2026 IL App (1st) 232381-U No. 1-23-2381 First Division June 30, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STAE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) ) No. 20 C6 60057 EMMANUEL CANTEBERRY, ) ) Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Patrick Coughin ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Howse concurred in the judgment. ORDER
¶1 Held: The defendant’s convictions for aggravated battery and resisting a peace officer are affirmed where defendant voluntarily made insulting or provoking physical contact with an officer and resisted officers performing a lawful arrest. Additionally, any discovery violation by the State was not material because it did not prejudice defendant.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Emmanuel Canteberry was sentenced to concurrent
terms of 24 months of probation for convictions of aggravated battery and resisting a peace officer.
The charges stemmed from an incident in which defendant struggled with police officers No. 1-23-2381
responding to a call to remove him from his girlfriend’s residence in the early morning hours of
January 12, 2020. Defendant now appeals his convictions, arguing that (1) the State failed to prove
that he committed aggravated battery where his actions were an involuntary response to being
Tased, (2) the State failed to prove that he resisted an “authorized act” where the officers lacked
probable cause to arrest him, and (3) the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose
impeachment evidence against one of the arresting officers. For the reasons that follow, we affirm
defendant’s convictions.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 At approximately 3:20 a.m. on January 12, 2020, Sauk Village police officers Scott Langan
and Joshua Morris responded to a call from Keyanna Williams, defendant’s then-girlfriend,
seeking to remove defendant from her home. The officers allowed defendant to gather his
belongings and then followed in their respective squad cars as Williams drove defendant a few
blocks to his mother’s house.
¶5 Once there, defendant exited the car and Williams told the officers that defendant had taken
her car keys. When defendant would not return the keys, the officers attempted to arrest him. A
struggle ensued, during which one of the officers used his Taser to “drive stun” defendant twice.
The same officer also sustained scrapes to his hands and leg during the incident when defendant
pulled him to the ground after being drive-stunned. Based on these events, defendant was charged
with three counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i)-(iii) (West 2020)) and one
count of resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(A-7) (West 2020).
¶6 The matter was initially set for trial on June 22, 2022. However, on that date the State
answered not ready because one of the police officers it intended to call as a witness (presumably
Officer Langan) was unavailable. On the next court date, July 27, 2022, the State advised that the
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officer was on “medical leave” for an unspecified reason. The State explained that it did not know
when the officer would return from leave because “when the officer becomes medical, that
becomes a little bit of a gray area as far as us finding out” details. The officer was still on medical
leave on September 1, 2022. The officer had returned from leave by November 9, 2022, but was
unavailable to testify as scheduled on that date because he had to respond to an emergency call
about a “missing juvenile.”
¶7 Defendant’s bench trial finally began on May 24, 2023. At trial, Officer Langan testified
that he and Officer Morris responded to a call that there was an unwanted person at a residence in
Sauk Village at approximately 3:20 a.m. on January 12, 2020. They arrived in separate marked
squad cars and in full police uniform. Williams answered the door and told the officers that she
wanted defendant to leave her home. The officers came inside and spoke with defendant, who
stated that he would go willingly and “just wanted to get his belongings.” The officers waited for
defendant to gather his things and offered to drive him somewhere. However, defendant wanted a
ride from Williams, not the police. Williams agreed to drive defendant to his mother’s house,
which was only a few blocks away, but asked Officer Langan to escort them there because “she
didn’t feel safe.” Officers Langan and Morris both followed while Williams drove defendant to
his mother’s house.
¶8 Once they arrived, defendant got out of Williams’ car and went to the front door of his
mother’s house. Williams also exited the car and told Officer Langan that defendant “took the car
keys. He’s not giving them back.” Officer Langan then approached defendant at the front door and
asked him to return Williams’ keys. Defendant was knocking on the door and trying to unlock it
with some keys. Defendant did not return the keys and stated that he wanted Williams to drive him
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to the bank. Officer Langan twice told defendant that he would be arrested for theft if he did not
give Williams her keys, but defendant did not comply.
¶9 When defendant refused to put his hands behind his back for the arrest, Officers Langan
and Morris each grabbed one of his arms and attempted to handcuff him. Defendant pulled his
arms forward to resist them, so the officers forced him to the ground and tried to handcuff him.
However, defendant broke free and attempted to escape by climbing a nearby fence. The officers
pulled him off the fence and onto the ground, where defendant “continued to wrestle” with them.
