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6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 7
8 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CF0431-14 ) 9 ) vs. ) 10 ) ) DECISION AND ORDER 11 ) (Defendant's Motion to Suppress VINCENT RODRIGUEZ CEPEDA, ) Evidence) 12 Defendant. ) ) 13 ) 14 INTRODUCTION 15 This matter came before this Court on October 21, 2014, on Vincent Rodriguez 16 Cepeda's ("Defendant") Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence. Defendant was 17 represented by Attorney Eric D. Miller from the Public Defender's Office. The People of Guam 18 was represented by Assistant Attorney General Lisa Lorig. Following the hearing, the Court 19 took the matter under advisement. On November 7, 2014, the Court orally denied Defendant's 20 Motion to Suppress Evidence and reduces to writing its earlier decision. Upon review of the 21 written and oral arguments and legal authorities presented by both parties, the Court hereby 22 issues its written Decision on Defendant's motion DENYING Defendant's Motion to Suppress 23 Evidence. 24 BACKGROUND 25 On August 20, 2014, the Guam Police Department apprehended Defendant at his place 26 of residence on #192 Artemio Cruz Street in Yona. While Defendant was in custody, Police 27 Officer Reyes met with Defendant's girlfriend Yvonne M. P. Demapan ("Demapan"). 28 Demapan took Officer Reyes to the back of the residence and gave him a bundle of items
Page 1 CF0431-14: People v. Cepeda Decision & Order: Motion to Suppress Evidence 1 potentially related to the robbery ofMijin Market in Yona. On August 29,2014, Defendant was 2 indicted for the following: (1) Second Degree Robbery, (2) Special Allegation of Possession or 3 Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony, and (3) Assault. On September 17, 4 2014, Defendant asserted his rights to a speedy trial. 5 On October 7, 2014, Defendant filed his Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress 6 Evidence. Defendant alleges violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights which 7 prohibit unreasonable search and seizure. On October 8, 2014, the People of Guam filed their 8 Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. The People of Guam alleges that 9 Demapan had actual authority to consent to the warrantless search of Defendant's apartment. 10 The Court heard oral arguments on October 21, 2014 and took the matter under 11 advisement. 12 DISCUSSION
13 I. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
14 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 15 "The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, 16 against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and 17 particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 18
19 U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Under Section 1421(b)(c) of the Organic Act of Guam the 20 protections of the Fourth Amendment are incorporated and makes it applicable to the 21 Territory of Guam. 22 II. Warrantless Search 23 '" [W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person unless 'the 24 exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the 25 warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 26 437 U.S. 385, 393-394 (1978). "In the absence of a warrant, the police may lawfully conduct a 27 search or seizure only if an exception to the warrant requirement applies." Chargualaf, 2001 28
Page 2 CF0431-14: People v. Cepeda Decision & Order: Motion to Suppress Evidence 1 Guam 1 ~ 14. "The general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, 2 however, is subject to certain well established exceptions .... " People v. Camacho, 2004 Guam 6 3 ~ 16. Exceptions include voluntary consent to the search, Santos, 1999 Guam 1 ~ 33." People of
4 Guam v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12. 5 III. Voluntary third party consent exception to the warrant requirement
6 a. Common Authority 7 Voluntary consent to search is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See 8 Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973). The Supreme Court of the 9 United States has established that voluntary consent can be obtained "either from the individual 10 whose property is searched, see Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 11 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises, 12 see United States v. Matlock, supra, 415 U.S., at 171, 94 S.Ct., at 993." Illinois v. Rodriguez, 13 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2797, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990). 14 The issue in this case is whether Demapan possessed a common authority over the 15 premises that Demapan resided in. The Supreme Court of the United States stated that, 16 "[c]ommon authority" rests "on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint 17 access or control for most purposes .... " !d. In this case, the Defendant did not submit any 18 declaration or present any witness to validate the facts. The Court heard from Officer Reyes 19 during the October 21, 2014 hearing and was limited to the facts testified by him. Officer Reyes 2o testified that Demapan mentioned to him that she was staying with the Defendant at the 21 residence. Officer Reyes also testified that he waited outside the house while Demapan went 22 inside the house to retrieve the items. Based on the facts, the Court finds that Demapan had 23 mutual use of the property and that she had access and control of the premises. Therefore, 24 Demapan had common authority with Defendant over the premises. 25 b. Consent 26 The next issue is whether the consent by Demapan was voluntary. The Supreme Court 27 of Guam established a test for consent which states that, "consent is voluntariness and is 28 determined from all the circumstances of a particular case. Rothman, 492 F.2d at 1264 (citations
