People v. Brash

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Brash

228 A.D.2d 687, 644 N.Y.2d 980, 644 N.Y.S.2d 980, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7441

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 24, 1996

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 228 A.D.2d 687 (People v. Brash) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Brash, 228 A.D.2d 687, 644 N.Y.2d 980, 644 N.Y.S.2d 980, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7441 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

Opinion

The Supreme Court erred in determining that the defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated (see, CPL 30.30 [1] [a]). It is uncontroverted that the subject six-month period consisted of 184 days and, in dismissing the [688]*688indictment, the court determined that 189 days were chargeable to the People. However, in rendering its determination the court erroneously charged the People with a 12-day period of delay which occurred between November 10, 1994, and November 22, 1994. The record of the November 10, 1994, calendar call before Justice Plug evinces that defense counsel clearly expressed his consent to this adjournment (see generally, People v Smith, 82 NY2d 676, 678; People v Liotta, 79 NY2d 841, 843). Since the subject 12-day period is dispositive with reference to the defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion, the defendant’s motion is denied, the indictment is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings on the indictment. Pizzuto, J. P., Santucci, Altman and Hart, JJ., concur.

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The Supreme Court erred in determining that the defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated (see, CPL 30.30 [1] [a]). It is uncontroverted that the subject six-month period consisted of 184 days and, in dismissing the [688]*688indictment, the court determined that 189 days were chargeable to the People. However, in rendering its determination the court erroneously charged the People with a 12-day period of delay which occurred between November 10, 1994, and November 22, 1994. The record of the November 10, 1994, calendar call before Justice Plug evinces that defense counsel clearly expressed his consent to this adjournment (see generally, People v Smith, 82 NY2d 676, 678; People v Liotta, 79 NY2d 841, 843). Since the subject 12-day period is dispositive with reference to the defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion, the defendant’s motion is denied, the indictment is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings on the indictment. Pizzuto, J. P., Santucci, Altman and Hart, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

228 A.D.2d 687, 644 N.Y.2d 980, 644 N.Y.S.2d 980, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7441, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-brash-nyappdiv-1996.

Opinion

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