2021 IL App (1st) 182611-U No. 1-18-2611 Order filed August 19, 2021 Fourth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 12 CR 7098 ) DANIEL BROWN, ) Honorable ) Maura Slattery Boyle, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The summary dismissal of defendant’s pro se postconviction petition is affirmed when it failed to present an arguable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
¶2 Defendant Daniel Brown appeals from the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his pro se
petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1
et seq. (West 2018)). On appeal, defendant contends that the court erroneously dismissed the
petition because it stated an arguable claim that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate No. 1-18-2611
counsel for failure to challenge trial counsel’s deficient performance in preparing a motion to quash
arrest and suppress evidence, and to argue the trial court’s violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule
431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) constituted plain error where the evidence was closely balanced.
We affirm. 1
¶3 Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2012)) and sentenced to 90 years in prison. The facts were detailed in our order
on direct appeal. See People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 142197. We therefore relate only the
facts relevant to the instant appeal.
¶4 Defendant’s arrest arose from the fatal shooting of Eddie Coleman on the evening of March
6, 2012. Defendant then filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence alleging that he was
arrested without a warrant and probable cause.
¶5 At the hearing on the motion, Chicago police detective Donald Hill testified that defendant
was arrested without a warrant on March 21, 2012. Afterwards, he was shown in lineups, and Hill
knew that the State planned to use the results at trial.
¶6 During cross-examination, Hill testified that when he arrived at the scene of the shooting
on March 6, 2012, he learned that Natasha Coleman and Kathleen Coleman witnessed the shooting
and stated that “Nu-Nu” was the shooter.2 Dominique Coleman, who did not witness the shooting,
also knew Nu-Nu. Officers Medina and DeJesus, who were at the crime scene, searched for
Nu-Nu in a police department database and generated a photograph which was shown to
1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order. 2 For clarity, we will refer to the victim and his family members by their first names. Additionally, although defendant’s nickname appears as “Nunu” and “Nu-Nu” in the record, we will use “Nu-Nu” in accordance with our order on direct appeal.
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Dominique. 3 She identified the photograph of Nu-Nu as defendant. Hill and other officers then
created a photographic array containing defendant’s photograph. Approximately three hours after
the shooting, Natasha, and Kathleen each identified defendant in photographic arrays. Hill later
relocated to a liquor store a block from the shooting and obtained a surveillance video that showed
defendant and Eddie conversing. After learning that Eddie died, Hill’s partner issued an
investigative alert for defendant. Defendant was arrested, placed in lineups, and identified by
Natasha, Kathleen and Mablelene Coleman.
¶7 During redirect, Hill acknowledged that Natasha and Kathleen identified the shooter as
Nu-Nu and that Dominique did not witness the shooting. He did not know if the database contained
more than one individual named Nu-Nu. Prior to defendant’s arrest, Hill could not connect
physical evidence from the crime scene to defendant. Nothing prevented Hill from attempting to
obtain an arrest warrant for defendant. During recross, Hill testified that before going to a hospital
with Eddie, Mablelene told Dominique that Nu-Nu was the shooter.
¶8 Trial counsel argued there was no probable cause to arrest defendant based upon two “very
shaky” identifications and no physical evidence. The State replied that Kathleen’s and Natasha’s
identification of defendant as the shooter in separate photographic arrays supported the
investigative alert that led to defendant’s arrest. The trial court denied the motion.
¶9 During jury selection, when the trial court asked the venire if anyone did not understand
and accept that the presumption of innocence was not overcome unless the State proved the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, juror L.L. stated, “I don’t understand.” The trial court
replied, “I’ll get to that in a second. Other than Ms. [L.L.], is there anyone that does not understand
3 The transcript does not include these officers’ first names.
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and accept that principle? Please raise your hand at this time *** no one has raised their hand.”
The court continued to question the venire pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 431(b).
¶ 10 During individual questioning, the trial court asked L.L. about her age, employment,
education, residence, marital status, and whether she, a family member, or close friend had been a
victim of a crime, involved in a criminal case, or a party to a lawsuit. The court asked if she knew
lawyers, judges, or police officers, whether she ever visited anyone detained or incarcerated, and
how she received the news. L.L. responded in English, generally providing one-word answers. She
responded affirmatively when the judge asked whether she would weigh the credibility of
witnesses without regard to their occupations and would listen to all the evidence and apply the
law as instructed in a fair and impartial manner.
