NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250723-U FILED This Order was filed under June 11, 2026 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0723 Carla Bender not precedent except in the th 4 District Appellate limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County STANSON N. CARTER, ) No. 17CF1255 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Christopher G Perrin, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Vancil and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The Office of the State Appellate Defender was allowed to withdraw where no meritorious issues could be raised on appeal, and the circuit court’s first-stage dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition was affirmed.
¶2 Defendant Stanson N. Carter was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to
deliver and resisting a peace officer and subsequently sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment. On
direct appeal, we affirmed his convictions. People v. Carter, 2025 IL App (4th) 231308-U, ¶ 81.
Defendant filed a postconviction petition that was summarily dismissed at the first stage, and he
now appeals that dismissal. Appointed appellate counsel has moved to withdraw, asserting that
there is no nonfrivolous argument that can be raised on appeal. Defendant was sent notice of
counsel’s request to withdraw and has not responded. For the reasons that follow, we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In December 2017, defendant was charged in a three-count information with
unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (heroin) (720 ILCS
570/401(a)(1)(A) (West 2016)), unlawful possession of a controlled substance (heroin) (id.
§ 402(a)(1)(A)), and resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2016)). The charges
stemmed from a traffic stop that escalated into a foot chase.
¶5 A. Trial Court Proceedings
¶6 At the preliminary hearing, Chris Owen, a lieutenant colonel with the Illinois State
Police (ISP), was called to testify. Owen pulled over defendant’s vehicle for following other traffic
too closely while traveling on Interstate 55. Before the traffic stop concluded, defendant fled into
a nearby farm field. Defendant “disappear[ed]” from his sight when entering a small brush area in
the field. Shortly thereafter, he was able to locate defendant. Owen observed defendant on his
knees but could not see his hands. Owen drew his weapon and ordered defendant to “come to me”
at which point he was placed in custody. There was dirt on defendant’s hands, “as though he had
been digging.” Officers returned to the area where defendant was detained and found a partially
buried bag weighing more than 20 grams, containing a substance that subsequently tested positive
for heroin.
¶7 Defendant filed a motion seeking to suppress the contents of the partially buried
bag, asserting that the statutory basis for the stop (following too closely) was unconstitutionally
vague. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant executed a jury waiver. The court
admonished defendant, explaining the differences between a bench trial and a jury trial and that it
was defendant’s choice alone as to which type of trial he would have. Defendant stated he
-2- understood and acknowledged his signature on the jury waiver form.
¶8 Defendant filed another motion to suppress, arguing that the officer conducting the
traffic stop lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant was armed and was therefore
unjustified in subjecting him to a pat-down search. Defendant argued that the heroin should be
suppressed. During the hearing on the motion, Owen testified that he maintained visual sight of
defendant while he was fleeing. The trial court denied the motion.
¶9 A bench trial ensued. Owen testified and expounded on what took place at the end
of the chase and the events afterward. He found defendant on his hands and knees in a thicket of
trees and shrubs about a quarter mile from the interstate and adjacent to a farm field. Owen was
“about 40 to 50 yards” away from defendant when he spotted him in the thicket. The ground in
that area was a combination of farm field, leaves, and sticks. His view of defendant in the thicket
was somewhat obstructed, and he could not see defendant’s hands. However, Owen maintained
that he was able to see defendant during the entire chase, even when he was in the thicket, although
he never saw defendant bury anything.
¶ 10 Owen instructed defendant to crawl out of the thicket towards him and secured
defendant in handcuffs. Owen marked the area where defendant was detained with a brick that was
in the area. Owen was wearing a recording device during the chase and defendant’s arrest, and the
resultant video was submitted into evidence.
