THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRIMINAL CASllfN61Ldf97fiZ 3 ) 4 v. ) ) NICHOLAS F. CAMADDU, ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 ) (Motion Objecting to Judge's Competency 6 to Proceed Pursuant to 7 GCA § 6107) Defendant. ) 7
8 INTRODUCTION 9 This matter comes before the HONORABLE VERNON P. PEREZ on Defendant 10 Nicholas F. Camaddu's Motion Objecting to Judge's Competency to Proceed Pursuant to 7 II
12 GCA § 6107, filed on July 8, 2013 ("Motion"). Defendant is represented by Attorney John
13 Patrick Morrison ofthe Alternate Public Defender. A hearing on Defendant's Motion was held 14 on July 24, 2013, at 2:00 pm. The Court now issues the following written Decision and Order 15 DENYING Defendant's Motion. 16
17 BACKGROUND 18 During Defendant's June 21, 2013 sentencing hearing, Judge Anita A. Sukola ("Judge 19
20 Sukola") disclosed that she was in receipt of a letter from Senator Brant McCreadie, dated June
21 3, 2013. See Decision and Order at 1-2 (7/5/2013). The letter asks Judge Sukola to sentence 22 Defendant to the maximum sentence under 9 GCA § 25.15. See id. Although the letter, which 23 was drafted on official letterhead, was sent to Judge Sukola via e-mail on June 3, 2013, the 24 letter was not brought to the judge's attention until the morning of the scheduled June 21, 2013 25
26 hearing. See id. at 2. Judge Sukola gave Defendant's counsel two hours to review the letter and
27 lodge any objection. See id. at 2. After having reviewed the letter, Defendant moved to strike 28 the letter and requested Judge Sukola to recuse herself. Judge Sukola denied both requests. See
id. at 1-7. People v. Cammadu Decision and Order (Motion Objecting to Judge's Competency to Proceed Pursuant to 7 GCA § 6107) Criminal Case No. CF97-12 Page I of6 On July 8, 2013, Defendant filed his motion to disqualify Judge Sukola under section
2 6107. See Motion. Defendant claims that disqualification is warranted pursuant to Dizon v. 3 Superior Court of Guam, 1998 Guam 3, because the circumstances of this case are identical to 4 that of Dizon: (1) a person of influence sent a letter to a judge requesting a specific result; (2) a 5
6 sitting Guam senator has more influence over a superior court judge than a federal judge does,
7 and (3) the judges in both knew of the importance of the case to the persons who wrote the 8 letters. See id. at 3-4. 9 Judge Sukola filed her answer on July 10, 2013, denying that Senator McCreadie's letter 10 "presents an amount of influence on the Court more than the complete lack of actual influence II
12 discussed in Dizon." See Answer at 2 ~ 3 (Objection to Judge) (7110/2013) ("Answer"). She
13 further denies that "she 'knows that the case is important to Senator McCreadie and he is 14 advocating to a particular sentence."' !d. at 2 ~ 4. Judge Sukola maintains that the mere receipt 15 of the letter, which she disclosed to all parties at the earliest practicable time, does not create the 16
17 appearance of impropriety. See id. at 2 ~ 5.
18 DISCUSSION 19
20 Title 7 GCA § 6107 governs the procedure for filing a statement of objection regarding a
21 judge's disqualification. The Supreme Court of Guam has described the procedure prescribed
22 by 7 GCA § 6107: 23 Pursuant to 7 GCA 6107, if a judge does not recuse himself, then a 24 party may, 'at the earliest practicable opportunity,' 'file ... a written statement objecting to the ... Judge.' The written statement 25 must 'set[ ] forth the fact or facts constituting the ground of the 26 disqualification of such ... Judge,' and must be served on the Judge. Within 'ten (1 0) days after the service ... or ... filing of any 27 statement, whichever is later in time,' a Judge may file a 'written answer,' which must be 'verified in the manner prescribed for the 28 verification of pleadings.' If the Judge opposes his own disqualification, then 'the question of the Judge's
People v. Cammadu Decision and Order (Motion Objecting to Judge's Competency to Proceed Pursuant to 7 GCA § 6107) Criminal Case No. CF97-12 Page 2 of6 disqualification shall be heard and determined by some other Judge.' 2
3 Van Dox v. Superior Ct., 2008 Guam 7 ~ 17 (internal citations omitted).
4 Title 7 GCA § 6105 is based on 28 U.S.C. § 455 and governs the substantive grounds for 5 disqualification of judges. Section 6105 provides: 6 § 6105. Grounds of Disqualification. 7 (a) Any judge shall disqualifY himself or herself in any 8 proceeding in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be 9 questioned, but if, following complete disclosure to all parties in the proceedings of the reasons for disqualification, all parties agree 10 to having the judge continue to sit in the proceedings, he or she need not disqualify himself or herself. 11
12 7 GCA § 6105(a) (2013) (emphasis added); see Ada v. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 22, ~ 12, n.2.