¶ 10 Officer Langan threatened to Tase defendant if he did not stop resisting and place his hands
behind his back. When defendant still did not comply, Officer Langan pulled out his Taser and
“drive stunned him in the back for about two seconds.” Officer Langan explained that a “drive
stun” means pressing the Taser against a subject as a means of “pain compliance.” The pain ends
when the Taser is moved away, as opposed to when a Taser’s prongs are fired at a person and
“stay[] inside” their body.
¶ 11 Defendant continued to resist after the first drive-stun, so Officer Langan drive-stunned
defendant again while standing over him. After the second drive-stun, defendant grabbed Officer
Langan’s vest by the collar, told him to “stop tasing [him],” and pulled him to the ground. They
“continued to struggle” on the ground for a few minutes until Officers Langan and Morris were
able to handcuff defendant.
¶ 12 Officer Langan testified that he sustained scratches to his left knee, right shin, and both
hands while attempting to arrest defendant. Photographs admitted into evidence show minor
scrapes and scratches on the areas Officer Langan described.
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¶ 13 Once defendant was in handcuffs, he was breathing heavily and refused to stand up and
walk to the squad car because he was “too tired.” The officers each picked defendant up by an arm
and carried him to one of the squad cars while defendant dragged his feet on the ground.
¶ 14 The defense called Williams, who testified that she called the police on the night of
defendant’s arrest because she wanted him removed from her home. When the police arrived,
defendant gathered many of his belongings and placed them in Williams’ car, including “clothes,
shoes, [a] TV, [and] game systems.” Williams then drove defendant a few minutes to his mother’s
house while the police followed. She wanted a police escort so that defendant would go to his
mother’s house “without conflict between himself and [her]self.”
¶ 15 Upon arrival, defendant took Wiliams’ keys out of the ignition because the key to his
mother’s house was on the same keyring. Defendant exited the car and walked to the front door of
the house. Williams also got out and stood by her vehicle. When the officers asked Williams why
she got out of the car, she told them that defendant “had [her] keys.” However, before Williams
could clarify that defendant had the keys because he needed the house key, the officers approached
defendant and “immediately” grabbed him.
¶ 16 Williams “ran quickly” towards defendant and the officers because she was confused about
what was happening. She acknowledged that defendant did not comply with the officers’ request
to return the keys, but denied hearing them ask defendant to place his hands behind his back.
According to Williams, defendant did not have time to resist because the police “instantly just ***
attacked him.” The officers took defendant to the ground and continued “attacking him” while he
tried to tell them that he would return the keys. Williams was screaming for the officers to stop
and trying to explain that defendant “had done nothing wrong.” However, the officers eventually
handcuffed defendant and dragged him into one of their squad cars.
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¶ 17 The defense also called defendant’s mother, Vanessa Canteberry. Vanessa testified she was
awoken by noise outside her house around 3:20 a.m. on the night in question. She went out to the
balcony and saw defendant being Tased by a police officer while on the ground next to her fence.
Vanessa then locked her dog in a room and came outside. By the time she made it outside, the
police were already dragging defendant into a squad car.
¶ 18 Defendant testified that he fell asleep at Williams’ house on the night of his arrest and woke
up around 3:20 a.m. to the sound of Officer Morris’ voice. He did not understand why the police
were there. Williams asked defendant to leave, and he agreed to do so once he found his earrings.
After defendant found his earrings, the officers offered to drive him somewhere. Defendant stated
that he wanted Williams to drive him because his things were already packed in her car.
¶ 19 When they arrived at his mother’s house, defendant took Williams’ keys from the ignition
because his house key was on the same key ring. Defendant walked to the front door, unlocked it
with his key, and opened it. Officer Morris then approached him and asked him to give Williams
her keys back. Defendant replied, “okay” and started to walk back towards Williams. However,
Officer Morris quickly grabbed his shoulder and again told him to return Williams’ keys.
Defendant explained that he was going to get his things from the car and give Williams the keys,
but Officer Morris grabbed him and slung him around, ripping his clothes.
¶ 20 Officer Langan then came over and told defendant to put his hands behind his back.
Defendant “kept asking” why, but Officer Langan only repeated that he should put his hands
behind his back. As defendant continued to ask what he had done wrong and whether he was under
arrest, Officer Morris threw him to the ground. Defendant explained that Officer Morris was “the
aggressor” who did most of the physicality as compared to Officer Langan. Defendant repeatedly
asked Officer Morris why he was grabbing him, but he did not answer.
