KIRSHBAUM, Justice.
The Weld County District Court found the defendant, Joe Chavez, Jr., guilty of attempt to introduce contraband into a detention facility, in violation of section 18-2-101(1), 8B C.R.S. (1986).
Based on its findings that Chavez was charged with having committed a previous felony at the time he committed the attempt, and that Chavez was subsequently convicted of the previous felony, the trial court imposed a sentence in the aggravated range pursuant to section 18-1-105(9)(a)(IV), 8B C.R.S. (1986). In
People v. Chavez,
743 P.2d 53 (Colo.App.1987), the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of guilt and held that although the sentence could not be imposed pursuant to section 18-l-105(9)(a)(IV), the status of Chavez might permit sentencing in the aggravated range pursuant to section 18-1-105(9)(a)(V).
However, relying on
People
v. Russell,
703 P.2d 620 (Colo.App.1985), the Court of Appeals vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. We granted the People’s petition for certiorari review of that portion of the Court of Appeals decision vacating the trial court’s sentence.
In view of our decision in
People v. Leonard,
755 P.2d 447 (Colo.1988), issued after our grant of the People’s petition for certiorari, we reverse and remand with directions.
I
On July 17, 1985, Chavez entered a plea of guilty to the felony offense of aggravated motor vehicle theft, § 18-4-409, 8B C.R.S. (1986), in the Weld County District Court. On July 18, 1985, a jailer discovered Chavez making alcohol in a shower stall at the Weld County Jail. On July 23,1985, Chavez was charged with the offense of introducing contraband in the first degree, pursuant to section 18-8-203(l)(b), 8B C.R. S. (1986). Chavez was sentenced for the aggravated motor vehicle theft offense on August 28, 1985.
A bench trial on the contraband charge commenced December 4, 1985. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found Chavez guilty of the offense of attempt to introduce contraband in the first degree.
In imposing sentence, the trial court found that at the time he attempted to introduce contraband into the Weld County Jail on July 18, 1985, Chavez had not yet been convicted of the aggravated motor vehicle theft offense. The trial court also concluded that Chavez was convicted of the aggravated motor vehicle theft offense on August 28, 1985, when he was sentenced for that offense. On the basis of those determinations, the trial court held that section 18-l-105(9)(a)(IV) requires imposition of a sentence in the aggravated range.
On appeal, Chavez argued,
inter alia,
that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence in the aggravated range. Relying on its prior decision in
People v. Russell,
703 P.2d 620 (Colo.App.),
cert. denied
(1985), the Court of Appeals held that because confinement is an element of the crime of attempt to make alcohol in jail, that fact could not also be deemed an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes. The Court of Appeals remanded the case with directions to the trial court to enter a new sentence within the presumptive range.
II
In
People v. Russell,
703 P.2d 620 (Colo.App.), ce
rt. denied
(1985), the Court of Appeals vacated a sentence imposed upon the defendant pursuant to section 18—1— 105(9)(a)(V) for the offense of felony-escape from custody or confinement. The trial court imposed a sentence in the aggravated range, presumably on the basis of its agreement with the People’s argument that because as an escapee the defendant was “under confinement” both at the time the felony was committed and thereafter, the provisions of section 18-1-105(9)(a)(V) requiring imposition of a sentence in the aggravated range were applicable.
See People v. Williams,
199 Colo. 515, 518, 611 P.2d 973, 975 (1980) (one element of the offense of escape is being under confinement when the offense was committed). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “lawful confinement is an element of the substantive crime of felony escape, and commission of this element by the defendant, in and of itself, cannot logically constitute an ‘extraordinarily aggravating’ aspect of the escape.”
Russell,
703 P.2d at 622. The decision was limited to the crime of escape, however, as reflected by the court’s language indicating that section 18-1-105(9)(a)(V) would apply to felonies other than escape committed while under confinement or to felonies other than escape committed after escape from confinement.
Id.
We denied a petition for certiorari review of
Russell.
However, we have on occasion referred to the limited nature of the holding of that decision. For example, in
People v. Haymaker,
716 P.2d 110 (Colo.1986), we rejected arguments of a defendant convicted of first degree sexual assault and a crime of violence that section 18—1— 105(9)(a)(I), 8B C.R.S. (1986), violated his constitutional rights.
In upholding the trial court’s sentence in the aggravated range, we made the following reference to the
Russell
decision:
[Ijnsofar as the court of appeals in ...