13 Section 6105(a) requires disqualification for the appearance ofpartiality, such as when ajudge's 14 "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 7 GCA § 61 05(a). In other words, 15 "disqualification may occur even though a judge is not actually biased or prejudiced, and has no 16
17 extrajudicial knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts." US. v. Salemme, 164 F.Supp.2d 49, 80
18 (D.Mass. 1998) (citation omitted). Actual bias is not a prerequisite for recusal, as the
19 appearance of impropriety is enough. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). 20 "The standard for recusal is the appearance of impropriety and [ ] no actual showing of bias is 21 necessary for recusal to lie." Dizon v. Superior Ct., 1998 Guam 3 ~ 32. 22
23 The purpose of Section 455(a) is "to promote public confidence in the integrity of the
24 judicial process" and to avoid even the "appearance of impropriety." Liljeberg v. Health Servs. 25 Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988). "Avoiding the appearance of impropriety is as 26 important to developing public confidence in the judiciary as avoiding impropriety itself." US. 27 v. Hollister, 746 F .2d. 420, 425-26 (8th Cir. 1984); See 28 U .S.C. § 455(a). "[J]udges and 28
justices have 'as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as [they] do[]
People v. Cammadu Decision and Order (Motion Objecting to Judge's Competency to Proceed Pursuant to 7 GCA § 6107) Criminal Case No. CF97-12 Page 3 of6 to recuse when the law and facts require."' People v. Tennessen, 2010 Guam 12 ~ 49 (quoting 2 Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347,351 (lOth Cir. 1995)). 3 Courts often apply a reasonable person standard to determine whether impartiality or the 4
5 appearance of impropriety must be reasonably questioned. This standard evaluates whether a
6 reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that a judge's impartiality 7 might reasonably be questioned. See United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 8 1986). The Supreme Court of Guam has adopted this objective standard and has held that "(t]he 9 appearance of bias is judged from the standard of a 'reasonable person' who knows all the facts, 10
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THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRIMINAL CASllfN61Ldf97fiZ 3 ) 4 v. ) ) NICHOLAS F. CAMADDU, ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 ) (Motion Objecting to Judge's Competency 6 to Proceed Pursuant to 7 GCA § 6107) Defendant. ) 7
8 INTRODUCTION 9 This matter comes before the HONORABLE VERNON P. PEREZ on Defendant 10 Nicholas F. Camaddu's Motion Objecting to Judge's Competency to Proceed Pursuant to 7 II
12 GCA § 6107, filed on July 8, 2013 ("Motion"). Defendant is represented by Attorney John
13 Patrick Morrison ofthe Alternate Public Defender. A hearing on Defendant's Motion was held 14 on July 24, 2013, at 2:00 pm. The Court now issues the following written Decision and Order 15 DENYING Defendant's Motion. 16
17 BACKGROUND 18 During Defendant's June 21, 2013 sentencing hearing, Judge Anita A. Sukola ("Judge 19
20 Sukola") disclosed that she was in receipt of a letter from Senator Brant McCreadie, dated June
21 3, 2013. See Decision and Order at 1-2 (7/5/2013). The letter asks Judge Sukola to sentence 22 Defendant to the maximum sentence under 9 GCA § 25.15. See id. Although the letter, which 23 was drafted on official letterhead, was sent to Judge Sukola via e-mail on June 3, 2013, the 24 letter was not brought to the judge's attention until the morning of the scheduled June 21, 2013 25
26 hearing. See id. at 2. Judge Sukola gave Defendant's counsel two hours to review the letter and
27 lodge any objection. See id. at 2. After having reviewed the letter, Defendant moved to strike 28 the letter and requested Judge Sukola to recuse herself. Judge Sukola denied both requests. See
id. at 1-7. People v. Cammadu Decision and Order (Motion Objecting to Judge's Competency to Proceed Pursuant to 7 GCA § 6107) Criminal Case No. CF97-12 Page I of6 On July 8, 2013, Defendant filed his motion to disqualify Judge Sukola under section
2 6107. See Motion. Defendant claims that disqualification is warranted pursuant to Dizon v. 3 Superior Court of Guam, 1998 Guam 3, because the circumstances of this case are identical to 4 that of Dizon: (1) a person of influence sent a letter to a judge requesting a specific result; (2) a 5
6 sitting Guam senator has more influence over a superior court judge than a federal judge does,
7 and (3) the judges in both knew of the importance of the case to the persons who wrote the 8 letters. See id. at 3-4. 9 Judge Sukola filed her answer on July 10, 2013, denying that Senator McCreadie's letter 10 "presents an amount of influence on the Court more than the complete lack of actual influence II
12 discussed in Dizon." See Answer at 2 ~ 3 (Objection to Judge) (7110/2013) ("Answer"). She
13 further denies that "she 'knows that the case is important to Senator McCreadie and he is 14 advocating to a particular sentence."' !d. at 2 ~ 4. Judge Sukola maintains that the mere receipt 15 of the letter, which she disclosed to all parties at the earliest practicable time, does not create the 16
17 appearance of impropriety. See id. at 2 ~ 5.