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¶ 21 Officer Langan then Tased defendant, and defendant asked, “why are you tasing me?”
When Officer Langan Tased him again, defendant put his hands behind his back and was
handcuffed. Defendant denied resisting the officers, refusing to put his hands behind his back, or
touching Officer Langan at all, let alone pulling him to ground.
¶ 22 In rebuttal, Officer Morris testifed that once Williams parked at defendant’s mother’s
house, defendant “hastily” got out of the car and “ran up to the stairs” leading to the front door.
Williams also exited the car and yelled “something about the defendant had taken her car keys.”
Officer Langan confronted defendant as he was knocking on the front door and “fumbling with
some keys trying to get in the door.” Officer Langan asked defendant to return the keys multiple
times, but he would not. Defendant stated that he would not return the keys and wanted Williams
to drive him to the bank. Officer Langan grabbed one of defendant’s arms and told him to put his
hands behind his back. Officer Morris grabbed the other arm, but defendant resisted by pulling his
arms forward.
¶ 23 As defendant continued to resist, the officers took him to the ground and a “scuffle”
occurred. During the struggle, defendant tried to climb a fence, but Officer Morris pulled him
down before he made it all the way over. Later in the struggle, Officer Langan warned defendant
that he would be Tased if he did not stop resisting. Officer Langan “drive stunned” defendant with
his Taser, but it did not seem to affect him. Officer Langan then drive-stunned defendant a second
time, at which point defendant grabbed Officer Langan by the vest and pulled him to the ground.
After more struggling, defendant was eventually handcuffed. Afterwards, the officers had to
“literally drag” defendant to the squad car because he refused to stand up and was “passively
resisting” by making himself dead weight.
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¶ 24 After closing arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty on all four counts. In so
ruling, the court opined that the testimony of Officers Langan and Morris was “largely consistent”
and “frankly ma[de] sense.” On the other hand, defendant and Williams’ testimony was
undermined by the photographic evidence of Officer Langan’s injuries, “conflict[ed] at several
points[,] and frankly d[id]n’t make much sense.” The court also stated that the officers had
probable cause to believe defendant had stolen Williams’ keys and thus were “authorized in
performing a lawful arrest.”
¶ 25 Defendant next filed a motion for a new trial. At the hearing on the motion, the defense
argued, for the first time, that defendant did not commit aggravated battery because he pulled
Officer Langan to the ground as “an involuntary action or reflex” from being Tased. The court
rejected that argument, stating that pulling Officer Langan down was consistent with defendant’s
resistance of the officers both before and after being drive-stunned. While noting that a defendant
need not present evidence or prove his innocence, the court also observed that defendant did not
mention anything about making involuntary movements in his testimony. Thus, the court found
that “defendant’s actions with regards to committing the aggravated battery were voluntary” and
denied the motion for a new trial.
¶ 26 Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the counts of aggravated battery and
sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 24 months of probation for aggravated battery and
resisting a peace officer, respectively. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 27 A. Aggravated Battery
¶ 28 On appeal, we first address defendant’s argument that the State failed to prove him guilty
of aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt.
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¶ 29 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court’s task is to
determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People
v. Johnson, 2026 IL 131337, ¶ 59. We will not retry the defendant, or substitute our own judgment
for that of the trier of fact on issues involving witness credibility or the weight assigned to the
evidence. Id. Additionally, we must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the State’s
favor. People v. Jones 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 28. Under this standard, we will reverse a conviction for
lack of evidence only if the evidence is “so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify
a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Id.
¶ 30 To sustain a conviction for aggravated battery as charged here, the State was required to
prove that defendant (1) committed a battery (2) against a peace officer (3) while the officer was
performing his official duties. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2020). A defendant commits
“battery” where he knowingly and without legal justification causes bodily harm to an individual
or otherwise makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual. Id.
§ 12-3(a). Additionally, the State must prove that defendant performed the prohibited act or acts
voluntarily. 720 ILCS 5/4-1 (West 2020) (“A material element of every offense is a voluntary
act[.]”); see also People v. Grant, 71 Ill. 2d. 551, 558 (1978) (recognizing the “fundamental
principle that a person is not criminally responsible for an involuntary act”).