¶ 11 Later, in chambers, the trial court stated:
“One preliminary matter. Ms. [L.L.]. While beginning questioning she raised her
hand indicating—she stated that she had trouble understanding English. The Court placed
the same questions to her as every other juror, she answered appropriately. She did not
indicate at any time struggling with anything, so the Court will not strike her for cause.”
¶ 12 Trial counsel did not ask the court to further question L.L. or to excuse her for cause.
Thereafter, a jury was selected.
¶ 13 At trial, Taheerah Abdullah, Eddie’s girlfriend, testified that she and Eddie walked from
the home of Eddie’s Aunt Mablelene to a store where Eddie spoke with men from the
neighborhood, including Nu-Nu. Abdullah identified defendant in court as Nu-Nu. Eddie and
defendant spoke in the parking lot and were “kind of hostile.” After a woman who was with
defendant spat on her, Abdullah returned to Mablelene’s house. Later, while on the porch, she
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heard a gunshot and saw Nu-Nu, whose arm was extended, chasing Eddie. There was another
gunshot and Eddie yelled, “ouch.” Abdullah ran inside because she thought Nu-Nu was “coming
after” her. She later identified defendant in a lineup.
¶ 14 Kathleen, Eddie’s aunt, testified that as she exited her parked vehicle, she saw Nu-Nu
chasing Eddie. At trial, Kathleen identified defendant, whom she knew from the neighborhood, as
Nu-Nu. Defendant, wearing a purple hoody, shot Eddie in the back. Eddie fell to the ground,
defendant jumped over him, turned, and shot him again. Kathleen yelled, and defendant looked
toward her. Defendant then shot at a light pole and left. When police officers arrived, she told them
that Nu-Nu shot Eddie. Kathleen later identified Nu-Nu in a photographic array. At trial, she
testified that defendant was the subject of that photo. On March 21, 2012, she identified defendant
in a lineup.
¶ 15 Natasha, Eddie’s cousin, testified that she saw Eddie being chased by defendant, who held
a firearm. She identified defendant, whom she knew from school, in court. Natasha heard a gunshot
and saw Eddie fall. Defendant then jumped over Eddie, turned, and shot him again. She heard
Kathleen’s voice and saw defendant fire at a light pole as he ran away. Natasha told police that
Nu-Nu shot Eddie, and subsequently identified Nu-Nu in a photographic array. She later identified
defendant in a lineup.
¶ 16 Mablelene, defendant’s aunt, testified that after hearing gunshots, she went to the front
door where her daughter Natasha was standing. There, she saw Nu-Nu, whom she identified in
court as defendant, running with a firearm in his hand, so she called 911. When Dominique arrived,
Mablelene told her that Nu-Nu shot Eddie. Dominique then spoke to police officers. During cross-
examination, Mablelene acknowledged that she did not see defendant shoot Eddie.
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¶ 17 Dominique testified that after receiving a call that Eddie had been shot, she went to her
aunt Mablelene’s home. There, Mablelene told her Nu-Nu shot Eddie. Dominique identified
defendant in court as Nu-Nu. She told officers at the scene that she was told Nu-Nu was the shooter
and could identify him and showed them his photo on Facebook.
¶ 18 Chicago police officer Kevin Fry testified that Dominique stated that Mablelene identified
the shooter as Nu-Nu and showed him a photograph of Nu-Nu. Dominique was taken to a squad
car where other officers ran a search and retrieved a photo of Nu-Nu. Dominique confirmed that
this was the person she was told was the shooter. Fry relayed defendant’s name to a detective and
identified defendant in court as the person in the photograph.
¶ 19 Chicago police detective William Meister testified that he and his partner interviewed
Kathleen and Natasha at a police station the night of the shooting. Natasha and Kathleen identified
the shooter as Nu-Nu, and Natasha gave a physical description. After officers at the crime scene
indicated that defendant had been identified as Nu-Nu, Meister created a photo array that included
a photo of defendant. Natasha and Kathleen separately viewed the array and identified the photo
of defendant as Nu-Nu.
¶ 20 Hill testified consistently with his testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress,
including that he obtained a store surveillance video. That video showed defendant wearing a black
jacket over a purple hoody and conversing with Eddie. This footage was admitted into evidence
and published without objection.
¶ 21 The State presented additional evidence, through the testimony of Chicago police officers
and a forensic DNA expert, that defendant was arrested pursuant to an investigative alert and could
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not be excluded as contributing to DNA recovered from items at the crime scene. The jury found
defendant guilty of first-degree murder.
¶ 22 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial alleging, in pertinent part, that the trial court erred
when it denied the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence because the police lacked probable
cause to arrest him. The court denied the motion, and following a hearing, sentenced defendant to
90 years in prison.
¶ 23 On direct appeal, defendant contended, in relevant part, that the trial court failed to conduct
an adequate voir dire of venire member L.L., who indicated she did not understand a fundamental
principle of the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. Defendant admitted forfeiting this issue
but requested plain error review because it affected the fairness of his trial and challenged the
integrity of the judicial process. In the alternative, defendant contended he was denied effective
assistance by trial counsel’s failure to preserve this issue for appeal.
¶ 24 We determined that the trial court failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 431(b) and
People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472 (1984), when it did not ascertain whether L.L. understood and
agreed with the second Zehr principle and possibly the third and fourth Zehr principles, but found
no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that the voir dire of L.L. demonstrated she did
not struggle to understand English and was competent to serve as a juror. Brown, 2017 IL App
(1st) 142197, ¶ ¶ 39-41. Moreover, defendant failed to meet his burden under the second prong of
plain error review when he cited no authority establishing that L.L.’s statement during voir dire
admitted a “ ‘lack of understanding of one of the essential qualifications of a juror,’ ” and
defendant presented no evidence of L.L.’s bias. Id. ¶ 41.
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¶ 25 We also determined that defendant was not denied effective assistance when trial counsel
failed to preserve this error for review, as defendant did not establish that counsel’s decision to
accept L.L. as a juror was not a matter of trial strategy. Id. ¶¶ 45-48. Further, “the evidence was
more than sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and there was no
evidence that L.L. rejected the principle that the State does not overcome defendant’s presumption
of innocence unless the State proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 48. Ultimately, we
corrected the mittimus while affirming the circuit court in all other aspects. Id. ¶¶ 85-87.
¶ 26 On August 27, 2018, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging, in relevant
part, ineffective assistance for trial counsel’s failure to challenge defendant’s arrest based upon an
investigate alert or object to a juror who did not understand “the 2nd Zehr principle.” Defendant
asserted that had trial counsel challenged defendant’s arrest pursuant to an investigative alert, the
motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence would have been granted. Defendant further alleged
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising this issue on direct appeal or arguing
“first prong” plain error for the jury selection claim. On October 18, 2018, the circuit court denied
defendant postconviction relief.
¶ 27 On appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court erred because the petition made an
arguable claim that he was denied effective assistance when appellate counsel failed to argue that
trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging defendant’s arrest on the basis of an investigative
alert or the jury selection claim under the closely-balanced prong of the plain error rule.
¶ 28 The Act provides a procedural mechanism through which a defendant may assert a
substantial denial of his constitutional rights in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction.
725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018). At the first stage of proceedings under the Act,
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the defendant files a petition, which the circuit court independently reviews and, taking the
allegations as true, determines whether it is frivolous or is patently without merit. People v. Tate,
2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9. A petition should be summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without
merit only when it has no arguable basis in either fact or law. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1,
11-12 (2009). A petition lacks an arguable basis in fact or law when it “is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.” Id. at 16. Fanciful factual allegations are
those which are “fantastic or delusional,” and an indisputably meritless legal theory is one that is
“completely contradicted by the record.” Id. at 16-17. We review the summary dismissal of a
postconviction petition de novo. Id. at 9.
¶ 29 When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the first stage of
postconviction proceedings, the defendant must show both that counsel’s performance was
arguably deficient, and that he was arguably prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at
17 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).
¶ 30 Defendant first contends that he was denied effective assistance on direct appeal when
counsel did not raise trial counsel’s failure to challenge defendant’s arrest based upon an
investigative alert specifically under the Illinois Constitution.
¶ 31 Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are judged against the same two-
pronged Strickland standard. People v. Simmons, 2020 IL App (1st) 170650, ¶ 48. To succeed,
a defendant must show counsel’s failure to raise an issue on direct appeal was objectively
unreasonable, and that he was prejudiced by this decision. People v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 293, 326
(2002). In other words, defendant must establish that but for counsel’s error, there is a reasonable
probability that his appeal would have been successful. People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 33.
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¶ 32 Generally, counsel’s decision not to raise an issue on appeal receives substantial deference.
