2020 IL App (4th) 180613-U NOTICE This order was filed under Supreme FILED Court Rule 23 and may not be cited NO. 4-18-0613 January 3, 2020 as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Macon County GARY W. BROWN, ) No. 10CF1857 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Jeffrey S. Geisler, ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
¶2 Defendant, Gary W. Brown, pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault
(720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2) (West 2010)) and, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement with the State,
was sentenced to 15 years in prison. He appeals the trial court’s denial of an amended motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his waiver of his right to a jury trial.
¶3 On appeal, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed to
represent defendant. OSAD has filed a motion to withdraw as appellate counsel, citing Pennsylva-
nia v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), and alleging there are no potentially meritorious issues for
review. Because this appeal involves a direct appeal from the trial court’s judgment and not a postconviction collateral attack, we characterize OSAD’s motion to withdraw as one brought pur-
suant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), rather than Finley. Additionally, we grant
OSAD’s motion and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In December 2010, the State charged defendant with two counts of aggravated
criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2) (West 2010)) (counts I and II), one count of ag-
gravated battery (id. § 12-4(b)(8)) (count III), and one count of burglary (id. § 19-1(a)) (count IV).
In connection with the criminal-sexual-assault counts, the State alleged that while displaying a
dangerous weapon, i.e., a hammer with rubber ends, defendant twice placed his sex organ in the
sex organ of the victim, T.T. In August 2011, the State filed a petition to have defendant declared
a sexually dangerous person under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq.
(West 2010)).
¶6 In April 2013, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated criminal sexual
assault (count I) pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement with the State. In exchange for his guilty
plea, the parties agreed defendant would receive a 15-year prison sentence and that the State would
dismiss both the remaining charges against defendant (counts II, III, and IV) and its petition to
have defendant declared a sexually dangerous person. At the plea hearing, the trial court admon-
ished defendant regarding the rights he would be giving up by pleading guilty, that the applicable
sentencing range was 6 to 60 years due to defendant’s prior criminal history, that “there would
also be a Mandatory Supervised Release [(MSR)], or parole term, of an indeterminate 3 years to
natural life,” and that defendant’s sentence was “an 85[%] sentence by law.” Defendant asserted
he understood each of the court’s admonishments and wished to plead guilty.
-2- ¶7 The State presented a factual basis that T.T. would testify, on December 18, 2010,
she was speaking with defendant when he “indicated he *** wanted to have sexual intercourse
with her.” T.T. refused and “struggled to get away.” The two “ended up” in a vehicle where de-
fendant struck T.T. on the head with a hammer. T.T. was incapacitated and “in a great deal of
pain” but did not lose consciousness. After striking T.T. with the hammer, defendant engaged in
an act of sexual intercourse with her inside the vehicle. The State asserted its evidence would also
show that forensic testing on samples taken from T.T.’s vaginal area were a deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) match to standards taken from defendant. It further represented that the police searched the
vehicle defendant had been using at the time of the offense and found a hammer that was consistent
with T.T.’s description of the hammer defendant used. Additionally, a physical examination of
T.T. showed a laceration on her head that was consistent with her being struck by an object and
“scuff marks and scratches” on her body that were consistent with a struggle.
¶8 On further questioning by the trial court, defendant asserted his counsel had an-
swered any questions he had about the case to his satisfaction; he was pleading guilty of his own
free will; he had no questions regarding the charges against him, his rights, the possible sentences,
or anything else; and he wanted to continue to plead guilty. The court then accepted defendant’s
plea, finding it was knowingly and voluntarily made, and sentenced him to 15 years in prison with
an “indeterminate [MSR term of] from 3 years to natural life.”
¶9 In May 2013, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate
his sentence. He alleged his attorney, Howard R. Baker, provided ineffective assistance of counsel;
he did not fully understand that he could be determined to be “a sexually dangerous person” in the
future and “do more time” after serving his 15-year prison sentence; and that he did not understand
-3- the trial court’s MSR admonishments. The same month, defendant’s attorney filed a second motion
to withdraw plea and vacate sentence on defendant’s behalf. Defendant’s claims in connection
with that motion essentially reiterated the claims of his pro se filing, except for his claim alleging
Baker’s ineffectiveness.