Page 3 CF0431-14: People v. Cepeda Decision & Order: Motion to Suppress Evidence 1 omitted)." People ofGuam v. Santos, 1999 Guam 1. In addition the Court states, "A court is 2 required to carefully sift through the unique facts and circumstances of each case. Rothman, 492 3 F.2d at 1264. Thus, a balance can be struck between the defendant's right to be free from 4 coercive conduct and the government's legitimate need to conduct lawful searches. Schneckloth, 5 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct at 2048." !d. Voluntariness is determined from "the totality of the 6 circumstances .... Factors in determining voluntariness include: 1) whether the defendant was 7 detained and the length of time of the questioning; 2) whether the defendant was threatened or 8 intimidated by the police; 3) whether the defendant relied on misrepresentations or promises 9 made by the police; 4) whether the person was in custody or under arrest when the consent was 10 given; 5) whether the person was in a public or a secluded place; and 6) whether the defendant 11 objected to the search." People of Guam v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12. 12 Based on the limited facts, Officer Reyes testified that Demapan was frustrated with the 13 Defendant and that she didn't want anything to do with him. Officer Reyes testified that 14 Demapan asked him to follow her to the back of the house. Officer Reyes' testimony didn't 15 mention that Demapan felt threatened or intimidated. The fact that Demapan requested Officer 16 Reyes to follow her adds her voluntariness.
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('nURT t ..J\../
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6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 7
8 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CF0431-14 ) 9 ) vs. ) 10 ) ) DECISION AND ORDER 11 ) (Defendant's Motion to Suppress VINCENT RODRIGUEZ CEPEDA, ) Evidence) 12 Defendant. ) ) 13 ) 14 INTRODUCTION 15 This matter came before this Court on October 21, 2014, on Vincent Rodriguez 16 Cepeda's ("Defendant") Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Evidence. Defendant was 17 represented by Attorney Eric D. Miller from the Public Defender's Office. The People of Guam 18 was represented by Assistant Attorney General Lisa Lorig. Following the hearing, the Court 19 took the matter under advisement. On November 7, 2014, the Court orally denied Defendant's 20 Motion to Suppress Evidence and reduces to writing its earlier decision. Upon review of the 21 written and oral arguments and legal authorities presented by both parties, the Court hereby 22 issues its written Decision on Defendant's motion DENYING Defendant's Motion to Suppress 23 Evidence. 24 BACKGROUND 25 On August 20, 2014, the Guam Police Department apprehended Defendant at his place 26 of residence on #192 Artemio Cruz Street in Yona. While Defendant was in custody, Police 27 Officer Reyes met with Defendant's girlfriend Yvonne M. P. Demapan ("Demapan"). 28 Demapan took Officer Reyes to the back of the residence and gave him a bundle of items
Page 1 CF0431-14: People v. Cepeda Decision & Order: Motion to Suppress Evidence 1 potentially related to the robbery ofMijin Market in Yona. On August 29,2014, Defendant was 2 indicted for the following: (1) Second Degree Robbery, (2) Special Allegation of Possession or 3 Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony, and (3) Assault. On September 17, 4 2014, Defendant asserted his rights to a speedy trial. 5 On October 7, 2014, Defendant filed his Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress 6 Evidence. Defendant alleges violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights which 7 prohibit unreasonable search and seizure. On October 8, 2014, the People of Guam filed their 8 Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. The People of Guam alleges that 9 Demapan had actual authority to consent to the warrantless search of Defendant's apartment. 10 The Court heard oral arguments on October 21, 2014 and took the matter under 11 advisement. 12 DISCUSSION
13 I. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
14 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 15 "The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, 16 against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and 17 particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 18
19 U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Under Section 1421(b)(c) of the Organic Act of Guam the 20 protections of the Fourth Amendment are incorporated and makes it applicable to the 21 Territory of Guam. 22 II. Warrantless Search 23 '" [W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person unless 'the 24 exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the 25 warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 26 437 U.S. 385, 393-394 (1978). "In the absence of a warrant, the police may lawfully conduct a 27 search or seizure only if an exception to the warrant requirement applies." Chargualaf, 2001 28
