NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2023 IL App (3d) 190538-U
Order filed May 18, 2023 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, ) Kankakee County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-19-0538 v. ) Circuit No. 18-CM-275 ) RONNIE C. CANNON, ) Honorable ) Kathy S. Bradshaw-Elliott, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hettel and Peterson concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial.
¶2 Defendant, Ronnie C. Cannon, appeals from his domestic battery conviction. Defendant
argues the case should be remanded for a new trial because his jury waiver was invalid. We
affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 The State charged defendant with domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West
2018)). The court appointed counsel to represent defendant.
¶5 On March 6, 2019, counsel told the court, “We would like a bench trial date ***.” The
court then addressed defendant:
“Okay. I need to make sure—and appreciate you dressed for court. Tell
me the difference between a bench and a jury, sir.
THE DEFENDANT: Bench trial is with you. A jury is with 12
people.
***
THE COURT: Show [defendant] is signing the jury waiver. So you
got to be here August 14th—
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We will be here.
THE COURT:—at 1:30. If not, I have to put on the record that you
can be convicted and sentenced without being here. Okay?
THE DEFENDANT: I will.”
Defendant filed his written jury waiver, and the court set the matter for a bench trial. The jury
waiver stated, “I hereby waive a jury trial in the above entitled cause and consent to trial before
the court” and was signed by defendant.
¶6 On August 14, 2019, the court acknowledged defendant’s presence in court with his
attorney. The court confirmed that the parties intended to proceed to a bench trial. Following a
bench trial, the court found defendant guilty of domestic battery. The court entered a conviction
and ordered defendant to pay fines.
¶7 II. ANALYSIS
2 ¶8 On appeal, defendant argues that he entered an invalid jury waiver and asks this court to
remand for a new trial. We find the court did not err as the record establishes that defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.
¶9 At the outset, we note defendant forfeited review of this issue by not objecting to it at
trial. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Defendant acknowledges this forfeiture and
asks that we conduct plain error review. Defendant argues that his unknowing and involuntary
jury waiver is a clear error subject to reversal under the second prong of the plain error doctrine.
The plain error doctrine permits a reviewing court to remedy a “clear or obvious error” when
“that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the
integrity of the judicial process.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). The first step
of the plain error doctrine is to determine whether an error occurred. People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL
114121, ¶ 19.
¶ 10 The United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution afford a defendant the
fundamental right to a jury trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 8, 13.
“ ‘ “Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent
acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ’ ”
People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 67-68 (2008) (quoting People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187
(1979), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). A valid jury trial waiver must
be knowingly and understandingly made. People v. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d 265, 270 (2004). “A valid
waiver exists if there is an express statement by defense counsel in open court, in the defendant’s
presence, without objection from him or her, that the defendant opts to waive his jury trial right
in favor of a bench trial.” People v. Rincon, 387 Ill. App. 3d 708, 718 (2008) (citing People v.
Elders, 349 Ill. App. 3d 573, 578 (2004)). The circuit court has a “duty of ensuring that a
3 defendant waives the right to a jury trial expressly and understandingly.” Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at
66. When a defendant waives his right to a jury trial, he “must understand—with its attendant
consequences—*** that the facts of the case will be determined by a judge and not a jury.” Id. at
69. “However, a trial court need not give any specific admonition or advice for a defendant to
make an effective jury waiver.” Id. at 66. “The determination of whether a jury waiver is valid
cannot rest on any precise formula, but rather depends on the facts and circumstances of each
particular case.” Id.
¶ 11 Section 115-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 requires that a defendant who
wishes to waive his right to a jury trial do so in writing. 725 ILCS 5/115-1 (West 2018). “[T]he
existence of a written waiver supports a finding of a knowing waiver when accompanied by
defense counsel’s request for a bench trial made in open court and in the defendant’s presence.”
