People v. Brown

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Brown

278 A.D. 576, 102 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1951 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3997

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 15, 1951

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 278 A.D. 576 (People v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Brown, 278 A.D. 576, 102 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1951 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3997 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1951).

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Opinion

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court of Orange County, adjudicating him to be a wayward minor. Judgment reversed on the law and the information dismissed. The information charging defendant with being a wayward minor specifies acts on four separate occasions between April 4, 1950, and July 16, 1950. There was no testimony with respect to the occurrence on July 16, 1950. The other acts charged were committed when defendant was under sixteen years of age. The statute (Code Grim, Pro., § 913-a) defines a wayward minor as a person between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one who commits the acts therein specified. In any event, we would reverse and grant a new trial on the ground that this juvenile delinquent of the age of sixteen, giving the answers he did when the court advised him of his right to counsel, did not competently and intelligently waive that right. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458; People ex rel. Sedlak v. Foster, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 477, revd. on other grounds 274 App. Div. 850, affd. 299 N. Y. 291.) Carswell, Acting P. J., Johnston, Adel, Sneed and Wenzel, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court of Orange County, adjudicating him to be a wayward minor. Judgment reversed on the law and the information dismissed. The information charging defendant with being a wayward minor specifies acts on four separate occasions between April 4, 1950, and July 16, 1950. There was no testimony with respect to the occurrence on July 16, 1950. The other acts charged were committed when defendant was under sixteen years of age. The statute (Code Grim, Pro., § 913-a) defines a wayward minor as a person between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one who commits the acts therein specified. In any event, we would reverse and grant a new trial on the ground that this juvenile delinquent of the age of sixteen, giving the answers he did when the court advised him of his right to counsel, did not competently and intelligently waive that right. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458; People ex rel. Sedlak v. Foster, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 477, revd. on other grounds 274 App. Div. 850, affd. 299 N. Y. 291.) Carswell, Acting P. J., Johnston, Adel, Sneed and Wenzel, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

278 A.D. 576, 102 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1951 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3997, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-brown-nyappdiv-1951.

Opinion

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