¶ 31 In this case, defendant argues that the State failed to prove he acted voluntarily.
Specifically, he contends that his act of grabbing Officer Langan’s vest and pulling him to the
ground was “an involuntary reaction to the painful stimuli of the taser.” Initially, we point out that
defendant does not seem to distinguish between being Tased, i.e. struck with the probes of a Taser,
and drive-stunned, where a Taser’s electrodes are pressed into a subject and then withdrawn. While
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we agree that both can be extremely painful, they affect the body in different ways. As the Seventh
Circuit has observed, the high-voltage current sent through the probes of a Taser overrides the
target’s central nervous system and takes control of the skeletal muscles, whereas a probe-less
drive-stun “does not override the target’s central nervous system.” Abbott v. Sangamon County,
Illinois, 705 F. 3d 706, 725 (7th Cir. 2013). As Officer Langan testified, a drive-stun is a means of
“pain compliance,” rather than a likely cause of involuntary movement. Id. at 726
¶ 32 Regardless, nothing about the circumstances of this case suggests that defendant pulling
Officer Langan to the ground was involuntary. The evidence showed that defendant resisted the
officers both before and after being drive-stunned, even going so far as to attempt to climb a fence
to escape. Defendant was also apparently unfazed by the first drive-stun, as he continued to resist
arrest. Moreover, the fact that defendant told Officer Langan to “stop tasing [him]” and grabbed
him by vest after being drive-stunned the second time strongly suggests that his conduct was
completely voluntary. Additionally, although we are mindful that defendant need not prove his
innocence, we find it notable that defendant did not mention involuntary movements in his
testimony and instead claimed that he never touched Officer Langan at all. Under these
circumstances, it was completely reasonable for the trial court to conclude that defendant acted
voluntarily. Defendant’s suggestion that he did not is pure speculation, and the trial court was “not
required *** to search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a
level of reasonable doubt.” People v. Galarza, 2023 IL App 127678, ¶ 25.
¶ 33 We also note that the cases on which defendant relies are readily distinguishable from the
matter at hand. First, in People v. Martino, 2012 IL App (2d) 101244, ¶¶ 6, 15, the Second District
reversed a conviction for aggravated domestic battery where the victim was injured because the
defendant was Tased and fell backward on top of her. In this case, defendant was not Tased per
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se, but drive-stunned. More importantly, it is one thing to conclude that a defendant involuntarily
fell backward, but quite another to find that a defendant involuntarily grabbed an over-200-pound
officer and pulled with enough force to bring him to the ground. Second, in People v. Jackson,
2017 IL App (1st) 142879, ¶ 27, the evidence established that, both before and long after being
drive-stunned 10 times, the defendant was acting extremely irrationally as a result of either
substance abuse or some kind of mental health crisis. Thus, the court’s finding that the defendant
lacked the requisite mental state for battery was not because of an involuntary reaction to being
drive-stunned, but a consequence of his failure to grasp the nature of reality for mental reasons. Id.
As such, Jackson has no bearing on this case.
¶ 34 We also note that defendant seems to suggest that, even if his conduct was voluntary, it did
not constitute battery because it was not of an insulting or provoking nature. Defendant is correct
that the focus is on whether his actions would be objectively insulting or provoking to a reasonable
person, not whether Officer Langan subjectively felt insulted or provoked. People v. Davidson,
2023 IL 127538, ¶ 16. Essentially, defendant’s argument is that grabbing Officer Langan and
pulling him to the ground is not objectively insulting or provoking given that defendant was just
drive-stunned while being arrested for no wrongdoing.
¶ 35 It is hard to understand this position. Regardless of whether defendant felt that the arrest
was justified, he was not entitled to pull a police officer to the ground in an attempt to resist arrest.
See 720 ILCS 5/7-7 (West 2020) (a person may not forcibly resist an arrest even if he believes the
arrest is unlawful, or even if the arrest is in fact unlawful). The trial court’s conclusion that
defendant made insulting or provoking contact with Officer Langan was far from arbitrary or
unreasonable. Thus, we affirm defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery.
¶ 36 B. Resisting a Peace Officer
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¶ 37 Next, defendant argues that we should reverse his conviction for resisting a peace officer
because, as the police lacked probable cause to arrest him for theft of Williams’ keys or any other
reason, Officer Langan was not performing an “authorized act” at the time defendant resisted him.
