NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme 2020 IL App (4th) 180069-U August 5, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender as precedent by any party except in NO. 4-18-0069 4th District Appellate the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Champaign County KYDEL J. BROWN, ) No. 17CF479 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Thomas J. Difanis, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court reversed and remanded where the trial court failed to conduct a neutral and nonadversarial Krankel inquiry.
¶2 Following an August 2017 jury trial, defendant, Kydel J. Brown, was found guilty
of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2016)), a Class X felony. On September 12,
2017, the trial court received a letter from defendant alleging ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. On September 21, 2017, defendant’s trial counsel filed a response to defendant’s
correspondence, arguing the trial court should conduct an inquiry into defendant’s allegations
pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984).
¶3 On October 5, 2017, pursuant to Krankel, the trial court conducted an inquiry into
defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following the hearing, the court declined to appoint new counsel to investigate defendant’s allegations. On October 10, 2017, the
court sentenced defendant to 38 years in prison.
¶4 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court (1) failed to conduct a nonadversarial
inquiry under Krankel because it did not allow defendant an opportunity to clarify his claims and
(2) abused its discretion in sentencing him to 38 years in prison. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 Because defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence leading to
his conviction, we recite only those facts providing the necessary context to resolve the issues
presented in this appeal.
¶7 A. The Charges and Jury Trial
¶8 On April 13, 2017, the State charged defendant by information with one count of
armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2016)), a Class X felony. The information alleged
that on July 26, 2016, defendant “took property, being U.S. Currency and tobacco products, from
the presence of Laurie Morris by the threat of the imminent use of force, and [defendant], or one
for whose conduct he is legally responsible, carried on or about his person a firearm, namely a
handgun.”
¶9 Over the course of a four-day jury trial in August 2017, the following evidence
was presented.
¶ 10 1. State’s Case-in-Chief
¶ 11 a. Laurie Morris
¶ 12 Laurie Morris testified that on July 26, 2016, she was working the overnight shift
as a cashier at the Shell gas station located at 1812 North Cunningham in Urbana, Illinois. Morris
-2- testified that around 12:50 a.m., two masked individuals entered the Shell, one of whom held a
silver revolver that he pointed at her. The individual with the silver revolver led her over to the
cash register while the other individual took cigarettes from behind the register and placed them
in a backpack and a garbage bag. After Morris opened the register, the individual with the
handgun ordered Morris to lay on the ground and then proceeded to take all of the paper money
from the cash register. A recording from the Shell surveillance camera was admitted into
evidence and played for the jury.
¶ 13 After the two individuals left the Shell, Morris locked the doors and called the
police. As Morris locked the doors, she saw the individuals enter a vehicle in the Motel 6 parking
lot, which was next door to the Shell. Morris described the vehicle as a beige or tan four-door
Buick. Morris testified that there was a third individual in the Buick, who appeared to have been
waiting for the two individuals while they were inside the Shell station.
¶ 14 b. Tierykah Wiley
¶ 15 Tierykah Wiley testified she was not familiar with either the Shell gas station or
the Motel 6 located on North Cunningham Avenue in Urbana, Illinois. She was not familiar with
either defendant or an individual named Kelvin Hartfield. She did not recall testifying previously
in a related case. The State then requested that Wiley be treated as a hostile witness and the court
allowed the State to proceed with cross-examination.
¶ 16 Wiley testified she did not recall being in a tan Buick with defendant and
Hartfield on the evening of July 25, 2016, or the early morning hours of July 26, 2016. She did
not recall any of the following: (1) going to the Motel 6 or Shell gas station on North
Cunningham Avenue with defendant and Hartfield, (2) that defendant and Hartfield went into the
Shell station and returned with bags full of cigarettes, (3) going to 54 Michelle Lane in Urbana
-3- with defendant and Hartfield where defendant’s mother lived and defendant entering the
residence, (4) entering a red Hyundai Elantra outside the residence while Hartfield attempted to
transfer bags of cigarettes from the Buick into the Elantra, or (5) police officers arriving at the
residence and gunfire being exchanged.
¶ 17 c. Deputy Joshua Demko
¶ 18 Champaign County Sheriff’s Office (CCSO) Deputy Joshua Demko testified that
on July 26, 2016, he received a radio report of a tan four-door Buick involved in a robbery. At
1:14 a.m., he saw a car matching that description pull into a parking spot in a trailer park off of
University Avenue in Urbana; he was about 300 feet away from the tan Buick and observed a
person walk away from the car’s passenger side. He reported his observations over his radio and
after several minutes, Deputies Derouchie, Casey Donovan, and Richard Ferriman arrived. Upon
their arrival, Officers Donovan and Ferriman shined their flashlights into a maroon Hyundai
Elantra that was parked next to the Buick and announced themselves while Demko approached
the driver’s side of the car. A man exited the vehicle and fled, firing a revolver in the direction of
the deputies.
