People v. Cain
Opinion
NOTICE
2026 IL App (5th) 250660-U NOTICE
Decision filed 08/26/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0660 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1).
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Hamilton County.
)
v. ) No. 25-TR-141 )
KORD T. CAIN, ) Honorable ) Thomas J. Dinn III, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Boie and Clarke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the default judgment entered against defendant as he provided an insufficient record which fails to demonstrate any alleged error. We vacate the August 7, 2025, order denying defendant’s application for waiver of criminal court assessments based only on alleged untimeliness.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On May 16, 2025, defendant was charged with the offense of speeding 21-25 miles per hour over the statutory limit. The ticket set forth a court date of June 19, 2025, at 9:30 a.m. The ticket provided instructions on how to plead either guilty or not guilty. On June 11, 2025, defendant filed the portion of the ticket indicating he wished to plead not guilty and made a written demand for a jury trial. A notice was sent to defendant on June 12, 2025, advising defendant that a jury pre-trial hearing was set for July 17, 2025, at 9 a.m.
¶4 The trial court’s docket entry of July 17, 2025, is as follows:
“DEF FTA, ASA, XPJ 251 1
Account Status Report generated.
Referral to Collection Agency Generated.
75.30 added SA collections. New balance is 326.30.”
¶5 On July 25, 2025, defendant filed an “Application for Waiver of Criminal Court Assessments.” On August 7, 2025, the trial court entered a form “Order on Application for Waiver of Criminal Court Assessments,” which denied the application. The form order contained a box to deny which states, inter alia, that “[t]he application does not qualify for a fee waiver because (must state specific reason).” The trial court wrote “untimely” as the reason for the denial. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 13, 2025, and an amended notice of appeal on August 27, 2025.
¶6 II. ANALYSIS
¶7 Defendant filed his appellant brief pro se. He argues (1) that the trial court erred in holding an ex parte hearing and entering a default judgment against him and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his application for a waiver of fees.
¶8 A. Default Judgment
¶9 Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and provided an address for service. A notice of the jury pre-trial hearing on July 17, 2025, was mailed to defendant at the address provided on his plea of not guilty. Defendant does not deny that he failed to appear at the jury pretrial hearing on July 17, 2025. Instead, his brief contains information to justify or excuse his absence from the hearing.
1 The docket entry contains common abbreviations that indicated that defendant failed to appear, the Assistant State’s Attorney was present, and an ex parte judgment in the amount of $251 was entered.
However, those facts are not part of the record on appeal. “[A] reviewing court may not consider matters not of record.” People v. Newbolds, 364 Ill. App. 3d 672, 676 (2006). Further, the record on appeal does not contain a report of proceedings or an acceptable substitute such as a bystander’s report or an agreed statement of facts. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c), (d) (eff. July 1, 2017). The appellant bears the burden of presenting an adequate record to support any claimed errors, and any doubts arising from an inadequate record will be construed against the appellant. People v. Hunt, 234 Ill. 2d 49, 58 (2009). Where, as here, the record on appeal fails to demonstrate the error alleged, we will not speculate as to what, if any, errors the circuit court may have committed. Smolinski v. Vojta, 363 Ill. App. 3d 752, 757 (2006). Instead, we “ ‘indulge in every reasonable presumption favorable to the judgment from which the appeal is taken, including that the [circuit] court ruled or acted correctly.’ ” Id. at 757-58 (quoting People v. Majer, 131 Ill. App. 3d 80, 84 (1985)). Accordingly, we affirm the default judgment entered on July 17, 2025.
¶ 10 B. Fee Waiver
¶ 11 Defendant asserts that he attempted to file a motion to vacate the default judgment, but his filing was rejected. Then, defendant filed an “Application for Waiver of Criminal Court Assessments.” Based upon defendant’s brief, it appears he intended to file a motion for waiver of fees to sue or defendant as a poor person pursuant to section 5-105 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/5-105 (West 2024)). However, defendant actually filed a Supreme Court Rule 404 application for waiver of court assessments.
¶ 12 An application for waiver of court assessments “should be submitted no later than 30 days after sentencing” Ill. S. Ct. R. 404 (eff. Sept. 1, 2023). Accordingly, when defendant filed his application on July 25, 2025, following his sentence being imposed on July 17, 2025, it was within 30 days and was timely. As such, it was error for the trial court to deny defendant’s application for
the sole reason of it being “untimely.” We vacate the trial court’s order of August 7, 2025, and remand for the trial court to consider defendant’s application for waiver of criminal court assessment.
¶ 13 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of July 17, 2025, and vacate the order of August 7, 2025, and remand the matter to the trial court.
¶ 15 Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions.
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