¶ 10 In October 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing in the matter. Defendant testi-
fied that when pleading guilty, he did not understand that his MSR term could be for an indeter-
minate length of time from three years to life. He stated he did not understand the word “indeter-
minate” and would not have agreed to plead guilty had he understood that “parole could be for
life.” Defendant also testified that he did not understand “the possibility of being found to be sex-
ually violent” and, if he had, he would not have pleaded guilty. On cross-examination, defendant
maintained that he did not ask the trial judge what “indeterminate” meant because “[i]t didn’t cross
[his] mind.” He also acknowledged that he had discussions with Baker about the possibility of
commitment as a sexually violent person. However, defendant asserted that he did not understand
what Baker was telling him. Specifically, he did not understand that his confinement could be
prolonged.
¶ 11 Ultimately, the trial court denied defendant’s request to withdraw his plea and va-
cate his sentence and he appealed. On appeal, defendant argued the court improperly failed to
conduct a Krankel inquiry (People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984)) into his
pro se postplea claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the State conceded the issue. People
v. Brown, 2015 IL App (4th) 130905-U, ¶ 16. This court accepted the State’s concession and re-
manded the matter to the trial court so that it could conduct an inquiry into defendant’s pro se
claims. Id. ¶ 19.
-4- ¶ 12 On remand, a new attorney, Scott A. Rueter, was appointed to represent defendant.
In March 2017, with Rueter’s assistance, defendant filed an amended motion to withdraw his guilty
plea and vacate his jury trial waiver. Defendant alleged (1) his jury trial waiver was not voluntarily
or knowingly executed because Baker did not inform defendant of the ramifications or conse-
quences of his waiver; (2) his guilty plea was not voluntarily or knowingly entered “because de-
fendant felt he had no option but to enter a plea of guilty based upon the representations made to
him by” Baker; (3) Baker did not inform defendant that he faced the possibility of commitment as
a sexually violent person after serving his 15-year prison sentence; and (4) Baker did not ade-
quately inform defendant regarding MSR, causing defendant not to understand the trial court’s
MSR admonishments.
¶ 13 In June 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s amended motion.
Defendant testified on his own behalf that at the time he pleaded guilty, he was not aware that he
could be committed as a sexually violent person after serving his 15-year sentence in the Illinois
Department of Corrections (DOC). According to defendant, Baker represented to him that if his
case went to trial, he “could be committed” but, if he pleaded guilty, “then whatever the plea
agreement was, that would be it.” Defendant asserted he would not have pleaded guilty if he had
known that he “could be committed as a sexually violent person.”
¶ 14 Defendant also asserted that at the time he pleaded guilty, he did not understand
what was being said about MSR. He acknowledged that the trial court advised him that his MSR
term could be “anywhere [from] three years to natural life.” However, the court used the word
“indeterminate,” which defendant asserted he did not understand. Defendant also testified that
Baker did not discuss MSR with him and had not informed him of the “possibility of up to life in
-5- parole.” Again, defendant stated he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known that he faced
the possibility of an MSR period of natural life.
¶ 15 The State elected not to cross-examine defendant or present evidence, believing
that State participation in the proceedings would be improper because the matter had been re-
manded for a Krankel inquiry into what were, originally, defendant’s pro se ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claims. The trial court then called Baker as the court’s own witness. Baker testified that
he met with defendant numerous times regarding the petition the State filed to have him declared
a sexually dangerous person. He asserted he explained “what that meant” to defendant several
times and that it was “basically indeterminate time of imprisonment or in a hospital facility to get
treatment.” Baker stated defendant “was not comfortable with that scenario.” Baker then noted
that the State offered to dismiss its petition as part of the plea agreement and testified as follows:
“There was discussion about at the time that it was feasible that [DOC] could file a
petition to declare him sexually violent, but that would mean he’d be evaluated by
doctors, they’d make some determination. [Defendant] was pretty adamant that
there was nothing wrong with him, so that didn’t bother—it bothered him to admit
he was sexually dangerous. That was troublesome to him.
In the numerous discussions I had, I am not honestly sure I ever got the
point across that this was still possible. I tried numerous times. [Defendant] felt and
maintained steadfastly that he wasn’t sexually dangerous or violent.”
¶ 16 Baker next testified that he had no independent recollection of discussing the ap-
plicable MSR term with defendant. However, he believed that it was “unlikely” that he would not
have had such a discussion “with a client of that scenario.” Baker then recalled that defendant was
-6- admonished by the trial court with respect to MSR and that the issue was addressed in connection
with defendant’s original motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
¶ 17 The trial court noted it was ruling on two matters—whether Baker was ineffective
and whether to allow defendant’s amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which incorporated
his ineffective-assistance claims. Initially, it stated that after listening to defendant’s testimony and
Baker’s response, it found Baker was not ineffective in his representation of defendant. The court
then denied defendant’s amended motion, finding defendant’s guilty plea was knowing and vol-
untary. In so finding, the court determined that the issue of whether defendant faced future con-
finement as a sexually violent person was “a collateral issue” and noted that defendant had been
admonished regarding the applicable MSR term.
¶ 18 Again, defendant appealed the trial court’s decision. In October 2017, this court
allowed an agreed motion for summary remand for the filing of an Illinois Supreme Court Rule
604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017) certificate. People v. Brown, 4-17-0448 (2017) (order for summary re-
mand). We remanded the matter to the trial court “for the filing of a *** Rule 604(d) certificate,
*** the opportunity to file a new post-plea motion, if counsel concludes that a new motion is
necessary, a new hearing on the motion, a new judgment, a new notice of appeal, and strict com-
pliance with the requirements of Rule 604(d).” Id.
¶ 19 In February 2018, on remand, Rueter filed a new Rule 604(d) certificate. His cer-
tificate stated as follows:
“Scott A. Rueter, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and states as fol-
lows:
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois.
-7- 2. I have been appointed to represent Defendant in connection with his ef-
forts to withdraw his guilty plea in the above case.
3. I have consulted with Defendant by mail and in person to ascertain his
contentions of error in the sentence and in the entry of the plea of guilty.
4. I have examined the trial court’s file in this matter and a report of the
proceedings with respect to the plea of guilty and the imposition of sentence upon
the Defendant.
5. I have prepared a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty on the defendant’s
behalf, and outlined therein any issues necessary for the adequate presentation of
any defects in those proceedings.”
¶ 20 In May 2018, defendant filed a new amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea
and vacate his jury trial waiver. He alleged that his jury trial waiver was not voluntary or knowing
because he “was not informed of the ramifications or consequences of his waiver by his counsel,”
he did not understand the ramifications of his guilty plea, and his plea “was a void sentence in that
such plea would require an additional period of 10 years to be mandatorily added to the sentence,
which was not done or taken into account during the plea.” In June 2018, the State filed a response
to the amended motion.
¶ 21 In August 2018, Rueter filed a second Rule 604(d) certificate that was identical to
the previous one. The same day, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion. The
parties relied on evidence presented at the hearing on defendant’s previous amended motion and
presented arguments to the court. Ultimately, the court denied the motion. It stated that after re-
viewing the record and transcripts in the case, it found defendant’s guilty plea was knowingly and
-8- voluntarily made. The court also rejected defendant’s void-sentence argument. It first determined
that a 10-year add-on was not required for the offense to which defendant pleaded guilty given the
factual basis that was presented by the State during the plea proceedings. Second, it noted that the
void sentence rule was abolished by the supreme court’s decision in People v. Castleberry, 2015
IL 116916, 43 N.E.3d 932.
¶ 22 This appeal followed. As stated, OSAD was appointed to represent defendant on
appeal. In March 2019, it filed a motion to withdraw as appellate counsel and attached a memo-
randum of law in support, identifying issues that might arguably support an appeal but concluding
they had no merit. Proof of service of the motion on defendant has been shown. Additionally, this
court granted defendant leave to file a response to the motion and he has responded. The State has
also filed an appellee’s brief. After examining the record and executing our duties in accordance
with Anders, we grant OSAD’s motion and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 As noted, OSAD filed its motion to withdraw as appellate counsel citing Finley,
481 U.S. 551. We note Finley, 481 U.S. at 556, is applicable in the context of postconviction
collateral attacks while Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, applies when an appointed attorney moves to
withdraw in a direct appeal. Because this case involves direct review of the denial of defendant’s
amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea—albeit in a third direct appeal—and not a postcon-
viction collateral attack, Anders applies. Here, OSAD’s memorandum meets Anders requirements.
Accordingly, we characterize its filing as a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders.
¶ 25 On review, OSAD identifies issues of potentially arguable merit as the (1) substan-
tive allegations of defendant’s May 2018 amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate
-9- his jury trial waiver and (2) sufficiency of his counsel’s most recent Rule 604(d) certificate. It
concludes that both issues are without arguable merit and we agree.
¶ 26 In connection with his May 2018 motion, defendant initially argued his jury trial
waiver was not voluntary and knowing because Baker did not inform him of the ramifications or
consequences of his waiver. He also alleged that he did not fully understand the ramifications of
pleading guilty. Specifically, defendant repeatedly asserted below that he was not informed of the
possibility that he could be committed as a sexually violent person after pleading guilty and serving
his 15-year prison sentence. He also maintained that he did not understand that he could be subject
to an MSR term of natural life. On appeal, defendant reiterates these claims in his response to
OSAD’s motion to withdraw.