¶ 19 d. Deputy Donovan
¶ 20 CCSO Deputy Casey Donovan gave an account similar to that of Demko, adding
that he and Deputy Derouchie removed a woman from the back of the red car, which he
identified as a maroon Hyundai Elantra. Deputy Donovan testified he handcuffed the woman and
identified her as Tierykah Wiley.
¶ 21 e. Susan Chapin
¶ 22 Pursuant to section 115-10.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725
ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West 2016)), the trial court allowed Susan Chapin, an employee of the
-4- Champaign County State’s Attorney’s Office, to read into evidence several excerpts from a
transcript of the testimony of Tierykah Wiley from the jury trial of Kelvin Hartfield, which
occurred on March 7, 2017. Ms. Chapin read that Wiley previously testified on July 26, 2016,
that defendant picked her up from the Motel 6 while Hartfield sat in the passenger’s seat. Wiley
believed the car belonged to defendant. Defendant drove to the Shell station where he and
Hartfield exited the vehicle and quickly returned with bags and drove away. The three of them
stopped to switch cars at a residence, where defendant went inside and Hartfield began to
transfer the bags from the first car into a second, maroon car. At some point, police officers
arrived, Wiley heard gunfire, and she was arrested.
¶ 23 f. Forensic Evidence
¶ 24 University of Illinois Police Department Detective Anthony Carpenter testified he
executed a search warrant at 54 Michelle Lane and found two sets of car keys in a drawer in the
south bedroom, one of which was given to CCSO Investigator David Sherrick, who used the
keys to unlock the tan Buick. CCSO Investigator Chad Carlson testified the tan Buick was
registered to Kathy Barker and the maroon Hyundai Elantra was registered to Joanna Wilson.
¶ 25 Illinois State Police (ISP) crime scene investigator Tim Lemasters testified he
searched the Hyundai Elantra belonging to Wilson, recovering latent fingerprints as well as a
series of objects including: a Samsung mobile phone, two backpacks, a trash bag, a red T-shirt
and a white T-shirt, cartons of Newport cigarettes, cigarillos, and personal property appearing to
belong to defendant and Hartfield. Lemasters testified he obtained fingerprint standards from
defendant and sent them to the Illinois State Police crime laboratory.
¶ 26 ISP fingerprint examiner Kevin Horath testified he compared latent fingerprints
from the Hyundai to standards obtained by Lemasters and found the print obtained from the
-5- Samsung mobile phone matched that of defendant. ISP forensic scientist Amanda Humke
testified she cut a portion of a white stain on the red T-shirt obtained from the Hyundai and
prepared it for further analysis. ISP forensic scientist Rhonda Carter testified she obtained
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profiles from the red T-shirt sample and buccal swabs from
defendant and an individual named Marcus Craig; Craig’s profile was excluded, but the profile
matched that of defendant.
¶ 27 2. Defendant’s Case-in-Chief
¶ 28 Defendant presented the testimony of two witnesses: his girlfriend, Joanna
Wilson, and his mother, Dionishia Terry.
¶ 29 Wilson testified that on July 25, 2016, defendant was at her house, but she
dropped him off in her Hyundai Elantra at Terry’s around 8 or 9 p.m. Later that evening,
sometime between 9 and 10 p.m., Wiley came to Wilson’s home where Wilson gave Wiley the
keys to her car, asking Wiley to pick defendant up at Terry’s house.
¶ 30 Dionishia Terry testified she was friends with Kathy Barker and that she had
Barker’s tan Buick and its keys in her possession on July 25, 2016. She knew Wilson through
defendant, and Wiley through Wilson. On July 25, 2016, Terry was at her mobile home at 54
Michelle Lane with defendant, Marcus Craig, Shantell Terry, Vanishia Hunt, Inece Hunt, Vashti
Dodd, Veaon Hunt, Sheree Harris, Tyshon Craig, and Tee Palmer. At some point, Terry went to
a nearby McDonald’s with Marcus Craig, and defendant was home when she returned around 10
p.m. Terry testified she did defendant’s laundry, watched TV, and socialized with the people in
the house. Terry did not leave the house after returning from McDonald’s or prior to hearing
gunfire outside. She testified defendant and Marcus Craig did not leave the house either. Terry
testified the Shell gas station on North Cunningham Avenue was about a five- to seven-minute
-6- drive from her home. Terry denied telling CCSO Investigator Carlson that defendant arrived at
her home shortly before the shooting but was impeached with her recorded statement to that
effect, made to Carlson around 7:30 a.m. on July 26, 2016.
