2024 IL App (5th) 220338-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 07/22/24. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-22-0338 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. ) v. ) No. 21-CF-1692 ) JOSHUA E. BURTON, ) Honorable ) Robert B. Haida, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Vaughan and Justice Boie concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We reverse the circuit court’s judgment denying defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence where the police officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop beyond its mission without reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant committed, or was about to commit, a crime.
¶2 After the St. Clair County circuit court denied a motion to quash arrest and suppress
evidence filed by defendant, Joshua E. Burton, the case proceeded to a stipulated bench trial and
defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver (720
ILCS 646/55(a)(1) (West 2020)), a Class X felony. Defendant appeals, arguing that his stipulated
bench trial amounted to a negotiated guilty plea and that the circuit court failed to admonish him
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 402 (eff. July 1, 2012) and 605(c) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001).
Defendant also argues that the court erred by denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress
1 evidence. We reverse the court’s judgment denying defendant’s motion to quash arrest and
suppress evidence.
¶3 I. Background
¶4 On May 2, 2021, an officer with the O’Fallon Police Department arrested defendant after
a traffic stop led to the discovery of methamphetamine in a rental vehicle driven by his girlfriend,
Season Schrader. Defendant was a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the traffic stop. The
traffic stop was recorded on a patrol car dashboard monitor, along with the body cameras of two
police officers. Thereafter, the State charged defendant by information with unlawful possession
with the intent to deliver between 100 and 500 grams of methamphetamine.
¶5 On February 11, 2022, defendant filed a pro se motion to quash arrest and suppress
evidence, alleging that law enforcement unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop without
justification on May 2, 2021. Defendant also filed a pro se motion requesting that the circuit court
allow him to proceed pro se on February 28, 2022, which the circuit court granted on March 14,
2022.
¶6 On April 19, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to quash arrest
and suppress evidence. At the hearing, Officer Brett Johnson testified that he began watching the
rental vehicle because it was parked in front of a hotel known for criminal activity. Officer Johnson
noticed that the rental vehicle had “some significant, obvious damage that would normally be taken
care of.” Officer Johnson found the damage on the rental vehicle suspicious. Officer Johnson noted
that rental vehicle damage could indicate that the vehicle had not been returned in a timely manner.
Officer Johnson noted that rentals were commonly used for criminal activity because the person
driving the vehicle did not want their own vehicle towed in the event of an arrest.
2 ¶7 Officer Johnson testified that when he began following the rental vehicle, he observed
defendant driving and Schrader sitting in the passenger seat. Defendant looked at Officer Johnson
in the rearview mirror. Defendant pulled into a gas station, where both defendant and Schrader
exited the vehicle and briefly entered the store. When they returned to the vehicle, Schrader entered
the driver side and defendant entered the passenger side. Officer Johnson found it “odd” that
defendant and Schrader switched seats.
¶8 Officer Johnson testified that he observed Schrader drive the vehicle near a house known
for drug activity. Shortly thereafter, Officer Johnson observed Schrader commit two traffic
infractions. He first observed her surpassing the stop line for a stop sign at an intersection. Officer
Johnson then began recording with his dash camera. He next observed Schrader failing to signal
within 100 feet of an intersection. When Schrader pulled into a different gas station, Officer
Johnson initiated a traffic stop.
¶9 Officer Johnson testified that he observed “some odd behavior” between defendant and
Schrader when he first made contact and obtained some basic information. Officer Johnson noted
that defendant appeared calm, while Schrader appeared nervous and “very shaky.” Officer Johnson
later acknowledged that the behavior he observed was “somewhat normal” for a traffic stop.
Officer Johnson returned to his patrol car and called for another unit. Officer Johnson learned that
Schrader had a valid license with no warrants, while defendant had a revoked driver’s license and
was on parole. Officer Johnson could not “recall what he was on parole for.” Officer Johnson
explained that dispatch “had some what’s called highlights, kind of basic history of his arrests.”
Officer Johnson agreed that he received this information approximately six minutes into the stop.
Officer Johnson agreed that he had all of the information he needed to write warning tickets after
he heard from dispatch, but he could not recall if he began working on the tickets at that point in
3 time. Officer Johnson testified that he could write warning tickets for the traffic infractions he
observed in five to seven minutes.
¶ 10 Officer Johnson testified that he did not place defendant under arrest after learning
defendant’s license was revoked because he wanted to “alleviate tensions” and obtain “further
cooperation.” Officer Johnson testified that he intended to arrest defendant for driving on a revoked
license. When asked if defendant was free to leave at that point, Officer Johnson responded, “He
was not.”
¶ 11 Officer Johnson testified that after “Officer Luttrell” 1 arrived on the scene, Officer Johnson
made an unsuccessful attempt to contact the rental company that owned the vehicle “to determine
who was the legal driver of the vehicle or the agreed upon driver.” Defendant advised that “another
female had rented [the vehicle] to him,” but defendant could not provide the rental agreement.
