People v. Chatman

2023 IL App (2d) 220385-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: August 30, 2023
• Docket: 2-22-0385
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2023 IL App (2d) 220385-U No. 2-22-0385 Order filed August 30, 2023

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 20-CF-2168 ) CHUCKIE E. CHATMAN, ) Honorable ) Alice C. Tracy, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hutchinson and Mullen concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant was proved guilty, based on accountability, of knowing murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm where (1) defendant’s passenger fired at a vehicle occupied by the two victims and (2) the jury could reasonably infer that defendant enlisted the passenger to fire at the victims, given defendant’s angry and menacing behavior in the days before, and on the night of the shooting.

¶2 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Kane County, defendant, Chuckie E. Chatman,

was convicted of two counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2), (a)(3) (West 2020)) and

three counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(2)) in connection with a shooting

that resulted in the death of Ernest Hardy. Hardy died of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle 2023 IL App (2d) 220385-U

accident after gunshots were fired at his vehicle, causing him to lose control of the vehicle.

Defendant argues on appeal that we must reverse his convictions because he did not fire the shots,

and the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was legally accountable for the

conduct of whoever did. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant was charged in a six-count indictment. Counts I and II charged first degree

murder. The counts’ common allegation was that defendant fired bullets from a handgun into a

motor vehicle operated by Hardy, causing an accident that led to Hardy’s death. Count I further

alleged that defendant knew his actions created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm

to Hardy (id. § 9-1(a)(2)), while count II alleged that defendant committed a forcible felony, i.e.,

aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(2)), which caused Hardy’s death (id. § 9-

1(a)(3)). Counts III, IV, and V charged aggravated discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-1.2(a)(2))—

one count for each shot defendant fired at Hardy’s vehicle. Count VI charged reckless homicide

(id. § 9-3).

¶5 The following facts were presented at trial. At about 12:05 a.m. on October 17, 2020, two

Aurora police officers were in a parking lot at Jefferson Middle School when they heard five to

seven gunshots from the west. While heading toward the sound of the gunshots, they received a

report of an accident in the 700 block of Redwood Drive. The officers proceeded to that location,

where they found Hardy in the driver’s seat of a red Dodge Durango. Hardy was barely breathing.

The driver’s door was too badly damaged to open. When the officers went to the passenger’s side

to extricate Harvey, they saw that he had stopped breathing. Bullet holes were found in the

Durango’s passenger compartment, rear bumper, and taillight. Later, a bullet was found lodged in

the rear passenger’s side wheel rim. The State presented evidence suggesting that Hardy lost

-2- 2023 IL App (2d) 220385-U

control of the vehicle, at least partly because the bullet lodged in the wheel rim had also struck the

tire, causing it to deflate rapidly. Police found in the Durango an employment identification card

belonging to Brandy Mitchell.

¶6 Hardy did not survive the injuries he sustained in the crash. The forensic pathologist who

conducted the autopsy on Hardy testified that he died from a spinal cord injury that caused him to

stop breathing.

¶7 Mitchell testified that she and defendant had two children together, who were 5 and 12

years old at the time of trial. Mitchell described her relationship with Hardy as “[f]riends with

benefits.” Several days before Hardy died, defendant sent Mitchell an angry text message that

included a photograph Mitchell had posted on social media. The photograph showed Hardy and

his friends at Mitchell’s home. In the message, defendant described Hardy and his friends as

“GangBangers.” Defendant added, “[t]his [is] my last time telling you next time them N*** in yo

crib yo ass is mines!” On October 17, 2020, Mitchell and defendant spoke by phone several times

during the day and at night before the incident. At about 11 p.m., Mitchell heard a knock on her

door. When Mitchell opened the door, she saw defendant standing by the bushes at the side of her

home. She then closed the door and called Hardy to ask him to come over. Hardy drove to

Mitchell’s home and picked her up. She and Hardy then drove around. She did not recall where

they went. At some point, Hardy began driving fast when a red car was behind them. Mitchell

did not recall the type of car. She did recall that defendant drove a red car at the time. Mitchell

did not remember telling detectives that the car behind them was defendant’s.

¶8 Mitchell testified that someone in the red car started shooting. She did not hear gunshots,

but she smelled smoke in the car. She admitted that she told detectives that she heard two gunshots.

-3- 2023 IL App (2d) 220385-U

After the shots were fired, Hardy lost control of the vehicle and struck a tree. Mitchell got out of

the vehicle and walked home.

¶9 An audio recording of Mitchell’s interview with two detectives was admitted into evidence

and played for the jury. During the interview, Mitchell indicated that, after Hardy picked her up,

they went to a parking lot, where Hardy saw defendant’s car. Hardy started driving fast. Mitchell

smelled “one [gunshot] and heard two [gunshots].” She looked back and saw defendant’s car.

¶ 10 A detective obtained video taken shortly after 12 a.m. by a surveillance camera located on

Redwood Drive. Screenshots from the video were admitted into evidence. The screenshots are

rather ill-defined; the detective interpreted them based on his experience. According to the

detective, the screenshots depicted a Chrysler traveling north on Redwood, and some showed what

appeared to be muzzle flashes from a firearm being fired from the passenger’s side of the Chrysler.