People v. Turner, 375 Ill. App. 3d 1101, 1108 (2007). “A defendant is bound by defense
counsel’s waiver of a trial by jury when defendant is present in open court and does not object
when the jury waiver is made or is explicitly discussed.” Id. We review de novo the issue of
whether defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial. Bracey, 213
Ill. 2d at 270.
¶ 12 Here, the facts and circumstances surrounding defendant’s jury waiver established that
defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver. Defendant appeared with counsel on the date
counsel requested to proceed to a bench trial and filed the written jury waiver. The court
conducted an inquiry into defendant’s knowledge of the difference between a bench and jury
trial. Despite the relative brevity of the court’s admonishment, defendant correctly described the
difference between a jury trial and a bench trial. Defendant also stated that he understood the
attendant consequence of waiving his right to a jury trial—that defendant’s trial would be in
4 front of the judge. Defendant submitted a signed written jury waiver further indicating his desire
to proceed to a bench trial. Defendant also made no objection to defense counsel’s request to
proceed to a bench trial on the date of his waiver or the date of trial. See Turner, 375 Ill. App. 3d
at 1108. Thus, the record establishes that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to a jury trial.
¶ 13 In reaching our holding, we find that People v. Chaplin, 2020 IL App (3d) 180731-U, the
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NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2023 IL App (3d) 190538-U
Order filed May 18, 2023 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, ) Kankakee County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-19-0538 v. ) Circuit No. 18-CM-275 ) RONNIE C. CANNON, ) Honorable ) Kathy S. Bradshaw-Elliott, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hettel and Peterson concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial.
¶2 Defendant, Ronnie C. Cannon, appeals from his domestic battery conviction. Defendant
argues the case should be remanded for a new trial because his jury waiver was invalid. We
affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 The State charged defendant with domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West
2018)). The court appointed counsel to represent defendant.
¶5 On March 6, 2019, counsel told the court, “We would like a bench trial date ***.” The
court then addressed defendant:
“Okay. I need to make sure—and appreciate you dressed for court. Tell
me the difference between a bench and a jury, sir.
THE DEFENDANT: Bench trial is with you. A jury is with 12
people.
***
THE COURT: Show [defendant] is signing the jury waiver. So you
got to be here August 14th—
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We will be here.
THE COURT:—at 1:30. If not, I have to put on the record that you
can be convicted and sentenced without being here. Okay?
THE DEFENDANT: I will.”
Defendant filed his written jury waiver, and the court set the matter for a bench trial. The jury
waiver stated, “I hereby waive a jury trial in the above entitled cause and consent to trial before
the court” and was signed by defendant.
¶6 On August 14, 2019, the court acknowledged defendant’s presence in court with his
attorney. The court confirmed that the parties intended to proceed to a bench trial. Following a
bench trial, the court found defendant guilty of domestic battery. The court entered a conviction
and ordered defendant to pay fines.
¶7 II. ANALYSIS
2 ¶8 On appeal, defendant argues that he entered an invalid jury waiver and asks this court to
remand for a new trial. We find the court did not err as the record establishes that defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.
¶9 At the outset, we note defendant forfeited review of this issue by not objecting to it at
trial. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Defendant acknowledges this forfeiture and
asks that we conduct plain error review. Defendant argues that his unknowing and involuntary
jury waiver is a clear error subject to reversal under the second prong of the plain error doctrine.
The plain error doctrine permits a reviewing court to remedy a “clear or obvious error” when
“that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the
integrity of the judicial process.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). The first step
of the plain error doctrine is to determine whether an error occurred. People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL
114121, ¶ 19.
¶ 10 The United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution afford a defendant the
fundamental right to a jury trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 8, 13.
“ ‘ “Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent
acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ’ ”
People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 67-68 (2008) (quoting People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. 2d 180, 187
(1979), quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). A valid jury trial waiver must
be knowingly and understandingly made. People v. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d 265, 270 (2004). “A valid
waiver exists if there is an express statement by defense counsel in open court, in the defendant’s
presence, without objection from him or her, that the defendant opts to waive his jury trial right
in favor of a bench trial.” People v. Rincon, 387 Ill. App. 3d 708, 718 (2008) (citing People v.
