People v. Bryant

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Bryant

73 A.D.3d 1442, 900 N.Y.S.2d 810

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 7, 2010

StatusPublished

Cited by12 cases

This text of 73 A.D.3d 1442 (People v. Bryant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Bryant, 73 A.D.3d 1442, 900 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010).

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Opinion

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Joseph D. Valentino, J.), rendered February 28, 2007. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of burglary in the first degree, attempted robbery in the first degree, [1443]*1443criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (two counts) and reckless endangerment in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him of, inter alia, burglary in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.30 [1]), defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in admitting certain evidence at trial because it was obtained directly or indirectly in violation of his physician-patient privilege (see CPLR 4504 [a]). We reject that contention. “[E]ven if there was a violation of the physician-patient privilege, the suppression of the evidence found as a result is not required. The physician-patient privilege is based on statute, not the State or Federal Constitution . . . [and] a violation of a statute does not, without more, justify suppressing the evidence to which that violation leads” (People v Greene, 9 NY3d 277, 280 [2007]; see People v Drayton, 56 AD3d 1278, 1278-1279 [2008], appeal dismissed 13 NY3d 902 [2009]). The further contention of defendant that the court improperly limited his cross-examination of a prosecution witness is also without merit. “It is well settled that ‘[t]he scope of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court’ ” (People v Baker, 294 AD2d 888, 889 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 708 [2002]). Here, the record establishes that defendant was given wide latitude in cross-examining the witness in question, and the court limited the cross-examination in merely a single instance that could not have affected the outcome of the trial. Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Peradotto, Lindley and Sconiers, JJ.

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Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Joseph D. Valentino, J.), rendered February 28, 2007. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of burglary in the first degree, attempted robbery in the first degree, [1443]*1443criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (two counts) and reckless endangerment in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him of, inter alia, burglary in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.30 [1]), defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in admitting certain evidence at trial because it was obtained directly or indirectly in violation of his physician-patient privilege (see CPLR 4504 [a]). We reject that contention. “[E]ven if there was a violation of the physician-patient privilege, the suppression of the evidence found as a result is not required. The physician-patient privilege is based on statute, not the State or Federal Constitution . . . [and] a violation of a statute does not, without more, justify suppressing the evidence to which that violation leads” (People v Greene, 9 NY3d 277, 280 [2007]; see People v Drayton, 56 AD3d 1278, 1278-1279 [2008], appeal dismissed 13 NY3d 902 [2009]). The further contention of defendant that the court improperly limited his cross-examination of a prosecution witness is also without merit. “It is well settled that ‘[t]he scope of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court’ ” (People v Baker, 294 AD2d 888, 889 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 708 [2002]). Here, the record establishes that defendant was given wide latitude in cross-examining the witness in question, and the court limited the cross-examination in merely a single instance that could not have affected the outcome of the trial. Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Peradotto, Lindley and Sconiers, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

73 A.D.3d 1442, 900 N.Y.S.2d 810, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-bryant-nyappdiv-2010.

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