Harris, 206 Ill. 2d at 326. It is not incompetence to refrain from raising issues which, in counsel’s
judgment, are without merit, unless counsel’s appraisal is patently wrong. People v. Simms,
192 Ill. 2d 348, 362 (2000); see also People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 243 (2004) (rather than
raise “every conceivable issue on appeal,” appellate counsel “exercise[s] professional judgment to
select from the many potential claims of error that might be asserted”). Absent a showing that the
underlying issue is meritorious, a defendant is not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s failure to raise
it on appeal. People v. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d 506, 523 (2001).
¶ 33 Here, defendant argues that trial counsel’s failure to rely on People v. Hyland, 2012 IL App
(1st) 110966, to argue that his arrest pursuant to an investigative alert was unconstitutional
constituted deficient performance. Therefore, defendant concludes he was denied effective
assistance on direct appeal when counsel failed to raise this meritorious issue.
¶ 34 “Probable cause for an arrest exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances known
to the officer is such that a reasonably prudent person would believe that the suspect is committing
or has committed a crime.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Braswell, 2019 IL App
(1st) 172810, ¶ 27. “An arrest without probable cause or a warrant based thereon violates” both
the United States and Illinois constitutions. People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 484 (2005). A defendant
bears the initial burden of proof, and once he shows a prima facie case of an unconstitutional arrest,
the burden shifts to the State to show his warrantless arrest was based on probable cause. Simmons,
2020 IL App (1st) 170650, ¶ 49. However, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant.
Id.
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¶ 35 The parties do not dispute that defendant’s arrest was warrantless. Therefore, the State was
required to demonstrate that the arrest was based on probable cause, and therefore legally justified.
¶ 36 An arrest without a warrant is valid only when supported by probable cause. People v.
Grant, 2013 IL 112734, ¶ 11. Police have probable cause to arrest an individual when the facts
known to the officer at the time of the arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to
believe that the individual committed a crime. Id. Whether probable cause exists depends on the
totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest. Id. An officer’s factual knowledge, based on
his or her police experience, is relevant to determining probable cause. Id. Probable cause is
governed by commonsense considerations, and the calculation concerns the probability of criminal
activity rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
¶ 37 While an arrest may be based on information beyond the arresting officer’s personal
knowledge, the State must show that the information reflected facts sufficient to show probable
cause. See Hyland, 2012 IL App (1st) 110966 ¶ 22. “An arresting officer may rely on information
received in an official police communication, provided that the officer who issued the
communication had probable cause to arrest.” Simmons, 2020 IL App (1st) 170650, ¶ 56.
¶ 38 After reviewing the record, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to
establish that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant for shooting Eddie. At the hearing
on the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, Hill testified that when he arrived at the crime
scene, he learned that Natasha and Kathleen witnessed the shooting and identified the shooter as
Nu-Nu. Additionally, although Dominique did not witness the shooting, she was told by Mablelene
that Nu-Nu was the shooter, knew Nu-Nu, and provided officers with a photograph of Nu-Nu. Hill
further testified that fellow officers generated a photograph which was shown to Dominique, and
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she identified the subject as Nu-Nu. Several hours later, Natasha and Kathleen identified defendant
in separate photographic arrays as the shooter. After learning of Eddie’s death, Hill’s partner issued
an investigative alert for defendant.
¶ 39 Thus, at the time of defendant’s arrest, he had been identified in photographic arrays as the
shooter by two eyewitnesses to the shooting. Although Hill did not obtain an arrest warrant, the
facts known to him when the investigative alert was issued were sufficient to establish probable
cause to arrest defendant. Grant, 2013 IL 112734, ¶ 11.
¶ 40 Defendant, however, relies on Hyland to support his argument that appellate counsel
should have challenged trial counsel’s failure to attack defendant’s arrest on the basis of an
investigative alert in the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.
¶ 41 In that case, the defendant was approached by two officers based on an investigative alert
stating that he violated an order of protection. Hyland, 2012 IL App (1st) 110966, ¶ 6. The officers
performed a custodial search that recovered a firearm. Id. The defendant was arrested and charged
with unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang
member. Id. ¶ 3.
¶ 42 At the hearing on the defendant’s motion to quash to arrest and suppress evidence, the State
presented the testimony of the arresting officers, who approached the defendant based on the
investigative alert, but lacked personal knowledge of the facts underlying its issuance. Id. ¶¶ 5-6.
We reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion, finding that the State “presented no evidence
that the underlying facts of the investigative alert established probable cause to arrest defendant,
either from the officer who issued the investigative alert or from the individual who obtained the
protective order that defendant allegedly violated.” Id. ¶ 25.
