People v. Cadle

Michigan Court of Appeals

People v. Cadle

531 N.W.2d 761, 209 Mich. App. 467

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedMarch 21, 1995

DocketDocket 180431, 180432, 180433

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 531 N.W.2d 761 (People v. Cadle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Cadle, 531 N.W.2d 761, 209 Mich. App. 467 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).

Pincite

Opinion

ON REMAND

Before: Hood, P.J., and Murphy and Fitzgerald, JJ.

Per Curiam.

This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court. 447 Mich 958 (1994). In a previous decision, People v Cadle, 204 Mich App 646; 516 NW2d 520 (1994), we reversed defendants’ convictions, finding, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying their motions for severance based on antagonistic defenses. In lieu of granting the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for our reconsideration in light of the Court’s decision in People v Hana, 447 Mich 325; 524 NW2d 682 (1994). Upon reconsideration, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance.

In Hana, our Supreme Court held that People v Hurst, 396 Mich 1; 238 NW2d 6 (1976), relied upon in our prior opinion, has been erroneously applied *469 by panels of this Court as mandating severance whenever antagonistic defenses are alleged. Instead, the Court held that

pursuant to MCL 768.5; MSA 28.1028, and MCR 6.121(D), the decision to sever or join defendants lies within the discretion of the trial court. Severance is mandated under MCR 6.121(C) only when a defendant provides the court with a supporting affidavit, or makes an offer of proof, that clearly, affirmatively, and fully demonstrates that his substantial rights will be prejudiced and that severance is „ the necessary means of rectifying the potential prejudice. [Hana, supra at 346.]

The Court pointed out that the defenses must be not only inconsistent, but also mutually exclusive or irreconcilable. This cannot be said of the defenses in the case at hand, which in many respects are quite similar to that involving Durid Hana.

We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant defendants’ motions for severance.

This does not totally change the result of our prior opinion, however. In light of the fact that the scope of an appeal on remand is limited by the remand order, law of the case prevents our reconsideration of our prior holding that the prosecutor’s failure to produce the alleged informant was a violation of due process. 204 Mich App 650-651. See People v Jones, 394 Mich 434; 231 NW2d 649 (1975).

Reversed in accordance with that part of our prior opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction._

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

ON REMAND

Before: Hood, P.J., and Murphy and Fitzgerald, JJ.

Per Curiam.

This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court. 447 Mich 958 (1994). In a previous decision, People v Cadle, 204 Mich App 646; 516 NW2d 520 (1994), we reversed defendants’ convictions, finding, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying their motions for severance based on antagonistic defenses. In lieu of granting the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for our reconsideration in light of the Court’s decision in People v Hana, 447 Mich 325; 524 NW2d 682 (1994). Upon reconsideration, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance.

In Hana, our Supreme Court held that People v Hurst, 396 Mich 1; 238 NW2d 6 (1976), relied upon in our prior opinion, has been erroneously applied *469 by panels of this Court as mandating severance whenever antagonistic defenses are alleged. Instead, the Court held that

pursuant to MCL 768.5; MSA 28.1028, and MCR 6.121(D), the decision to sever or join defendants lies within the discretion of the trial court. Severance is mandated under MCR 6.121(C) only when a defendant provides the court with a supporting affidavit, or makes an offer of proof, that clearly, affirmatively, and fully demonstrates that his substantial rights will be prejudiced and that severance is „ the necessary means of rectifying the potential prejudice. [Hana, supra at 346.]

The Court pointed out that the defenses must be not only inconsistent, but also mutually exclusive or irreconcilable. This cannot be said of the defenses in the case at hand, which in many respects are quite similar to that involving Durid Hana.

We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant defendants’ motions for severance.

This does not totally change the result of our prior opinion, however. In light of the fact that the scope of an appeal on remand is limited by the remand order, law of the case prevents our reconsideration of our prior holding that the prosecutor’s failure to produce the alleged informant was a violation of due process. 204 Mich App 650-651. See People v Jones, 394 Mich 434; 231 NW2d 649 (1975).

Reversed in accordance with that part of our prior opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction._

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

531 N.W.2d 761, 209 Mich. App. 467, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-cadle-michctapp-1995.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack