2025 IL App (2d) 250030-U No. 2-25-0030 Order filed April 14, 2025
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 24-CF-2496 ) CHANCE M. CAGER, ) Honorable ) John A. Barsanti, and ) Salvatore LoPiccolo, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judges, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McLaren and Hutchinson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Circuit court’s detention order is affirmed, where the police synopsis related that police observed injuries on the victim consistent with her allegations, defendant has a violent criminal history, and where he was discharged off parole several months before the acts alleged in this case.
¶2 Defendant, Chance M. Cager, appeals from the circuit court’s order granting the State’s
request to deny him pretrial release, pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)), as amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan.
1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). See also Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 2025 IL App (2d) 250030-U
(eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various provisions of the Act); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52
(setting the Act’s effective date as September 18, 2023).
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On November 20, 2024, the State charged defendant with aggravated domestic battery –
strangle (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2022)) (class 2), domestic battery - bodily harm - other
prior conviction (id. § 12-3.2(a)(1)) (class 4), domestic battery - physical contact - other prior
conviction (id. § 12-3.2(a)(2)) (class 4), domestic battery - bodily harm (id. § 12-3.2(a)(1)) (class
A), and domestic battery - physical contact (id. § 12-3.2(a)(2)) (class A). Defendant was arrested
on January 1, 2025.
¶5 On January 2, 2025, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release,
alleging that defendant was charged with a forcible felony offense or any other felony involving
the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm and charged with domestic battery or aggravated
domestic battery and defendant’s pretrial release posed a real and present threat to the safety of
any person or the community. Further, the State alleged, as additional grounds upon which
defendant should be denied pretrial release, that defendant had a significant criminal history. The
State listed several Kane County cases: (1) 2009CF3158 - robbery (class 2 felony); burglary (class
2 felony); mob action (class 4 felony); unlawful restraint (class 4 felony) - five years’
imprisonment on August 4, 2010; (2) 2015CF606 - aggravated battery to a peace officer (class 2
felony) - three years’ imprisonment on September 8, 2017; (3) 2016CF487 - criminal damage to
government supported property (class 4 felony) - one year imprisonment on September 8, 2017;
(4) 2017CM1984 - domestic battery - bodily harm (class A misdemeanor) - convicted on
September 8, 2017 (a different complaining witness than the one in the current case); and (5)
2021CF1350 - battery (class A misdemeanor) - convicted on November 1, 2023. The State also
-2- 2025 IL App (2d) 250030-U
listed several Cook County cases: (1) “24MC3003837” - assault (class C misdemeanor) -
December 15, 2024, date of offense - case pending; (2) “2400130301” - resisting a peace officer
(class A misdemeanor) - March 25, 2024, date of offense - pending; (3) “22CR038401” - unlawful
use of a weapon by a felon (class 2 felony) - four years’ imprisonment on May 18, 2022; discharged
off parole on July 23, 2024; and (4) “2021 CF 00038401001 - 22 CR 038401” - unlawful use of a
weapon by a felon (class 2 felony) - four years’ imprisonment on May 18, 2022; discharged off
parole on July 23, 2024. 1
¶6 The police synopsis, which was admitted at the hearing, related that, on November 15,
2024, West Dundee police officers were dispatched to 944 Locust Drive to assist Sleepy Hollow
police with a domestic battery report. The caller, Tamika Jones, had reported being punched in
the jaw by her husband, defendant. Jones drove off in a black Toyota Camry, and officers located
the vehicle in Sleepy Hollow. They made contact with Jones, who was upset and crying. Her
jaw/cheeks were red and swollen, and there was a small streak of blood on her shirt. Jones’ child,
T’A.J., was calm and secured in a car seat behind the passenger seat. Jones related that, while she
was in the front passenger seat as defendant drove, they began to argue. When their vehicle
approached the intersection of west Main Street and north 8th Street, defendant struck Jones with
a closed fist of his left hand on her left cheek. The inside of Jones’ lip bled. They continued on
westbound Main Street until defendant pulled into the LifeZone360 parking lot and stopped the
car. Defendant continued to yell at Jones and struck her multiple times in the face. Jones was
unable to recount the number of times she was struck or if it was with an open or closed fist.
1 The State later acknowledged that the third and fourth Cook County cases were duplicative of each
other.