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¶ 43 In the case at bar, unlike Hyland, the State presented the testimony of Hill, the detective
assigned to investigate the shooting, who described the steps that he, his partner, and other officers
took in order to identify defendant as the shooter. Hill’s testimony regarding what officers knew
prior to the issuance of the investigative alert is much more detailed than the testimony presented
in Hyland and reflected Hill’s personal knowledge of the case.
¶ 44 Defendant also relies on People v. Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640, ¶ 43, for the proposition
that an arrest based solely on an investigative alert is unlawful under the Illinois Constitution even
where the investigative alert is supported by probable cause. In People v. Bass, 2021 IL 125434,
¶ 26, however, our supreme court recently found that the traffic stop that led to the discovery of
the investigative alert issued for the defendant was unreasonably extended and the motion to
suppress should therefore have been granted. Having affirmed this court’s decision to reverse the
defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial, the supreme court declined to “express any
opinion on limited lockstep analysis, its application to warrants or investigatory alerts, or the
constitutionality of investigative alerts,” and vacated the “portions of the appellate [court] opinion
dealing with these issues” Id. ¶¶ 27, 29-31.
¶ 45 Here, defendant’s arrest was supported by probable cause in that two witnesses identified
him as the shooter by nickname and in photographic arrays. Thus, defendant’s warrantless arrest
did not violate the Illinois Constitution on that basis. Accordingly, defendant cannot show he was
prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to challenge defendant’s arrest pursuant to an investigative
alert. As the issue was not meritorious, defendant cannot establish that he was arguably prejudiced
by appellate counsel’s failure to raise it on direct appeal.
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¶ 46 Defendant next contends that he was denied effective assistance on direct appeal when
appellate counsel did not challenge the trial court’s failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule
431(b) under the first prong of the plain error rule. He concludes that he was prejudiced because
the evidence at trial was “not overwhelming,” and such an argument would have been successful.
¶ 47 The plain error doctrine permits this court to consider an unpreserved error when (1) the
evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against
the defendant, or (2) the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial
and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.
People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564-65 (2007). The first step in plain error review is to
determine whether an error occurred. See People v. Hood, 2016 IL 118581, ¶ 18 (without error,
there can be no plain error).
¶ 48 On direct appeal, as discussed, we determined the trial court failed to comply with Supreme
Court Rule 431(b) when it did not ascertain whether L.L. understood and agreed with the second
Zehr principle and possibly the third and fourth Zehr principles but found no abuse of discretion
in the trial court’s conclusion that its voir dire of L.L. demonstrated she did not struggle to
understand English and thus was competent to serve as a juror. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 142197,
¶¶ 39-41. Contrary to defendant’s position on appeal, however, the result of his direct appeal would
not have been different had appellate counsel argued that the evidence was closely balanced.
¶ 49 To determine whether the evidence was closely balanced, we “must evaluate the totality of
the evidence and conduct a qualitative, commonsense assessment of it within the context of the
case.” People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 53. This requires “an assessment of the evidence on the
elements of the charged offense or offenses, along with any evidence regarding the witnesses’
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credibility.” Id. Our supreme court has held evidence is close when a factfinder is left to resolve a
credibility contest, which occurs when both the State and defense present credible versions of
events and neither version is corroborated or contradicted by extrinsic evidence. Id. ¶ 63; see also
People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 607 (2008) (“Given these opposing versions of events, and the
fact that no extrinsic evidence was presented to corroborate or contradict either version, the trial
court’s finding of guilty necessarily involved the court’s assessment of the credibility of the two
officers against that of defendant.”).
¶ 50 In the case at bar, the evidence was not closely balanced when Kathleen and Natasha
testified that defendant shot Eddie and Mablelene placed defendant at the scene of the shooting
holding a firearm. Additionally, Abdullah testified that defendant and Eddie engaged in a “hostile”
discussion at a store prior to the shooting, and that she saw defendant chasing Eddie with an
extended arm and heard gunshots and Eddie yell “ouch.” Moreover, a surveillance video showed
defendant and Eddie conversing that night, and defendant contributed to DNA recovered from the
crime scene. The trier of fact was not required to resolve a contest of credibility when the State
presented a credible version of events which was corroborated by a surveillance video and physical
evidence. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 63. As the evidence was not closely balanced, defendant
cannot establish that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s decision not to raise this issue on
direct appeal. See Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d at 523.
¶ 51 As defendant has failed to establish that he was arguably denied the effective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal, the circuit court properly denied him postconviction relief. Hodges,
234 Ill. 2d at 17. We therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 52 Affirmed.
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