People v. Campanaro

223 A.D. 248, 228 N.Y.S. 24, 1928 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6185
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMarch 30, 1928
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 223 A.D. 248 (People v. Campanaro) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Campanaro, 223 A.D. 248, 228 N.Y.S. 24, 1928 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6185 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928).

Opinion

O’Malley, J.

The indictment was for murder in the first degree, charging the defendant with having shot and killed one James Lamantia in front of 133 Mott street in the city of New [250]*250York on the early morning of June 23, 1923. The defendant was not apprehended until October, 1926, nor the indictment filed until November twelfth of that year. However, there was evidence tending to show that the defendant was under suspicion and sought by the police immediately following the crime. Two police officers testified to having visited the premises where the defendant resided, but failed in finding him.

The defendant testified that he lived with his parents in the neighborhood for at least two years after June 23, 1923, and although he lived thereafter on Long Island, where he was engaged in business, he claimed to have continued frequently to visit the neighborhood until the time of his arrest. In this he was supported by the testimony of several witnesses.

Whether the defendant disappeared at least temporarily after the date in question, we think presented a question of fact. He had long been known under various names, and there was testimony from one of his own witnesses that while engaged in business on Long Island he was known under the name of Lano.” Under the peculiar circumstances of the case the jury might well have found that the defendant, even though guilty, would feel secure in returning to his accustomed haunts.

The defendant’s arrest was finally effected after two women who were claimed to have been eye-witnesses to the shooting were located. Their names were disclosed to the district attorney by a convict named Marro, who was brought from Sing Sing for examination. When questioned the women admitted having been present when the shots were fired. They explained their failure to give earlier information to the police as being based upon a desire not to get mixed up in the affair. This was a natural motive in view of the surrounding circumstances.

The women were known as Helen Gallo and Margie Davenport. The former was the mistress of one Archie Gallo and the latter the mistress of Marro. All four had been accustomed to live in the same premises. Marro and Gallo had criminal records and the women were dissolute characters.

Upon the night in question Marro and the two women left their place of abode together. They met the deceased, a night watchman of premises near Mulberry and Grand streets, and the four went to a basement restaurant at 133 Mott street. While there seated at a table, one of the women testified, the defendant walked in, said “ hello,” and immediately passed out. Each of the women testified that they had not been drinking either in the restaurant or before going there. Marro, on the other hand, who was one of the chief witnesses for the defense, testified that before going [251]*251to the restaurant the girls were intoxicated from drinking gin, and that four bottles of wine were consumed while in the restaurant; and, further, that he and the deceased had to assist the women upstairs to the sidewalk on leaving the restaurant. Other witnesses for the defendant likewise gave testimony tending to support the claim that the two women had been drinking and were intoxicated.

The women testified that on reaching the sidewalk in front of 133, which is located on the westerly side of Mott street, all four turned to go north towards Grand street. The Gallo woman immediately heard three shots, turned and saw the defendant with a pistol pointed towards us.” The Davenport woman, who was slightly deaf, heard one shot, turned and saw the defendant putting a pistol in his right-hand hip pocket. At the same time she saw the deceased grasp his side and run in a northerly direction. Marro was heard by the Gallo woman to say to the defendant, You dirty rat.”

While the defendant denied having been in the basement restaurant, he was concededly on the scene. He testified that he was standing in front of a ground floor restaurant at No. 133, owned by one DeAngelo, when the women, Marro and the deceased appeared; that he said hello ” to Marro, and as the group of four was proceeding north towards Grand street, he heard a shot, whereupon he and DeAngelo, who was standing with him, went into the latter’s restaurant and closed the door. He then heard another shot. He was corroborated in this story by DeAngelo and to some extent by the latter’s brother who was at work in DeAngelo’s restaurant, and also by a witness named Gerber.

Marro testified that as he and the deceased were walking together behind the two women, he heard a shot which seemed to come from a building at a point about fifteen or twenty feet north of No. 133, and that the other shots seemed to come from the same side of the street, but at a point somewhat to the north of where the first shot was heard, and that when all shots were fired, the Gallo and Davenport women were walking together a considerable distance in advance of the witness and the deceased. The deceased was heard to cry out, and then went home. Marro accompanied him, but claims to have lost him after arriving at the home of the deceased. Lamantia sustained two shot wounds which caused his death the following night.

Upon this evidence we think there was presented purely a question of fact as to whether the defendant fired the fatal shots. If believed by the jury, it was sufficient, it seems to us, to have supported a verdict much more serious in consequence to defendant. [252]*252It is his good fortune that he escaped with a verdict of manslaughter. While it is true that no motive was shown, evidence of such was not essential, if the facts were otherwise sufficient to satisfy the jury of defendant’s guilt. (People v. Seppi, 221 N. Y. 62, 70.)

The trustworthiness of the testimony of the People’s two witnesses was for the jury. True, they were not witnesses of high repute, yet of the character that are usual in trials of this kind, where, as has been aptly said by the Court of Appeals, “ the State is not likely to discover witnesses of high character.” (People v. Cohen, 223 N. Y. 406, 422.) Surely the jury would have been justified in finding that the People’s two witnesses compared favorably with many of the defendant’s witnesses, and more particularly with the defendant and Marro, both of whom had long criminal careers.

The appellant’s counsel urges in addition that the trial was unfair and the verdict was coerced. It is urged that the numerous questions asked by the trial judge indicated his bias, and that the defendant’s counsel did not have full and fair opportunity in the cross-examination of witnesses. Perhaps, as the learned district attorney conceded, the participation of the trial judge in the questioning of witnesses was more than is customary. But it is noteworthy that the excessive questioning now complained of so bitterly seems not to have elicited any protest whatever throughout the entire trial. Moreover, numerous witnesses called for the defendant testified through an interpreter, and the record discloses that it was almost impossible to secure direct answers to questions. The trial judge thus found it necessary frequently to interfere for the purpose of shortening answers and to hold the case within proper issues.

We find no merit in the claim that defendant’s counsel was prohibited from fairly conducting bis cross-examination.

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223 A.D. 248, 228 N.Y.S. 24, 1928 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6185, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-campanaro-nyappdiv-1928.