People v. Boyd

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Boyd

116 A.D.2d 978, 498 N.Y.S.2d 932, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 51750

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 24, 1986

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 116 A.D.2d 978 (People v. Boyd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Boyd, 116 A.D.2d 978, 498 N.Y.S.2d 932, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 51750 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986).

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Opinion

— Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: The hearing court properly denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that they had been denied their statutory right to a speedy trial (CPL 30.30, 210.20). The court properly excluded from the statutory six-month time period (CPL 30.30 [1] [a]) the 32 days that the case was initially adjourned in Lackawanna City Court to allow defendants to secure the services of an attorney (CPL 30.30 [4] [f]) and thereafter further adjourned at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendants or their counsel for the purpose of scheduling a preliminary hearing (People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523; People v Pressley, 115 AD2d 228; People v Campbell, 96 AD2d 725; see, People v Sturgis, 38 NY2d 625). In addition, the record fully supports the court’s exclusion of that period of time between defendants’ postindictment request for a 45-day adjournment to make pretrial motions and the People’s announcement on the record of their readiness for trial (CPL 30.30 [4] [a], [b]). When these two time periods are excluded, the People were ready for trial within the statutory six-month period. (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Mark, J. — robbery, second degree, two counts.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Denman, O’Donnell, Pine and Schnepp, JJ.

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— Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: The hearing court properly denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that they had been denied their statutory right to a speedy trial (CPL 30.30, 210.20). The court properly excluded from the statutory six-month time period (CPL 30.30 [1] [a]) the 32 days that the case was initially adjourned in Lackawanna City Court to allow defendants to secure the services of an attorney (CPL 30.30 [4] [f]) and thereafter further adjourned at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendants or their counsel for the purpose of scheduling a preliminary hearing (People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523; People v Pressley, 115 AD2d 228; People v Campbell, 96 AD2d 725; see, People v Sturgis, 38 NY2d 625). In addition, the record fully supports the court’s exclusion of that period of time between defendants’ postindictment request for a 45-day adjournment to make pretrial motions and the People’s announcement on the record of their readiness for trial (CPL 30.30 [4] [a], [b]). When these two time periods are excluded, the People were ready for trial within the statutory six-month period. (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Mark, J. — robbery, second degree, two counts.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Denman, O’Donnell, Pine and Schnepp, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

116 A.D.2d 978, 498 N.Y.S.2d 932, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 51750, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-boyd-nyappdiv-1986.

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