¶ 31 At the conclusion of trial, the jury found defendant guilty of armed robbery.
¶ 32 B. Krankel Proceedings
¶ 33 Prior to sentencing, defendant pro se sent a letter to the trial court stating the
following:
“Dear Honorable Judge Difanis,
I am writing you [to] let you know that I found my attorney being an
effective assistant of counsel due to her not filing a motion for limine excluding
all uncharged crimes and excluding all evidence of uncharged crimes. She has
also failed [to] call 5 witness[es] on my behalf: Kelvin Hartfield, Vanishia Hunt,
Veaon Hunt, Kathy Barker, and Marcus Craig. [Trial counsel] did not object [to]
Susan Chapin testifying on behalf of Ti[e]rycka[h] Wiley.
Kelvin Hartfield: Could have testified I was not an accomplice of the
charged and uncharged crimes.
Kathy Barker: Could testify she has rightful ownership of the Tan Buick
that was allegedly used in this crime.
Vanishia Hunt: Could testify on the behalf of my alibi placing me at home
from 11:00 p.m. until I was taken [to] the police station.
Veaon Hunt: Could place me at home during the time 11:00 p.m. until I
was taken [to] the Police station.
-7- Marcus Craig: Could place me home during 11:00 p.m. until the time I
[Trial counsel] did not send an officer nor private investigator to follow up
with my witness[es] for my alibi.
This is the importance of these witness[es] she failed [to] call on my
behalf.”
¶ 34 On September 14, 2017, defendant’s trial counsel filed a motion for acquittal or,
in the alternative, new trial. On September 21, 2017, trial counsel filed a response to defendant’s
letter to the trial court. In her response, trial counsel asserted that because defendant raised pro se
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, “[i]t would be proper for this Court to conduct a
hearing under People v. Krankel, 102 Ill 2d. 181 (1984) to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the
factual basis behind [defendant’s] claims.”
¶ 35 Trial counsel then addressed each of defendant’s allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel as follows:
“a. She failed to file a Motion in Limine regarding uncharged conduct.
There was a Motion in Limine filed. The Motion was denied in part and granted
in part (see Exhibit B).
b. She allowed Susan Chapin to testify on behalf of Tierykah Wiley. This
is not reflected in the proceedings. Ms. Chapin did not testify on behalf of
Tierykah Wiley. Ms. Chapin was used to read the trial testimony from the trial of
Kelvin Hartfield on March 7, 2017 as impeachment for Ms. Wiley’s testimony
on August 15, 2017.
-8- c. She failed to call Kelvin Hartfield as a witness at trial to deny
[defendant] was an accomplice to charged and uncharged crime. This was a
matter of trial strategy. Mr. Hartfield was convicted in [Champaign County case
No.] 16-CF-1055 and received a sentence of 90 years. Mr. Hartfield maintained
his own innocence throughout his trial and sentencing. As a trial strategy,
[defense counsel] believed that this would reflect that Mr. Hartfield would not
testify about events that he claimed not to be at himself.
d. She failed to call Kathy Barker. The ownership of the tan Buick was not
at issue at trial. Ms. Dionishia Terry, mother of [defendant], testified that she was
in possession of the tan Buick as a vehicle for her personal use. Investigator
Anthony Carpenter testified that he found keys to the tan Buick in the south
bedroom of 54 Michelle Lane. Additionally, Steve Guess, Investigator for the
Champaign County Public Defender, interviewed Kathy Barker and found out
there was only one set of keys to the tan Buick and those keys were in the sole
possession of Dionishia Terry. As a trial strategy, [defense counsel] did not call
Kathy Barker because her testimony only would support the theory of the case
that someone at 54 Michelle Lane was the only person with access to the car
keys.
e. She failed to call Vanishia Hunt to serve as an alibi. Ms. Hunt gave a
statement to police the morning after the incidents occurred in which she stated
that she got off work at 9:00 p.m. and arrived home at l0:30 p.m. Ms. Hunt stated
that she went to bed shortly after arriving home and everyone, including
[defendant] was still up in the residence. Ms. Hunt also said it was possible that
-9- someone could have left the residence during the overnight hours of 7-25-16 and
7-26-16 without her knowing (see Exhibit C). Ineffective assistance of counsel
claims are reviewed pursuant to the standards set forth in Strickland v.
