People v. Carr

2025 IL App (5th) 220635-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: July 28, 2025
• Docket: 5-22-0635
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 220635-U NOTICE Decision filed 07/28/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0635 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jackson County. ) v. ) No. 22-CF-7 ) JUSTIN D. CARR, ) Honorable ) Ralph R. Bloodworth III, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cates and Vaughan * concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Where the defendant raised a pro se ineffective assistance of counsel claim at a postsentencing hearing, and the trial court did not conduct an adequate hearing pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), we remand this case to the trial court with directions to conduct a Krankel hearing.

¶2 The defendant pled guilty to charges of aggravated kidnapping and home invasion and was

sentenced to 24 years for the aggravated kidnapping charge plus 3 years of mandatory supervised

release (MSR) to be served concurrently with a 20-year sentence for home invasion plus 18

months’ MSR. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence alleging that the trial court

should have granted his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, that his attorney had an actual conflict

* Justice Welch participated in oral argument. Justice Vaughan was later substituted on the panel and has read the briefs and listened to the recording of oral argument. 1 of interest, and that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Krankel inquiry of his pro se claim

that his attorney was ineffective. For the following reasons, we remand this case with directions

for the trial court to conduct a Krankel hearing on the defendant’s assertions of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On January 21, 2022, the defendant and a codefendant were charged with aggravated

kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/10-2(b) (West 2020)), home invasion (id. § 19-6(a)(3)), aggravated

kidnapping (id. § 10-1(a)(1), (2)), aggravated criminal sexual assault with the use of a firearm (id.

§ 11-1.30(a)(8)), and aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(a)(1)).

¶5 On April 14, 2022, the State filed a “SUPERSEDING INFORMATION” which contained

the original five counts against the defendant, and added three counts: a second home invasion

charge (id. § 19-6(a)(2)), a second aggravated criminal sexual assault charge (id. § 11-1.30(a)(1)),

and a kidnapping charge (id. § 10-1(a)(2)).

¶6 A preliminary hearing was held on April 26, 2022, during which Sergeant Matthew Acray

(Acray) of the Carbondale Police Department testified that on January 2, 2022, he was dispatched

to the Metropolitan Apartments in Carbondale in response to a possible kidnapping. Katrina

Hunter contacted police to report that her granddaughter, Brienna R. Hunter-Travis (Brienna), had

been kidnapped; that she was attempting to obtain the demanded ransom money; and that the

kidnappers said if she did not get the money, Brienna would be killed. The police department then

received information that Brienna had escaped her kidnappers. Acray testified that Brienna had

multiple facial and skull injuries, including a skull fracture.

¶7 Brienna told the police that she had been asleep in bed and was awakened by two

individuals who were beating her. She recognized her assailants, whom she had previously refused

2 entry into her apartment. The defendant struck her head with the butt of a silver gun. Brienna

identified the other assailant as Jalyn Rush (Rush), who possessed a semi-automatic handgun, and

who kicked her in the face. Brienna stated that the defendant and Rush were looking for the

defendant’s vehicle. The defendant had previously loaned his vehicle to Brienna’s roommate. The

defendant told Brienna that he would take her vehicle until his vehicle was returned. Alternatively,

the kidnappers told Brienna that they wanted ransom money, and that they intended to kill her, her

baby, and her grandmother. Brienna was then transported to a residence she believed belonged to

the defendant, where she was placed in a bedroom and told she would be tortured. The defendant

forced Brienna to perform fellatio on him, and later to perform fellatio on a dog. The defendant

then put Brienna in a car and traveled to an area Kroger grocery store, and then to a Walmart store,

where she escaped.

¶8 The police interviewed Rush, who implicated herself and the defendant in entering

Brienna’s apartment, confirmed that the defendant had a handgun, and confirmed Brienna’s

kidnapping. Rush also said that they beat Brienna in her apartment, and the defendant struck

Brienna’s head with a shotgun. Rush also said that another unnamed and armed female participated

in the attempts to obtain ransom money.