Officer Johnson did not know if Schrader or defendant were authorized drivers of the vehicle, but
he acknowledged that it was not a crime for an unauthorized driver to drive a rental vehicle in
Illinois. Officer Johnson also acknowledged that he ran the vehicle’s registration through dispatch
and “[i]t came back clear.” Officer Johnson returned to his vehicle and requested a canine sniff for
the rental vehicle; however, the nearest available canine unit was located in Caseyville, Illinois.
¶ 12 Officer Johnson testified that he next asked Schrader to step out of the vehicle for
questioning. When Officer Johnson asked her where they were going, she replied that she did not
know. Officer Johnson did not recall Schrader advising that they were traveling to defendant’s
brother’s home. When Officer Johnson asked her how she knew defendant, she paused for a brief
period before stating that the two were dating. Schrader advised that she worked for defendant.
1 Officer Luttrell’s full name is not contained in the record on appeal. 4 When Officer Johnson asked if there was anything illegal in the vehicle, Schrader looked into the
vehicle and responded in the negative.
¶ 13 Officer Johnson testified that he asked defendant the same questions he asked Schrader.
Defendant advised that he was in town looking for work. Defendant’s response seemed odd to
Officer Johnson because it was unclear how Schrader could work for defendant if he did not have
job. Defendant also advised that they were on their way to “Troy” to see his brother. Defendant
denied that there was anything illegal in the vehicle. Officer Johnson asked defendant to step out
of the vehicle before the canine unit arrived.
¶ 14 When asked why he began questioning Schrader and defendant, Officer Johnson responded
that he believed Schrader and defendant “had some sort of criminal element to [their] vehicle.”
Officer Johnson believed Schrader and defendant “were trying to avoid [him] due to [his] presence
and [their] reaction to [his] presence, and [he] believed there was some sort of contraband within
[their] vehicle.” When asked what specific facts led him to believe defendant and Schrader were
carrying contraband, Officer Johnson responded, “It’s kind of a totality of everything. It’s—not
only is it your driving behavior and your reaction to seeing me initially and what you did at the
gas stations and pulling into the neighborhoods, but also your body language.” Officer Johnson
also noted that Schrader and defendant’s “stories were off on certain aspects.”
¶ 15 When asked why he waited 17 minutes to call the canine unit, Officer Johnson responded
that it was not “a normal traffic stop.” Officer Johnson testified that he was “building [his]
reasonable suspicion.” Officer Johnson believed he had built enough reasonable suspicion to call
a canine unit 17 minutes into the stop. Officer Johnson clarified that he was investigating
contraband at that point in the stop. However, he wrote Schrader traffic tickets and was explaining
5 the tickets to Schrader when the canine unit arrived. Officer Johnson denied that he stalled in
writing Schrader tickets.
¶ 16 Officer Johnson testified that when the canine unit arrived, the dog immediately alerted to
the front passenger door of the rental vehicle. Officer Johnson searched that area of the vehicle
and recovered a bag of suspected methamphetamine. Thereafter, Officer Johnson placed defendant
under arrest. Defendant stated that the methamphetamine belonged to him. Officer Johnson
estimated that 20 to 25 minutes elapsed from the time he stopped the vehicle to the time he searched
the vehicle.
¶ 17 Defendant next testified at the hearing. Defendant agreed that Schrader committed traffic
infractions, but he believed that Officer Johnson “exceeded the scope of the stop.” According to
defendant, Officer Johnson “should have been working on the traffic tickets.” Defendant noted
that the traffic stop began at approximately 2:08 p.m. and that Schrader was “cleared” by dispatch
at approximately 2:15 p.m. After Schrader was cleared, Officer Johnson attempted to contact the
rental company to check the status of the rental vehicle for seven to eight minutes. Defendant
believed that Officer Johnson turned the investigation to drugs when he was unable to contact the
rental company. Defendant claimed that he and Schrader provided the same responses to Officer
Johnson’s questions. Defendant noted that Officer Johnson called the canine unit at 2:25 p.m.—
17 minutes after he initiated the traffic stop. The canine unit arrived and alerted at 2:41 p.m. or
2:42 p.m.—33 or 34 minutes after Officer Johnson initiated the stop. According to defendant,
Officer Johnson advised that he was not arresting defendant for driving on a revoked license.
¶ 18 Defendant also submitted, and the circuit court admitted into evidence, the dash camera
footage from Officer Johnson’s patrol car, as well as the body camera footage from both Officers
Johnson and Luttrell. The footage confirmed that the traffic stop lasted approximately 34 minutes.
6 The video footage also confirmed the following: the traffic stop commenced at approximately 2:08
p.m.; dispatch advised Officer Johnson of the status of Schrader and defendant’s driver’s licenses
at approximately 2:15 p.m.; Officer Johnson began attempts to contact the rental company at 2:15
p.m.; Officer Johnson ceased his efforts to contact the rental company at 2:24 p.m.; Officer
Johnson called for a canine unit at 2:25 p.m.; Officer Johnson asked Schrader to get out of the
vehicle and began questioning her at 2:26 p.m.; Officer Johnson asked defendant to get out of the
vehicle and began questioning him at 2:29 p.m.; Officer Johnson indicated that he was not going
to write defendant a ticket for driving with a revoked license; both defendant and Schrader advised
Officer Johnson that they were traveling to defendant’s brother’s home; defendant stepped out of
the vehicle and Officer Johnson frisked defendant at 2:32 p.m.; Officer Johnson began writing
Schrader warning tickets at 2:35 p.m.; Officer Johnson completed the warning tickets at
approximately 2:38 p.m.; Officer Johnson explained the tickets to Schrader at 2:39 p.m.; the canine
unit arrived at 2:41 p.m.; and the dog alerted on the vehicle at 2:42 p.m.