Washington. In order to prove ineffective assistance, defendant must show that
his counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by counsel's
deficient performance. People v. Campbell, 37 N.E.3d 891, 902 (2015). Failure
to demonstrate prejudice defeats defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Id. at 902. Since the alibi testimony was presented at trial, defendant
was not prejudiced by counsel’s omission and his claim of ineffective assistance
must fail. Id. at 902. In this case, alibi testimony was presented through
Dionishia Terry. In Campbell, Defendant also contended that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to present witnesses whose testimony would have
supported his defense. However, as the trial court noted, neither witness
definitively testified that defendant was not involved in the crime so the Court
did not see how this evidence would have helped defendant’s case in light of
strong identification testimony and other corroborating evidence. This is
analogous to the case of [defendant].
f. She failed to call Ve[a]on Hunt to serve as an alibi. Mr. Hunt currently
is incarcerated in the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice on an unrelated
matter. Mr. Hunt gave a statement to police the morning after the incidents
occurred that was inconsistent throughout the statement (see Exhibit D).
Additionally, in part of his statement, Ve[a]on Hunt indicated that [defendant]
was in the south bedroom with him. This is the same bedroom where Investigator
- 10 - Carpenter found the keys to the tan Buick that was allegedly used during the
Circle K [sic] robbery. This would have put [defendant] in the room with the
keys. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are reviewed pursuant to the
standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington. In order to prove ineffective
assistance, defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient
and that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. People v.
Campbell, 37 N.E.3d 891, 902 (2015). Failure to demonstrate prejudice defeats
defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 902. Since the alibi
testimony was presented at trial, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s
omission and his claim of ineffective assistance must fail. Id. at 902. In this case,
alibi testimony was presented through Dionishia Terry. In Campbell, Defendant
also contended that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present witnesses
whose testimony would have supported his defense. However, as the trial court
noted, neither witness definitively testified that defendant was not involved in the
crime so the Court did not see how this evidence would have helped defendant’s
case in light of strong identification testimony and other corroborating evidence.
This is analogous to the case of [defendant].
g. She failed to call Marcus Craig to serve as an alibi. Mr. Craig gave a
statement on July 26, 2016. In this statement, Mr. Craig said that he was not
going to say anything about [defendant] and didn’t know the times [defendant]
was at home or gone from the residence (Exhibit E). Additionally, Mr. Craig
gave a statement on October 11, 2016. In this statement, Mr. Craig said that
Tierykah Wiley was in the vehicle when the shooting happened and that Kelvin
- 11 - Hartfield did the shooting. Mr. Craig said he did see [defendant] in the trailer just
before the shooting. Mr. Craig also said that he knew Kelvin Hartfield through
Marcus Craig (Exhibit F). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are reviewed
pursuant to the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington. In order to prove
ineffective assistance, defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was
deficient and that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. People
v. Campbell, 37 N.E.3d 891, 902 (2015). Failure to demonstrate prejudice
defeats defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 902. Since
the alibi testimony was presented at trial, defendant was not prejudiced by
counsel’s omission and his claim of ineffective assistance must fail. Id. at 902. In
this case, alibi testimony was presented through Dionishia Terry. In Campbell,
Defendant also contended that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present
witnesses whose testimony would have supported his defense. However, as the
trial court noted, neither witness definitively testified that defendant was not
involved in the crime so the Court did not see how this evidence would have
helped defendant’s case in light of strong identification testimony and other
corroborating evidence. This is analogous to the case of [defendant].
Furthermore, the trial strategy by [trial counsel] was to avoid any close ties
between Mr. Hartfield and [defendant] and Mr. Craig corroborated the
relationship between Mr. Hartfield and [defendant].
h. Finally, [defendant] alleges that [trial counsel] did not send the private
investigator out to talk to witnesses. The private investigator for Champaign
County Public Defender’s Office Steve Guess conducted interviews on
- 12 - September 12, 2016 with Dionishia Terry. Steve Guess also met with [defendant]
along with [trial counsel] on August 9, 2017. At this time, [defendant] indicated
that he really did not want us to call any particular witnesses on his behalf.”
¶ 36 At the conclusion of the response, trial counsel again requested, on defendant’s
behalf, that the trial court “conduct a Krankel hearing” and “that the Court make a ruling as to
whether [trial counsel] should continue as counsel of record for post-trial matters and sentencing
hearing.”
¶ 37 On October 5, 2017, the trial court conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry.
Neither defendant nor his trial counsel spoke at the hearing and the trial court did not ask
defendant or his trial counsel any questions. The court addressed defendant’s factual allegations
as follows:
“[Defendant], in looking at what you filed, there was some issue of
excluding uncharged crimes, and excluding evidence of uncharged crimes, and
that she failed to call witnesses on your behalf, and you listed those witnesses, and
that you didn’t object to Susan Chapin testifying on behalf of Tierykah Wiley.