¶9 The police also interviewed the defendant who initially claimed that he was not involved

with Brienna’s kidnapping. When confronted with evidence to the contrary, the defendant

provided police with information that placed him at Brienna’s apartment. He informed police that

Brienna willingly left her apartment with him and Rush. The police showed the defendant

surveillance video obtained from Brienna’s apartment complex that depicted the defendant

carrying a firearm. The defendant told police that he had not gotten his vehicle back after loaning

3 it to Brienna’s roommate, and Rush inflicted all of Brienna’s injuries. The court found probable

cause, and the defendant pled not guilty to all counts.

¶ 10 At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the court found that there was probable cause

for the case to continue to trial, and the defendant pled not guilty to all counts.

¶ 11 On June 3, 2022, the defendant entered an open plea to one count of aggravated kidnapping

and one count of home invasion—both Class X felonies—in exchange for dismissal of the other

charges. The defendant volunteered to testify at Rush’s sentencing.

¶ 12 After multiple continuances, the defendant’s sentencing hearing was held on November 4,

2022. Because Rush’s case was still pending, the defendant was unable to testify at her sentencing.

With respect to the timing of the defendant’s sentencing, the defendant’s attorney stated:

“[A]s the court knows to some regard with all of those court hearings that have been recited

during the negotiations of the open plea, one option that [the defendant] was offered and

was going to avail himself of was to speak at the codefendant Jalyn Rush’s sentencing

hearing and that his sentencing hearing would come after that so that the state could take

all the information revealed at that sentencing hearing as the state and [the defendant] and

I discussed the possibility of presenting a negotiated recommendation, which, as the Court

well knows, between an open plea and a sentencing hearing often times there are further

discussions between parties as far as presenting a negotiated or a pre-sentence. Due to

scheduling and for reasons that of course I’m not aware as I don’t have any connection to

the codefendant’s case, that codefendant has—her sentencing hearing has been continued

and I believe may be set next month, and as a result of that, [the defendant] is going first

in sentencing hearing, although he has told me that he definitely still wants to make those

statements at that hearing when it does occur, so he’d like certainly the state and the Court

4 to note that, even though this scheduling situation has become what it is. He is still anxious,

I guess, to speak at that—at that sentencing hearing, and that’s all I wanted to alert the

Court to.”

¶ 13 In response, the court stated the following:

“Understood. Thank you, *** I understand your intent and eagerness to testify, if called,

and speak at that sentencing hearing of codefendant ***. I’ll note for the record both cases,

due to a variety of reasons, scheduling issues, the Court’s schedule, trial schedules, PSI’s

being completed, have been continued and reset a number of times. We’ll note for the

record the intent of [the defendant] to either testify or make a statement in Ms. Rush’s

sentencing hearing as well and the Court is familiar with the open plea and what transpired

leading up to the open plea for [the defendant] as well as Ms. Rush in her case as well.”

¶ 14 The trial court then asked the State if it had anything to say about the defendant’s offer to

testify at his codefendant’s sentencing. The State responded:

“[W]e understand [the defendant’s] wish to participate in that sentencing hearing, again,

the situation with the timing of that sentencing hearings is what is it, but we have taken into

consideration his wanting to do that in our recommendation to the Court ***[.] [W]e

understand that and we’re hoping that he’s doing that because he thinks that’s the right

thing to do and not just to take some years off of his sentence, and so with that being said,

we are giving him the benefit of the doubt that that’s what he’s going to do and we’ve

considered that and that’s worked into our recommendation for *** the Court today, your

Honor.” (Emphases added.)

¶ 15 The court sentenced the defendant to 24 years in prison plus 3 years’ MSR on the

aggravated kidnapping charge, and a concurrent term of 20 years plus 18 months’ MSR on the

5 home invasion charge. The defendant’s sentence for aggravated kidnapping would be served at

85%, and the sentence for home invasion would be served at 50%.