¶ 11 Owen noticed that defendant’s right hand, specifically his thumb and index finger,
had mud caked on it, while the other hand was clean. Owen took photographs of the hand, and
they were also submitted into evidence. Owen assumed that defendant had been digging in the dirt
in the area where he was detained, especially because dirt was present on only one hand. He relayed
that information to his fellow officers, and they returned to the scene of defendant’s arrest to
-3- continue the search for contraband. The subsequent search located a bag of suspected heroin in the
ground “within a few yards” of where defendant was detained. Owen returned to the scene and
took custody of the bag of suspected heroin. He weighed the substance at 25.5 grams, and a field
test was positive for heroin.
¶ 12 Based on Owen’s training and experience, the amount of heroin was more
consistent with distribution rather than individual use. End users of heroin typically do not buy
“bulk quantity” because they cannot afford it. He believed distributors often kept on hand amounts
ranging from an ounce to several kilograms. Owen also recovered two cell phones from
defendant’s vehicle. The prosecution presented Owen with the exhibits containing, among other
things, the cell phones taken from the vehicle and the heroin located during the search. All the
items were in substantially the same condition as when he booked them into evidence, and he
followed “proper protocols” when booking the items into evidence. Defense counsel noted that he
had no objection to the heroin found at the scene, labeled as People’s exhibit No. 5, being entered
into evidence.
¶ 13 Aaron Roemer testified that in December 2017, he was a forensic scientist
employed by the ISP and specialized in drug chemistry. He analyzed the substance found buried
in the farm field and submitted into evidence as People’s exhibit No. 5. The substance was off-
white and chunky, weighed 20.8 grams, and tested positive for heroin. Roemer performed two
tests on the substance from two different areas of the container. He did not sample each individual
chunk. Roemer described the normal chain-of-custody process involved in transferring a piece of
evidence from the ISP to the lab. He stated that he received this exhibit from the ISP and explained
that evidence is given a case number when it comes into the lab. He retrieved the exhibit from the
vault and made sure it was properly initialed, taking note of the packaging before proceeding with
-4- analysis. He then identified the exhibit as the same one he tested at the lab, noting the matching
case number, initials, and packaging. Once he was done testing the item, the same protocols would
be followed to return the item to the ISP. The agency would come to the lab and would receive
“their returns for that day.”
¶ 14 Following Roemer’s testimony, the trial court noted that defendant was previously
admonished regarding his jury waiver but decided that “to be safe we should review the Williams
admonishments.” The court then went through the charges and possible penalties defendant faced
and explained his right to plead guilty or proceed to trial. The court then reviewed whether any
plea offers or counteroffers were made. The State noted that it had offered an open plea with a
sentencing cap of 14 years’ imprisonment, but the offer was rescinded when the motion to suppress
was litigated. Defense counsel stated defendant thought the capped offer was for probation and
that former counsel made a counteroffer for a term of probation. The State noted all offers had
been rescinded following the motions to suppress, and none had been made since.
¶ 15 Once the State rested its case-in-chief, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal,
arguing that the evidence was largely circumstantial and that the State had failed to establish a
chain of custody for People’s exhibit No. 5. Defendant argued there was no evidence regarding
how the exhibit made its way from the farm field to the forensic lab. The trial court denied the
motion, and the defense rested.
¶ 16 In closing, defense counsel argued that “random sampling is insufficient to
establish the weight of this substance,” referencing the seized heroin. Further, the substance was
contaminated by officers with “dirt and whatever was already in the bag,” so “representative
sampling is insufficient to show weight.” Counsel cited People v. Adair, 406 Ill. App. 3d 133
(2010), asserting “a test must be performed on each sample unless the chemist can testify that
-5- they’re sufficiently homogeneous to allow for random samples”; however, “that testimony never
happened.” Counsel argued the missing testimony was crucial “because the state’s only evidence
purporting to show intent to deliver is the weight of the substance” but “dirt and suspected heroin
were commingled by the officers.” To that end, while “there may have been 21 grams of something
in the [bag], rocks, dirt, something else. Rocklike chunks of heroin in Exhibit 5, but the state has
not proven how much of that was actually heroin.”