¶ 19 After presenting evidence, defendant argued that Officer Johnson abandoned the scope of
the traffic stop when he called the rental company and called for a canine unit. Defendant asserted
that Officer Johnson prolonged the mission of the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion for a
drug investigation. Defendant, relying on Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015),
asserted that the prolonged stop became an illegal seizure and that the circuit court should suppress
the resulting evidence.
¶ 20 The State argued that Officer Johnson intended to arrest defendant for driving on a revoked
license but did not do so immediately to gain defendant’s cooperation in further investigation. The
circuit court interjected and stated, “But watching the video, I get an impression that the officer
had not decided to charge him.” The court also noted that defendant was not ultimately charged
7 with driving with a revoked license. The State responded, “All I can go by is what the officer told
me prior to the hearing and what he testified to on the stand, Judge.” The State argued that this
was “a search incident to arrest” not a prolonged stop. The court agreed that “a search incident to
arrest is almost unimpeachable” but noted that it appeared to be “a search after a canine hit,” not a
search incident to arrest. The State also argued that Officer Johnson had reasonable suspicion to
prolong the traffic stop, where the rental vehicle had damage, the vehicle was in “a high drug area,”
the inconsistent stories between defendant and Schrader, and Officer Johnson’s knowledge of
defendant’s prior drug convictions.2 Following the hearing, the circuit court took the matter under
advisement.
¶ 21 On April 25, 2022, the circuit court entered an order denying defendant’s motion to quash
arrest and suppress evidence. The court found the following facts supported Officer Johnson’s
detention of defendant for the arrival of a canine unit to conduct “an open-air sniff” of the vehicle
defendant occupied: law enforcement observed defendant driving the rental vehicle when his
driving privileges were suspended or revoked and he switched positions with Schrader under
circumstances that suggested he was aware of police presence; the vehicle was a rental car with
incomplete or non-existent documentation to show that defendant had the right to possess the
vehicle; and the vehicle had exterior damage indicating to Officer Johnson that the vehicle was in
defendant’s possession for a lengthy period of time.
¶ 22 On May 5, 2022, defendant filed a pro se motion to reconsider the circuit court’s order
denying the motion to suppress. Defendant urged the court to review the dash and body camera
footage.
2 Officer Johnson did not specifically testify that he considered defendant’s prior drug convictions in forming his reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for a drug investigation. 8 ¶ 23 On May 11, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to reconsider and
took the matter under advisement. At a hearing held on May 19, 2022, the court denied the motion
to reconsider. After denying the motion, the court stated, “So I’d like to know if we’re going to set
the case for trial; if so, when, if you need more time to think about it.” Defendant, proceeding
pro se, expressed a desire to meet with the State. The court scheduled a meeting between defendant
and the State. Defendant then stated that he would “like to get it wrapped up as soon as possible.
If we can come to an agreement, could we do a stipulated bench trial that day or how does that
work?” The court directed defendant to discuss the matter with the State and asked if defendant
wanted to preserve his right to appeal. Defendant responded, “Yes.”
¶ 24 On May 23, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing. The court inquired about the status of
the “plea negotiations.” The State responded, “The agreement is that [defendant] will be sentenced
to 12 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections on the charge as filed. But instead of doing a
plea, he is requesting and the State is agreeing to do a stipulated bench trial on the matter.” The
following colloquy then took place between the court and pro se defendant:
“THE COURT: In other words, [defendant], [the State] will give a factual basis.
And if this goes through, you’re stipulating that if the evidence was presented that it would
be sufficient to find you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
DEFENDANT BURTON: Yes.
THE COURT: And you preserve your right to appeal the Court’s ruling on the 4th
Amendment issue.
DEFENDANT BURTON: Yes.”
¶ 25 The circuit court then advised defendant that he was charged with unlawful possession with
intent to deliver methamphetamine, a nonprobationable Class X felony that carried a sentencing
9 range of 6 to 40 years in prison followed by 3 years of mandatory supervised release. Defendant
indicated that he understood. The court next advised defendant that he did not “have to plead
guilty” and that he had “a right to a trial.” The court advised that “the State would have the burden
of calling witnesses to testify” and defendant would have the right to cross-examine the State’s
witnesses. The court further advised that defendant had the right to call witnesses and to testify on
his own behalf. When the court asked if defendant had any questions about his “trial rights,”
defendant responded, “No, sir.” The court then stated, “And if you stipulate at this bench trial that
the State has sufficient facts to convict you of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then there’s
not going to be a trial.” Defendant indicated that he understood. When the court asked if anyone
forced defendant to proceed by way of stipulated bench trial, defendant responded, “No, sir.” When
the court asked if defendant felt “that the stipulated bench trial and the admission by [him] that the
State ha[d] sufficient evidence [was] the best way to proceed,” defendant responded, “I do, sir.”