¶ 16 On November 16, 2022, the defendant filed two motions. The first motion asked the court

to reconsider his sentence. The defendant argued that the sentences were excessive because the

court (1) did not weigh the mitigating factors; (2) failed to consider that the victim did not testify

in aggravation of sentence and did not submit a victim impact statement; (3) did not consider that

the criminal conduct was partly induced by his codefendant, Rush; and (4) did not consider his

minor history of criminality. The second motion sought to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the

judgment, arguing (1) that the defendant was not guilty of the crimes charged and (2) that the

defendant did not receive a preliminary hearing on the “superseding information” filed on April

14, 2022.

¶ 17 On April 5, 2023, the defendant filed amended versions of his two motions. In his amended

motion to reconsider sentence, the defendant included his previous allegations and added the

following: (1) that subsequent to his sentencing, Rush received a sentence of 15 years plus 3 years

of MSR on the aggravated kidnapping charge; (2) that the court failed to consider evidence

submitted at the sentencing hearing that the victim was led out of the apartment building by his

codefendant, Rush; and (3) that the court sentenced the defendant before it sentenced Rush despite

the State’s agreement that Rush would be sentenced first and that the defendant would testify at

her hearing. In his amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment, the

defendant added the argument that he did not receive the benefit of his plea bargain because he did

not have the opportunity to testify at Rush’s sentencing hearing before he was sentenced.

¶ 18 On August 22, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the defendant’s motions. The

defendant’s attorney argued that the defendant did not receive the benefit of his agreement with

6 the State, explaining that Rush kept continuing her case, which forced the defendant to do the

same. The trial court’s refusal to allow additional continuances resulted in the defendant’s

sentencing hearing being held first. The State argued that the defendant voluntarily agreed to enter

an open plea of guilty and is now unhappy with the sentences he received, and the defendant did

not have the absolute right to testify at his codefendant’s sentencing. The defendant’s attorney

responded that the defendant had sought to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing and his

current motion was not motivated by the sentences he received. The trial court acknowledged

counsel’s arguments and denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the

judgment.

¶ 19 Regarding the defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence, his attorney argued that at

sentencing the court saw video of Rush leading the victim out of the building. Since Rush only

received a 15-year sentence for aggravated kidnapping, the defendant’s sentence for that crime

should mirror that of his codefendant Rush. The State countered that the situations were different

and that each defendant was sentenced accordingly. The defendant’s attorney responded that the

defendant does not have a substantial criminal history—only traffic charges and one drug

possession charge. The trial court also denied the defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentences.

¶ 20 The defendant timely appealed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 The defendant argues that he raised pro se ineffective assistance allegations in court

regarding his attorney’s failure to investigate and utilize his mental health records, but the trial

court failed to conduct a preliminary hearing pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984).

At issue are statements made by the defendant, and the trial court’s responses, during a scheduled

postplea motion hearing on February 7, 2023, which included:

7 “THE DEFENDANT: *** I asked her when I was in the Department of

Corrections to get my mental health records so that we can have them on file and she told

me, no, have your family do that. This is the type of relationship we have.

***

THE DEFENDANT: *** From day one I told her about my mental thing. She

tells me that I—only thing she would do is to see if I was fit to stand trial. That’s not what

this is about. I was not in my right mind, period. I just lost my mother. I was only back in

time to bury them when this crap happened. I wasn’t in my right mind, but she never—it

never got it mentioned, though, expert testimony or nothing. We never did nothing, but I

did let her know all these things, she just let me sit in a cell ***. ***

THE COURT: I understand. What we’re going to do is this. All I want is for her

to know all the claims that you potentially have.

THE DEFENDANT: She knows them, sir, but she will not do—

THE COURT: And she can only do what she can legally do based upon her legal

experience. If there is something frivolous, an attorney is not going to file a frivolous

motion, they can’t do it.

THE DEFENDANT: *** [W]e don’t get along. I told her this during the trial,

during everything that’s been going on, we don’t get along, so how am I going to be

represented, if she don’t like me and I don’t like her, what chance do I stand.