-3- 2025 IL App (2d) 250030-U
Defendant then put Jones in a headlock, wrapping his arm around her face and neck. Jones felt
like she could not breathe and was going to pass out. Defendant held her in a headlock for about
three seconds before letting go. Defendant drove the rest of the way to 944 Locust Drive, where
he got out of the vehicle and told Jones not to call the police. Jones got into the driver’s seat and
drove away with T’A.J., leaving defendant standing in the parking lot. Jones was not sure where
defendant went after she left. The synopsis further related that defendant had fled the area before
the police arrived, and he was not taken into custody.
¶7 The Cook County misdemeanor complaint in case No. 24MC3003837 listed above, filed
on December 16, 2024 (and admitted over defense counsel’s objection), related that Jones accused
defendant of assault, alleging that he threatened her and raised his arms, created a closed fist, and
made a motion as if he was going to strike her. He then grabbed a gaming console and made a
motion as if he was going to strike her with it, stating “I’m going to smack you, I’m going to choke
you before the police get here,” causing Jones to be in fear of receiving a battery.
¶8 Jones’ verified March 23, 2024, petition for order of protection (which was admitted over
defense counsel’s objection) related that, on March 22, 2024, in the evening, defendant showed up
at Jones’ residence while she was at work. When Jones arrived home, defendant came out of
nowhere and she let him in because she was afraid. Defendant started fighting Jones, grabbing
and pushing her face and grabbing her hair. Jones alleged that she was 32 weeks pregnant, of
which defendant was aware. Defendant asked for her keys, and Jones told him no. Defendant
took her bag from her, pushed Jones to the ground, kicked her, and ran out the door with her bag
(which contained her keys, credit cards, and identification). Jones called 911 and made a police
report. She went to the hospital via ambulance, as she was afraid for her unborn child. She was
admitted overnight. Next, Jones alleged that, in February 2024, defendant informed her that he
-4- 2025 IL App (2d) 250030-U
was coming to pick up something that he had left at her residence. She allowed him in because he
frequently threatened Jones if she did not let him in. Defendant refused to leave and began
physically abusing Jones, specifically, choking her, pushing her around, and pulling Jones’ hair.
Defendant had a knife and threatened to kill Jones. Jones alleged that she was 32 weeks pregnant,
of which defendant was aware. She ran into a bedroom, locked the door, and called police.
Defendant fled before the police arrived. Jones filed a report about the incident. Her lip was
swollen from the incident and police photographed her injury. Finally, Jones related that,
regularly, defendant physically and verbally abused her. She had a previous order of protection
that was dismissed, as she was unable to attend court. Jones asserted that she detailed several other
incidents of abuse in that order of protection, including threats to shoot and kill her and her family.
¶9 At the hearing on the State’s petition to detain, the prosecutor tendered a copy of a
complaint in Du Page County case No. 24CF2011, of which defense counsel acknowledged
receipt. The date of the offense was September 6, 2024, and, in the first count, defendant was
charged with aggravated battery to a peace officer, wherein defendant allegedly hit away a police
officer’s arm while the officer was preventing defendant from approaching Jones during a
domestic disturbance where he had threatened her. In a second count, defendant was charged with
criminal damage to property of less than $500, wherein he allegedly threw a set of Jones’ keys. A
form given to defendant and signed by him on September 7, 2024, stated that he was not to commit
any criminal offenses.
¶ 10 The State argued that it had met its burden to show that the proof was evident and
presumption great that defendant committed detainable offenses, noting the police synopsis. The
State also asserted that defendant had a prior domestic battery conviction (case No. 17CM1984).
It argued that Jones’ allegations reflected a strangulation, as she stated that she could not breathe
-5- 2025 IL App (2d) 250030-U
for three seconds and thought that she was going to pass out. The officers also observed injuries
on Jones that, the State asserted, were consistent with her allegations. The State further argued
that it had established dangerousness, noting the crime alleged was one of violence, and
referencing defendant’s criminal history, which was indicative of violent, abusive, and assaultive
behavior. Further, addressing defendant’s criminal history, the State noted that it includes forcible
felonies. The State also referenced the order of protection, noting that an emergency order was
granted but was then dismissed when the parties failed to appear, and the pending assault case,
noting that there were allegations that defendant threatened to strike Jones with his fists and a
gaming console. It noted that defendant had pleaded guilty to unlawful use of a weapon by a felon,
which indicated that he was known to possess or have access to weapons.
