People v. Ceasar

• Court: Superior Court of Guam
• Decided: April 13, 2021
• Docket: CM0379-20
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

, oLEo SUPERIOR COURT GF GUAM 2021 APR 13 an 9: 26 CLERK OF COURT

By !

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM

PEOPLE OF GUAM, Criminal Case No. CM0379-20 GPD Report No. 20-21635 Plaintiff,

vs.

DECISION AND ORDER DIANA ATIN CEASAR GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION (aka Dianne Apps Ceasar), FOR CWIL COMPROMISE DOB: 02/24/1973 or 02/24/1974

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

This matter came before the Honorable Dalai A. Gutierrez on February 26, 2021 for a

hearing on Defendant Diana Atin Ceasar's ("Defendant") Motion for Civil Compromise filed on

January 28, 2021 ("Motion"). Present via Zoom was Defendant Diana Atin Ceasar

("Defendant"); Attorney Kathleen Aguon of the Public Defender Service Corporation

representing Defendant; and Assistant Attorney General Sean Brown representing the People of

Guam (the "People"). Having reviewed the record and arguments presented by the parties as

well as applicable law, the Court now issues this Decision and Order GRANTINGDefendant's

Motion.

BACKGROUND

On August 28, 2020, Defendant was charged, by Magistrate's Complaint, with One

Count of Criminal Trespass (As a Misdemeanor) and One Count of Criminal Mischief (As a DECISION AND ORDER CM0379-20; People v. Diana Arin Ceasar

Misdemeanor). Magistrate's Con pl. (Aug. 28, 2020). On January 28, 2021, Dorisa Frank

("Victim") tiled a Declaration in this case acknowledging that she received satisfaction for her

injury and harm to her property. Further, in her Declaration, the Victim stated that she did not

object to dismissal of this case and that she made her Declaration voluntarily and without

coercion. See Decl. of Dorisa Frank 1[4-5 (Jan. 28, 2021).

On January 28, 2021, Defendant filed this Motion. The People tiled an Opposition to

Defendant's Motion ("Opposition") on February 1, 2021. Defendant filed a Reply to the

Government's Opposition ("Reply") on February 10, 2021. T he Court heard the matter on

February 26, 2021 and took the Motion under advisement.

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves the Court to dismiss the Magistrate's Complaint pursuant to 8 GCA §

80.90. Motion, at 1. Defendant's Motion is based upon the Declaration filed by the Victim.

Decl. of Darisa Frank 'll 4-5. Defendant further argues that civil compromise is appropriate in

this case because: 1) both charges have a civil remedy under Title 7 of the Guam Code

Annotated, Chapter 10, 2) the circumstances surrounding the co ission of the offenses are

such that this was an isolated incident and the Victim received the satisfaction she requested, and

3) the Victim's settlement agreement was made voluntarily, shown by her Declaration. Motion,

at 2-3 (citing People v Moulton, 182 Cal. Rptr. 761, 767-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)).

In the People's Opposition, the People argue that the Victim's Declaration does not meet

the satisfaction of injury requirement because "Defendant does not indicate how the victim

received satisfaction for her injury or if any actual civil agreement was reached." Opposition, at

3. Additionally, the People argue that dismissal due to civil compromise is inappropriate because

2 DECISION AND ORDER CM0379-20,° People u Diana Attn Ceasar

the public interest is best served by Defendant receiving necessary treatment through the

prosecution of this matter and because Defendant was on probation in Superior Court Case No.

CF0318-17 when the underlying incident in this case occurred. Id.

At the February 26, 2021 Motion Hearing, the People further argued that based on the

"on payment of costs incurred" language in Guam's Civil Compromise statute, 8 GCA § 80.90,

the Defendant is required to pay monetary satisfaction to the Victim or at least must account for

the type of satisfaction that has been paid to the Victim. Min. Entry, at 9:18:12 AM (Feb. 26,

2021). 1. The Requirements of Guam's Civil Compromise Statute, 8 GCA §80.90, Are Met.

Guam's Criminal Procedure Code provides that a court may order a criminal action

dismissed, "[w]hen the defendant has been charged with the commission of an offense which is

not a felony for which the person the person injured by the act constituting the offense has a

remedy by a civil action," and "[when] the person injured appears before, or files his declaration

in, the court in which the criminal action is pending and acknowledges that he has received

satisfaction for the injury." 8 GCA § 80.90(a) and (b). Further, "dismissal under this Section is a

bar to another prosecution for the same offense." 8 GCA § 80.90(c).

