People v. Carrasco CA3

Opinion

Filed 9/3/26 P. v. Carrasco CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Butte)

THE PEOPLE, C103357 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 23CF00922)

v.

GERARDO ANTHONY CARRASCO, Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Gerardo Anthony Carrasco pleaded guilty to two violations of the Sex Offender Registration Act. (See Pen. Code, § 290, subd. (a).)1 The trial court sentenced him to three years in state prison, awarded more days of presentence custody credit (1,460 days) than his prison commitment (1,095 days), and imposed a $300 restitution fine, a $300 parole revocation fine, an $80 court operations assessment, and a $60 criminal conviction assessment.

Defendant now contends that under section 2900.5, the trial court should have applied his excess custody credit against his fines and assessments. As we will explain, however, section 2900.5 does not apply to restitution fines or nonpunitive assessments. We will affirm the judgment.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of failing to update his sex offender registration (count 1) and one count of failing to comply with transient registration requirements (count 2). In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court dismissed a prior strike allegation and sentenced defendant to a stipulated upper term of three years on count 1 and a concurrent six months on count 2. The trial court imposed a $300 restitution fine, a $300 parole revocation fine, an $80 court operations assessment, and a $60 criminal conviction assessment. It awarded defendant 1,460 days of presentence custody credit, which exceeded the total prison commitment. Defendant did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.

At the time of sentencing, defendant did not ask the trial court to apply his excess custody credit against his fines and assessments. But it appears he subsequently did so in a letter to the trial court, citing People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954. The trial court denied the request.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that under section 2900.5, the trial court should have applied his excess custody credit against his fines and assessments. The contention raises a matter of statutory interpretation requiring this court to exercise de novo review. (People v. Carranza (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th Supp. 17, 23.)

Section 2900.5, subdivision (a) provides that all presentence custody credit awarded to a defendant “shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment, or credited to any base fine that may be imposed, at the rate of not less than one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125) per day, or more, in the discretion of the court imposing the sentence. If the total number of days in custody exceeds the number of days of the term of imprisonment to be imposed, the entire term of imprisonment shall be deemed to have been served. In any case where the court has imposed both a prison or jail term of imprisonment and a fine, any days to be credited to the defendant shall first be applied

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to the term of imprisonment imposed, and thereafter the remaining days, if any, shall be applied to the base fine.” (Italics added.)

The relevant statutory language has undergone several changes over the years.

Before 2014, any days of custody credit exceeding the term of imprisonment were required to be applied to “any fine … including, but not limited to, base fines and restitution fines.” (Former § 2900.5, subd. (a); Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 466.) Effective January 1, 2014, the Legislature removed the reference to restitution fines, providing that excess days of custody credit were required to be applied to “any fine, including, but not limited to, base fines.” (Former § 2900.5, subd. (a); Stats. 2013, ch. 59, § 7.) After that amendment, excess custody credit could not be applied to a restitution fine. (People v. Petri (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 82, 92-93 (Petri); People v. Pinon (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 956, 967, fn. 7 (Pinon).) The current version of the statute went into effect on January 1, 2017. (Stats. 2016, ch. 769, § 2.) That amendment changed “any fine, including, but not limited to, base fines” (Stats. 2015, ch. 209, § 2) to “any base fine.” (§ 2900.5, subd. (a); Stats. 2016, ch. 769, § 2.) The amendment also added: “If an amount of the base fine is not satisfied by jail credits, or by community service, the penalties and assessments imposed on the base fine shall be reduced by the percentage of the base fine that was satisfied.” (Ibid.)

Accordingly, the current version of the statute, which was in effect at the time of defendant’s offenses, provides for the application of excess custody credit only to the base fine, with a percentage reduction to any penalties and assessments imposed on the base fine if the amount of the base fine is not satisfied in full. (§ 2900.5, subd. (a).) Section 2900.5 does not apply to restitution fines, nor does it apply to nonpunitive assessments, such as the court operations assessment and the criminal conviction assessment imposed in this case. (Petri, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 92-93; People v. Rojas (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 48, 56; see also Pinon, supra, Cal.App.5th at p. 967, fn. 7.)

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Defendant cites People v. Robinson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 401 for the proposition that section 2900.5, subdivision (a) “applies to ‘court-ordered payment of monies that serve as punishment.’ ” But the court operations assessment and criminal conviction assessment are nonpunitive. And although section 2900.5 applied to restitution fines at the time Robinson was decided, it no longer does.

In his reply brief, defendant cites the pre-2017 version of the statute, arguing that his fines and assessments fall within the meaning of “ ‘any fine, including, but not limited to, base fines.’ ” As we have explained, however, that statutory language was replaced with “any base fine.” (§ 2900.5, subd. (a); Stats. 2016, ch. 769, § 2.) Section 2900.5 does not apply to any of the fines and assessments imposed in this case.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

/S/ MAURO, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/S/ BOULWARE EURIE, J.

/S/ MESIWALA, J.