¶ 27 We note that “[a] defendant has no absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea.” Peo-
ple v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 32, 983 N.E.2d 439. “Rather, he must show a manifest injustice
under the facts involved.” Id. “Withdrawal is appropriate where the plea was entered through a
misapprehension of the facts or of the law or where there is doubt as to the guilt of the accused
and justice would be better served through a trial.” Id. “[T]he decision to grant or deny a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea rests in the sound discretion of the circuit court and, as such, is reviewed
for abuse of discretion.” Id.
¶ 28 Due process generally requires that for a defendant to knowingly and voluntarily
plead guilty, he or she must be advised of the direct consequences of a guilty plea. Id. ¶ 35. “[A]
direct consequence of a guilty plea is one which has a definite, immediate and largely automatic
effect on the range of a defendant’s sentence.” Id. “[A] defendant need not be advised by the trial
court of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 36. “A collateral
- 10 - consequence is one which the circuit court has no authority to impose, and results from an action
that may or may not be taken by an agency that the trial court does not control.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 29 Accordingly, the trial court must admonish a defendant who pleads guilty pursuant
to a negotiated plea agreement regarding the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law,
including the applicable MSR term. People v. Boykins, 2017 IL 121365, ¶ 13, 93 N.E.3d 504 (cit-
ing People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 194-95, 840 N.E.2d 658, 669 (2005)). By contrast, because
the possibility of involuntary commitment under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act
(725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2010)) is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, the trial court is
not obligated to advise the defendant of the possibility prior to accepting a plea. Hughes, 2012 IL
112817, ¶¶ 37-40.
¶ 30 However, the supreme court has held that “defense counsel has a minimal duty to
advise a defendant who pleads guilty to a triggering offense subject to the provision of the Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act that he will be evaluated for and may risk involuntary commit-
ment after completing his prison term.” Id. ¶ 60. For a defendant to obtain relief based on a claim
that his attorney failed to properly advise him prior to pleading guilty, the defendant must establish
ineffective assistance under the Strickland standard (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984)) by showing “counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance re-
sulted in prejudice.” Id. ¶ 44.
¶ 31 Here, the first issue presented by defendant’s May 2018 amended motion concerned
whether Baker’s representation of defendant was ineffective because he did not inform defendant
of the ramifications or consequences of his decision to waive a jury trial and plead guilty.
- 11 - Ultimately, however, the record refutes any contention that Baker’s performance was deficient or
that defendant suffered prejudice. In response to defendant’s allegations of ineffectiveness, Baker
testified and recalled discussing with defendant the State’s petition to have him declared sexually
dangerous and “what that meant.” He also recalled that at the time defendant was contemplating
pleading guilty, “[t]here was discussion *** that it was feasible that [DOC] could file a petition to
declare him sexually violent.” Further, although Baker had no independent recollection of discuss-
ing the applicable MSR term with defendant, he found it “unlikely” that he would not have done
so. Moreover, Baker recalled, and the record reflects, that the trial court fully admonished defend-
ant prior to accepting his guilty plea regarding the MSR term that applied. The record shows de-
fendant asserted he understood the court’s admonishments and that he had no questions.
¶ 32 After reviewing the record and considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court
found no merit to defendant’s ineffective-assistance claims. The record supports that finding. As
a result, the court did not err in rejecting defendant’s ineffectiveness claims or abuse its discretion
by denying his May 2018 amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his jury trial.
On appeal, OSAD is correct in finding no arguable merit to defendant’s ineffective-assistance
claim.
¶ 33 The second issue presented in connection with defendant’s May 2018 amended
motion was that he did not fully understand the ramifications of pleading guilty because he did not
understand from the trial court’s admonishments that he could face future commitment as a sex-
ually violent person or the applicable MSR term. As stated above, the prospect of commitment
under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act is a collateral consequence and the trial court
was under no obligation to advise defendant of that possibility at the time he pleaded guilty.
- 12 - Further, the record of the plea hearing reflects that the court provided appropriate MSR admonish-
ments to defendant. Defendant asserted he understood the admonishments given to him and had
no questions.
¶ 34 Additionally, both of these issues were raised in connection with defendant’s orig-
inal, May 2013 motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate sentence. The trial court considered
and rejected the issues, denying defendant’s motion. Although defendant appealed within 30 days
of that judgment, he challenged only the court’s failure to conduct any inquiry into his pro se
ineffective-assistance claims. We note that “the law of the case doctrine bars relitigation of an
issue already decided in the same case.” People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 395, 794 N.E.2d 238,
247 (2002). Specifically, “the failure of a party to challenge a legal decision when it has the op-
portunity to do so renders that decision the law of the case for future stages of the same litigation,
and the party is deemed to have waived the right to challenge that decision at a later time.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (2d) 160971, ¶ 24, 92 N.E.3d 968. Here,
the trial court decided issues regarding whether defendant’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily
entered given the admonishments he received, and defendant did not challenge that portion of the
court’s decision in his initial appeal. Accordingly, the law-of-the-case doctrine barred him from
attempting to relitigate those issues, either before the trial court on remand or now in this third
appeal.