¶ 11 When interviewed by police, defendant claimed that Mitchell was lying and knew nothing

about the crash that killed Hardy. He stated that he was at home at the time of the crash and that

he had not spoken to Mitchell in two months. He denied making phone calls to her on the night

of the crash.

¶ 12 During closing argument, the prosecutor contended that defendant was driving the Chrysler

and that a passenger fired the shots that struck Hardy’s vehicle. The prosecutor argued that

defendant was guilty of first degree murder based on principles of accountability (see id. § 5-2(c)).

The jury was instructed on accountability.

¶ 13 The jury returned a general verdict of guilty on the first degree murder counts and found

defendant guilty on all three counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm. The jury found defendant

not guilty of reckless homicide. The jury also made a special finding that defendant was armed

with a firearm.

-4- 2023 IL App (2d) 220385-U

¶ 14 At sentencing, the trial court found that the conviction on count II (felony murder) merged

into the conviction on count I (knowing murder). On count I, the court sentenced defendant to 28

years’ imprisonment, along with a 15-year enhancement based on the finding that defendant was

armed with a firearm (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1), (d)(i) (West 2020)). The court imposed three

10-year prison terms for aggravated discharge of a firearm, to be served concurrently with each

other and with the prison term for first degree murder.

¶ 15 Defendant filed this timely appeal.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 Defendant does not dispute that he was driving his vehicle when a passenger fired the shots

that caused Hardy to lose control of his vehicle and crash it into a tree, resulting in Hardy’s death.

Defendant argues, however, that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was

legally accountable for the passenger’s conduct. He asks us, therefore, to reverse his convictions

of first degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm.

¶ 18 A reviewing court will not set aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so

improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v.

Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, “ ‘the

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979)). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “there is no legal distinction between direct

and circumstantial evidence as to the weight and effect thereof.” People v. Case, 246 Ill. App. 3d

566, 576 (1993). It is well established that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a

criminal conviction, provided that such evidence satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the

-5- 2023 IL App (2d) 220385-U

elements of the crime charged.” People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 330 (2000). The reasonable doubt

standard does not require the trier of fact to disregard inferences that flow normally from the

evidence. People v. Saxon, 374 Ill. App. 3d 409, 417 (2007). Nor is the trier of fact “obligated to

accept any possible explanation compatible with the defendant’s innocence and elevate it to the

status of reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d

187, 272 (2006).

¶ 19 Defendant was charged with two counts of first degree murder. Count I charged knowing

murder, and count II charged felony murder. Section 9-1(a)(2) and (a)(3) of the Criminal Code of

2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2), (a)(3) (West 2020)) provides in pertinent part:

“(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first

degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:

***

(2) he or she knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or

great bodily harm to that individual or another; or

(3) he or she, acting alone or with one or more participants, commits or

attempts to commit a forcible felony other than second degree murder, and in the

course of or in furtherance of such crime *** he or she or another participant causes

the death of a person.”

¶ 20 The jury returned a general verdict finding defendant guilty of first degree murder. “Under

Illinois law, where an indictment contains several counts arising out of the same transaction and a

general verdict of guilty is returned, the effect is that the defendant is guilty as charged as to each

count to which the proof is applicable.” People v. Davidson, 2023 IL App (2d) 220140, ¶ 66. The

trial court merged the conviction on count II (felony murder) into the conviction on count I

-6- 2023 IL App (2d) 220385-U

(knowing murder) and imposed sentence on count I. We have no jurisdiction over the unsentenced

conviction on count II because it is a nonfinal judgment. See People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23,

51 (1984) (no jurisdiction to review armed violence convictions on which sentence was not

imposed); People v. Olaska, 2017 IL App (2d) 150567, ¶¶ 112-13 (no jurisdiction over

unsentenced felony murder convictions merged into knowing murder conviction).

¶ 21 Defendant was also convicted of multiple counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm. A

defendant commits this offense when he knowingly or intentionally “[d]ischarges a firearm in the

direction of another person or in the direction of a vehicle he or she knows or reasonably should

know to be occupied by a person[.]” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2020).

¶ 22 In determining whether the evidence supports the knowing murder and aggravated

discharge convictions, we apply accountability principles, on which the jury was instructed.

Section 5-1 of the Criminal Code (id. § 5-1) provides that “[a] person is responsible for conduct

which is an element of an offense if the conduct is either that of the person himself, or that of

another and he is legally accountable for such conduct as provided in Section 5-2 [of the Criminal

Code (id. § 5-2)], or both.” Section 5-2(c) of the Criminal Code (id. § 5-2(c)) provides, in pertinent

part:

“A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:

(c) either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent

to promote or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or

attempts to aid that other person in the planning or commission of the offense.