¶ 26 The State then presented a factual basis, which included facts similar to those presented at
the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress. The State indicated that its evidence would include
the dash and body camera video footage. The State and defendant stipulated that the time between
the traffic stop and the search was approximately 30 minutes. The following colloquy then took
place between the circuit court and defendant:
“THE COURT: All right. The record at the motion hearing is also—will be part of
the record also. So that’s there. And you preserved your 4th Amendment argument—
DEFENDANT BURTON: Okay.
THE COURT: —in that regard—
DEFENDANT BURTON: Then I’m fine with stipulating that.
10 THE COURT: —and by this proceeding. So, sir, now, with that clarification, you
are stipulating that if this was presented to a trier of fact that there would be a finding of
guilty?
DEFENDANT BURTON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Very well. And you’re preserving your right to appeal the
4th Amendment issue.
THE COURT: Very well. Based upon that, I will accept the stipulation and
[defendant’s] agreement with the fact that the State could provide a burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt on the charge as alleged in the Criminal Information and based upon
that make a finding of guilty to the Class X felony of possession with intent to deliver
methamphetamine.”
¶ 27 Defendant waived his right to a presentence investigation, and the circuit court sentenced
him to 12 years in prison in accordance with the parties’ agreement. The court advised defendant
that he had 30 days to file his notice of appeal. The court further stated, “So don’t lose track of
that. That’s the whole reason we did the stipulated bench trial was for you to proceed with that.”
The court advised that counsel would be appointed for defendant after he filed a notice of appeal.
Defendant asked for assistance in filing the notice of appeal and defendant was provided a notice
of appeal form. Defendant stated that he had no additional questions.
¶ 28 On May 31, 2022, defendant filed a pro se motion for new trial, arguing that the circuit
court erred by denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The court denied the
motion on June 1, 2022, and again admonished defendant of his appeal rights.
11 ¶ 29 Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and the Office of the State Appellate Defender
was appointed to represent him on appeal.
¶ 30 II. Analysis
¶ 31 On appeal, defendant raises two issues. First, he argues that his stipulated bench trial was
tantamount to a guilty plea, and that the circuit court failed to substantially comply with Illinois
Supreme Court Rules 402 and 605. Second, defendant argues that the court erred by denying his
motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. We address his arguments in turn.
¶ 32 We first consider whether defendant’s stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty
plea. “The question of whether a defendant’s stipulated bench trial is tantamount to a guilty plea
is a question of law subject to de novo review.” People v. Weaver, 2013 IL App (3d) 130054, ¶ 17
(citing People v. Horton, 143 Ill. 2d 11 (1991)). Generally, “[a] guilty plea forfeits all
nonjurisdictional defenses or defects.” Id. (citing Horton, 143 Ill. 2d at 22); see also People v.
Mueller, 2013 IL App (5th) 120566, ¶ 19. “On the other hand, a stipulated bench trial allows a
defendant to avoid the forfeiture rule as to an issue the defendant seeks to raise on appeal, while
still allowing the defendant to enjoy the advantages of a guilty plea.” Weaver, 2013 IL App (3d)
130054, ¶ 17 (citing People v. Thompson, 404 Ill. App. 3d 265 (2010)).
¶ 33 Our supreme court has held that “a stipulation is tantamount to a guilty plea when one of
two conditions is met: (1) the State presents its entire case by stipulation and defendant fails to
preserve a defense; or (2) the stipulation concedes that the evidence is sufficient to support a guilty
verdict.” (Emphases in original.) People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 324 (2010). In other words,
“[i]f the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant, it
is tantamount to a guilty plea regardless of whether a defense was presented or preserved.”
Mueller, 2013 IL App (5th) 120566, ¶ 13.
12 ¶ 34 Here, the State concedes, and the record confirms, that the parties stipulated that the
evidence was sufficient to convict defendant. Despite stating multiple times that the purpose of the
stipulated bench trial was to preserve review of defendant’s fourth amendment issue, the court
stated that defendant was “stipulating that if the evidence was presented that it would be sufficient
to find [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court also stated, “And if you stipulate at this
bench trial that the State has sufficient facts to convict you of this offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, then there’s not going to be a trial.” When the court asked if defendant felt “that the
stipulated bench trial and the admission by [him] that the State ha[d] sufficient evidence [was] the
best way to proceed,” defendant responded, “I do, sir.” The court also asked defendant if he was
“stipulating that if this [evidence] was presented to a trier of fact that there would be a finding of
guilty,” and defendant responded in the affirmative. Accordingly, throughout the hearing, the court
stated, and defendant agreed, that the evidence was sufficient to convict him. Under these
circumstances, and the current state of legal precedent, we agree that defendant’s stipulated bench
trial was tantamount to a guilty plea. See id. ¶ 18 (holding that the defendant’s stipulation that the
evidence was sufficient to convict him was tantamount to a guilty plea despite the circuit court’s
acknowledgment that the purpose of the proceeding was to preserve the defendant’s right to appeal
certain issues).
