People v. Campos- Gutierrez

2023 IL App (3d) 220117-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 10, 2023
• Docket: 3-22-0117
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2023 IL App (3d) 220117-U

Order filed May 10, 2023 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-22-0117 v. ) Circuit No. 19-CF-1197 ) ALMA CAMPOS-GUTIERREZ, ) Honorable ) Amy Bertani-Tomczak, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McDade and Hettel concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for failure to stop after an accident involving personal injury.

¶2 Defendant, Alma Campos-Gutierrez, appeals her class 4 felony conviction for failure to

stop her vehicle after causing an accident involving personal injury or death, in violation of section

11-401(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-401(a) (West 2018)).

Defendant argues the evidence at trial was insufficient to find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

For the reasons stated below, we affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The State charged defendant by indictment for allegedly leaving the scene of a car accident

caused by her reckless driving. Count I of the indictment charged defendant with failure to stop

after causing an accident involving personal injury or death, a class 4 felony, in violation of section

11-401(a) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-401(a) (West 2018)). Count II charged defendant

with reckless driving, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of sections 11-503(a)(1) and 11-503(b)

of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-503(a)(1), (b) (West 2018)).

¶5 The matter proceeded to a bench trial, where the evidence established the following. On

June 29, 2019, at approximately 4:45 p.m., Fernando Ceballos was driving his family northbound

on I-55, approaching Route 30. It was a sunny day, and the road conditions were dry and clear,

with light traffic. Ceballos first noticed defendant’s vehicle on the entrance ramp to I-55 from

Route 30. He saw defendant’s vehicle travel west across the lanes of traffic, i.e., perpendicular to

northbound traffic. Ceballos immediately swerved to avoid impact with defendant’s vehicle, lost

control, and spun out before coming to a complete stop at the right shoulder of I-55 and partially

in the far right lane, facing west. Ceballos’ son, Juan Carlos, was ejected out the rear windshield

of the vehicle and onto the roadway.

¶6 While the family was looking for Juan Carlos, Ceballos searched for defendant. Ceballos

saw defendant’s vehicle traveling southbound in the northbound lanes, and he started walking

southbound. He then saw defendant make a U-turn and travel northbound. While standing in the

middle lane of the highway, he directed defendant to pull over. Ceballos testified that defendant

pulled over to the shoulder approximately 15-20 feet south of his vehicle. Seeing that defendant

had stopped, he started walking back to his vehicle. Immediately, defendant left the shoulder and

continued driving northbound, passing the damaged vehicle.

2 ¶7 An individual in a passing car offered to drive Ceballos to track defendant down. Ceballos

accepted the offer and the two traveled for two miles before they caught up to defendant. She was

driving in the right lane at the speed limit. Ceballos instructed her to pull over, and she eventually

stopped on the right shoulder. Ceballos approached defendant’s driver’s side and asked for her

information. She wrote her name and insurance information on a piece of paper. Ceballos moved

to the passenger side because he was worried about being struck by a passing vehicle. He then

entered defendant’s vehicle and instructed her to take him back to the scene of the accident, which

she did.

¶8 While Ceballos looked for defendant, witnesses to the accident approached Juan Carlos to

help and check on his injuries. Juan Carlos testified that a family travelling behind his own stopped

to check on his arm. An off-duty volunteer firefighter/EMT, Bobbie Vissering, was travelling

southbound on I-55 when he saw the accident. He pulled his vehicle over, climbed over the center

median, and crossed the highway to assist Juan Carlos. He stayed with Juan Carlos until the

emergency medical team arrived. Defendant’s car was not present at the scene when Vissering

reached Juan Carlos. She returned after law enforcement arrived. Juan Carlos suffered road rash

and a fractured toe and was transported to a hospital by ambulance.

¶9 By the time Ceballos and defendant returned, police were already processing the scene.

Trooper David Ptak responded to the traffic accident. He testified that it took him approximately

30 minutes to get to the scene, and defendant arrived 15 minutes after the trooper. Juan Carlos was

taken to the hospital before he arrived. After the damaged vehicle was towed, Trooper Ptak

relocated defendant, witnesses, and the Ceballos family members to the Weber Road accident

investigation site because it was a safer location for police to get more information.