18 DISCUSSION 19
20 Title 7 GCA § 6107 governs the procedure for filing a statement of objection regarding a
21 judge's disqualification. The Supreme Court of Guam has described the procedure prescribed
22 by 7 GCA § 6107: 23 Pursuant to 7 GCA 6107, if a judge does not recuse himself, then a 24 party may, 'at the earliest practicable opportunity,' 'file ... a written statement objecting to the ... Judge.' The written statement 25 must 'set[ ] forth the fact or facts constituting the ground of the 26 disqualification of such ... Judge,' and must be served on the Judge. Within 'ten (1 0) days after the service ... or ... filing of any 27 statement, whichever is later in time,' a Judge may file a 'written answer,' which must be 'verified in the manner prescribed for the 28 verification of pleadings.' If the Judge opposes his own disqualification, then 'the question of the Judge's
People v. Cammadu Decision and Order (Motion Objecting to Judge's Competency to Proceed Pursuant to 7 GCA § 6107) Criminal Case No. CF97-12 Page 2 of6 disqualification shall be heard and determined by some other Judge.' 2
3 Van Dox v. Superior Ct., 2008 Guam 7 ~ 17 (internal citations omitted).
4 Title 7 GCA § 6105 is based on 28 U.S.C. § 455 and governs the substantive grounds for 5 disqualification of judges. Section 6105 provides: 6 § 6105. Grounds of Disqualification. 7 (a) Any judge shall disqualifY himself or herself in any 8 proceeding in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be 9 questioned, but if, following complete disclosure to all parties in the proceedings of the reasons for disqualification, all parties agree 10 to having the judge continue to sit in the proceedings, he or she need not disqualify himself or herself. 11
12 7 GCA § 6105(a) (2013) (emphasis added); see Ada v. Gutierrez, 2000 Guam 22, ~ 12, n.2.
13 Section 6105(a) requires disqualification for the appearance ofpartiality, such as when ajudge's 14 "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 7 GCA § 61 05(a). In other words, 15 "disqualification may occur even though a judge is not actually biased or prejudiced, and has no 16
17 extrajudicial knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts." US. v. Salemme, 164 F.Supp.2d 49, 80
18 (D.Mass. 1998) (citation omitted). Actual bias is not a prerequisite for recusal, as the
19 appearance of impropriety is enough. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). 20 "The standard for recusal is the appearance of impropriety and [ ] no actual showing of bias is 21 necessary for recusal to lie." Dizon v. Superior Ct., 1998 Guam 3 ~ 32. 22
23 The purpose of Section 455(a) is "to promote public confidence in the integrity of the
24 judicial process" and to avoid even the "appearance of impropriety." Liljeberg v. Health Servs. 25 Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988). "Avoiding the appearance of impropriety is as 26 important to developing public confidence in the judiciary as avoiding impropriety itself." US. 27 v. Hollister, 746 F .2d. 420, 425-26 (8th Cir. 1984); See 28 U .S.C. § 455(a). "[J]udges and 28
justices have 'as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as [they] do[]
People v. Cammadu Decision and Order (Motion Objecting to Judge's Competency to Proceed Pursuant to 7 GCA § 6107) Criminal Case No. CF97-12 Page 3 of6 to recuse when the law and facts require."' People v. Tennessen, 2010 Guam 12 ~ 49 (quoting 2 Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347,351 (lOth Cir. 1995)). 3 Courts often apply a reasonable person standard to determine whether impartiality or the 4
5 appearance of impropriety must be reasonably questioned. This standard evaluates whether a
6 reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that a judge's impartiality 7 might reasonably be questioned. See United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 8 1986). The Supreme Court of Guam has adopted this objective standard and has held that "(t]he 9 appearance of bias is judged from the standard of a 'reasonable person' who knows all the facts, 10
II and understands the 'contexts of the jurisdictions, parties, and controversies involved,'
12 including such 'realities of the Guam judicial system' as the relatively small number of lawyers 13 in the Guam bar and 'the nature of Guam families."' Van Dox, 2008 Guam 7 ~ 32 (quoting 14 Ada, 2000 Guam 22 ~~ 12-13). Section 455(a) recusal cases are "extremely fact intensive and 15 fact bound, and must be judged on its unique facts and circumstances more than by comparison 16