Russell
did not recognize a blanket constitutional prohibition against basing an aggravated sentence on an element of the crime, those decisions are consistent with our holding in this case.
716 P.2d at 118.
Other cases subsequent to
Haymaker
have confirmed that an element of an underlying offense may also provide the basis for an increased sentence under the crime of violence statute without violating constitutional standards.
See People v. Mozee, 723
P.2d 117, 129 n. 11 (Colo.1986).
See, e.g., People v. Vigil,
718 P.2d 496 (Colo.1986);
People v. Sanders,
717 P.2d 948 (Colo.1986) (per curiam);
People v. Powell,
716 P.2d 1096 (Colo.1986).
Any doubt that
People v. Russell
is inapplicable to the circumstances of this case was resolved by our recent decision in
People v. Leonard,
755 P.2d 447 (Colo.1988). In
Leonard,
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KIRSHBAUM, Justice.
The Weld County District Court found the defendant, Joe Chavez, Jr., guilty of attempt to introduce contraband into a detention facility, in violation of section 18-2-101(1), 8B C.R.S. (1986).
Based on its findings that Chavez was charged with having committed a previous felony at the time he committed the attempt, and that Chavez was subsequently convicted of the previous felony, the trial court imposed a sentence in the aggravated range pursuant to section 18-1-105(9)(a)(IV), 8B C.R.S. (1986). In
People v. Chavez,
743 P.2d 53 (Colo.App.1987), the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of guilt and held that although the sentence could not be imposed pursuant to section 18-l-105(9)(a)(IV), the status of Chavez might permit sentencing in the aggravated range pursuant to section 18-1-105(9)(a)(V).
However, relying on
People
v. Russell,
703 P.2d 620 (Colo.App.1985), the Court of Appeals vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. We granted the People’s petition for certiorari review of that portion of the Court of Appeals decision vacating the trial court’s sentence.
In view of our decision in
People v. Leonard,
755 P.2d 447 (Colo.1988), issued after our grant of the People’s petition for certiorari, we reverse and remand with directions.
I
On July 17, 1985, Chavez entered a plea of guilty to the felony offense of aggravated motor vehicle theft, § 18-4-409, 8B C.R.S. (1986), in the Weld County District Court. On July 18, 1985, a jailer discovered Chavez making alcohol in a shower stall at the Weld County Jail. On July 23,1985, Chavez was charged with the offense of introducing contraband in the first degree, pursuant to section 18-8-203(l)(b), 8B C.R. S. (1986). Chavez was sentenced for the aggravated motor vehicle theft offense on August 28, 1985.
A bench trial on the contraband charge commenced December 4, 1985. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found Chavez guilty of the offense of attempt to introduce contraband in the first degree.
In imposing sentence, the trial court found that at the time he attempted to introduce contraband into the Weld County Jail on July 18, 1985, Chavez had not yet been convicted of the aggravated motor vehicle theft offense. The trial court also concluded that Chavez was convicted of the aggravated motor vehicle theft offense on August 28, 1985, when he was sentenced for that offense. On the basis of those determinations, the trial court held that section 18-l-105(9)(a)(IV) requires imposition of a sentence in the aggravated range.
On appeal, Chavez argued,
inter alia,
that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence in the aggravated range. Relying on its prior decision in
People v. Russell,
703 P.2d 620 (Colo.App.),
cert. denied
(1985), the Court of Appeals held that because confinement is an element of the crime of attempt to make alcohol in jail, that fact could not also be deemed an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes. The Court of Appeals remanded the case with directions to the trial court to enter a new sentence within the presumptive range.
II
In
People v. Russell,
703 P.2d 620 (Colo.App.), ce
rt. denied
(1985), the Court of Appeals vacated a sentence imposed upon the defendant pursuant to section 18—1— 105(9)(a)(V) for the offense of felony-escape from custody or confinement. The trial court imposed a sentence in the aggravated range, presumably on the basis of its agreement with the People’s argument that because as an escapee the defendant was “under confinement” both at the time the felony was committed and thereafter, the provisions of section 18-1-105(9)(a)(V) requiring imposition of a sentence in the aggravated range were applicable.