¶ 38 As relevant here, a person commits the offense of resisting a peace officer when he
“knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer
*** of any authorized act within his or her official capacity[.]” 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a)(1) (West 2020).
¶ 39 In this case, defendant contends that he was arrested without probable cause, and thus
Officer Langan was not performing an “authorized act” at the time he resisted him. However, we
again observe that “[a] person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest which he knows is
being made *** by a peace officer *** even if he believes that the arrest is unlawful and the arrest
is in fact unlawful.” Id. §7-7. As such, our supreme court has held that even an unlawful arrest by
a peace officer qualifies as an “authorized act” within the meaning of section 31-1. City of
Champaign v. Torres, 214 Ill. 2d 234, 242 (2005); see also People v. Jones, 2015 IL App (2d)
130387, ¶ 11 (“Where the authorized act is an arrest, the inquiry usually ends because a defendant
is not privileged to resist even an unlawful arrest.”). It is undisputed that Officer Langan was
arresting defendant at the time of his resistance. Thus, his argument fails.
¶ 40 Although we could stop there, we also observe that Officer Langan did have probable cause
to arrest defendant. Whether an arrest is supported by probable cause is an objective inquiry that
depends on whether the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest would lead a reasonable
person to believe that the arrestee committed a crime. People v. Rich, 2025 IL App (1st) 230818,
¶ 31.
¶ 41 In this case, the officers responded to a call to remove defendant from his girlfriend’s house
at 3:20 a.m. Although defendant left willingly once the police arrived, he declined a ride with them
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and insisted on riding with Williams. Williams only agreed to drive defendant if the police
followed them because she “didn’t feel safe” and thought there would be a conflict without the
police there. Upon arrival at their destination, he immediately took Williams’ keys from the
ignition and made a hurried attempt to enter his mother’s house. At this time, Williams also exited
her car and told the officers that defendant had taken her keys. When confronted, defendant
continued to attempt entry into the house and, according to the testimony credited by the trial court,
repeatedly refused to return the keys. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would of
course suspect that defendant was committing a crime. Thus, probable cause existed. Accordingly,
we affirm defendant’s conviction for resisting a peace officer.
¶ 42 C. Brady Violation
¶ 43 Finally, defendant argues this court should reverse his convictions and remand for a new
trial based on the State’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence that Officer Langan
accidentally shot an unarmed minor suspect in an unrelated case during the pendency of his trial.
Alternatively, defendant asks us to remand the matter so that the trial court may consider the merits
of his claim.
¶ 44 In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that
a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to due process requires the prosecution to disclose
certain exculpatory evidence to the defense. Under Brady, “the prosecution must disclose evidence
that is favorable to the accused and ‘material either to guilt or punishment.’ ” People v. Harris,
206 Ill. 2d 293, 298 (2002) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87); see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 412 (eff. Mar. 1,
2001) (codifying Brady). In some circumstances, impeachment evidence may be material to guilt
and thus required to be disclosed under Brady. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d at 298.
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¶ 45 Here, defendant argues that the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose
that Officer Langan shot an unarmed juvenile suspect in an unrelated case in March 2022. In
particular, defendant relies solely on an article and accompanying eight-minute video about the
incident from a CBS 2 Investigates news report. See Dave Savini and Michele Youngerman,
“Body camera video shows Chicago area police shooting unarmed teen,”
https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/sauk-village-police-shooting-body-camera-unarmed-
14-year-old-boy (last visited June 27, 2026). According to the video, Officer Langan and another
officer approached two teenaged suspects and ordered them to put their hands behind their backs
because they were under arrest for criminal damage to property. The other officer drive-stunned
one of the teens, a 14-year-old boy, as he resisted arrest. The boy then broke away from the officers
and ran, at which point Officer Langan drew his gun and shot the boy in the hip. According to the
video, Officer Langan later told investigators that he mistook his gun for his Taser. The video
indicates that the boy’s lawyer had filed a civil lawsuit, but that Officer Langan was not disciplined
by the police department or criminally charged.
¶ 46 The parties in this case argue at length as to whether the news report is an appropriate
subject for judicial notice and whether we may consider it because it was not raised below and
thus outside the record on appeal. However, we need not resolve either of those issues to dispose
of defendant’s claim.