Page 2 CF0431-14: People v. Cepeda Decision & Order: Motion to Suppress Evidence 1 Guam 1 ~ 14. "The general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, 2 however, is subject to certain well established exceptions .... " People v. Camacho, 2004 Guam 6 3 ~ 16. Exceptions include voluntary consent to the search, Santos, 1999 Guam 1 ~ 33." People of
4 Guam v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12. 5 III. Voluntary third party consent exception to the warrant requirement
6 a. Common Authority 7 Voluntary consent to search is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See 8 Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973). The Supreme Court of the 9 United States has established that voluntary consent can be obtained "either from the individual 10 whose property is searched, see Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 11 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises, 12 see United States v. Matlock, supra, 415 U.S., at 171, 94 S.Ct., at 993." Illinois v. Rodriguez, 13 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2797, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990). 14 The issue in this case is whether Demapan possessed a common authority over the 15 premises that Demapan resided in. The Supreme Court of the United States stated that, 16 "[c]ommon authority" rests "on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint 17 access or control for most purposes .... " !d. In this case, the Defendant did not submit any 18 declaration or present any witness to validate the facts. The Court heard from Officer Reyes 19 during the October 21, 2014 hearing and was limited to the facts testified by him. Officer Reyes 2o testified that Demapan mentioned to him that she was staying with the Defendant at the 21 residence. Officer Reyes also testified that he waited outside the house while Demapan went 22 inside the house to retrieve the items. Based on the facts, the Court finds that Demapan had 23 mutual use of the property and that she had access and control of the premises. Therefore, 24 Demapan had common authority with Defendant over the premises. 25 b. Consent 26 The next issue is whether the consent by Demapan was voluntary. The Supreme Court 27 of Guam established a test for consent which states that, "consent is voluntariness and is 28 determined from all the circumstances of a particular case. Rothman, 492 F.2d at 1264 (citations
Page 3 CF0431-14: People v. Cepeda Decision & Order: Motion to Suppress Evidence 1 omitted)." People ofGuam v. Santos, 1999 Guam 1. In addition the Court states, "A court is 2 required to carefully sift through the unique facts and circumstances of each case. Rothman, 492 3 F.2d at 1264. Thus, a balance can be struck between the defendant's right to be free from 4 coercive conduct and the government's legitimate need to conduct lawful searches. Schneckloth, 5 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct at 2048." !d. Voluntariness is determined from "the totality of the 6 circumstances .... Factors in determining voluntariness include: 1) whether the defendant was 7 detained and the length of time of the questioning; 2) whether the defendant was threatened or 8 intimidated by the police; 3) whether the defendant relied on misrepresentations or promises 9 made by the police; 4) whether the person was in custody or under arrest when the consent was 10 given; 5) whether the person was in a public or a secluded place; and 6) whether the defendant 11 objected to the search." People of Guam v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12. 12 Based on the limited facts, Officer Reyes testified that Demapan was frustrated with the 13 Defendant and that she didn't want anything to do with him. Officer Reyes testified that 14 Demapan asked him to follow her to the back of the house. Officer Reyes' testimony didn't 15 mention that Demapan felt threatened or intimidated. The fact that Demapan requested Officer 16 Reyes to follow her adds her voluntariness. In addition, Officer Reyes testified that Demapan 17 went to the house by herself. If Demapan felt threatened or objected to the search, Demapan 18 could have easily stayed in her house or called for help. Based on the testimony of Officer 19 Reyes, the Court finds that Demapan voluntarily consented to the search when she went into the 20 residence to retrieve items given to Officer Reyes. Therefore, Demapan's consent was 21 voluntary. 22 In conclusion, the Court finds that there was voluntary consent to search the property by 23 Demapan and therefore there was no unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth 24 Amendment. In review of the moving papers filed by both parties, the oral arguments, and 25 witness presented, the Court is satisfied at this time. Therefore, Defendant's Motion to 26 Suppress Evidence is DENIED. 27 Ill 28 III
Page 4 CF0431-14: People v. Cepeda Decision & Order: Motion to Suppress Evidence CONCLUSION 1
2 By preponderance of the evidence and based on the foregoing reasons, the Court
3 DENIES Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 4 SO ORDERED this f 2 day ofNOVEMBER, 2014. 5
9 Judge, Superior Court of Guam
Page 5 CF0431-14: People v. Cepeda Decision & Order: Motion to Suppress Evidence