First of all, Ms. Chapin didn’t testify on behalf of Ms. Wiley, she merely
read a transcript. Anybody could have read that. The court determined that I
wasn’t going to read it. It could have been anybody, and then Ms. Chapin seemed
to be an appropriate person, so that’s not even close to being an error.
You indicated that Ms. Barker would have testified that she was the
rightful owner of the Buick in question. Ownership wasn’t an issue, possession
was, and there’s a substantial difference between ownership and possession. She
owned the vehicle, but someone else had possession of it, namely the woman who
- 13 - was residing at the residence. The Buick was found outside the residence, and the
keys were in the bedroom.
Ms. Hunt, you indicated could have testified that, concerning an alibi
placing you at home from 7 p.m. until you were taken into custody. Now
according to the public defender in their response, Ms. Hunt gave a statement to
the police the morning after the incident, and she said that she got off work at nine
p.m., arrived home at 10:30, she went to bed shortly thereafter, and everyone,
including yourself, was still up in the residence. She also said it was possible that
someone could have left the residence during the overnight hours without her
knowing it. So had she been called as a witness, she could have verified, as other
witnesses did, other alibi witnesses, that you were present in the residence, but she
could not account for your presence during the actual entire time in question,
because she had made a statement to the police that would have been used in the
trial, should she have testified.
Now you also indicate that Veaon Hunt would have placed you at home,
11 p.m. until I was taken into the police station, and Mr. Hunt is incarcerated in
the Juvenile Department of Justice on an unrelated matter. He gave a statement to
the police that was inconsistent with the statement. Additionally in part of his
statement he indicated that you were in the south bedroom with him, and this is
the same bedroom where the keys to the Buick were found. So had that person
been called as a witness, that would have verified the fact that you were in the
same bedroom where the keys to the Buick were found.
- 14 - That’s—that’s a determination that’s a—a trial strategy determination,
whether or not that evidence would have been more beneficial to you than not,
and since there was already the alibi witnesses called, there doesn’t appear to have
been a problem with not calling that person. Again, not only that, but that person
would have come in from the Department of Juvenile Justice, obviously in
custody, and that also would have tested his credibility.
Now Marcus Craig could have placed you at home. He gave a statement to
the police also, according to the public defender’s response, that he was not going
to say anything about you and didn’t know the times you were at home or gone
from the residence.
So again, had he been called to testify, and had he testified contrary to
what he told the police, then his statement to the police would have come in to
challenge his credibility, and again, there was alibi witnesses that— there were
alibi witnesses that were called.
You’ve indicated that the public defender did not send an officer, nor
private investigator to follow up with my witnesses for my alibi. According to the
public defender, the private investigator for Champaign County Public Defender’s
Office conducted interviews on September 12 with Dionishia Terry. They met
with Mr. Guess—met with you, along with [trial counsel], on August 9 of 2017,
and at that time you indicated that you really did not want us—namely the PD’s
office—to call any particular witnesses on your behalf.
Based upon what the court viewed during the course of the trial, based
upon your complaints, based upon the public defender’s understanding of those
- 15 - complaints—and under normal circumstances I would be asking [trial counsel] to
answer those questions, it’s not necessary because she has provided written
answers to those questions—this isn’t a—an issue where there was in any way,
shape, or form ineffective assistance of counsel.
So the request in the Krankel hearing, the court’s made a determination
that there was not ineffective assistance of counsel.”
¶ 38 C. Posttrial Motions and Sentencing
¶ 39 The trial court conducted a hearing October 10, 2017. After denying defendant’s
posttrial motion for acquittal, or in the alternative, a new trial, the court proceeded with
sentencing.
¶ 40 1. Evidence and Arguments
¶ 41 As evidence in aggravation, the State presented testimony from Investigator
Norman J. Meeker from the Champaign County Sheriff’s Department. Meeker testified that over
the course of his investigation in this case, he obtained a video from defendant’s mobile phone,
dated several weeks before the armed robbery, depicting defendant with two firearms. The State
played the video for the court and it was admitted into evidence. Meeker testified that one of the
firearms depicted in the video was a small revolver that resembled the one recovered during the
investigation of the case and was alleged to have been used during the armed robbery. In
performing a firearms trace, Meeker discovered the revolver was originally sold to an individual
named Craig Antoline. When Meeker contacted Antoline about the revolver, he was not aware
that it was missing. Antoline did not know how the revolver went missing. Antoline informed
Meeker that he kept the revolver in the glove compartment of his car, that he sometimes gave
rides to people he met at his job at Planned Parenthood, and that occasionally he leaves those
- 16 - people in the car while he goes to the convenience store. Finally, Meeker testified that although
the revolver depicted in defendant’s video bore a “striking resemblance” to the one recovered in
the investigation of this case, he did not discover anything “directly connect[ing] *** defendant
to the actual theft of the firearm” and could not “place *** defendant as the actual thief of that
firearm.”
