 24
25 U.S. 161, 166, 97 S. ct. 2221 (1977) (A Defendant may not be successively prosecuted \under
26 separate statutes that constitute the same offense under the Bloekburger test). However, the case
27 before us does not raise the double jeopardy concerns of Blockburger and Brown. This i first 28
Page 2 of 6 Decision and Order CF0027- 18, People v. Cheon I
1 time the De f e nd ant has b e e n charg e d with the alle g e d of f e nse s that occurre d on or ab out January
2 1 4 , 2 0 1 8 . A s s u c h , t h e r e i s n o c o n c e r n r e g a r d i n g s u c c e s s i v e p r o s e c u t i o n s a s t h e De f e n d a n t h a s
3 n o t p r e v i o u s l y b e e n p u t i n t o je o p a r d y co n ce r n i n g t h i s o f f e n se . P e o p l e v . T o r r e s , 2 0 0 8 G o , 26
4 [ 18 ("[A]n accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double jeopardy."). 5 Additionally, the case before us has not even begun Md, and the Defendant has not 6
7 convicted or punished with regard to the offenses charged against him. The Court is well aware
8 that should the Defendant be convicted of Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol With
9 Injuries (as a Third Degree Felony) and Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol (as a 10 Misdemeanor) there will need to be merging at sentencing, because the Defendant may net be
punished for both an offense and its lesser included offense. 9 GCA § 1.22, See Torres, 2008 12
13 Guam 26 'll 42-43 (acknowledging that punishment for both an offense and its lesser included
14 offense arising out of the same act is prohibited under Bloekburger). However, the mered fact 15 that the Defendant may not be punished for both offenses does not mean that the Defendant 16 cannot stand triad for both, nor does it support the Defendant's contention that we should 17 dismiss the felony offense from the indictment. Accordingly, the Defendant's cited authority is 18
19 not applicable to the situation before us, nor does it support the relief requested.
20 Second, the rule of lenity does not require this Court to dismiss the felony offense. The 21 rule of lenity requires a Court to resolve ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the 22 Defendant. People v. Tenorio, 2007 Guam 19 'II 14. The Qefendant argues that the statutes 23
prescribe two separate punishments for the same offense, and therefore, the Court Gould 24
25 resolve the ambiguity by. finding that the Defendant would have to be punished uncle' the
26 misdemeanor guidelines for first offenders and dismiss the felony charge from the indictment 27 (Mot. Strike at 5, 7). The statutes the Defendant complains of state: 28 I I
Page 3of 6 Decision and Order CF0027-18, People v. Cheon
§ 18104. Conviction of.First Violation of 18102; Punishment. 1
2 (a) If any person is convicted of a first violation of § 18102 of this Chapter, that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprisonment 3 in the custody of the Department of Corrections ("DOC") or the Guam Police Department ("GPD") for not less than a mandatory forty-eight (48) hours nor 4 mor e tha n one (1) yea r a nd a fine of not less tha n One T housa nd Dolla r s 5 ($1,000) nor more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000). In addition, the judge may impose any additional penalties, including requiring the offenders pay 6 restitution to persons injured or for property damaged. 7
8 § 18110. Vehicular Negligence; Third Degree Felony. 9
10 Any violation of subsection (c) or (d) of § 18102 of this Chapter shall be a felony of the third degree. 11
16 GCA § 18104(a) (1993) and § 18110 (1994). The Defendant argues that §§ 1810)(a) and 12
13 18110 ambiguously prescribes different punishments for the same offense under § l8102(c)~ and
14 (d), because § 18104(a) states that first time offenses under all subsections in § 18102 will be a
15 misdemeanor and § 18104(a) also relates to violations that cause personal injury, whereas § 16 18110 prescribes felony punishment for such offenses. (See Mot. Strike at 4-5). Accordingly, 17 18 the Defendant argues that the rule of lenity would require this Court to punish the Defendant
19 under § 18104(a) because it prescribes the less severe punishment. Id. at 7. We disagree.
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s
FILED l
supEamacauRr 1
GFGUAM I
1 I
2a19 FEB 19 PM 36 2 BLERK OFCGURT 3
4 By! 009 5
7 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) Case No. CF0027-18 ) 1
8 > 9 Plaintiff, ) ) 10 v. ) DECISION & ORDER ) 11 ) BEOM SEOK CHEON, ) 12 DOB: 10/16/1999 ) ) 13 Defendant. ) ) 14 ) 15 I NTRO D U CTI O N
16 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena, III on November 21, 2018 17 on a submission by Beom Seok Cheon ("Defendant") of a Motion to Strike Felony Charge. 18 Def endant i s represent ed by At t orney Curt i s Van de Veld and the People o f G u a m a r e 19
20 represented by Assistant Attorney General Rolland Wimberley. After hearing the arguments of V 1 i 21 the parties and considering the applicable law, the Court issues its Decision and Order.