¶ 17 B. Trial Court’s Ruling, Sentencing, and Posttrial Motions
¶ 18 The trial court found defendant guilty of all charges. Defendant filed a motion for
judgment of acquittal or a new trial arguing, among other things, that the court erred in denying
the motion to suppress where Owen did not have an articulable, reasonable suspicion justifying a
search, that the State failed to establish a chain of custody regarding People’s exhibit No. 5, and
there was insufficient evidence regarding an intent to deliver. The court denied the motion and
proceeded to sentencing, where it imposed a sentence of 16 years’ imprisonment. Defendant filed
an amended motion to reconsider sentence that was denied.
¶ 19 C. Direct Appeal
¶ 20 On direct appeal, appellate counsel for defendant argued that the State had failed to
establish a foundation and chain of custody for the admission of People’s exhibit No. 5. Counsel
argued that the error was preserved, but also that it could be addressed as plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel. Counsel also argued that the State had failed to prove defendant’s intent to
deliver.
¶ 21 On the issues of possession and intent to deliver, we found the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the convictions. Carter, 2025 IL App (4th) 231308-U, ¶¶ 45, 52. We
acknowledged the argument that defendant was gainfully employed and could have bought heroin
-6- in bulk for personal purposes. Id. ¶ 49. However, the evidence that indicated that he was gainfully
employed at the time of the offense (the presentence investigation report) was not before the court
at trial, and the record was devoid of any other financial ability to purchase a large amount of
heroin. Id. Regarding People’s exhibit No. 5, we found that defense counsel’s failure to object to
admission of the exhibit forfeited this issue. Id. ¶ 66 On the merits, even assuming deficient
performance, prejudice would require a presumption that the State could not have cured the alleged
chain-of-custody deficiency. Id. ¶ 68. The record did not support such a conclusion. Id. Absent
prejudice, defendant was unable to establish first-prong plain error, and the claim was not
cognizable as second-prong plain error. Id. ¶ 69.
¶ 22 D. Postconviction Proceedings
¶ 23 Defendant filed a postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial and
appellate counsel. Defendant alleged trial counsel was ineffective for the failure to (1) object to
Owen changing his testimony, (2) admit tax documents provided by defendant that show his work
history and income as a basis to purchase the heroin for personal use rather than distribution,
(3) subpoena video footage from cameras near the traffic stop that would show the stop was
unnecessarily prolonged, (4) negotiate a plea agreement to obtain “a less severe punishment,”
(5) object to the admission People’s exhibit No. 5, because it “was possibly commingled with dirt,”
(6) object to Roemer’s testimony where he “only analyzed one of the chunks in evidence and did
not know how much [it] weighed, and how much of [it] could have commingled with dirt,”
(7) “make a timely objection to chain of custody” to preserve the issue for direct appeal, and
(8) object to the admission of People’s exhibit No. 5 “after the States Attorney stated off the record
that Exhibit 5 may have been contaminated by water when evidence room had a water leak.”
Regarding appellate counsel for his direct appeal, defendant argued counsel was ineffective for
-7- failing to raise on appeal the issue that defendant “wasn’t admonished until the middle of trial.”
Presumably, this argument revolves around the jury trial waiver, but that is not entirely clear. The
petition did not contain any affidavits or exhibits.
¶ 24 The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition at the first stage, finding that
defendant’s claims were conclusory, unsupported, lacked specificity, and rebutted by the record.
¶ 25 This appeal followed.
¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 27 On appeal, appellate counsel reviews three bases for potential argument and
determines that they are without merit: (1) the procedural propriety of the summary dismissal
under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 20024)), (2) the
sufficiency of the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and (3) the sufficiency of the
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We address each matter in turn.
¶ 28 The Act provides a three-stage framework to challenge convictions on grounds that
they were the result of a substantial denial of a right under either the United States or Illinois
Constitutions or both. People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 8. At the first stage, the circuit court must
take as true the allegations in the petition that are not rebutted by the record and determine whether
they are frivolous or patently without merit. See People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 454 (2005) (noting
the allegations in the defendant’s summarily dismissed petition were rebutted by the record);
People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 10-12 (2009) (noting a petition that is frivolous or patently lacks
merit has “no arguable basis either in law or in fact”).