THE COURT: People don’t like each other all the time. Patients and doctors

don’t like each other. We’ve talked about that time and time again. We spent a lot of hours

in court leading up to your trial time in this case.

8 THE COURT: *** I’m going to grant your request, we’re going to reset this one

final time for a motion to vacate and withdraw your plea and hearing. I’m going to grant

her leave to file an amended motion in a new 604(d) certificate saying once again that this

has all your claims of error that can be filed legally. I’m going to do this one more time for

you and reset it over on another court date, give you time to discuss those things with her

and put those in the motion. I think that’s the best course of action.”

¶ 23 The Krankel inquiry was developed to address a pro se posttrial motions alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 34. The goal of the Krankel

inquiry is to enable the court’s complete evaluation and consideration of a defendant’s pro se claim

to create the appellate record and to limit issues on appeal. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 13.

¶ 24 In People v. Moore, the supreme court established a two-step procedure for handling such

claims. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 77-79 (2003). First, once the defendant brings his pro se claim to

the trial court’s attention, the trial court should first examine the factual basis of the defendant’s

claim to determine if it has merit. Id. “If the trial court determines that the claim lacks merit or

pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new counsel and may

deny the pro se motion.” Id. at 78. However, if the defendant’s allegation shows possible neglect

of the case, the trial court should appoint new counsel to evaluate the defendant’s claim. Id.

¶ 25 “The operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted an

adequate inquiry into the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id.

In determining whether a Krankel inquiry was sufficient, a reviewing court should consider three

factors: “(1) whether there was some interchange between the trial court and defense counsel

regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation, (2) the

sufficiency of defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance, and (3) the trial court’s

9 knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the sufficiency of the defendant’s

allegations on their face.” People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 71 (citing Moore, 207

Ill. 2d at 78-79). There is no unequivocal requirement about what constitutes a sufficient Krankel

inquiry. Id.

¶ 26 To prompt a Krankel inquiry, “a pro se defendant is not required to do any more than bring

his or her claim to the trial court’s attention.” Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79. A coherent verbal or written

claim asserting ineffective assistance of counsel is sufficient to prompt the trial court’s duty to

conduct the inquiry. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 18. The defendant does not need to use the phrase

“ineffective assistance of counsel” to precipitate the need for a Krankel hearing. People v. Lobdell,

2017 IL App (3d) 150074, ¶ 37. Whether the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are

sufficient to trigger a trial court’s duty to conduct a Krankel inquiry is a question of law, and

therefore, is subject to de novo review. People v. Cook, 2023 IL App (4th) 210621, ¶ 64. If the

appellate court determines that the trial court did not conduct any inquiry into the defendant’s

pro se claims, the case should be remanded to the trial court for the appropriate inquiry. Moore,

207 Ill. 2d at 79.

¶ 27 The State argues that the defendant merely made a “passing remark” about trial counsel

failing to obtain his mental health records so that they could be on file at the Illinois Department

of Corrections (IDOC). The State contends that trial counsel’s failure to collect and place his

mental health records on file with IDOC does not implicate counsel’s reasonable representation at

trial or sentencing. However, the State ignores the fact that the defendant’s request for the medical

records was to develop possible defense strategies at trial and mitigation evidence at sentencing.

Additionally, the defendant repeatedly asked for new counsel throughout the proceedings.

10 ¶ 28 The trial court failed to adequately address the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective

assistance of counsel. The record discloses that there was no interaction between the court and

defense counsel regarding the defendant’s request for his mental health records. Instead, the court

merely granted trial counsel additional time to meet with the defendant and to amend any postplea

motions and her Rule 604(d) certificate. However, allowing the defendant’s attorney additional

time to amend pleadings failed to address the defendant’s claims of deficient representation.

¶ 29 Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court with directions to conduct a proper

Krankel inquiry. We therefore do not reach the defendant’s remaining issues on appeal, which he

may raise later if necessary.

¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 31 For the above reasons, we remand this case to the Jackson County circuit court with

directions to conduct proper Krankel proceedings.

¶ 32 Remanded with directions.