¶ 42 In mitigation, defendant presented the testimony of his mother, Dionishia Terry.
Terry testified defendant was only 24 years old and a father, and that a long prison sentence
would present a great hardship on defendant’s family. Terry believed she and her family offered
defendant a positive support system.
¶ 43 During argument, the State emphasized defendant’s past criminal history, which
included a juvenile adjudication for battery in 2006 and a Class 1 burglary conviction in 2010. In
each case, defendant received probation that was later revoked, resulting in sentences to the
Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice and the Illinois Department of Corrections, respectively.
The State also noted defendant was convicted for robbery in 2010 and received a later conviction
for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The State argued there was ample evidence the
armed robbery was planned well in advance and it was “not a spur of the moment thing.” The
State further emphasized the violent nature of the offense, stating, “I’m sure the court remembers
the video and the stills from the trial where they take someone; in this case, Laurie Morris, who
is simply trying to do her job in the early morning hours, and they put her at gunpoint on the
floor with a loaded weapon pointed directly at her.” Additionally, the State argued this was not a
case where defendant “was driven to his actions by an addiction” or desperation; defendant and
his accomplice stole the cigarettes for the purpose of resale. The State recommended a sentence
of 42 years in prison.
- 17 - ¶ 44 Defendant’s attorney argued for the minimum sentence of 21 years in prison,
emphasizing defendant was a father of three and had expressed a desire to be present in their
lives. Defendant’s attorney noted defendant was “very young, and so to sentence him to an
exceedingly large number of years in the Department of Corrections could be an injustice that we
don’t want have happen.” Defendant additionally gave a statement in allocution, apologizing to
his family and requesting a furlough of 24 to 48 hours to spend with his family before beginning
his prison sentence.
¶ 45 2. Trial Court’s Sentence
¶ 46 At the conclusion of arguments, the trial court stated the following:
“Well, I have considered the report prepared by Court Services. I have
considered the comments of counsel and the comments of *** defendant. I have
considered the testimony on behalf of *** defendant, as well as the letters
submitted on his behalf. I have considered the testimony presented by the
prosecution.
I have considered the statutory factors in aggravation as well as the
statutory factors in mitigation. There aren’t any statutory mitigating factors that
apply to *** defendant to this type of an offense. There is some mitigation in this
record. He’s only twenty-four years of age. That in and of itself is a nonstatutory
mitigating factor. One—given a person that age, one would hope that there is
mitigation—rehabilitation potential in his life, so again he’s only twenty-four
years of age, and that is a nonstatutory mitigating factor.
- 18 - The two statutory factors in aggravation, we have *** defendant’s prior
criminal history. This is his fourth felony conviction plus one juvenile
adjudication, so that prior criminal history is a statutory factor in aggravation.
The other statutory factor in aggravation is the deterrent factor. This court
has to fashion a sentence that will not only deter [defendant] but other individuals
similarly situated from committing this type of an offense. This was an armed
robbery. The court reviewed the video of the offense. Chilling. The clerk is placed
face down on the floor with a gun pointed at her as a cash drawer is emptied and
*** defendant is collecting the cigarettes. So the deterrent factor has to come
across loudly and clearly.
The majority of armed robberies in this court’s experience committed by
individuals who have some form of an addiction, they need to steal to support
their habit. Sometimes they take it to the extreme using a firearm. Based upon the
evidence that was presented in this case, that doesn’t appear to be the
circumstances surrounding this type of an offense. This was an offense that was
planned out right down to the amount of money the cigarette packages were going
to be sold for—I believe it was five dollars a pack—and then *** defendant and
his co-defendant executed their plan. They went in and committed their armed
robbery. So to the extent that this one was carried out with a great deal of
planning is a deterrable offense. We’re not dealing with an addict who doesn’t
believe he or she can survive without stealing money to support their habit. This
was a crime of violence committed so that *** defendant and his co-defendant
could get money.