When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement,

any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are

-7- 2023 IL App (2d) 220385-U

considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design or agreement and all

are equally responsible for the consequences of those further acts. Mere presence

at the scene of a crime does not render a person accountable for an offense; a

person’s presence at the scene of a crime, however, may be considered with other

circumstances by the trier of fact when determining accountability.”

¶ 23 As noted, defendant does not deny that he was driving his vehicle when his passenger fired

the shots that struck Hardy’s vehicle. Clearly, defendant’s driving enabled the passenger to be in

position to fire those shots. Defendant argues, however, that the State failed to prove that he acted

with the requisite mental state to sustain a conviction based on principles of accountability.

Specifically, defendant argues that the State presented no evidence that he knew his passenger had

a gun or that the passenger intended to use it.

¶ 24 Contrary to defendant’s argument, the State presented ample circumstantial evidence that

defendant knew his passenger was armed and intended to fire at Hardy’s vehicle. The evidence

shows that defendant was angry after seeing a picture showing Hardy at Mitchell’s home. That

night, defendant knocked on the door to Mitchell’s home, but then retreated to the bushes. After

Mitchell shut the door on defendant, he remained near Mitchell’s home. They spoke by phone, as

they had earlier that day. After Hardy picked Mitchell up in his Durango, they encountered

defendant’s Chrysler, and defendant followed them. While the vehicles were on Redwood Drive,

a passenger in defendant’s vehicle fired several shots at the Durango. The most natural inference

arising from these facts is that defendant enlisted the passenger to fire at the Durango to exact

revenge against Mitchell, Hardy, or both.

¶ 25 Defendant would have us believe that he did not know that his passenger was armed and

that, for some unknown reason, his passenger acted on his or her own initiative in opening fire on

-8- 2023 IL App (2d) 220385-U

the Durango. Although there is a remote possibility that that is what occurred, that possibility does

not give rise to a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. See Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 272.

¶ 26 We note that, “[i]n determining a defendant’s legal accountability, the trier of fact may

consider the defendant’s presence during its commission, the defendant’s continued close

association with other offenders after its commission, the defendant’s failure to report the crime,

and the defendant’s flight from the scene.” People v. Fleming, 2014 IL App (1st) 113004, ¶ 53.

Although there is no evidence indicating whether defendant maintained a close association with

the passenger after the incident, defendant was present during the commission of the offense, failed

to report it, and fled the scene. Moreover, when interviewed by police, defendant falsely claimed

that he had not spoken with Mitchell for two months and that he was home at the time of the

incident. “A false exculpatory statement is probative of a defendant’s consciousness of guilt.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Milka, 211 Ill. 2d 150, 181 (2004).

¶ 27 The jury could reasonably infer that defendant knew that his passenger was armed and

would fire at Hardy’s vehicle. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions

of aggravated discharge of a firearm. Furthermore, the jury could reasonably infer that both

defendant and his passenger knew that firing at Hardy’s vehicle created a strong probability of

death or great bodily harm to Hardy. Thus, the evidence was also sufficient to sustain defendant’s

conviction of first degree murder.

¶ 28 In support of his argument that the evidence was insufficient, defendant cites People v.

Johnson, 2014 IL App. (1st) 122459-B, and People v. Estrada, 243 Ill. App. 3d 177 (1993). In

Johnson, the defendant was driving with Clayton Sims. Johnson, 2014 IL App. (1st) 122459-B,

¶ 7. Sims indicated that he wanted to buy marijuana from Brian Baity. Id. When the defendant

and Sims stopped near Baity’s vehicle, Sims stepped out and shot Baity. Id. There was conflicting

-9- 2023 IL App (2d) 220385-U

evidence as to whether the defendant then drove away with Sims. Id. The Johnson court found

that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant was responsible for Sims’s

conduct. Id. ¶ 158. Unlike in this case, however, in Johnson there was no evidence that the

defendant had a reason to harm the victim. See id. ¶ 161. Thus, Johnson is readily distinguishable

from this case.

¶ 29 In Estrada, the defendant and several other individuals were riding in a vehicle driven by

Juan Portillo. Estrada, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 178. At some point, Portillo pulled the vehicle in front

of a building where Jesus Sanchez stood. Id. at 178-79. The defendant exited the vehicle

brandishing a tire iron, and then Portillo shot Sanchez. Id. at 179, 185. Sanchez died from his

injuries. Id. at 181. The trial court found the defendant guilty of first degree murder on a theory

of accountability. Id. at 177. In reversing the conviction, the Estrada court reasoned:

“In the present case there is no direct evidence tying [the defendant] to a common

plan or design to shoot Sanchez. The evidence shows that [the defendant], who left the car

brandishing a tire iron, had already exited the car when Portillo fired a gun at Sanchez.

Although [the defendant’s] acts indicate that he intended to intimidate Sanchez, there is no

evidence that he was aware that Portillo intended to shoot at Sanchez. In fact, it is less

likely that [the defendant] would leave the car to pursue Sanchez if he knew that Portillo

intended to fire at Sanchez.” Id. at 185.

No similar circumstances exist in this case.

¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.

¶ 32 Affirmed.

- 10 -