People v. Cain

2020 IL App (1st) 181668-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: July 24, 2020
• Docket: 1-18-1668
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2020 IL App (1st) 181668-U

FIFTH DIVISION Order filed: July 24, 2020

No. 1-18-1668

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County ) v. ) No. 17 CR 7744 ) ) JAMAL CAIN, ) Honorable ) Thaddeus L. Wilson, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Rochford and Delort concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a firearm, ammunition, and narcotics recovered from a bedroom in which proof of his residency was also recovered.

¶2 Following a bench trial, the defendant, Jamal Cain, was convicted of unlawful possession

of a firearm by a felon (UPFF) and possession of a controlled substance. He was sentenced to

concurrent terms of six years’ imprisonment for the UPFF conviction and three years’ No. 1-18-1668

imprisonment for the possession of a controlled substance conviction. On appeal, the defendant

contends that that the State failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he constructively

possessed the firearm, ammunition, and narcotics. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶3 The defendant was charged by indictment with, inter alia, three counts of unlawful

possession of a firearm by a felon and one count of possession of a controlled substance. The

following evidence was adduced at trial.

¶4 The State called three members of the Chicago Police Department, Officer Kevin Garcia,

Officer Marvin Bonnstetter, and Sergeant Ivan Ramos, who all testified that on April 23, 2017,

they executed a search warrant for Douglas Tate at the residence located at 704 North Trumbull

Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. Sergeant Ramos testified that the team made a forced entry through a

front security gate. The defendant met them at the front door of the single-family home, where he

and two other adults were present. After informing the defendant that they were executing a search

warrant, he was detained. Officer Garcia recovered two Illinois driver’s licenses on the defendant’s

person—one current and one expired—both bearing the defendant’s name and listing 704 North

Trumbull as his address.

¶5 Sergeant Ramos testified that the residence contained two bedrooms on the second floor.

The second-floor bedrooms were on either side of a staircase, contained sloped ceilings, and were

separated by half-walls. In the east bedroom on the second floor, Sergeant Ramos recovered the

following from a dresser: a .22 caliber Uzi firearm in the bottom drawer underneath some clothing,

.22 caliber ammunition from the top drawer, and 34 pieces of mail addressed to the defendant at

the Trumbull address in the top drawer underneath the ammunition.

¶6 When questioned about the two prescription pill bottles on top of the dresser in the east

bedroom on the second floor, Sergeant Ramos could not recall whether he looked at the bottles to

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find a name. No close-up photographs were taken of the pill bottles. Sergeant Ramos testified that

he could not definitively state whether he looked at or recovered mail from other areas in the room,

including on the floor or in a box underneath the dresser; however, he admitted that if the mail was

“proof of residency bearing [the defendant’s] name, it was inventoried.”

¶7 Officer Garcia testified that, in the second floor east bedroom, he recovered two, small

Ziploc bags, each containing a white, rock-like substance of suspected cocaine, from inside a pair

of black gym shoes that were among a group of “multiple shoes.” He did not note the size of the

shoes on the floor in the bedroom, nor did he compare the size of those shoes with the size of the

shoes the defendant was wearing at the time of his arrest. Officer Garcia admitted that he did not

see the defendant place anything inside of the black gym shoes nor did the defendant wear those

shoes to the police station.

¶8 Officer Bonnstetter testified that he participated in the execution of the search warrant at

the Trumbull address as the “evidence supervisor,” which included taking photographs as well as

recovering and inventorying items. He testified that he photographed, took custody of, and later

inventoried the items Sergeant Ramos recovered from the dresser in the second-floor east

bedroom. He stated that, in addition to photographing the 34 pieces of mail recovered by Sergeant

Ramos, he also photographed and inventoried 17 pieces of mail that Officer Andrew Robles

recovered on a table in the same bedroom. The 17 pieces of mail were also addressed to the

defendant at the Trumbull address. Officer Bonnstetter also testified that, on a coffee table in the

same second floor east bedroom, he recovered, photographed, and inventoried 61 pieces of mail

addressed to the defendant at the Trumbull address. He stated that he did not believe that the mail

on top of the dresser or on the floor near the dresser was inventoried. According to Officer

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Bonnstetter, aside from the mail addressed to the defendant, bundles of mail from the basement

addressed to Tate were recovered, photographed, and inventoried.