¶ 29 The first stage allows the circuit court “ ‘to act strictly in an administrative capacity
by screening out those petitions which are without legal substance or are obviously without
merit.’ ” Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9 (quoting People v. Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 373 (2001)); 725
-8- ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2024). “If a petition alleges sufficient facts to state the gist of a
constitutional claim, even where the petition lacks formal legal argument or citations to authority,
first-stage dismissal is inappropriate.” People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 24. We review dismissal
at the first stage de novo. Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 30 A. Procedure
¶ 31 Appellate counsel notes that the petition was dismissed within the 90-day window
as required by statute and that there is no evidence in the record that the State improperly
participated in the dismissal of the petition. See id. ¶¶ 21, 33 (noting the statutory 90-day window
and that “[n]ot until the second stage is the petition subjected to adversarial testing through the
State’s involvement”). Having reviewed the record, we agree with counsel’s determination on this
point and find that there are no nonfrivolous arguments that could be advanced.
¶ 32 B. Assistance of Trial Counsel
¶ 33 Most of the issues posed in defendant’s petition pertain to ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, which we evaluate under the familiar two-prong Strickland test (see Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring a defendant to establish deficient performance
of counsel and resulting prejudice)). To avoid first-stage dismissal, it is a defendant’s burden to
establish an arguable basis that counsel’s performance was deficient and that defendant was
prejudiced as a result. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17.
¶ 34 1. Testimony of Owen
¶ 35 Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to portions
of Owen’s testimony during trial that differed from his previous testimony. He essentially frames
this argument as a failure to impeach, although he couches the issue in terms of a failure to object.
Initially, we observe that this argument does not rely on matters outside the record and therefore
-9- should have been raised on direct appeal under the consequence of waiver. People v. Simpson, 204
Ill. 2d 536, 551-52 (2001); People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999). Defendant does not allege
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.
¶ 36 Moreover, it is clear that trial counsel chose not to impeach Owen with his prior
testimony as a mattery of strategy because the trial testimony was more advantageous to defendant,
where Owen testified that he never lost sight of defendant but nonetheless did not see him bury
the heroin. See People v. Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 22 (1995) (“Generally, the decision of whether
or not to cross-examine or impeach a witness is a matter of trial strategy, which cannot support a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
¶ 37 2. Evidence of Defendant’s Income
¶ 38 Next, defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to submit as
evidence defendant’s tax documents that would have shown he had sufficient income to purchase
a bulk amount of heroin for personal use and thereby rebut the argument that the purchase was for
distribution. Appellate counsel argues that this contention fails because defendant has failed to
attach supporting documentation to the petition or explain why he was unable to do so. See People
v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 45 (“[A] postconviction petitioner is required to attach to his petition
affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting the petition’s allegations or state why the same
are not attached.”) (citing 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2014)). Further counsel posits that defendant
fails to argue how these documents would have changed the outcome of the trial or how they would
have been admitted into evidence. We agree with the contentions of counsel and find that there is
no nonfrivolous argument that could be raised on this point.
¶ 39 3. Additional Surveillance Footage
¶ 40 Defendant also posits that additional surveillance footage would have shown that
- 10 - Owen prolonged the stop. We agree with counsel that this claim is conclusory and unsupported.
Moreover, the dashcam footage of the stop was admitted into evidence. There is no indication that
the additional footage would have impacted the admissibility of the heroin. Accordingly, the claim
lacks arguable merit.
¶ 41 4. Plea Negotiation
¶ 42 Defendant argues that trial counsel failed to seek a plea deal to reduce the severity
of the punishment. However, the record demonstrates that counsel did, in fact, negotiate with the
State, and defendant was offered a plea that capped the possible sentence at 14 years’
imprisonment. Further, defendant turned down a plea offer that he understood to be for probation.