22 BACKGROUND r
; Defendant was charged with Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol with kljluries
25 (as a Third Degree Felony), Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol (as a Misdeme or ), \
26 and Reckless Driving with Property Damage (as a Petty Misdemeanor). (Indictment, Fe . 02,
27 2018). In October 2018, Defendant tiled a Motion to Strike Felony Charge, seeking dismiss al of 28 the first charge of the indictment. (Mot. Strike Felony Charge ("Mot. Strike"), Oct. 26, 2b18).
K Decision and Order CF0027-18, People v. Cheon
The People filed an opposition to the motion. (People's Opposition to Mot. Strike Flony l 2 Charge, Nov. 07, 2018). On November 21, 2018 the Court heard arguments on the Defenclant's
3 motion and took the matter under advisement. (Minute Entry, Nov. 21, 2018). 4 DISCUSSION 5 The Defendant asserts that the first charge of the indictment, Driving While Under the 6
7 Influence of Alcohol with Injuries (as a Third Degree Felony), should be dismissed from the
8 indictment. (Mot. Strike at 7). In his motion, the Defendant appears to argue that 16 G CA §§
9 18104(a) and 18110 ambiguously prescribe two different punishments for the same conduct 10 i.e., driving under the influence of alcohol and causing injuries to another person. See id. at 5 l1 Defendant asserts that under the rule of lenity the Court would be required to resolve this 12
13 ambiguity in the Defendant's favor by following the less severe punishment guidelines in §
14 18104(a) and, as such, we should preemptively strike the felony chargefrom the indictment
15 See id. at 5, 7. The Defendant's arguments fail for two reasons: 1) the Defendant misapplies the 16 authority he cites; and, 2) there is no statutory ambiguity requiring us to apply the rule of lerrity 17 First, the Defendant misapplies Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), and Brown v. Uhio 18
19 432 U.S. 161 (1977), in arguing that the felony charge should be preemptively struck. Both of
20 the Defendant's cited cases concern the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against 21 cumulative punishments or subsequent prosecution for the same criminal conduct. Bldckburger 22 v. U.5., 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 s. Ct. 180 (1932) (A Defendant may not be punished Finder 23
separate statutes for a single act when the statutes punish the same offense), Brown v. ohioL 432 24
25 U.S. 161, 166, 97 S. ct. 2221 (1977) (A Defendant may not be successively prosecuted \under
26 separate statutes that constitute the same offense under the Bloekburger test). However, the case
27 before us does not raise the double jeopardy concerns of Blockburger and Brown. This i first 28
Page 2 of 6 Decision and Order CF0027- 18, People v. Cheon I
1 time the De f e nd ant has b e e n charg e d with the alle g e d of f e nse s that occurre d on or ab out January
2 1 4 , 2 0 1 8 . A s s u c h , t h e r e i s n o c o n c e r n r e g a r d i n g s u c c e s s i v e p r o s e c u t i o n s a s t h e De f e n d a n t h a s
3 n o t p r e v i o u s l y b e e n p u t i n t o je o p a r d y co n ce r n i n g t h i s o f f e n se . P e o p l e v . T o r r e s , 2 0 0 8 G o , 26
4 [ 18 ("[A]n accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double jeopardy."). 5 Additionally, the case before us has not even begun Md, and the Defendant has not 6
7 convicted or punished with regard to the offenses charged against him. The Court is well aware
8 that should the Defendant be convicted of Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol With
9 Injuries (as a Third Degree Felony) and Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol (as a 10 Misdemeanor) there will need to be merging at sentencing, because the Defendant may net be
punished for both an offense and its lesser included offense. 9 GCA § 1.22, See Torres, 2008 12
13 Guam 26 'll 42-43 (acknowledging that punishment for both an offense and its lesser included
14 offense arising out of the same act is prohibited under Bloekburger). However, the mered fact 15 that the Defendant may not be punished for both offenses does not mean that the Defendant 16 cannot stand triad for both, nor does it support the Defendant's contention that we should 17 dismiss the felony offense from the indictment. Accordingly, the Defendant's cited authority is 18
19 not applicable to the situation before us, nor does it support the relief requested.