See People v. Williams,
199 Colo. 515, 518, 611 P.2d 973, 975 (1980) (one element of the offense of escape is being under confinement when the offense was committed). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “lawful confinement is an element of the substantive crime of felony escape, and commission of this element by the defendant, in and of itself, cannot logically constitute an ‘extraordinarily aggravating’ aspect of the escape.”
Russell,
703 P.2d at 622. The decision was limited to the crime of escape, however, as reflected by the court’s language indicating that section 18-1-105(9)(a)(V) would apply to felonies other than escape committed while under confinement or to felonies other than escape committed after escape from confinement.
Id.
We denied a petition for certiorari review of
Russell.
However, we have on occasion referred to the limited nature of the holding of that decision. For example, in
People v. Haymaker,
716 P.2d 110 (Colo.1986), we rejected arguments of a defendant convicted of first degree sexual assault and a crime of violence that section 18—1— 105(9)(a)(I), 8B C.R.S. (1986), violated his constitutional rights.
In upholding the trial court’s sentence in the aggravated range, we made the following reference to the
Russell
decision:
[Ijnsofar as the court of appeals in ...
Russell
did not recognize a blanket constitutional prohibition against basing an aggravated sentence on an element of the crime, those decisions are consistent with our holding in this case.
716 P.2d at 118.
Other cases subsequent to
Haymaker
have confirmed that an element of an underlying offense may also provide the basis for an increased sentence under the crime of violence statute without violating constitutional standards.
See People v. Mozee, 723
P.2d 117, 129 n. 11 (Colo.1986).
See, e.g., People v. Vigil,
718 P.2d 496 (Colo.1986);
People v. Sanders,
717 P.2d 948 (Colo.1986) (per curiam);
People v. Powell,
716 P.2d 1096 (Colo.1986).
Any doubt that
People v. Russell
is inapplicable to the circumstances of this case was resolved by our recent decision in
People v. Leonard,
755 P.2d 447 (Colo.1988). In
Leonard,
the defendant, while an inmate at the Skyline Correctional Facility, was charged with possession of contraband in the first degree, in violation of section 18-8-204.1, 8B C.R.S. (1986). A jury returned a verdict of guilty to the charge. Rejecting the People’s argument that a sentence in the aggravated range was required by the provisions of section 18-1-105(9)(a)(V), the trial court imposed a sentence in the presumptive range.
The People appealed the sentence to this court, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to impose a sentence in the aggravated range pursuant to the requirements of section 18-l-105(9)(a)(V). We vacated the sentence and remanded the case for imposition of a sentence in the aggravated range.
Noting the General Assembly’s use of mandatory language and relying on our
decision in
People v. District Court,
713 P.2d 918 (Colo.1986), we held that:
[T]he plain meaning of subsection (9)(a) [of section 18-1-105] would seem to dictate that a sentencing court, when faced with the presence of one of the extraordinary aggravating circumstances set forth in that subsection, has no alternative other than to sentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment within the aggravated range.
Leonard,
755 P.2d at 449 (citing
People v. District Court,
713 P.2d at 921). We further held that a trial court choosing to impose a sentence for a felony conviction under circumstances governed by section 18-1-105 had no discretion to impose a sentence in the presumptive range.
In
Leonard,
we also rejected the argument that
Russell
required a contrary result. We pointed out that in
Russell
the aggravating circumstance was synonymous with an element of the underlying offense, noting that “the fact that the substantive offense and the sentencing statute contain a similar element does not ‘in and of itself result in a violation of equal protection or constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy.” 755 P.2d at 450-51.
Our decision in
Leonard
compels rejection of Chavez’s argument here. The General Assembly has the authority to establish more severe penalties for conduct it believes produces especially serious consequences.
People v. Thatcher,
638 P.2d 760, 766 (Colo.1981). The language of section 18-1-105(9)(a)(V) clearly reflects a legislative intent to punish felony offenses committed by convicted felons confined in detention facilities more severely than felonies committed by non-felons in detention facilities.
Leonard,
755 P.2d at 451 (Lohr, J., specially concurring). Under the circumstances presented by the record in this case, Chavez, like the defendant in
Leonard,
committed a felony offense while under confinement as a “convicted” felon.
The enhanced sentencing requirements of section 18—1— 105(9)(a)(V) apply to the circumstances of that offense, just as they required imposition of a sentence in the aggravated range for the defendant in
Leonard.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed insofar as it vacates the trial court’s sentence. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for remand to the trial court with directions to correct the mittimus in conformity with this opinion.