- 19 - The sentencing range is minimum twenty-one years and a maximum
forty-five years. In determining that range, the court has to consider the
circumstances surrounding the offense, as the court has indicated. The history,
character, and condition of the defendant. We have here a young man who has
been adjudicated a delinquent minor back in ‘06, was convicted of a Class 1
felony in 2010, convicted of a robbery conviction in 2010, convicted of unlawful
possession of a weapon in 2012. So we have here a young man who hasn’t really
made mistakes; he commits serious felony offenses.
The video that was played in court today again is somewhat chilling, and
we have the request and the concern that his children he has brought into the
world, that he is unable to support because of his lack of education and lack of
employment, that they are going to be at a loss if he is committed to the
Department of Corrections. That video is again an indication of the history,
character, and condition of *** defendant.
When the court considers all of the factors, and especially, especially the
deterrent factor, I believe an appropriate sentence will be one of incarceration to
the Illinois Department of Corrections. It will be for a period of thirty-eight
years.”
¶ 47 In November 2017, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, arguing
the trial court gave improper weight to his prior criminal history and the deterrent factor in
fashioning the sentence. Following a hearing on January 23, 2018, the trial court denied the
motion.
¶ 48 This appeal followed.
- 20 - ¶ 49 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 50 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court (1) failed to conduct a nonadversarial
hearing on defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of
Krankel and (2) abused its discretion when it sentenced defendant to 38 years in prison.
¶ 51 A. The Preliminary Krankel Inquiry
¶ 52 1. General Principles
¶ 53 When confronted with a defendant’s posttrial allegations of ineffective assistance
of counsel, our supreme court set out the procedural steps to follow in People v. Moore, 207 Ill.
2d 68, 77-78, 797 N.E.2d 631, 637 (2003) (noting the rule that had developed since Krankel):
“New counsel is not automatically required in every case in which a defendant
presents a pro se posttrial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
Rather, when a defendant presents a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the trial court should first examine the factual basis of the
defendant’s claim. If the trial court determines that the claim lacks merit or
pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new
counsel and may deny the pro se motion. However, if the allegations show
possible neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed.”
¶ 54 A court can conduct an inquiry into allegations counsel was ineffective by doing
one or more of the following: “(1) questioning the trial counsel, (2) questioning the defendant,
and (3) relying on its own knowledge of the defense counsel’s performance in the trial.” People
v. Peacock, 359 Ill. App. 3d 326, 339, 833 N.E.2d 396, 407 (2005). “[A] preliminary Krankel
inquiry should operate as a neutral and nonadversarial proceeding.” People v. Jolly, 2014 IL
- 21 - 117142, ¶ 38, 25 N.E.3d 1127. Accordingly, “the State should never be permitted to take an
adversarial role against a pro se defendant at the preliminary Krankel inquiry.” Id.
¶ 55 “Where a defendant’s claims are conclusory, misleading, or legally immaterial, or
do not bring to the trial court’s attention a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the trial court may be excused from further inquiry.” People v. Bobo, 375 Ill. App. 3d 966, 985,
874 N.E.2d 297, 315 (2007). Whether a trial court properly conducted a Krankel inquiry is a
matter of law that we review de novo. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 28.
¶ 56 2. Alleged Adversarial Participation of Trial Counsel
¶ 57 We first address defendant’s claim the trial court erred by allowing trial counsel
to participate in an adversarial manner. Citing People v. Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st) 133741, 50
N.E.3d 66, defendant argues the trial court improperly allowed his trial counsel to participate in
an adversarial manner by “straightforwardly arguing to the court that [defendant’s] ineffective
assistance of counsel claims should be rejected.” Defendant further argues that “by ruling on the
written submissions alone, the court ensured that its ruling was based in part on the relative
drafting skills of a pro se litigant pitted against an adversarial attorney.”
¶ 58 In Jackson, the appellate court stated:
“At this preliminary stage of the Krankel inquiry, ‘[t]rial counsel may simply
answer questions and explain the facts and circumstances surrounding the
defendant’s allegations,’ but not argue his or her side of the story. [Moore, 207 Ill.
2d at 78.] The key point, at this preliminary pro se stage, where the only question
is whether defendant has demonstrated possible neglect of the case based on the
defendant’s factual allegations, is that any participation by trial counsel not
- 22 - become adversarial. See Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 38.” Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st)
133741, ¶ 80.