20 Second, the rule of lenity does not require this Court to dismiss the felony offense. The 21 rule of lenity requires a Court to resolve ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the 22 Defendant. People v. Tenorio, 2007 Guam 19 'II 14. The Qefendant argues that the statutes 23
prescribe two separate punishments for the same offense, and therefore, the Court Gould 24
25 resolve the ambiguity by. finding that the Defendant would have to be punished uncle' the
26 misdemeanor guidelines for first offenders and dismiss the felony charge from the indictment 27 (Mot. Strike at 5, 7). The statutes the Defendant complains of state: 28 I I
Page 3of 6 Decision and Order CF0027-18, People v. Cheon
§ 18104. Conviction of.First Violation of 18102; Punishment. 1
2 (a) If any person is convicted of a first violation of § 18102 of this Chapter, that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprisonment 3 in the custody of the Department of Corrections ("DOC") or the Guam Police Department ("GPD") for not less than a mandatory forty-eight (48) hours nor 4 mor e tha n one (1) yea r a nd a fine of not less tha n One T housa nd Dolla r s 5 ($1,000) nor more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000). In addition, the judge may impose any additional penalties, including requiring the offenders pay 6 restitution to persons injured or for property damaged. 7
8 § 18110. Vehicular Negligence; Third Degree Felony. 9
10 Any violation of subsection (c) or (d) of § 18102 of this Chapter shall be a felony of the third degree. 11
16 GCA § 18104(a) (1993) and § 18110 (1994). The Defendant argues that §§ 1810)(a) and 12
13 18110 ambiguously prescribes different punishments for the same offense under § l8102(c)~ and
14 (d), because § 18104(a) states that first time offenses under all subsections in § 18102 will be a
15 misdemeanor and § 18104(a) also relates to violations that cause personal injury, whereas § 16 18110 prescribes felony punishment for such offenses. (See Mot. Strike at 4-5). Accordingly, 17 18 the Defendant argues that the rule of lenity would require this Court to punish the Defendant
19 under § 18104(a) because it prescribes the less severe punishment. Id. at 7. We disagree.
20 T he r ule of lenit y only a pplies wher e, a ft er r es or t ing t o t he ca nons of s t a t ut or y 21 construction, a court is satisfied that the statute is ambiguous. People v. Lau 2007 Guam 41 11 22 n. 5 (citing U.S. v. Pearson, 321 F.3d 790, 791 (9th Cir. 2003)). Lenity cannot be invoked 23 i I
simply because a different reading of the statute is possible. Pearson, 321 F.3d at 791. In I I
25 determining the meaning of a statute, the inquiry starts with the plain language. Sumitomo
26 Const., Co., Ltd. V Gov. of Guam, 2001 Guam 35
Page 4 of 6 Decision and Order CF0027-18, People v. Cheon
language of a statute should not be read in a manner that circumvents the clear legislative intent. 1
2 See id. Ki determining legislative intent, the Court should consider each section in conjen¢tion
3 with the others to determine its meaning as a whole. 4 Reading §§,18104 and 18110 in a vacuum might lead one to conclude, as the DefeNdant 5 has, that the legislature has prescribed widely different punishments for the same conduct. (See 6
7 Mot. Strike at 4-5, 7). However, such an absurd reading flies in the face of the legislative intent
8 surrounding the Safe Streets Act, Public Law ("P.L.")22-020, which added Title 16, Chapter 18
9 to the Guam Code.I The legislative statement reads as follows: 10 In recent years, traffic accidents involving motorists driving under the influence 11 of alcohol have risen alarmingly despite previous legislative efforts to curb the problem. The Legislature finds that a revised implied consent law and tougher 12 penalties are needed. 13 P.L. 22-020 at 3 (available at http://www.guamlegislature.com/22nd_pub1ic_1aws.htm). ~It is 14 clear that the legislature, through the Safe Streets Act, intended to curb drunk driving through 15
16 the imposition of harsh penalties for offenders. Before it was repealed and reenacted, § 18110
17 simply read: "if any person is convicted of a violation of § 18102 of this Chapter and the
18 offense causes bodily injury to any person other than the driver, such person shall be guilty Of . 19 a felony of the third degree." Id. at 10. Section 18110 was later changed to read that violations 20 of § 18102 (c) and (d)2 were third degree felonies. P.L. 22-146 at 2 (available at 21
22 http://www.guam1egislature.com/22nd_public_laws.htm).
23 It appears to this Court that the legislature intended to punish DUI offenses that resulted 24 in injury to another who is not the driver as a felony, regardless of whether or not the offense 25
26 I Title 16 Chapter 18 has since been repealed and reenacted as Title 9 Chapter 92: "Safe Streets Act of 20l8." P.L. 34-107:3 and l07:4. i 27 z Section l8I02(c) and (d) makes it a crime for a person to operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, or with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08%, where the person's negligent driven 1
28 actions forbidden by law, or neglect of a duty imposed by law proximately causes bodily injury to any person thee than the driver.
Page 5of 6 1 Dec is ion and Order CF0027- 18, People v. Cheon
constituted a defendant's first violation. If we read the statute as the Defendant requests, then 1
2 there is no purpose to the inclusion of § 18110, as first and second violations of §l8102(c and
(d) would always be punished as a misdemeanor. See 16 GCA §§l8104-105. This . out 3
4 1 declines to read the statute in a manner that will completely render it ineffective, especially 5 given clear legislative history and intent to the contrary. Sum itomo Const., 2001 Guam 35 17. 6
Accordingly, the Court finds no ambiguity in the statutes, and declines to apply the rule of 7
8 lenity to dismiss the first charge of the indictment. People v. Lau 2007 Guam 4 *I 11 n. 5.
10 For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby DENIES the Defendant's Motion to 11 Strike Felony Charge. A trial setting conference will be held on February 27, 2019 at 3:00 m. 12
14 IT IS so ORDERED on this 19th day of February, 2019.
21 HONORABLE ALBERT O c. LAMORENA III Presiding Judge, Superior Court of Guam 22
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