Both of these plea offers would have been less than the sentence ultimately imposed. Therefore,
we agree that this claim lacks arguable merit, as defendant can establish neither deficient
performance nor prejudice.
¶ 43 5. People’s Exhibit No. 5—Commingling and Expert Testimony
¶ 44 Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to People’s
exhibit No. 5 because it was possibly comingled with dirt. This argument suffers from the same
defect as the one concerning Owen’s testimony, where it (1) does not rely on evidence outside of
the record, (2) was not raised on direct appeal, and (3) does not allege ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. Accordingly, the argument has been waived. Simpson, 204 Ill. 2d 536, 551-52.
Moreover, defendant’s allegation of commingling is pure speculation and does not support his
claim of ineffective assistance. See People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 126291, ¶ 55 (noting prejudice
cannot be based on speculation or conjecture).
¶ 45 Regarding the expert testimony, defendant argues that trial counsel failed to object
to the testimony where the expert “only analyzed one of the chunks in evidence and did not know
- 11 - how much the individual chunk in evidence weighed, and how much of the chunk in evidence
could have commingled with dirt.” Again, this argument could have been raised on direct appeal,
and the failure to do so means that it is waived. Further, it is apparent that the lack of objection
was a matter of trial strategy where counsel argued these exact points in support of a motion for a
directed verdict. As appellate counsel now points out, an objection would not have prevented the
admission of the expert’s testimony and could have only affected the weight it was given. Given
that there is no underlying error and the allegation rests on a matter of trial strategy, there is no
legal merit to this claim.
¶ 46 6. People’s Exhibit No. 5—Contamination
¶ 47 Defendant also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
People’s exhibit No. 5 after the prosecutor commented off the record that the evidence may have
been contaminated with water from a leak in the evidence room. However, defendant’s claim is
conclusory and unsupported. See Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶¶ 24, 26 (noting that if a petition lacks
affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations and the defendant fails to explain
in the pleading why that evidence is not attached, the petition fails to meet the low threshold to
avoid summary dismissal). This claim lacks arguable merit.
¶ 48 7. People’s Exhibit No. 5—Chain of Custody and Direct Appeal
¶ 49 The final argument in this vein is that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
object to the admission of People’s exhibit No. 5. This issue was presented on direct appeal, and
we found the argument was “easily dispensed with” by looking to People v. Aquisto, 2022 IL App
(4th) 200081, ¶¶ 25, 53, 64, where defendant could not establish prejudice absent a reasonable
probability that, if the chain-of-custody objection was made, the State could not cure the objection.
Carter, 2025 IL App (4th) 231308-U, ¶ 68. Defendant failed to direct us to a basis showing that
- 12 - the State would have been incapable of curing any chain-of-custody objection in the direct appeal,
and his petition merely repeats this misstep. There is no nonfrivolous argument that can be raised
on this point.
¶ 50 C. Assistance of Appellate Counsel
¶ 51 Finally, defendant claims appellate counsel for his direct appeal was ineffective in
failing to raise the issue that he “wasn’t admonished until the middle of trial.” This claim is
evaluated under the same Strickland standard as the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.
West, 187 Ill. 2d at 435. “Appellate counsel is not obligated to brief and argue every conceivable
issue on appeal, and a defendant cannot claim prejudice based on appellate counsel’s failure to
raise an issue that is not meritorious.” People v. Pingelton, 2022 IL 127680, ¶ 64.
¶ 52 Defendant does not argue that the trial court failed to issue admonishments at the
appropriate time or omitted any relevant admonishments. Instead, it appears that he takes issue
with the cautionary “Williams admonishments” given by the trial court midtrial. Defendant fails
to allege that he was prejudiced by receiving these cautionary admonishments or that the timing
of these admonishments impacted the outcome of the case. In relation to his jury waiver, he was
admonished and signed a written jury waiver when he waived his right to a jury trial. Defendant
fails to articulate how the trial court erred in issuing admonishments. We agree with counsel that
this argument lacks legal merit.
¶ 53 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 54 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm
the circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 55 Affirmed.
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