Elders, 349 Ill. App. 3d 573, 578 (2004)). The circuit court has a “duty of ensuring that a
3 defendant waives the right to a jury trial expressly and understandingly.” Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at
66. When a defendant waives his right to a jury trial, he “must understand—with its attendant
consequences—*** that the facts of the case will be determined by a judge and not a jury.” Id. at
69. “However, a trial court need not give any specific admonition or advice for a defendant to
make an effective jury waiver.” Id. at 66. “The determination of whether a jury waiver is valid
cannot rest on any precise formula, but rather depends on the facts and circumstances of each
particular case.” Id.
¶ 11 Section 115-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 requires that a defendant who
wishes to waive his right to a jury trial do so in writing. 725 ILCS 5/115-1 (West 2018). “[T]he
existence of a written waiver supports a finding of a knowing waiver when accompanied by
defense counsel’s request for a bench trial made in open court and in the defendant’s presence.”
People v. Turner, 375 Ill. App. 3d 1101, 1108 (2007). “A defendant is bound by defense
counsel’s waiver of a trial by jury when defendant is present in open court and does not object
when the jury waiver is made or is explicitly discussed.” Id. We review de novo the issue of
whether defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial. Bracey, 213
Ill. 2d at 270.
¶ 12 Here, the facts and circumstances surrounding defendant’s jury waiver established that
defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver. Defendant appeared with counsel on the date
counsel requested to proceed to a bench trial and filed the written jury waiver. The court
conducted an inquiry into defendant’s knowledge of the difference between a bench and jury
trial. Despite the relative brevity of the court’s admonishment, defendant correctly described the
difference between a jury trial and a bench trial. Defendant also stated that he understood the
attendant consequence of waiving his right to a jury trial—that defendant’s trial would be in
4 front of the judge. Defendant submitted a signed written jury waiver further indicating his desire
to proceed to a bench trial. Defendant also made no objection to defense counsel’s request to
proceed to a bench trial on the date of his waiver or the date of trial. See Turner, 375 Ill. App. 3d
at 1108. Thus, the record establishes that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to a jury trial.
¶ 13 In reaching our holding, we find that People v. Chaplin, 2020 IL App (3d) 180731-U, the
case relied on by defendant, is distinguishable from the instant case. In Chaplin, this court
determined that defendant’s presence with counsel in court when counsel requested a bench trial
plus defendant’s written jury waiver was insufficient to establish that defendant made a knowing
and voluntary jury waiver because the record failed to show that the court had any discussion
with defendant regarding the nature of a jury trial or bench trial. Id. ¶¶ 14, 20-21. In contrast,
here, the court briefly discussed with defendant the difference between a jury and bench trial,
and defendant’s response indicated that he clearly understood the difference between the two
types of trials. Supra ¶ 12. Finding no error occurred, we need not proceed further with the plain
error analysis.
¶ 14 We note that a jury trial is “ ‘one of the most revered of all rights acquired by a people to
protect themselves from the arbitrary use of power by the State.’ ” Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d at 269
(quoting People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209, 212 (1988)). While we acknowledge that
a court is not constitutionally required to advise a defendant of his right to a jury trial or provide
an explanation regarding the ramifications of waiving that right, we urge the court to participate
in a discussion that ensures that an untrained defendant fully understands the right that they are
waiving. See People v. Steiger, 208 Ill. App. 3d 979, 981 (1991). Admonishments that include an
explanation of the nature of a jury trial versus a bench trial, defendant’s constitutional right to
5 demand a jury trial, defendant’s participation in selecting a jury of his peers, that the waiver is
defendant’s choice, and that the implications of waiving that right result in a bench trial in front
of a judge alone, avoids unnecessarily risking a defendant’s entry of an involuntary or ill-
informed jury waiver.
¶ 15 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 16 For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is
affirmed.
¶ 17 Affirmed.