¶9 At the conclusion of the officers’ testimony, the State introduced a certified copy of the

defendant’s 2010 felony conviction for possession of heroin, which the trial court admitted into

evidence. The parties stipulated that the two plastic bags containing a white, rock-like substance

that were recovered from the black gym shoes tested positively for cocaine and each weighed .1

grams.

¶ 10 The State rested and the defendant moved for a directed finding, arguing that the State

failed to establish constructive possession of the firearm, ammunition, and narcotics. The trial

court denied the motion. The defense requested that its exhibits be moved into evidence and then

rested, with the defendant waiving his right to testify and not presenting any witnesses or evidence.

¶ 11 The parties waived closing arguments and the trial court found the defendant guilty of three

counts of UPFF and one count of possession of a controlled substance.

¶ 12 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider or alternatively a motion for a new trial, which

the trial court denied. Following the sentencing hearing, the court merged the UPFF convictions

and sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of six years’ imprisonment for UPFF and three

years’ imprisonment for possession of a controlled substance. The defendant filed a motion to

reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.

¶ 13 In urging reversal of his convictions, the defendant’s sole argument is that the State failed

to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had constructive possession of the firearm,

ammunition, and narcotics. We disagree.

¶ 14 When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our function is not to retry

the defendant. People v. Nere, 2018 IL 122566, ¶ 69 (citing People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541

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(1999)). The appropriate question for a reviewing court is whether, considering all of the evidence

in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. The

trier of fact is responsible for weighing the evidence, resolving conflicts in that evidence, and

drawing reasonable inferences from the testimony and other evidence. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶

48. The trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences which flow normally from the evidence,

seek explanations that are consistent with innocence and elevate them to the level of reasonable

doubt, or find that a witness is not credible simply based on the defendant’s word. Jonathon C.B.,

2011 IL 107750, ¶ 60. A reviewing court will reverse a conviction only where the evidence is so

unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that there is a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s

guilt. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48.

¶ 15 The defendant was charged with UPFF and possession of a controlled substance. To

convict a defendant for UPFF, the State must prove that a defendant: (1) knowingly possessed a

weapon or ammunition; and (2) was previously convicted of a felony. People v. Sams, 2013 IL

App (1st) 121431, ¶ 10; 720 ILCS 5/24–1.1(a) (West 2016). In order to sustain a charge of

possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove the defendant had knowledge of the

presence of an illicit substance and that the substance was in his immediate and exclusive control.

People v. Brown, 277 Ill. App. 3d 989, 997 (1996).

¶ 16 “Because possession is often difficult to prove directly, proving possession frequently rests

upon circumstantial evidence.” People v. Love, 404 Ill. App. 3d 784, 788 (2010). When a case is

based on circumstantial evidence, a trier of fact need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt

of each link in the chain of circumstances; rather, it is sufficient if all of the evidence taken together

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satisfies the trier of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant’s guilt. In re Jonathon C.B.,

2011 IL 107750, ¶ 60.

¶ 17 Possession of contraband may be either actual or constructive. People v. Givens, 237 Ill.

2d 311, 335 (2010). The State does not argue that the defendant had actual possession of the

firearm, ammunition, and narcotics; rather, it argues that there was sufficient evidence to prove

that the defendant had constructive possession. The defendant contends that the State’s evidence

proved only that the contraband was found in the second-floor east bedroom, not that he actually

knew of its presence or had control over the bedroom where it was found. He concludes, therefore,

that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove that he had constructive possession of the

contraband. We disagree.

¶ 18 In order to establish constructive possession, the State must prove that the defendant: (1)

knew that the contraband was present, and (2) exercised immediate and exclusive control over the

area where the contraband was found. Sams, 2013 IL App (1st) 121431, ¶ 10. “Habitation in the

premises where contraband is discovered is sufficient evidence of control to constitute constructive

possession.” People v. Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17. Further, where two people

exercise control over the premises, each person has possession. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 335. Once

the State establishes possession, “an inference of culpable knowledge can be drawn from the

surrounding facts and circumstances,” including a defendant’s acts, declarations, or conduct. Id.;

Sams, 2013 IL App (1st) 121431, ¶ 10.