¶ 59 In Jackson, the appellate court found the trial court conducted an improper
Krankel inquiry when it decided the merits of the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim rather than first determining whether defendant’s factual allegations showed trial counsel’s
possible neglect of the case. Id. ¶ 77. The Jackson court additionally found the court erred by
(1) improperly considering evidence beyond the record and (2) misconstruing the appellate
court’s prior mandate regarding a jury admonition issue. Id. ¶¶ 78, 79. Jackson did not involve a
claim of alleged adversarial participation by the defendant’s trial counsel; rather, the defendant’s
lead trial counsel, who was the subject of several of his ineffective assistance claims, was not
present at all for the trial court’s preliminary Krankel inquiry. Id. ¶ 80. The Jackson court
determined that, because it had already found the trial court improperly decided the merits of the
defendant’s ineffective assistance claims, “the question of whether trial counsel should have
been present is difficult to gauge.” Id. ¶ 81. The court then recommended, upon remand, the trial
court “ensure trial counsel’s presence at the preliminary phase of the Krankel hearing if
necessary to answer any basic factual or foundational questions about the trial proceedings.” Id.
¶ 60 Based on our review of Jackson, we agree with the State that “[t]he Jackson
court’s general statements that any participation by defense counsel in a preliminary Krankel
inquiry should be nonadversarial are dicta based only on the general proposition that such
inquiries should be nonadversarial.” Also, neither of the cases cited by the Jackson court (Moore,
207 Ill. 2d at 78; Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 38) involved the alleged adversarial participation of
trial counsel during a preliminary Krankel inquiry. Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st) 133741, ¶ 80. The
Moore case did not involve or discuss the issue of trial counsel’s alleged adversarial participation
- 23 - in a Krankel inquiry (Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78-80), while Jolly involved adversarial participation
by the State, which our supreme court found to be an error requiring remand (Jolly, 2014 IL
117142, ¶¶ 38, 46). Defendant cites no authority holding that the alleged adversarial participation
by defense counsel during a preliminary Krankel inquiry constitutes error or—more
significantly—reversible error.
¶ 61 However, our inquiry does not end there. In the absence of precedent specifically
addressing what constitutes adversarial participation by trial counsel and whether such
participation is allowed, we look to the body of developed case law regarding Krankel inquiries.
As previously noted, a court can conduct an inquiry into allegations counsel was ineffective by
doing one or more of the following: “(1) questioning the trial counsel, (2) questioning the
defendant, and (3) relying on its own knowledge of the defense counsel’s performance in the
trial.” Peacock, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 339. Moreover, “a preliminary Krankel inquiry should operate
as a neutral and nonadversarial proceeding.” Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 38. Finally, “[a]t this
preliminary stage of the Krankel inquiry, ‘[t]rial counsel may simply answer questions and
explain the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s allegations,’ but not argue his or
her side of the story.” Jackson, 2016 Ill App (1st) 133741, ¶ 80 (quoting Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at
78).
¶ 62 In this instance, the procedure employed abandoned basic tenets regarding a
Krankel inquiry and requires reversal. Here, absent was any questioning of trial counsel or the
defendant. Instead, the trial court considered the written response filed by trial counsel and
neglected to provide defendant an opportunity to respond, in open court, to trial counsel’s written
response. We realize the court properly considered defense counsel’s performance in the trial.
Even so, we find it acutely problematic that at this preliminary stage, the procedure used pitted a
- 24 - self-represented litigant against his former counsel in a fight that was unfair from its inception.
Even more troubling, in her written response, trial counsel went well beyond explaining the facts
and circumstances surrounding defendant’s allegations. Specifically, as to defendant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, trial counsel, in the written response, offered argument
regarding the ultimate issue of whether defendant’s claims constituted, as a matter of law,
ineffective assistance of counsel. We find no place for such advocacy by trial counsel in a
preliminary Krankel inquiry. After all, at this stage, the trial court is simply to determine if the
allegations show possible neglect of the case and appoint new counsel in the event possible
neglect is shown. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78.
¶ 63 Accordingly, we find the trial court’s Krankel inquiry improper and reverse and
remand. On remand, the court shall conduct an inquiry into the allegations counsel was
ineffective by doing one or more of the following: “(1) questioning the trial counsel,
(2) questioning the defendant, and (3) relying on its own knowledge of the defense counsel’s
performance in the trial.” Peacock, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 339. Also important on remand, the
“preliminary Krankel inquiry should operate as a neutral and nonadversarial proceeding.” Jolly,
2014 IL 117142, ¶ 38.
¶ 64 Although we reverse in order to provide defendant an appropriate Krankel
hearing, we offer no opinion on the merits of defendant’s claims.
¶ 65 B. Defendant’s Other Claim
¶ 66 Given our reversal on the Krankel issue, we decline to address defendant’s
remaining claim which may become moot depending upon the outcome of defendant’s Krankel
hearing.
¶ 67 III. CONCLUSION
- 25 - ¶ 68 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for
¶ 69 Reversed and remanded with directions.
- 26 -