¶ 35 Next, in his May 2018 amended motion, defendant also argued that his sentence
was void. He asserted that the offense to which he pleaded guilty required a 10-year add-on to his
sentence that the parties’ plea agreement did not take into account, resulting in a void sentence.
However, as the trial court found and OSAD asserts in its motion to withdraw, the supreme court
- 13 - has abolished the void sentence rule as constitutionally unsound. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916,
¶ 19.
¶ 36 Further, as argued by the State, defendant’s additional assertions on appeal (in his
response to OSAD’s motion to withdraw as counsel) that his sentence was “illegal” or “invalid”
because it did not include the 10-year add-on are also without merit. The record shows defendant
was originally charged with two counts (counts I and II) of aggravated criminal sexual assault with
the charging instrument referencing section 12-14(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720
ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2) (West 2010)). Both counts alleged that, “while displaying a dangerous
weapon, a hammer with rubber ends, [defendant] knowingly committed a criminal sexual assault
*** against” T.T.
¶ 37 Relevant to this appeal, the text of section 12-14(a) provides as follows:
“The accused commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if he or she commits
criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances existed
during *** the commission of the offense:
(1) the accused displayed, threatened to use, or used a dangerous weapon,
other than a firearm, or any object fashioned or utilized in such a manner as to lead
the victim under the circumstances reasonably to believe it to be a dangerous
weapon; or
(2) the accused caused bodily harm *** to the victim[.]” Id. § 12-14(a).
Additionally, under the Code, convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault under both sec-
tions 12-14(a)(1) and 12-14(a)(2) were Class X felonies; however, convictions under section 12-
14(a)(1) required 10 years to be added to any term of imprisonment imposed by the trial court. Id.
- 14 - § 12-14(d)(1).
¶ 38 Here, for both aggravated-criminal-sexual-assault counts, the charging instrument
referenced section 12-14(a)(2) of the Code but defined the offense consistently with section 12-
14(a)(1), which would have required the 10-year add-on to any sentence imposed. Ultimately,
however, the record supports a finding that defendant pleaded guilty to an offense of aggravated
criminal sexual assault under section 12-14(a)(2), requiring no add-on.
“[T]he State and a defendant have the right to negotiate what facts are presented to
the court in support of a plea agreement. Those facts must be statutorily consistent
with the agreed sentence or sentencing range. The factual basis is the principal
means of placing those facts before the court.” People v. Hubbard, 2012 IL App
(2d) 120060, ¶ 17, 978 N.E.2d 719.
¶ 39 In this instance, the State’s factual basis was in conformity with an offense brought
under section 12-14(a)(2), which required “bodily harm” as an element of the offense. The facts
submitted by the State were also statutorily consistent with the agreed upon 15-year prison sen-
tence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2010) (providing that the applicable sentencing range for
a Class X felony is 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment). Under these circumstances, defendant’s sentence
was neither “invalid” nor “illegal.”
¶ 40 Finally, on review, OSAD argues that any claim with respect to the most recent
Rule 604(d) certificate filed by defendant’s attorney would also have no arguable merit. “Rule
604(d) governs the procedure to be followed when a defendant wishes to appeal from a judgment
entered upon a guilty plea.” In re H.L., 2015 IL 118529, ¶ 7, 48 N.E.3d 1071. It requires that a
defendant’s attorney file a certificate with the trial court, asserting the following:
- 15 - “1. I have consulted with the Defendant in person, by mail, by phone, or by
electronic means to ascertain the defendant’s contentions of error in the entry of the
plea of guilty and in the sentence;
2. I have examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea
of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing; and
3. I have made any amendments to the motion necessary for the adequate
presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1,
2017), Art. VI Forms Appendix.
An attorney must strictly comply with Rule 604(d)’s certification requirement. H.L., 2015 IL
118529, ¶ 8.
¶ 41 Here, the record reflects strict compliance by defendant’s attorney with Rule
604(d)’s requirements. Thus, there is no arguable merit to any claim based upon the insufficiency
of counsel’s most recent Rule 604(d) certificate.
¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
¶ 44 Affirmed.
- 16 -