¶ 35 We acknowledge that in Mueller this court concluded that a defendant waives all
nonjurisdictional issues when he pleads guilty. Id. ¶ 19. In Mueller, this court found that the
defendant’s stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty plea and declined to address the
defendant’s independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred
prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Id. ¶¶ 18, 19. This court, citing People v. Gonzalez, 313 Ill.
App. 3d 607, 618 (2000), noted that if the wrong language was used in a stipulated bench trial and
13 the trial became tantamount to a guilty plea, “the very issue sought to be preserved is foreclosed.”
Mueller, 2013 IL App (5th) 120566, ¶ 17.
¶ 36 Under the circumstances of the present case, we do not find the reasoning of Mueller
applicable. We, instead, follow the Second District’s more recent decision in People v. Villarreal,
2022 IL App (2d) 200077. In Villarreal, the Second District acknowledged its prior decision in
Gonzalez, in which it interpreted Horton and stated that “ ‘[i]f counsel stipulates that the evidence
is sufficient to convict, then the stipulated bench trial mutates into a guilty plea and the suppression
issues are waived on appeal.’ ” Id. ¶ 17 (quoting Gonzalez, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 617). The Second
District concluded that the Gonzalez court misread Horton and, instead, “read Horton to hold that
preservation of a defense in a stipulated bench trial is not affected by a stipulation that the evidence
is sufficient to convict.” Id. ¶ 18. Accordingly, the Second District declined to follow its own
decision in Gonzalez—a case this court relied on in Mueller. In doing so, the Second District
reasoned as follows:
“We emphasize that here defendant was twice told that proceeding with a stipulated bench
trial would preserve her right to appeal the ruling on the motion to suppress. As such, it
would be manifestly unfair to deprive defendant of review of that issue, particularly where
the State and defendant negotiated for and ultimately agreed to the stipulated bench trial
process.” Id. (citing People v. Cordero, 358 Ill. App. 3d 121, 124 (2005)).
¶ 37 Similarly, here, the circuit court repeatedly advised defendant, who was proceeding pro se,
that proceeding by way of a stipulated bench trial would preserve his right to appeal the court’s
denial of his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. At the hearing, the court confirmed
that defendant wanted to proceed by way of stipulated bench trial and that defendant would
“preserve [his] right to appeal the Court’s ruling on the 4th Amendment issue.” Later at the hearing,
14 the court again told defendant that he “preserved [his] 4th Amendment argument” by proceeding
by way of a stipulated bench trial. Before accepting the stipulation, the court again stated, “And
you’re preserving your right to appeal the 4th Amendment issue.” On each occasion, defendant
confirmed his understanding that he was proceeding in such a manner to preserve his right to
appeal the fourth amendment issue. Under these circumstances, we decline to follow Mueller and
find that it would be manifestly unfair to deprive defendant of review of the fourth amendment
issue.
¶ 38 Before we address the fourth amendment issue, we consider defendant’s argument that the
circuit court failed to comply with the requirements of Rules 402 and 605. We reject defendant’s
contention that the court failed to substantially comply with Rule 402. Rule 402 requires certain
admonitions “[i]n hearings on pleas of guilty, or in any case in which the defense offers to stipulate
that the evidence is sufficient to convict” (Ill. S. Ct. R. 402 (eff. July 1, 2012)). In such cases, the
circuit court is required to address the defendant personally in open court and inform him or her
of and determine his or her understanding of the following: (1) the nature of the charge; (2) the
minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law; (3) that the defendant has the right to plead
not guilty, to persist in that plea if it has already been made, or to plead guilty; and (4) that if he or
she pleads guilty there will not be a trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty he or she waives
the right to a trial by jury and the right to be confronted by witnesses against him or her; or that by
stipulating the evidence is sufficient to convict, he or she waives the right to a trial by jury and the
right to be confronted with any witnesses against him or who have not testified.
¶ 39 Here, defendant concedes that the circuit court complied with Rule 402 “in some ways.”
Notably, defendant does not argue that the court failed to admonish him of the nature of the charge
or the minimum and maximum sentence. Defendant acknowledges that the circuit court advised
15 defendant that he had “a right to a trial” and the right to plead not guilty. However, defendant
claims that the court failed to specify that he was giving up his right to a jury trial, and that he had
the right to plead not guilty and to continue pleading not guilty throughout the proceedings.
¶ 40 We find the circuit court’s statement that defendant had “a right to a trial” sufficient to
comply with the Rule. We do not find defendant’s claim that he “may not have known he had a
right to a jury trial” persuasive. At the hearing on May 11, 2022, the court asked defendant if the
matter needed to be set for trial. Defendant expressed a desire to talk with the State and proceed
by way of a stipulated bench trial. At the hearing on May 23, 2022, defendant clearly stated his
intention to proceed by way of a stipulated bench trial to preserve his right to appeal the fourth
amendment issue. When asked if he had any questions about his “trial rights,” defendant
responded, “No, sir.” The court then stated that if defendant proceeded by way of a stipulated
bench trial, there would not be a trial. Defendant indicated that he understood.