¶ 11 The State argued that no conditions or combination thereof could mitigate the threat
defendant posed. It relied on his criminal history, including that he was on juvenile probation and
committed two forcible felonies, convicted of aggravated battery in 2015, committed domestic
battery while on release, and convicted of criminal damage to property and domestic battery
committed while on “bail or bond” and to which he pleaded guilty. Addressing GPS and electronic
home monitoring (EHM), the State noted that defendant does not live in Streamwood (which is in
Cook County). GPS and EHM would not, it asserted, mitigate any threat because defendant would
be allowed out for many hours.
¶ 12 The State added that defendant had several juvenile adjudications. In Kane County case
No. 06JD376, he received an adjudication for class A battery and it was terminated unsatisfactorily
on September 8, 2010. In case No. 07JD171, he was adjudicated delinquent on a class A battery,
and was terminated unsatisfactorily on September 8, 2010. While on juvenile probation for that
case, defendant was arrested for a robbery in Kane County case No. 09JD336 (date of offense:
-6- 2025 IL App (2d) 250030-U
June 12, 2009) and charged in Kane County case No. 09CF3158 (date of offense: October 28,
2009).
¶ 13 Defense counsel proffered that defendant worked full time at Weber Grill as a painter, has
six children (and three of them live with his mother and one lives with him), and he financially
supported all his children (ages 15, 14, 9, 4, 3 and 7 months). Defendant was staying at his
mother’s house in Hampshire and at his brother’s home in Dundee. Defendant and Jones were
separated and share a seven-month-old child. Counsel asserted that defendant and Jones have had
a cordial relationship since their separation and had been in contact but did not live together.
Addressing the evidence concerning whether the proof was evident and presumption great that
defendant committed detainable offenses, defense counsel argued that, as related in the police
synopsis, a strangulation would be physically difficult to occur. Also, referencing the order of
protection, counsel asserted that Jones was an unreliable narrator, where she asserted in both
February and March 2024 that she was 32 weeks pregnant and where she asserted she called 911
and the police took a report (but there was no report). Counsel also argued that, other than the
present case, no injuries corroborated her allegations. Next, addressing dangerousness, counsel
argued that the State did not establish that there was real and present threat, where the parties had
an amicable relationship since November 18, 2024, with the exception of the argument that
resulted in the Cook County charges. Finally, defense counsel asserted that conditions could
mitigate any threat defendant posed, including a no-contact order and EHM at his brother’s or
mother’s address. Defendant also could be placed on GPS monitoring and leave Jones’ residence
in the protected zone.
¶ 14 The circuit court granted the State’s petition. It found that the State met its burden to show
that the proof was evident and presumption great that defendant committed detainable offenses
-7- 2025 IL App (2d) 250030-U
(domestic battery class 4 and class A offenses). It based its finding on the police synopsis, which
contained information that the police observed injuries that corroborated Jones’ allegations,
excluding any observations concerning her neck. The court also found that the State had
established dangerousness, again relying on the Cook County complaint, which reflected that,
when they were together a second time on December 15, defendant threatened acts similar to those
alleged in this case—choking Jones and striking her. The court noted that defendant’s last known
address was Jones’ address in Streamwood. Defendant’s criminal history includes crimes of
violence. Addressing Jones’ reliability, the court found that, given their child’s birth in May 2024,
Jones would have been 32 weeks pregnant in March 2024. Finally, the court found that no
conditions or combination thereof could mitigate any threat defendant posed, where defendant has
a history of failing to comply with court orders. While on juvenile probation, he was arrested and
adjudicated delinquent of robbery, and he was arrested and pleaded guilty to another count of
robbery and burglary. He also committed offenses while out on bond “throughout his adult life.”
Defendant, the court further found, also has a history of not following conditions of probation and
conditions of bond. “And in order for EHM or GPS to work, this defendant has to follow the
rules.” By committing new offenses that are violent offenses, the court determined, defendant
demonstrated an inability to comply with conditions. GPS monitoring and EHM would not protect
Jones from dropping off the child for visitation or going to visit defendant; they would not tell
police what defendant is doing or who he is with. (In granting the State’s petition, the court further
imposed a condition that defendant have no contact with Jones.)
¶ 15 On January 13, 2025, defendant filed a motion for relief, arguing that the State failed to
meet its burden to show (and the court erred in finding) that the proof was evident and presumption
-8- 2025 IL App (2d) 250030-U
great that defendant committed the charged offenses, he posed a real and present threat to Jones,
and that no conditions could mitigate that threat.