3 ¶ 10 Defendant testified she was travelling with her young daughter on Route 30 when she

realized she had missed the exit. She saw an opportunity to make a U-turn but did not realize she

was making a left turn into oncoming traffic on I-55. She recognized her error when she saw cars

driving toward her. She saw Ceballos’s vehicle swerve. She then made a U-turn to drive with the

flow of traffic. She remembered possibly stopping for a second to make the U-turn, but she was

focused on correcting herself. She noticed an accident had occurred, but she did not see any

damage to the vehicle. Defendant wanted to find a safe place to park her car and call the police.

She was also concerned about her daughter. She denied stopping by Ceballos’s vehicle, explaining

that she did not feel it was safe to do so. Her goal was to avoid obstructing traffic. Defendant did

not call 911 because she did not want to use her phone while driving. She decided to find an exit

to drive back to the scene when she noticed a car trying to get her attention. She pulled over when

she felt safe. Defendant wrote her information on a piece of paper and agreed to take Ceballos

back to the accident site, returning 20 minutes after the accident. She denied being forced, and she

voluntarily spoke to police.

¶ 11 The court found defendant guilty of count I and not guilty of count II.

¶ 12 Defendant filed a posttrial motion, asserting the State failed to meet its burden of proof on

count I. She asked the court to enter a verdict of not guilty or, alternatively grant defendant a new

trial or other appropriate relief. The court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to 12 months’

conditional discharge. This appeal followed.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine

whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable

inferences in the State’s favor, “a rational trier of fact could have found the required elements of

4 the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 12. “The trier of

fact need not, however, be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of

circumstances. It is sufficient if all of the evidence taken together satisfies the trier of fact beyond

a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.” People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 330 (2000).

¶ 15 The trier of fact is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the

evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from the facts. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 12.

“Therefore, a court of review will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on questions

involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Gray, 2017 IL

120958, ¶ 35. We may reverse a conviction only when “the evidence is so unreasonable,

improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.” People

v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67.

¶ 16 Under section 11-401(a) of the Vehicle Code,

“The driver of any vehicle involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in personal

injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of

such accident, or as close thereto as possible and shall then forthwith return to, and

in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until the requirements of

Section 11-403 have been fulfilled. Every such stop shall be made without

obstructing traffic more than is necessary.” 625 ILCS 5/11-401(a) (West 2018).

Section 11-403, titled “Duty to give information and render aid,” sets forth the duty of a driver

involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in injury to (1) provide the driver’s name, address,

registration number, and the name of the vehicle’s owner and (2) render reasonable assistance to

the injured party. 625 ILCS 5/11-403 (West 2018).

5 ¶ 17 Thus, to obtain a conviction under section 11-401(a), “the State must establish that the

defendant was involved in an accident, the accident resulted in injury or death to a person, and the

defendant left the scene of the accident without rendering aid or leaving the information required

by section 11-403 of the Vehicle Code.” People v. Villanueva, 382 Ill. App. 3d 301, 306 (2008).

“Section 11-403 of the [Vehicle] Code imposes upon the driver a duty to render aid and to provide

specified information to the victims of the accident.” People v. Nunn, 77 Ill. 2d 243, 247 (1979).

“For a conviction under section 11-401, the State must prove that the defendant had knowledge of

an accident involving a person.” People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24, 40 (1997).

¶ 18 Defendant does not dispute that she was the driver of the vehicle involved in the motor

vehicle accident, that the accident resulted in personal injury, or that she knew an accident had

occurred. The crux of defendant’s argument is that she did, in fact, comply with the provisions of

section 401(a). She did not stop at the scene on the side of the highway because she felt unsafe.

She decided to drive to the nearest exit and park elsewhere before calling police. She argues this

is permitted by the statute, as she may stop “as close as possible and shall then forthwith return”

to the accident, which was her plan before she was flagged down by Ceballos in another vehicle.

She further argues that if she was not permitted to leave and return, then the language on stopping

“as close as possible” would be synonymous with the language alternatively requiring a driver to

“immediately stop,” and the legislature would not have intended such an interpretation.