¶ 41 The court further advised defendant that he had the right to plead not guilty. The court also
advised that the State had the burden of calling witnesses to testify at trial and that defendant would
have the right to cross-examine each witness. The court advised that defendant had the right to call
witnesses and the right to testify in his own defense. The court clarified that the State had the
burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then stated that if
defendant proceeded by way of a stipulated bench trial, there would not be a trial. Defendant
indicated that he understood. In our view, the court substantially complied with the requirements
that the court confirm defendant’s understanding that he had the right to a jury trial and that he had
the right to plead not guilty or to persist in a not guilty plea. Thus, we reject defendant’s assertion
that the circuit court failed to substantially comply with Rule 402.
16 ¶ 42 We also reject defendant’s assertion that this court must remand the matter back to the
circuit court for compliance with Rule 605(c). Rule 605(c) requires that the circuit court, in all
cases in which a judgment is entered on a negotiated guilty plea, advise the defendant of the
following: (1) that the defendant has the right to appeal; (2) that prior to taking an appeal, the
defendant must file a written motion to vacate the judgment and for leave to withdraw the guilty
plea within 30 days of the date on which the sentence was imposed; (3) that if the motion is
allowed, the guilty plea, sentence, and judgment will be vacated and a trial date will be set on the
charges; (4) that the State may request to reinstate any charges that were dismissed as part of the
plea agreement; (5) that if defendant is indigent, a copy of the transcript of the proceedings at the
time of the defendant’s plea of guilty and sentence will be provided without cost to the defendant
and counsel will be appointed to assist the defendant in preparing the motions; and (6) that in any
appeal taken from the judgment on the plea of guilty any issue or claim of error not raised in the
motion to vacate the judgment and to withdraw guilty plea shall be deemed waived.
¶ 43 We find the Third District’s decision in Weaver, 2013 IL App (3d) 130054, instructive. In
Weaver, the Third District considered whether a defendant whose stipulated bench trial was
tantamount to a guilty plea was required to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea before filing
his appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2006). 2013 IL App (3d)
130054, ¶ 16. The Third District acknowledged that Rule 604(d) required “that before a defendant
may appeal from a guilty plea, he must file a motion in the trial court to withdraw his guilty plea
and vacate the judgment within 30 days of the date sentence is imposed.” Id. ¶ 20. The Third
District noted that “[a]ny issue not raised in the motion to withdraw the plea is deemed forfeited,”
that “[c]ompliance with Rule 604(d) is a condition precedent to an appeal,” and that the appellate
court must dismiss the appeal if a defendant fails to meet this requirement. Id. (citing Ill. S. Ct. R.
17 604(d); People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291 (2003)). The Third District concluded that “categorizing
the proceeding as a stipulated bench trial ‘tantamount to a guilty plea’ for purposes of Rule 402”
did not render the defendant’s guilty plea subject to Rule 604(d). Id. ¶ 22.
¶ 44 In support, the Third District noted that Rule 402 contained express language pertaining to
a stipulation of guilt, making that rule applicable to stipulated bench trials that were tantamount to
guilty pleas. Id. ¶ 23. The Third District noted, however, that:
“[A] stipulated bench trial tantamount to a guilty plea is still a stipulated bench trial. It
allows a defendant to avoid the forfeiture rule as to an issue that he or she seeks to preserve
for appeal but take advantage of the benefits of a guilty plea. [Citation.] Thus, while it may
be similar to a guilty plea, it is not actually a guilty plea subject to Rule 604(d).” Id.
¶ 45 As noted, here, the parties and the circuit court clearly intended to proceed by way of a
stipulated bench trial. The court substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 402, which
apply to stipulated bench trials. As the Third District noted in Weaver, “a stipulated bench trial
tantamount to a guilty plea is still a stipulated bench trial.” As a result, it is our view that the court
was not required to comply with the requirements of Rule 605(c), which apply to negotiated guilty
pleas. Moreover, defendant was not prejudiced by the court’s failure to comply with Rule 605(c),
where this court has concluded that he has not forfeited review of the fourth amendment issue.
Thus, we reject defendant’s assertion that this court must remand the matter back to the court for
compliance with Rule 605(c).
¶ 46 We now turn to defendant’s argument that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to
quash arrest and suppress evidence. This court reviews a circuit court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress evidence under a two-part standard of review. People v. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222, 230
(2008). The circuit court’s findings of fact are entitled to deference and will be reversed only if
18 they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. However, the circuit court’s ultimate
ruling as to whether suppression is warranted is reviewed de novo. Id.
¶ 47 The purpose of the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amend. IV) and article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6) is to
protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. Evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment is subject to suppression under the “ ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ ” doctrine.
People v. Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 66 (quoting People v. Ferris, 2014 IL App (4th)
130657, ¶ 66). A traffic stop is a seizure of an individual, and if the seizure violates the fourth
amendment, any evidence obtained by exploiting that violation is suppressible. Id.