¶ 47 To establish a successful Brady claim, a defendant must show that (1) the evidence was
undisclosed by the State either willingly or inadvertently, (2) the undisclosed evidence was
favorable to the defendant because it was either exculpatory or impeaching, and (3) the defendant
was prejudiced because the evidence was material to guilt or punishment. People v. Montanez,
2023 IL 128740, ¶ 82.
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¶ 48 As to the first element, the State contends that evidence of the March 2022 shooting was
not “withheld” because there is no reason to believe that the prosecution was aware of the shooting
prior to defendant’s trial. However, as defendant observes, this is beside the point. For purposes
of a Brady claim, the defendant need only show that the evidence was undisclosed “either willfully
or inadvertently.” (Emphasis added.) Id. (quoting People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 73-74 (2008)).
We do note, however, that defendant does not allege that the State willfully suppressed evidence
of the shooting. We agree that there is no evidence that the prosecutors were untruthful when they
told the court that they were unable to find out the details of Officer Langan’s “medical leave.”
Still, “[t]o comply with Brady, the prosecutor has a duty to learn of favorable evidence known to
other government actors, including the police.” Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d at 73. It is undisputed that the
shooting was known to the police at the time of defendant’s trial, but, for whatever reason, not
disclosed to the defense. Thus, defendant has satisfied the first element of his Brady claim.
¶ 49 The second element of a Brady claim requires the undisclosed evidence to be favorable to
the defense, whether as probative of the defendant’s guilt or as impeachment evidence. Defendant
contends that the shooting was valuable impeachment evidence against Officer Langan, whose
credibility was central to the State’s case. It is true that evidence of police misconduct can
sometimes be used to impeach the credibility of the officer involved. People v. Cacini, 2015 IL
App (1st) 130135, ¶ 66. “However, to be admissible, the evidence must not be too remote or
uncertain, and must raise an inference that the witness had something to gain or lose by his
testimony.” Id. Thus, “[m]ere evidence of a civil suit against an officer charging some breach of
duty unrelated to the defendant’s case it not admissible to impeach the officer.” People v. Coleman,
206 Ill. 2d 261, 279 (2002). Similarly, “[m]ere allegations of misconduct, without evidence the
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officer was disciplined, are not admissible as impeachment *** and do not raise an inference of
bias or motive to testify falsely.” People v. Porter-Boens, 2013 IL App (1st) 111074, ¶ 20.
¶ 50 As summarized above, defendant’s evidence demonstrates that the shooting was the subject
of a civil suit, but that Officer Langan was not disciplined or charged for the incident. Indeed, the
record establishes that Officer Langan had returned to active duty by the time he testified in this
case. Thus, evidence of the shooting was likely inadmissible to impeach him at defendant’s trial.
¶ 51 In any event, defendant cannot show the third element of a Brady claim, that he was
prejudiced because the undisclosed evidence was material. Evidence is “material” under Brady
where there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different
had the evidence been disclosed. Montanez, 2023 IL 128740, ¶ 82. The key inquiry is whether the
favorable evidence could reasonably put the whole case in such a new light that it undermines
confidence in the result. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d at 317.
¶ 52 Here, the impeachment evidence would not have had a reasonable probability of changing
the outcome. Although we agree with defendant that Officer Langan’s credibility was important
to this case, the evidence against defendant would remain strong even if the trial court was made
aware that Officer Langan was involved in a shooting for which he was not disciplined or charged
years after defendant’s arrest. Not only was Officer Langan’s testimony supported by the physical
evidence of his injuries, his testimony was virtually identical to that of Officer Morris, who the
trial court also found credible. Defendant does not raise any impeachment evidence against Officer
Morris. Moreover, impeaching Officer Langan with an unrelated case would have done nothing to
change the fact that, in the trial court’s words, the defense’s version of events “conflict[ed] at
several points[,] and frankly d[id]n’t make much sense.” On this point, defendant suggests that,
had he been able to impeach Officer Langan, he might have raised a claim of self-defense.
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However, we note that a defendant raising self-defense against an arresting police officer must
prove, among other things, that the arrest and use of force was unlawful. People v. Vesey, 2026 IL
130919, ¶ 47. For the reasons previously explained, Officer Morris’ testimony easily establishes
that defendant resisted a lawful arrest supported by probable cause. Thus, while we do not condone
the State’s failure to disclose Officer Langan’s involvement in the 2022 shooting, defendant’s
Brady claim fails.
¶ 53 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 54 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 55 Affirmed.
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