¶ 19 “Proof of residency in the form of rent receipts, utility bills and clothing in closets is

relevant to show the defendant lived on the premises and therefore controlled them.” People v.

Cunningham, 309 Ill. App. 3d 824, 828 (1999). In deciding whether constructive possession has

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been shown, the trier of fact is entitled to rely on reasonable inferences of knowledge and

possession, absent other factors that might create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.

See People v. Smith, 191 Ill. 2d 408, 413 (2000). The elements of possession or knowledge for the

purposes of constructive possession are issues of fact and, this court will not disturb the trier of

fact’s findings unless the evidence is so unbelievable, improbable, or contrary to the verdict that it

creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v. Carodine, 374 Ill. App. 3d 16, 25

(2007).

¶ 20 Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that a reasonable

trier of fact could infer that the defendant knew of the presence of the firearm, ammunition, and

narcotics, found in a bedroom within which numerous pieces of mail were also found bearing his

name and containing the Trumbull address where the contraband was recovered. See Spencer,

2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 18.

¶ 21 The defendant, nevertheless, argues that the firearm, ammunition, and narcotics were not

in plain view (the firearm was in a drawer covered by clothes, the ammunition was in a drawer,

and the narcotics was in a shoe), making it impossible for the trier of fact to infer that he knew the

items were present. The defendant also argues that the two forms of identification found on his

person failed to prove that he resided at or had a “connection to” the Trumbull address.

¶ 22 The defendant’s arguments invite this court to reweigh the evidence in his favor and

substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. Again, it was the trial court’s responsibility to

weigh the evidence, resolve any conflicts in that evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from

the testimony and other evidence. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242 (2006). We will not

substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on such issues. Id. Based upon the evidence

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introduced by the State, we find that a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the defendant knew

of the presence of the firearm, ammunition, and narcotics found in a bedroom where over 100

pieces of mail bearing his name and listing the Trumbull address were also recovered. We also

find that a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the defendant resided at the Trumbull address

where, in addition to the over 100 pieces of mail addressed to him at the Trumbull address that

were recovered from the bedroom, two driver’s licenses bearing his name and listing 704 North

Trumbull Avenue as his address were also recovered from his person.

¶ 23 We reject the defendant’s argument that the State failed to prove the defendant’s control

over the bedroom where the contraband was found because it was freely accessible by others. The

rule that possession must be exclusive does not mean the possession cannot be joint. Givens, 237

Ill. 2d at 335. Therefore, if multiple people share the power to exercise control, then each person

has possession. Id. Accordingly, when considering the totality of the evidence, in the light most

favorable to the State, we find that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant had

control over the bedroom (whether joint or sole) and, therefore, had possession of the contraband.

¶ 24 Next, the defendant argues that the State failed to establish constructive possession of the

contraband because it did not inventory and produce certain other items that were in the bedroom.

However, as we previously stated, when a case is based on circumstantial evidence, a trier of fact

need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt on each link in the chain of circumstances, it is

sufficient if all of the evidence taken together satisfies the trier of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt,

of the defendant’s guilt. See In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 60. Therefore, we find there

was enough evidence for the trier of fact to conclude that the defendant had constructive possession

of the contraband.

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¶ 25 Finally, the defendant argues that not attempting to flee from the scene demonstrated a lack

of culpable knowledge of the contraband. While “consciousness of guilt can be inferred from

flight, the converse, that failure to flee is indicative of innocence, is not a necessary corollary.”

People v. Zarate, 264 Ill. App. 3d 667, 675 (1994). Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s

contention that his failure to flee infers a lack of culpable knowledge of the contraband.

¶ 26 In sum, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence to allow the trial court to

reasonably infer that the defendant knew that the contraband was present in the bedroom and that

he exercised immediate and exclusive control over the area where the contraband was found;

thereby satisfying the State’s burden to prove that the defendant constructively possessed the

firearm, ammunition, and narcotics.

¶ 27 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence.

¶ 28 Affirmed.

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