A. Defendant's Charges Are Misdemeanors and Each Charge Has a Civil Remedy.

First, it is undisputed that Defendant was charged with two misdemeanors and no

felonies. Second, each charge has a remedy by civil action. A charged offense has a

corresponding civil remedy lg "the civil cause of action shares a common element with the

cr imina l offense, compr omise is a va ila ble, over la pping, not Ml congr uence, is r equir ed. "

3 DECISION AND ORDER CM0379-20; People u Diana Attn Ceasar

People u Hschman, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 654 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).

In Guam, criminal trespass is defined as follows: "[a] person commits an offense lg

knowing that he is not licensed to do so, he enters or surreptitiously remains in any habitable

property or building." 9 GCA § 37.30(a). Likewise, trespass has a corr non law civil

counterpart that requires, "the following elements: a) the tortfeasor intentionally, b) enters the

land in possession of another ... c) or remains on the land ...." Guerrero 14 DLB Const. Co.,

1999 Guam 9 1[ 16 (citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 158 (1988)). Here, both criminal and

common law trespass require the entering of another's property, the knowledge or intent that they

are not under license to do so, and remaining on the property. Therefore, the act constituting the

charge of Criminal Trespass has a civil remedy, and civil compromise is thereby allowed under §

80.90(a). Criminal mischief is defined as, "intentionally daman[ing] the property of another." 9

GCA § 34.50(c). Guam recognizes the common law civil cause of action of conversion, whose

"elements . .. are: (1) facts showing plaintiff's ownership or right of possession of the property,

(2) defendant's wrongful act toward ... the properly, interfering with plaintiff's possession; and

(3) damage to the plaintiff" Adkins v Suva, 2011 WL 4443232 *10 (D. Guam 2011), reversed

on other grounds. As above, the criminal cause of action and the civil cause of action share

common elements, including a wrongful act to the property of another. Therefore, the act

constituting the charge of Criminal Mischief has a civil remedy, and civil compromise is thereby

allowed under § 80.90(a).

B. The Victim Filed A Declaration Acknowledging Tbat She Has Received Satisfaction for the Injury.

In addition, the Victim filed a Declaration, stating "I acknowledge that I have received

4 DECISION AND ORDER CM0379-20;People u Diana Attn Ceasar

satisfaction for the injury and harm to my property, and I do not object to dismissal of this case

by way of the Civil Compromise statute." Decl. of Darisa Frank1]4 (Jan..28, 2021). The People

argue that the Declaration is insufficient because the "on payment of costs incurred" language in

Guam's Civil Compromise statute, 8 GCA § 80.90, requires Defendant to pay monetary

satisfaction to the Victim or the Defendant at least must account for the type of satisfaction that

has been paid to the Victim. Min. Entry, at 9:18:12 AM (Feb. 26, 2021). The Court disagrees

and Ends the Declaration to be sufficient.

The statute does not suggest that monetary satisfaction is the only way to meet 8 GCA §

80.90's requirements T he C ivil C ompr omise sta tute does not "specify tha t the victim's

'satisfaction for the injury' must arise from the institution of a civil action or what the nature or

form of such 'satisfaction' [may] be." People v. Stephen, 182 Cal. App. ad Supp. 14, 27 (Cal.

App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1986) (rejecting the Government's contention "that unless the victim

acknowledges that he has received complete compensation for the injury, the court abuses its

discretion in granting civil compromise.").

Furthermore, satisfaction for the injury is achieved when "the victim has in actuality

received recompense acceptable to him for his injury, not that the victim has received every

recovery possible under civil law or everything the victim believed he would be entitled to

civilly." Stephen, 182 C a l. App. a d S upp. a t 27. Since 8 GCA § 80.90 neither defines

satisfaction nor explicitly authorizes waiver or partial waiver of satisfaction, the Court must

determine the meaning of satisfaction.

Sta tutor y inter pr eta tion is a lega l question a nd the inquir y a lwa ys begins with the

1 See e.g., People u Castro, CM0350-14, Decision and Order, at.2 (May 18, 2015), People u Doone, CM0845-12, Decision and Order, at 3-4 (May 9, 2013); People u Kinsey, CM0009-14, Decision and Order, at 2-4 (Aug. 18, 2014); People M Gaza, CM0860-14, Decision and Order, at 5-6 (April 15, 2015).

