People v. Caballero

604 N.E.2d 913, 152 Ill. 2d 347, 178 Ill. Dec. 390, 1992 Ill. LEXIS 142
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 15, 1992
Docket70642
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 604 N.E.2d 913 (People v. Caballero) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Caballero, 604 N.E.2d 913, 152 Ill. 2d 347, 178 Ill. Dec. 390, 1992 Ill. LEXIS 142 (Ill. 1992).

Opinion

JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM

delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Juan Caballero, directly appeals to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a)) regarding the denial of his post-conviction petition relief by the circuit court of Cook County. We affirm.

On March 23, 1984, this court affirmed defendant’s conviction and death penalty sentence on direct appeal in People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 23. On June 4, 1984, this court denied defendant’s motion for rehearing. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 29,1984.

Eventually, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Defendant alleged that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing. The circuit court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, this court held that the allegations raised a substantial constitutional deprivation. This court remanded the cause for an evidentiary hearing. People v. Caballero (1989), 126 Ill. 2d 248.

On June 19-20, 1990, the circuit court of Cook County held a two-day hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that defendant had not met the two requirements to establish ineffective assistance of counsel as set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052. The requirements are:

“First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.)

The trial court found that defendant failed to show that (1) the trial attorney did not perform in a manner that was beyond the standard of a reasonable, competent attorney in the manner in which he conducted the activity in the sentencing hearing, and (2) there was reasonable probability that but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors the outcome of the trial would have been different. The defendant must show that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s actions.

Defendant raises only one issue in this appeal: whether defendant received effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing. Since the facts at trial were adequately set forth in the opinion of this court in defendant’s first direct appeal, we will repeat only those facts necessary to this appeal.

The evidence adduced at trial is as follows. The defendant gave a detailed confession of his guilt, which was admitted at the original trial. In his confession, the defendant told how he and his three companions abducted three victims, one of whom allegedly was a member of a rival gang. In defendant’s confession, he admitted that he personally stabbed and cut the throat of one of the victims. Extensive physical and forensic evidence corroborated many of the details of the confession. At the trial, defendant testified in his own behalf, repudiating his confession saying that it was extracted by the use of force.

At the evidentiary hearing on June 19, 1990, it was revealed that several witnesses stated that they would have testified on behalf of the defendant at the mitigation stage of the sentencing hearing. Five of the 12 witnesses were staff members of Inter City Impact (ICI), William Dillon, Donald Gillaspie, Tina Jakus, Grace Constable, and Wayne Gropp. Two were members of defendant’s family. Only two witnesses at the evidentiary hearing testified at the trial, Frank Blatnick and Shirley Gibbons. The remaining three witnesses were Reverend Douglas Moore and his wife, Connie Moore, and Akim Gursel, defendant’s trial counsel. Defendant presented those 12 witnesses. The State presented no evidence.

Defendant’s counsel, at the evidentiary hearing, argued that defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing because trial counsel failed “to introduce the mitigating testimony of several potential witnesses solely because they were not categorically opposed to the death penalty in all situations” and “failed to contact or investigate other mitigation witnesses who were suggested by defendant’s family and who could have attested to defendant’s background and character.” The testimony at the hearing revealed the following facts.

The first witness to testify was Reverend Douglas Moore, who was at that, time pastor of the First Evangelical Free Church of Los Angeles. He first met defendant and his family in 1974 while he was pastor at another church called the Salem Evangelical Free Church Hispanic congregation. He was pastor at the Salem Church from 1974 to 1982.

Reverend Moore visited with defendant at the jail from the time defendant was arrested until the time of the trial. He visited at least once a month. He had “fairly” extensive discussions relating to matters about the Bible, God and family. During those visits, Reverend Moore was impressed with defendant’s gentle demeanor. Defendant was always very respectful and caring. Defendant would always ask about family. Reverend Moore stated that defendant was a follower.

Reverend Moore attended every day of the trial because he believed that his role was to be aware of what was happening and to communicate to defendant’s family, especially defendant’s mother, who did not understand English.

Reverend Moore met defendant’s trial attorney, Akim Gursel, at the trial. He would talk to counsel during breaks at the trial. He explained to Gursel his relationship to defendant and his family. Gursel only talked to him about testifying at the sentencing hearing on the date defendant was found guilty. The next couple of days, they talked about what needed to be done. A meeting was called on the Sunday following the conviction, which was on a Friday, at Reverend Moore’s home. The following Monday, the court scheduled the sentencing hearing.

At the meeting, approximately 10 to 12 people were in attendance. Gursel explained at the meeting what was going to happen the next day and the need to have character witnesses. However, he did not recall Gursel’s discussing any strategy. He recalled that Gursel did ask opinions on the death penalty. Gursel did not ask him directly about his opinion, but he gave it anyway. Reverend Moore stated that the death penalty was appropriate for people in the Mafia and for premeditated and multiple murders, but he did not believe that it was appropriate for defendant. Reverend Moore stated that he offered to testify, but Gursel said he could not be used because he would be giving a pastoral blessing to the jury to allow it to give the death sentence to defendant.

Reverend Moore also recalled a conversation with defendant’s older brother, Jose.

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Related

People v. Caballero
2022 IL App (1st) 181747-U (Appellate Court of Illinois, 2022)
United States ex rel. Caballero v. Hardy
837 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Illinois, 2011)
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732 N.E.2d 553 (Illinois Supreme Court, 2000)
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719 N.E.2d 681 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1999)
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688 N.E.2d 658 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1997)
People v. Ashford
660 N.E.2d 944 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1995)
People v. Orange
659 N.E.2d 935 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1995)
People v. Coleman
660 N.E.2d 919 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1995)
People v. Hood
634 N.E.2d 404 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1994)
People v. Goldsmith
630 N.E.2d 1259 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1994)
People v. McDaniel
619 N.E.2d 214 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1993)
People v. Park
615 N.E.2d 753 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
604 N.E.2d 913, 152 Ill. 2d 347, 178 Ill. Dec. 390, 1992 Ill. LEXIS 142, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-caballero-ill-1992.