People v. Bryan

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Bryan

158 A.D.2d 530, 551 N.Y.S.2d 296, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1759

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 13, 1990

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 158 A.D.2d 530 (People v. Bryan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Bryan, 158 A.D.2d 530, 551 N.Y.S.2d 296, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1759 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990).

Pincite

Opinion

Although the offenses charged in the indictment arose out of two separate robberies, they were properly joined for trial pursuant to CPL 200.20 (2) (c) and the trial court did not improperly exercise its discretion in denying the defendant’s pretrial motion pursuant to CPL 200.20 (3) for severance. The offenses were based on the same statutory provisions (see, CPL 200.20 [2] [c]). The defendant failed to demonstrate that he would be prejudiced by trying the charges together. Nor did the defendant show that he had important testimony to give with respect to one incident and a strong need to refrain from testifying with respect to the charges arising from the second incident (see, People v Lane, 56 NY2d 1; People v Montanez, 149 AD2d 627; People v Telford, 134 AD2d 632).

Equally unavailing is the defendant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion by conducting his trial in absentia. A review of the record indicates that the defendant together with his codefendant was informed of his right to be present at trial and the consequences of failing to appear for trial (see, People v Parker, 57 NY2d 136, 140). Upon the defendant’s failure to appear for trial, the trial court conducted a hearing which revealed that reasonable efforts had been made to locate the defendant without success. Under the circumstances, we find that the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in trying the defendant in absentia (see, People v Parker, supra, at 141).

We also find no merit to the defendant’s argument that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting one of the [531]*531complainants to identify him in court from a single photograph. Because the defendant had absconded prior to trial thereby depriving the complainant of an opportunity to identify him in person, the use of his photograph for identification purposes was proper (see, People v Seabrooks, 120 AD2d 691).

We have examined the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J. P., Lawrence, Kunzeman and Balletta, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Although the offenses charged in the indictment arose out of two separate robberies, they were properly joined for trial pursuant to CPL 200.20 (2) (c) and the trial court did not improperly exercise its discretion in denying the defendant’s pretrial motion pursuant to CPL 200.20 (3) for severance. The offenses were based on the same statutory provisions (see, CPL 200.20 [2] [c]). The defendant failed to demonstrate that he would be prejudiced by trying the charges together. Nor did the defendant show that he had important testimony to give with respect to one incident and a strong need to refrain from testifying with respect to the charges arising from the second incident (see, People v Lane, 56 NY2d 1; People v Montanez, 149 AD2d 627; People v Telford, 134 AD2d 632).

Equally unavailing is the defendant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion by conducting his trial in absentia. A review of the record indicates that the defendant together with his codefendant was informed of his right to be present at trial and the consequences of failing to appear for trial (see, People v Parker, 57 NY2d 136, 140). Upon the defendant’s failure to appear for trial, the trial court conducted a hearing which revealed that reasonable efforts had been made to locate the defendant without success. Under the circumstances, we find that the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in trying the defendant in absentia (see, People v Parker, supra, at 141).

We also find no merit to the defendant’s argument that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting one of the [531]*531complainants to identify him in court from a single photograph. Because the defendant had absconded prior to trial thereby depriving the complainant of an opportunity to identify him in person, the use of his photograph for identification purposes was proper (see, People v Seabrooks, 120 AD2d 691).

We have examined the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J. P., Lawrence, Kunzeman and Balletta, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

158 A.D.2d 530, 551 N.Y.S.2d 296, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1759, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-bryan-nyappdiv-1990.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack