People v. Castro

Opinion

FILED SUpER~ OURT

1 2~i9MttY —9 Pi’~ 2~ 3•7 2 CLERK OF ‘~~URT 3 Bv~ 4

5 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 6

‘~ THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, CIVIL CASE NO. CF0474-13 8 vs.

9 DECISION AND ORDER MIGUEL MARIANO MUNA CASTRO, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO MODIFY 10 DOB: 05/30/1970, JUDGMENT 11 Defendant.

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13 INTRODUCTION 14 This matter came before the Honorable Judge Arthur Barcinas on March 26, 2019, 15 upon Defendant Miguel Mariano Muna Castro’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Modify Judgment 16 filed November 6, 2018. Attorney Terry E. Timblin represented the Defendant and Assistant 17 Attorney General Jerimiah Luther represented the People of Guam (“the People”). Having 18 reviewed the pleadings and having heard oral argument on the matter, the Court hereby 19 DENIES the Defendant’s Motion to Modify Judgment. 20 BACKGROUND 21 On August 30, 2013, the Defendant was arrested for burglary and has since been 22 incarcerated at the Department of Corrections Def.’s Mot. to Modify J. On July 17, 2015, the 23 Defendant entered into a plea agreement whereby he plead guilty to two counts of burglary as a 24 second degree felony. j~i The Defendant was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years 25 imprisonment at the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) with all but seven years suspended, 26 with credit for time served. Id. 27 In his motion, the Defendant argues that he is eligible for parole as he has served two 28 thirds of his seven-year “fixed sentence,” and the minimum sentence of five years imposed

Decision and Order • Criminal Case No. CF0474-13; People v. Miguel Mariano Muna Castro

1 under 9 GCA § 37.20(b). DOC however, claims that an inmate’s “fixed sentence” includes 2 both the actual incarceration period as well as any suspended portion of the sentence Thus, 3 based on that formula, DOC argues and has calculated that the Defendant is not eligible for 4 parole until a period of ten years has passed, as that would constitute two-thirds of the fifteen 5 year sentence imposed upon the Defendant.

6 The Defendant, on the other hand, contends that there is no definitive interpretation of 7 what the term “fixed sentence” means, and requests that the Court either find that the term only 8 applies to the time of actual incarceration, or find the term ambiguous and interpret it against 9 the People. As such, the Defendant requests that the Court modify the underlying judgment in 10 this case by adding the sentence, “Defendant shall be eligible for parole after 5 years.” Def. ‘5 ii Mot. to Modify J. Subsequently, the Court held a hearing and took the matter under advisement 12 on February 26, 2019. 13 DISCUSSION 14 Until Guam creates its own Constitution, the Organic Act of Guam is the equivalent of 15 Guam’s Constitution. Bordallo v. Baldwin, 624 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cir.1980). The Organic Act 16 specifically provides that “[t]he government of Guam shall consist of three branches, 17 Executive, Legislative, and Judicial . . . .“ 48 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1992). By its very language, 18 therefore, the Organic Act requires application of the constitutional doctrine of separation of 19 powers to government of Guam functions.” Taisipic v. Marion, 1996 Guam 9 ¶ 26. Through 20 strict adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers, courts throughout the United States 21 have sought to protect the legislative and executive branches of government from judicial 22 interference. Id. at ¶ 27. 23 In Taisipic, the Supreme Court of Guam found that the Guam Parole Board had been 24 vested the authority in parole determinations, and that the Superior Court of Guam cannot 25 impermissibly encroach on the powers granted by the Guam Legislature. j~ at ¶ 33. The 26 instant action does not seek to have the Court grant or deny parole, in direct violation of the 27 Parole Board’s powers described in Taisipic, but rather seeks an amendment to the Judgment 28 explicitly providing when the Defendant would be eligible for parole. Title 9 GCA § 80.72(a),

Decision and Order V

Criminal Case No. CF0474-13; People v. Miguel Mariano Muna Castro

1 states that “[u]nless otherwise provided by law, every person confined in a Guam penal or 2 correctional institution shall be eligible for release on parole at any time after the service of 3V two-thirds (2/3) of his or her fixed sentence . . .“ (emphasis added). Here, the Defendant 4 claims that he has served the requisite two-thirds of his fixed sentence, as well as the five-year 5 minimum sentence imposed upon him, and therefore must be considered eligible for parole. 6 The Parole Board, on the other hand, claims that the Defendant is improperly computing his 7 eligibility based upon a misunderstanding of the term “fixed sentence” as used in the statute. 8 Therefore, the two issues before the Court are: 1) whether the Parole Board is violating 9 GCA 9 § 80.72(a) in its computation of parole eligibility, and 2) whether the Court should modify the 10 Judgment as requested. V

