People v. Chavez
This text of 2016 CO 20 (People v. Chavez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinions
delivered the Opinion of the Court
11 In this ongmal proceeding, we are asked to decide whether a trial court has the authority to grant a defendant's discovery motion seeking access to the private residence of a non-party-here, the alleged victim.1 Because the trial court lacked the authority to order such: access, we hold that it abused its discretion. We therefore make the rule absolute.
I. Facts and f’rdcedural History
12 The defendant, Saul Chavez, has been charged with one count of sexual assault. The alleged victim.lives in a home with other members of her family. The People allege that .Chavez,. a family friend, had been allowed to stay the night at the victim's house after drinking alcohol late into the evening. The People further allege that Chavez en[944]*944tered a bedroom where the victim was asleep, where he engaged in sexual intercourse with her, without her consent, while she was physically helpless.
T3 On December 23, 2014, Chavez filed a motion requesting court-ordered gccess to the home-the seene of the alleged crime. He argued that he needed access in order to "be able to investigate and photograph the property for his defense." Chavez cited Crim. P. 16(I)(d) in support of his motion, arguing that, under that rule, the court had "discretionary power" to order the disclosure of "relevant material and information."
14 The People argued to the trial court that Chavez had not shown that a visit to the scene "would assist in resolving any of the issues." They noted that "this is a case which does not involve an unlawful entry into the home" and asserted that Chavez had already been given "a detailed floor plan of the home." Additionally, the People informed the court that "the victim has chosen not to share the fact that she was sexually assaulted with members of ”her family who live with her at the home."
T5 The trial court granted Chavez's motion for access to the home. In so. doing, it followed the 'court of appeals' then-recent decision in People in the Interest of E.G., 2015 COA 18, ¶ 15, 371 P.3d 693, overruled by People in the Interest of E.G., 2016 CO 19, 368 P.3d 946. In reliance om that decision, the trial court held that Chavez had shown that access to the home was "relevant, material, and necessary" to his defense and that he was therefore entitled to access it "in order to prepare his defense." Id.
[6 The People petitioned this court for an order to show cause under C.A.R. 21, and we agreed to review the district court's order.
iI Stafidard of Review
17 Generally speakmg, appellate courts will review a trial court's discovery order in a criminal casé for abuse of discretion. Crim. P. 16(D(d)(1); People ex rel. Shinn v. Dist. Ct., 172 Colo. 23, 469 P.2d 732, 733-34 (1970). A trial court abuses its discretion if it exceeds the bounds of its legal authority. See Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 164 (Colo.2005). Thus, the precise question we are faced with today-whether a trial court has the authority to order a third party (here, the alleged victim) to open her home to the defendant-presents a legal question that is subject to de novo review. See Stackhouse v. People, 2015 CO 48, ¶ 4, — P.3d —.
18 Under GAR. 21, we will review a trial court's order only where "the normal appellate process would prove inadequate," Warden v. Exempla, Inc., 2012 CO 74, ¶ 16, 291 P.3d 30, 34. This is certainly such a case. If the defendant were erroncously allowed to access the alleged victim's home, the damage to her privacy rights would be irreparable.
III. Analysis.
T9 The People argue that the court of appeals' decision in E.G., 2015 COA 18, 371 P.3d 693, was wrongly decided and that the trial court had no authority to order that Chavez be granted access to the alleged vice-tim's private home. They contend that neither the Constitution nor the rules of criminal procedure grant a trial court the ability to order defense access to a non-party's2 home.
{10 Today we have overruled the court of appeals' decision in E.G., 2015 COA 18, 371 P.3d 693. See E.G., 2016 CO 19, 368 P.3d 946. As we explain there, a trial court lacks authority to order defense access to a third party's private home that is not in the possession or control of the government. E.G., 2016 CO 19, ¶¶ 30-32, 368 P.3d 946. Similarly, the trial court here lacked authority to grant Chavez access to the alleged victim's home. Given our decision in E.G., 2016 CO 19, 368 P.3d 946, the trial court's order, issued in reliance on the court of appeals' now-overruled opinion, cannot stand:; [945]*945We therefore make the rule to show cause absolute.
A11. Under the cireumstances presented here, neither the United States Constitution, the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor any statute provides the trial court with authority3 to grant Chavez access to the alleged victim's home without her. consent. Accordingly, the trial court had no authority to issue such an order and Chavez's motion should have been denied. See E.G., 2016 CO 19, ¶¶ 30-32, 368 P.3d 946.
12 We therefore make the rule absolute and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
2016 CO 20, 368 P.3d 943, 2016 WL 1567235, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-chavez-colo-2016.