5 DECISION AND ORDER CM0379-20; People Vu Diana Atin Ceasar

language of the statute. See People u Robert, 2019 Guam 2 1] 10. A statute's plain meaning

prevails absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, but the Court need not follow the plain

language of a statute "where the result would lead to absurd or impractical consequences,

untenable distinctions, or unreasonable results." People v Flores, 2004 Guam 18 11 18.

Consistent with previous holdings issued by the Superior Court, this Court therefore concludes

that it would be an absurd result to require the Victim to receive complete satisfaction and to

reject any lesser proposed, or non-monetary, satisfaction? Acceptable satisfaction may take

different forms based on the crimes charged, damage inflicted, and relationship between the

Victim and Defendant. The Court, therefore, declines to adopt a rigid approach and concludes

that assessing satisfaction necessarily is a fact-speciiic inquiry.

Here, the Victim requested an apology from the Defendant which the Defendant provided

to the Victim, Motion, Exhibit A-B (Jan. 28, 2021). The Victim also identifies the Defendant as

her "aunty." Id. at Exhibit A. Additionally, there is no information provided to the Court of any

costs incurred as a result of this incident. See Magistrate's Complaint (Aug. 28, 2020). Because

8 GCA § 80.90 does not direct this Court to adjudicate the terms of a mutually satisfactory

agreement between competent private parties and because there is no basis to question the

Victim's sworn statement, the Court accepts the Victim's Declaration aclmowledging that she

received satisfaction for her injury. See Stephen, 182 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 27.

11. The Court Should Exercise Its Discretion To Dismiss The Case Based on Civil Compromise.

When the requirements of 8 GCA § 80.90 are met, the Court must then determine

whether it should exercise its discretion to dismiss the case based on civil compromise. Title 8

zSee e.g., supra note 1.

6 DECISION AND ORDER CM0379-20; People v. Diana Attn Ceasar

GCA § 80.90 is based on former California Penal Code §§ 1377 and 1378. See 8 GCA § 80.90,

Note, compare 8 GCA § 80.90 with Cal. Penal Code §§ 1377 and 1378. Thus, California case

law interpreting §§ 1377 and 1378 is persuasive to interpreting 8 GCA § 80.90. See Cruz u

Cruz, 2005 Guam 3, 1] 9, see also People u Hall, 2004 Guam 12, 'II 18; see also Fajardo VS

Liberty House Guam, 2000 Guam 4, 11 17.

In People v Moulton, the Court held that various factors may be taken into consideration

by a trial judge in determining whether to dismiss a misdemeanor criminal prosecution under a

civil compromise statute. 182 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68. These factors include: 1) whether the civil

injury was coextensive with the criminal violation; 2) whether the circumstances were such that

through private settlement, fully vindicated; and 3) whether the

victim's settlement agreement was made voluntarily. Id.

First, as explained above, the civil injury was coextensive with the violations of criminal

mischief and criminal trespass. Second, in detennining whether the injury to the public was fully

vindicated, the seriousness of the injury, as well as the circumstances of the commission of the

offense, should be considered. Moulton, 182 Ca l. Rptr.. at 768. Here, the Magistrate's

Complaint, Victim's Declaration, a nd the cr imina l mischief and criminal trespass statutes

indicate that the offense in question was of minimal severity. Further, the incident occurred

between parties known to one another, it was isolated with respect to its scope and damage

caused, and the incident was not against public order. See Motion, Exhibit A-C (Jan. 28, 2021).

Although the Magistrate's Complaint indicates some physical harm to the Victim, she did not

seek medical attention.

7 DECISION AND ORDER CM0379-20;People u Diana Attn Ceasar

Third, the Victim's Declaration states: "I have authority to make this declaration and I do

so voluntarily and Mthout any coercion." Deal. of Dorisa Frank 1]4-5 (Jan. 28, 2021). In the

absence of any indication that it was made involuntarily, the Court is in no position to second

guess the Victim's sworn statement that she has received satisfaction and is filing the Declaration

voluntarily.

Therefore, in light of the harm caused to the Victim, which did not require medical

attention, and the Victim's Declaration that she has received satisfaction for any injuries

incurred, this Court finds that civil compromise as applied in this case best serves "the interests

of justice, judicial economy, fairness, and common sense" and fully vindicates the injury to the

public. Tischman, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby GRANTS the Defendant's Motion for

Civil Compromise. The case is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

SO ORDERED this 13th day of April, 2021.

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HOD ORABLE A. GI RREZ Jud uderioll Co of Guar

SERVICE VIA E-MAIL I acknowledge that an electronic

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