17 to situations considered in prior jurisprudence." United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 157 (5th
18 Cir. 1995). 19 Based upon the above standard, the facts presented in this case do not establish that 20 Judge Sukola's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. To impose "a requirement that a 21 criminal trial court recuse itself every time it receives unsolicited material uncomplimentary to a 22
23 defendant prior to trial or sentencing would create an intolerable situation which could lead to a
24 manipulation of the criminal justice." State v. Santangelo, 205 Conn. 578, 602, 534 A.2d 1175, 25 1189 (1987) (citing United States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328, 335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 26 U.S. 1041, 107 S.Ct. 1981,95 L.Ed.2d 821 (1987)). 27
28 This case is much like Santangelo. In Santangelo, the defendant, who was convicted by
a jury, claimed that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion for
People v. Cammadu Decision and Order (Motion Objecting to Judge's Competency to Proceed Pursuant to 7 GCA § 6107) Criminal Case No. CF97-12 Page 4 of6 disqualification from sentencing. See id. at 601. The basis of his motion was that the trial 2 judge, prior to the defendant's scheduled sentencing, received and read a letter from a detective. 3 See id. The detective's letter "contained unsubstantiated, inflammatory comments and 4 accusations concerning the defendant." !d. "The trial court, on the record, acknowledged 5
6 receiving and reading the letter but stated that it was 'disregarding all [its] contents."' !d. The
7 Supreme Court in Santangelo found that disqualification was not warranted because the judge 8 "brought the letter he had received to the attention of the defendant and noted that there was no 9 basis for giving its allegations credence. He then emphatically and categorically stated that he 10 could, and would, disregard the letter's contents. There is no reason to believe he could not do II
12 so, or that a reasonable person would have cause to question his ability to do so." !d. at 603.
13 In this case, Judge Suk:ola received an unsolicited letter from a senator requesting tha 14 Defendant be sentenced to the maximum sentence. Judge Suk:ola denies that the letter woul 15 influence her decision making and also denies that she knows that the case is important to th 16
17 senator. See Answer at 2 ~~ 3-5. This Court must assume that she will be able to disregar
18 extraneous matters such as those. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 562 ("[t]he acquired skill and capacit 19 to disregard extraneous matters is one of the requisites of judicial office"). Therefore 20 disqualification is not warranted in this case. 21 Further, contrary to Defendant's arguments in favor of disqualification pursuant to Dizon 22
23 the circumstances ofthis case are distinguishable from that of Dizon. First, nothing on the recor
24 suggests that Judge Sukola and Senator McCreadie are friends, which proved to be a significan 25 factor in the Dizon Court's finding that the appearance of impartiality existed. More specifically 26 the Dizon court found that: 27 The fact that Judge Goodwin had such strong feelings and a 28 seemingly emotional stake in the outcome and speedy resolution of this case could be viewed as information which Judge Lamorena did not already possess. When viewed in conjunction with the People v. Cammadu Decision and Order (Motion Objecting to Judge's Competency to Proceed Pursuant to 7 GCA § 6107) Criminal Case No. CF97-12 Page 5 of6 two judges' friendship a reasonable question as to impartiality and bias in the mind of a reasonable person is created. 2
3 1998 Guam 3 ~ 12 (emphasis added). Second, unlike the trial court in Dizon, Judge Sukol
4 voluntarily disclosed the existence of Senator McCreadie's letter to the parties at the earlies 5 practicable time and also gave the parties the opportunity to comment on the letter. As such 6 Dizon does not require disqualification in this case. 7 CONCLUSION 8
9 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant has not stated sufficient grounds under 7 GCA §
10 6105(a) warranting Judge Sukola's disqualification. Thus, Defendant's Motion is hereby II DENIED. 12 :lh SO ORDERED this fl,~ of July 2013. 13
15 HONORABLE VERNON P. PEREZ JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT OF GUA 16
People v. Cammadu Decision and Order (Motion Objecting to Judge's Competency to Proceed Pursuant to 7 GCA § 6107) Criminal Case No. CF97-12 Page 6 of6