¶ 19 “The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the

legislature's intent.” People v. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d 166, 170 (2006). “The best indication of

legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. at 170-71.

“Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resort to further

6 aids of statutory construction.” Id. at 171. “The construction of a statute is a question of law, which

is reviewed de novo.” Id.

¶ 20 We reject defendant’s allegation that a literal reading of the statute renders the term

“immediately” synonymous with the term “as close as possible.” We find the statute clear and

unambiguous. There may be instances where a driver involved in a motor vehicle accident cannot

stop immediately but would still be compliant with section 11-401(a) by stopping as close as

possible, if not immediately.

¶ 21 Where two moving vehicles are involved in an accident, a defendant can be presumed to

know that another person was involved. See Nunn, 77 Ill.2d at 245-46; Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d at

39. Section 11-401 “was designed to prevent the callous and unacceptable act of leaving the scene

of an accident when aid and assistance are potentially required.” People v. Digirolamo, 279 Ill.

App. 3d 487, 492 (1996), aff'd, 179 Ill. 2d 24 (1997). But even so,

“section 11-401 does not impose an absolute duty to stop regardless of the

circumstances of a collision. Dark country roads and poorly lit urban crime centers

breed shattered windshields as a result of sudden impact with unknown objects.

There is no affirmative duty to stop in a high-crime area after a collision with an

object of unknown origin. Nor is there a duty to stop on a desolate country road to

render aid to a host of unknown animals that constitute the most likely source of an

unknown impact that shatters a windshield. The statute's purpose is to impose a

duty to stop and render aid after an accident with other people. It is a duty associated

with knowledge of an accident involving a person who, because of the accident,

may need aid and assistance. Whether the person is actually hurt and whether a

driver knows the person is actually hurt does not define the duty.” Id. at 495-96.

7 None of these circumstances apply here where the accident occurred while defendant was driving

on a highway with light traffic on a sunny afternoon and the accident did not involve impact with

an unknown object. Furthermore, defendant’s argument that she was not required to render aid

ignores the clear requirement of section 11-403 to render reasonable assistance to the injured party

in an accident.

¶ 22 Here, the State established at trial that defendant was involved in an accident involving two

moving vehicles. She was driving against the flow of traffic, causing Ceballos to swerve and lose

control of his vehicle. Under these circumstances, we presume defendant knew that another person

was involved in the accident, thus triggering her duty to stop and render aid. Moreover, although

defendant’s actual knowledge of an injured party is irrelevant to the duty to stop and render aid,

see id. at 496, the accident did in fact result in injury to Juan Carlos, an occupant of the other

vehicle involved in the accident. In violation of her statutory duty, defendant left the scene without

providing information or rendering aid.

¶ 23 Defendant’s claim that there was no safe place for her to stop is refuted by the evidence.

Road conditions at the time of the accident were clear and sunny with light traffic. Numerous cars

were able to stop near the accident. A family stopped to check on Juan Carlos. A witness crossed

multiple lanes of traffic on foot to reach Juan Carlos. Another individual was able to stop long

enough to allow Ceballos into his vehicle. Furthermore, the damaged vehicle was partially

blocking one lane of traffic, rendering that lane at least partly unusable, leading to the inference

that there would be room behind or in front of the accident to pull over. Defendant was not required

to immediately stop in the center lane of the highway further blocking traffic, but she was required

to pull over to the shoulder as near as she could to the accident, which she initially did according

to Ceballos before immediately driving away.

8 ¶ 24 We appreciate that defendant may have been frightened and concerned for the safety of

both herself and her daughter. However, the trial evidence indicated that it was both feasible and

safe for defendant to pull over near the scene of the accident. Rather than park her vehicle on the

shoulder, defendant turned around and proceeded to drive for two miles before being flagged down

by Ceballos. Defendant’s conduct and the time it took for her to return to the scene of the accident,

whether 20 or 45 minutes, was a clear violation of section 11-401(a), which required her to

immediately stop at the scene of the accident or as close as possible to the scene of the accident.

Accordingly, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of guilt.

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 26 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Will County.

¶ 27 Affirmed.