¶ 16 On January 15, 2025, a hearing was held on defendant’s motion. Defense counsel argued
that defendant has six children that he supported, one of which lived with him prior to his arrest.
He also was employed and would have that job if released. Further detention, counsel asserted,
would cause a severe hardship on the financial support of defendant’s children. Defense counsel
also requested the court to consider that defendant’s mother was present on Zoom. If released,
defendant would reside with his mother in Hampshire, an address that would be served by house
arrest, if the court deemed it appropriate. Counsel noted that, at the detention hearing, the court
did not find that defendant committed the highest charge—class 2 strangulation. Counsel also
argued that defendant was not a real and present threat to Jones or anyone in the community, where
the date of the offense was November 15, 2024, and defendant was not arrested until January 1,
2025. Counsel also asserted that conditions could mitigate any threat defendant posed, such as a
no-contact or stay-away order, and a pretrial supervision level deemed appropriate by the court.
The State responded by referencing the police synopsis. It also noted that defendant was on pretrial
release in two separate matters involving Jones: Cook County case No. 24MC3003837 (class C
assault) and Du Page County case No. 2024CF2011 (date of offense: September 6, 2024; class A
criminal damage to property, class 2 aggravated battery to a peace officer, and criminal damage to
property). The State also referenced defendant’s criminal history and noted that it included a 2022
class 2 unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon for which he was sentenced to four years’
imprisonment and discharged from parole on July 23, 2024. Defense counsel, in reply, noted that
defendant was not on pretrial release in this case when he was arrested in Cook County because
he had not yet been arrested in this matter.
-9- 2025 IL App (2d) 250030-U
¶ 17 The circuit court denied defendant’s motion, finding that the proof was evident and
presumption great that defendant committed detainable offenses, he posed a real and present threat
to Jones, and that no conditions could mitigate that threat. After the date of this offense, the court
noted, defendant was arrested and charged with other offenses, which reflected a threat to Jones’
safety, as she “is a multiple time victim of this defendant.”
¶ 18 On January 15, 2025, defendant filed a notice of appeal. On February 21, 2025, the Office
of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) filed, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(7)
(eff. Apr. 15, 2024), a notice in lieu of memorandum. On March 7, 2025, the State filed a
memorandum in opposition to defendant’s appeal.
¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 Defendant argues that the State did not meet its burden to show that: (1) the proof is evident
and presumption great that he committed detainable offenses, (2) he posed a real and present threat
to the safety of any person or the community, and (3) that no conditions or combination thereof
can be imposed that would mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the
community based on the specific articulable facts of the case. For the following reasons, we reject
his arguments.
¶ 21 Where, such as here, the detention hearing was conducted solely by way of proffer and
evidence otherwise documentary in nature and where no live testimony was presented, we review
de novo the circuit court’s determination. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶¶ 51, 54. Because
OSAD filed a notice in lieu of memorandum, we consider only the arguments asserted in
defendant’s motion for relief. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) (“The motion for
relief will serve as the argument of the appellant on appeal.”).
- 10 - 2025 IL App (2d) 250030-U
¶ 22 The State argues that defendant waived his arguments on appeal, because the motion for
relief does not contain sufficient detail and contains merely conclusory assertions. Id. (“the form
of the appellant’s arguments must contain sufficient detail to enable meaningful appellate review,
including the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefore and citations of the record and
any relevant authorities”). We conclude that the motion for relief as a whole and the transcript of
the hearing on the motion provide sufficient detail of defendant’s arguments.
¶ 23 Under the amended Code, every person charged with an offense is presumed eligible for
pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 6.1(e) (West 2022). The State must file a verified petition
requesting the denial of pretrial release, and the circuit court shall hold a hearing on the petition.
Id. § 110-6.1(a). When seeking denial of pretrial release, the State bears the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that the defendant
committed a detainable offense; (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of
any person, persons, or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case; and (3)
“no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section
110-10 of this Article can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of any person
or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, for offenses
listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a), or (ii) the defendant’s willful flight
for offenses listed in paragraph (8) of subsection (a).” Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3).
Section 110-10(b) provides a list of pretrial conditions that may be imposed. Id. § 110-10(b).
Conditions that may be imposed include restrictions on out-of-state travel, reporting requirements,
restraining orders as to certain people or places, home supervision with or without electronic
monitoring, and “other reasonable conditions” as the least restrictive means to ensure compliance
with the law. Id.