¶ 48 “When a police officer sees a driver commit a traffic violation, the fourth amendment
allows the officer to briefly detain the driver to investigate the violation.” Id. ¶ 67 (citing People
v. Ramsey, 362 Ill. App. 3d 610, 614 (2005)). Here, defendant conceded that Schrader committed
two traffic infractions and that Officer Johnson had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop. Thus,
the initial traffic stop was a reasonable seizure.
¶ 49 “Although a police officer may stop and briefly detain a motorist when the officer has seen
the motorist commit a traffic offense, the traffic stop can become an unreasonable seizure ‘if it is
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to satisfy its initial purpose.’ ” Id. ¶ 68 (quoting
People v. Heritsch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151157, ¶ 9). Because there is no bright-line rule setting for
the appropriate length of a traffic stop, courts “employ a contextual, totality of the circumstances
analysis that includes consideration of the brevity of the stop and whether the police acted
diligently during the stop.” People v. Baldwin, 388 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1034 (2009).
¶ 50 “ ‘[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by
the seizure’s “mission”—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop.’ ” Thomas, 2018
19 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 68 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)).
“ ‘Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably
should have been—completed.’ ” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354). In addition to
determining whether to issue a traffic citation, an officer’s mission includes ordinary questions
incident to the traffic stop, including checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are
outstanding warrants, and inspecting the vehicle’s registration and proof of insurance. Rodriguez,
575 U.S. at 355. Such checks ensure that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.
Id.
¶ 51 While the fourth amendment tolerates certain unrelated investigations that do not lengthen
the roadside detention, a traffic stop may “ ‘become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Id. at 354-55 (quoting
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). There must be evidence that, but for the activities
unrelated to the mission of the stop, such as a dog sniff, the officer would have finished writing
the defendant’s traffic citation before drugs were detected in the defendant’s vehicle. Heritsch,
2017 IL App (2d) 151157, ¶ 16 (citing People v. Reedy, 2015 IL App (3d) 130955, ¶ 32).
¶ 52 Here, as an initial matter, we note the circuit court found, and the body camera footage
confirms, that Officer Johnson repeatedly indicated to defendant that he would not issue a citation
to defendant for driving with a revoked license. Moreover, Officer Johnson did not issue a citation
to defendant for driving with a revoked license and the State never charged defendant with this
offense. Accordingly, we agree with the circuit court that the evidence in this case indicated that
the issue was whether there was a prolonged traffic stop, not a search incident to arrest.
¶ 53 Moreover, Officer Johnson did not act diligently in writing tickets for the traffic infractions
he observed Schrader commit. Officer Johnson testified that it would have taken him five to seven
20 minutes to write tickets for the traffic infractions he observed. The dash camera footage indicates
that dispatch advised Officer Johnson of the status of Schrader and defendant’s driver’s licenses
at approximately 2:15 p.m.—approximately seven minutes after he initiated the traffic stop.
Officer Johnson did not begin writing the warning tickets at that time. He instead made
unsuccessful attempts to contact the rental company. The dash camera footage confirms that
Officer Johnson searched for the rental company’s phone number until approximately 2:19 p.m.
Officer Johnson then asked defendant for the rental agreement, but defendant was unable to
provide the agreement. Officer Johnson called the rental company at 2:21 p.m. but ceased his
efforts at 2:24 p.m. Officer Johnson called for a canine unit at approximately 2:25 p.m.—17
minutes after he initiated the traffic stop.
¶ 54 Officer Johnson then began questioning defendant and Schrader. It does not appear that
Officer Johnson began writing the warning tickets until Officer Luttrell suggested that he do so at
approximately 2:35 p.m.—27 minutes into the stop. Officer Johnson gave Schrader the warning
tickets at approximately 2:38 p.m.—30 minutes into the stop. In our view, Officer Johnson should
have begun writing the warning tickets at 2:24 p.m., after he was unable to contact the rental
company. The body camera footage demonstrates that it took Officer Johnson three minutes to
write Schrader’s tickets; thus, he should have completed the mission of the traffic stop at
approximately 2:27 p.m. See People v. Sadeq, 2018 IL App (4th) 160105, ¶ 69 (“When deciding
whether a traffic stop is impermissibly prolonged, the focus of the inquiry is on ‘when tasks tied
to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.’ ” (quoting Rodriguez,
575 U.S. at 354)); see also People v. Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d 159, 164 (1995) (affirming the
circuit court’s determination that “a stop of 14, 18 or 20 minutes was too long to write a warning
21 ticket for a minor speeding offense”). Under these circumstances, we find that Officer Johnson
unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop.
¶ 55 Having found that Officer Johnson unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop, we must next
consider whether Officer Johnson’s conduct in prolonging the stop was justified under the fourth
amendment. If an officer discovers specific, articulable facts that give rise to reasonable suspicion
that a defendant has committed, or is about to commit a crime, the officer may broaden the traffic
stop into an investigative detention. People v. Ruffin, 315 Ill. App. 3d 744, 748 (2000) (citing
People v. Stewart, 242 Ill. App. 3d 599 (1993); People v. Hardy, 142 Ill. App. 3d 108 (1986)).