11 I. The Parole Board is not explicitly violating 9 GCA § 80.72(a) in its 12 V computation of parole eligibility. 13 The Defendant’s motion does not question the underlying Judgment, but rather the 14 Parole Board’s sentencing computations for parole eligibility. The Parole Board construes the 15 term “fixed sentence” — as found in 9 GCA § 80.70 and 80.72 — to include the actual 16 incarceration period as well as any suspended portion of the sentence when determining parole 17 eligibility, whereas the Defendant. believes that only the period of actual incarceration should 18 Vbe considered as the “fixed sentence” when computing parole eligibility. 19 The term “fixed sentence” is not defined by statute. However, the People argue that it 20 should be used interchangeably with “Prison Term” as defined in 9 GCA § 80.70.1(k), which 21 in the applicable portion reads: “Prison Term shall mean the term Of actual incarceration plus 22 any suspended term of imprisonment.. [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law to the .

23 contrary, this definition of Prison Term shall be controlling whenever the term is used to 24 determine eligibility for parole or to determine the date an inmate is Eligible for Parole.” 25 The Defendant does not cite to any authority supporting his claim that a “fixed 26 sentence” only applies to the time of actual incarceration. Instead, the Defendant claims that 27 due to the ambiguity of the term, the Court should find against the People. However, based 28 upon a reading of the statute, there is nothing to support the Defendant’s position. Although the

Decision and Order Criminal Case No. CF0474-13; People v. Miguel Mariano Muna Castro

1 Court does not necessarily believe that the terms “fixed sentence” and “Prison Term” were 2 meant to be used interchangeably, the Court does find some evidence of legislative intent such 3 that the totality of an individual’s actual term of incarceration and their suspended sentence 4 should be considered in determining parole eligibility. 5 Therefore, the Court finds that in the absence of a definition of “fixed sentence,” 6 discretion lies with the Parole Board in determining the proper computation for parole 7 eligibility, and the Parole Board’s current method of computing parole eligibility is not an 8 express violation of the. statute. 9 I. The Defendant’s Motion for Modification of Judgment is Untimely and Does 10 Not Properly Attack the Judgment, But Rather the Parole Board’s Discretion. 11 The Defendant requests that the Court modify its previous Judgment to add a clause 12 that the “Defendant shall be eligible for parole after 5 years.” Def.’s Mot. to Modify J. The 13 Defendant does not seek to add language that was previously agreed upon when the Defendant 14 entered into his Plea Agreement on July 17, 2015, but instead seeks to add language to reflect 15 his implicit assumption about when he would be eligible for parole. Therefore, the Court finds 16 that the Defendant’s motion is more aptly categorized as a motion to alter or amend the 17 judgment under GRCP Rule 59(e). Rule 59(e) states that “[amy motion to alter or amend a 18 judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.” In this instance, the 19 Defendant’s Motion to Modify Judgment was filed beyond the ten-day time limit. 20 Moreover, the Defendant’s attempt to amend the Judgment is not an attack on the 21 Judgment itself, but rather an attack on the Parole Board’s discretion. The Defendant seeks to 22 amend his Judgment because he was mistaken about how the Parole Board determines parole 23 eligibility, and attacks the methods by which the Parole Board calculates when prisoners are 24 eligible for parole. As determined above, the Court finds that the Parole Board is not expressly 25 violating 9 GCA § 80.72(a) in its current method of calculations, and the Superior Court will 26 not impermissibly encroach on the powers granted to the Parole Board by the Guam 27 Legislature, as it could by challenging the Parole Board’s discretion in determining parole 28 eligibility.

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Decision and Order Criminal Case No. CF0474-13; People v. Miguel Mariano Muna Castro

1 Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s Motion to Modify Judgment on the 2 bases that it is untimely and an improper attack on the Parole Board’s discretion. 3 CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES the Defendant’s Motion to 5 Modify Judgment. 6

7 IT IS SO ORDERED ~ 2019 8

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13 HONORABLE ARTHUR R. BARCINAS Judge, Superior Court of Guam 14

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24 SERVICE VIA COURT BOX I acknowledge that a copy of the 25 original hereto was placed in the courtboxo~ —

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27 Date:_____ ______

28 Deputy Clerk, Supe~(Court of Guam