- 11 - 2025 IL App (2d) 250030-U
¶ 24 To set appropriate conditions of pretrial release, the circuit court must determine, by clear
and convincing evidence, what pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the
appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the
likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” Id. § 110-
5(a). In reaching its determination, the circuit court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances
of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific, real, and present
threat to any person that would be posed by the defendant’s release; and (5) the nature and
seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. Id.
The statute lists no singular factor as dispositive. See id.
¶ 25 In his motion for relief, defendant asserted in a conclusory fashion that the State did not
meet its burden to show that the proof was evident and presumption great that he committed
detainable offenses. At the hearing on his motion, defense counsel merely asserted on this issue
that the court had not found that the State met its burden as to the highest charge of strangulation.
As counsel made no argument concerning the court’s findings on the remaining charges, we
conclude that defendant’s claim fails. Regardless, at a pretrial detention hearing, the State is
explicitly permitted to present evidence “by way of proffer based upon reliable information.” 725
ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2) (West 2022); see id. § 110-6.1(f)(5) (exempting detention hearings from the
rules of evidence). A police synopsis alone is sufficient to sustain the State’s burden. People v.
Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 24. The synopsis here contained ample evidence to show that
the proof was evident and presumption great that defendant committed the charged detainable
offenses.
- 12 - 2025 IL App (2d) 250030-U
¶ 26 Next, defendant argues that the State did not meet its burden to show that he posed a real
and present threat to the safety of any person or the community. At the hearing, defense counsel
asserted that the offenses allegedly occurred on November 15, 2024, but defendant was not arrested
until January 1, 2025. Thus, he was “out of custody” for over one month before his arrest and
(presumably) did not pose a threat to Jones during that period.
¶ 27 We find this argument unavailing. The charges in this case involve domestic battery, which
is a violent crime. Jones related that, after she and defendant argued while defendant drove, he
struck her with a closed first on her left cheek and thereafter struck her multiple times in the face
(while their child was secured in a car seat). This was corroborated by police, who observed that
Jones’ jaw/cheeks were red and swollen and there was a small streak of blood on her shirt. Further,
defendant’s adult criminal history, which spans 2009 to the present, includes another domestic
battery (involving a different complaining victim; he was convicted of that crime in 2017) and
unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (from which he was discharged off parole four months before
the date of the alleged offenses in this case). The fact that defendant was “out of custody” for 1
1/2 months before his arrest in this case does not preclude a dangerousness finding. During that
period, he was charged (and the case remains pending) in Cook County with misdemeanor assault
for allegedly threatening to strike Jones. His alleged actions in that case are similar to those alleged
here and to the actions alleged in the March 2024 petition for order of protection. Finally, in
September 2024, defendant was charged in Du Page County with aggravated battery to a peace
officer and criminal damage to property arising out of a domestic disturbance where he had
threatened Jones. All of the foregoing support a finding of a real and present threat to Jones.
¶ 28 Finally, defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden to show that no condition
or combination thereof could be imposed that would mitigate the threat he posed. Defense counsel
- 13 - 2025 IL App (2d) 250030-U
noted that the charges were for probationable class 4 and A offenses and a stay-away order and
pretrial supervision level that the court deemed appropriate would mitigate any threat defendant
posed. Counsel also noted that defendant would have a job if released, he financially supported
his six children (one of whom resided with him), and that his mother, with whom he would live if
put on EHM, was present at the hearing via Zoom.
¶ 29 We reject defendant’s argument and agree with the circuit court that no conditions or
combination thereof could mitigate the threat defendant poses. Defendant’s criminal history and
pattern of violence support such a conclusion. As noted, defendant was discharged from parole
only four months before the alleged offenses in this case, he has an extensive criminal history that
includes another domestic battery, and he was charged in September 2024 with aggravated battery
to a peace officer and criminal damage to property arising out of a domestic disturbance where he
had threatened Jones, and, two months later, allegedly engaged in domestic violence against Jones,
which led to the charges in this case. Further, EHM/GPS would likely not mitigate any threat
defendant poses, because he would be allowed at least two days of movement in the community.
See 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-4(A-1) (West 2022) (“[a]t a minimum, any person ordered to pretrial home
confinement with or without electronic monitoring must be provided with movement spread out
over no fewer than two days per week, to participate in basic activities such as those listed in
paragraph (A)”). Given defendant’s history of not complying with court orders, the State met its
burden of showing that defendant would not likely stay away from Jones during those two days.
¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 32 Affirmed.
- 14 -