However, “[m]ere hunches and unparticularized suspicions are not enough to justify a broadening
of the stop into an investigatory detention.” Id. (citing People v. Penny, 188 Ill. App. 3d 499
(1989)). Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard that requires consideration of the totality of
the circumstances. People v. Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9.
¶ 56 Here, the evidence did not support a determination that Officer Johnson had objective
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to further detain defendant and Schrader. We
initially note that at the motion hearing, Officer Johnson did not testify that he considered
defendant’s prior drug convictions in forming his reasonable suspicion. Instead, Officer Johnson
testified that it was “kind of a totality of everything,” which caused him to suspect there were drugs
in vehicle. Officer Johnson based his suspicions on defendant’s “driving behavior,” defendant’s
“reaction to seeing [him] initially,” the fact that the vehicle pulled in and out of several gas stations
and neighborhoods, the fact that defendant and Schrader switched seats, and the body language of
Schrader and defendant. Officer Johnson further noted that the vehicle came from an area Officer
Johnson knew to be a high crime area for drug trafficking. In our view, however, this behavior
22 alone was insufficient to demonstrate that Officer Johnson had reasonable suspicion to prolong the
traffic stop.
¶ 57 Officer Johnson also noted that Schrader and defendant’s “stories were off on certain
aspects.” However, the body camera footage indicates that Schrader and defendant provided very
similar stories to Officer Johnson. In addition, we note that much of the information Officer
Johnson gathered occurred during his questioning of defendant and Schrader after he unreasonably
prolonged the traffic stop. It is well settled that information learned after the officer unreasonably
prolonged the traffic stop cannot be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion
existed to prolong the traffic stop. Sadeq, 2018 IL App (4th) 160105, ¶ 87.
¶ 58 Officer Johnson also testified that Schrader appeared nervous, although he later
acknowledged that the behavior he observed was “somewhat normal” for a traffic stop. We also
note that the body camera footage fails to corroborate Officer Johnson’s testimony that Schrader
appeared nervous and “shaky.”
¶ 59 Officer Johnson also observed that the vehicle was a rental car that had damage, which
could indicate that the vehicle was stolen or kept past the agreed upon term. Officer Johnson noted
that defendant was unable to provide the rental agreement for the vehicle. Officer Johnson also
noted that rental cars are often used in criminal activity to avoid having the criminal’s personal car
impounded. However, Officer Johnson was unable to contact the rental company. Officer Johnson
also acknowledged that he ran the vehicle’s registration through dispatch and “[i]t came back
clear,” and that it was not a crime for an unauthorized driver to drive a rental vehicle in Illinois.
Moreover, Officer Johnson’s observation that rental vehicles are commonly used in criminal
activity, standing alone, was insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
in this case.
23 ¶ 60 We conclude that the information Officer Johnson possessed prior to unreasonably
prolonging the traffic stop did not give rise to reasonable suspicion. See People v. Moses, 2023 IL
App (5th) 210115-U, ¶¶ 39, 43 (finding that the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop of
a rental vehicle without a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing where the officer testified
that he had reasonable suspicion based on the following: the defendant changing lanes and slowing
down upon seeing the officer; traffic violations; the defendant’s statement that he had a prior arrest
for drug charges; the defendant’s repeated response of “no” when asked if drugs were in the
vehicle; the defendant’s increased nervousness when asked about cocaine; and the defendant’s
explanation as to why he was carrying $4000); Ruffin, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 750 (finding that the
officer lacked reasonable suspicion based on the defendant’s act of driving a rental car, the
defendant’s nervousness, the fact that the defendant was traveling from California to New York
after visiting Mexico, and inconsistent statements between the defendant and his fiancée about
who had traveled with them); Baldwin, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 1035 (finding that the officer lacked
reasonable suspicion based on the defendant’s nervousness, heavy breathing, hand placement, a
faint odor of alcohol, and the defendant’s act of looking in the direction of the officer and the
driver); Thomas, 2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶¶ 77-93 (holding that the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion based on the defendant’s excessive nervousness, driving two miles under the speed limit,
the defendant’s act of taking an unusual route from Washington to Alabama, the defendant’s
decision to “drive straight through” rather than stopping, evidence of “hard travel,” the defendant’s
decision to drive rather than fly, the lack of luggage, and the defendant’s criminal history for drug
trafficking). In our view, the cases cited above provided even more circumstances that would give
rise to reasonable suspicion than the circumstances of the present case.
24 ¶ 61 We acknowledge that Officer Johnson’s hunch in this case was ultimately correct, where
he discovered a large amount of methamphetamine in the rental vehicle. We appreciate Officer
Johnson’s desire to ensure the safety of the community by removing dangerous drugs from our
streets, but we cannot overlook or condone disregard of the fourth amendment’s protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures of any citizen, innocent or guilty alike. Because
defendant’s fourth amendment rights were violated by the prolonged traffic stop, we conclude that
the circuit court erred by denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.
¶ 62 III. Conclusion
¶ 63 For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment denying defendant’s motion
to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Because the State would not have been able to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendant unlawfully possessed methamphetamine without the suppressed
evidence, we vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence. See People v. Clark, 394 Ill. App. 3d
344, 349-50 (2009).
¶ 64 Reversed.