People v. Box

2024 IL App (4th) 230649-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 29, 2024
• Docket: 4-23-0649
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 230649-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is May 29, 2024 NO. 4-23-0649 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Winnebago County REZA L. BOX, ) No. 21CF274 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Debra D. Schafer, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Lannerd concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court vacated defendant’s conviction for possession of a defaced firearm and remanded for further proceedings where the State failed to present evidence that defendant knew about the defacement of the firearm he possessed. The court further held that (1) the trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress evidence, (2) the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of a controlled substance, (3) defendant was not entitled to raise a necessity defense against the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon charge, and (4) defendant’s conviction for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon did not violate the second amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. II).

¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant, Reza L. Box, was found guilty of possession of

cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2020)) (count IV), possession of a

firearm with a defaced serial number (720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2020)) (count V), unlawful use

of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2020)) (count VI), and possession

of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2020)) (count VII). The trial court found

defendant not guilty of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2020)) (count I) and two counts of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2020)) (counts II

and III). Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress

evidence, (2) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed

possession of a controlled substance and possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number,

(3) the court erroneously determined that defendant was not entitled to a necessity defense, and

(4) defendant’s UUWF conviction violates the second amendment to the United States

Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. II). We vacate defendant’s conviction for possession of a firearm

with a defaced serial number and remand for further proceedings on that count but affirm on all

other grounds.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant was charged with the aforementioned offenses following his February

13, 2021, arrest. On that date, officers observed a handgun with a filed-off serial number on the

floorboard of the vehicle defendant was in. After detaining defendant, officers also located cocaine

and marijuana in the vehicle.

¶5 A. Motion to Suppress

¶6 On April 29, 2021, defendant filed a “motion to quash arrest & suppress physical

evidence.” Therein, defendant requested the trial court “suppress physical evidence seized” from

his vehicle because the arresting officers lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to detain

him.

¶7 The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on July 13, 2021. Sergeant

Greg Yalden of the Rockford Police Department testified to the following. On February 13, 2021,

Yalden was patrolling “the area of the Aragona Club” in Rockford in an unmarked car. As Yalden

was driving, he observed an individual he knew “from prior contact” as Von Johnson leaning into

-2- the front driver’s window of a gray Nissan. Johnson was speaking with defendant, who was sitting

in the driver’s seat of the Nissan. Johnson saw Yalden and immediately walked toward a nearby

white Pontiac. The Pontiac, however, drove away. As Yalden observed this, he saw a bulge in

Johnson’s front left pocket. Yalden drove around the block and returned to the scene. As Yalden

rounded a corner, he saw Johnson sitting in the front passenger seat of the Nissan. Defendant was

still sitting in the driver’s seat. Both then exited the Nissan, walked toward a Hyundai Santa Fe

that was parked nearby, and sat in the back seat before the Hyundai drove away. Yalden did not

see defendant holding anything, and he could not tell whether Johnson still had an object in his

pocket.

¶8 After the Hyundai drove away, Yalden requested other officers to meet him at the

parked Nissan to see whether anything was discarded and to investigate why defendant and

Johnson quickly left the vehicle. Before backup arrived, Yalden parked and walked to the Nissan.

Yalden shined his light through the front passenger window and observed in plain view an uncased

handgun on the passenger floorboard with its serial number filed off. The gun was next to a black

fanny pack. After other officers arrived, they conducted surveillance on the vehicle, waiting for

defendant and Johnson to return to detain them for an uncased and defaced firearm. About 19

minutes later, the Hyundai returned and pulled up behind the Nissan. Defendant exited the rear

seat on the driver’s side of the Hyundai and got into the driver’s seat of the Nissan. When defendant

started the vehicle, Yalden and the officers activated their vehicles’ lights, converged, and took

defendant into custody. Yalden testified that, although the gun was found on the passenger-side

floorboard where Johnson had been sitting, defendant was the driver and the only occupant of the

vehicle where the handgun was found.

-3- ¶9 Officer Jeremiah Cizerle of the Rockford Police Department testified next, and his

testimony was substantially like Yalden’s. Cizerle noted that upon arriving at the scene, he

observed a parked Nissan. Yalden directed him to the front passenger-side floorboard of the

vehicle, where he saw a black handgun next to a black fanny pack. Cizerle observed that the

firearm’s serial number was scratched off. Cizerle testified that officers surveilled the Nissan until

another vehicle approached the area. After defendant got out of that vehicle, he entered the Nissan

and was inside for 30 to 40 seconds before he turned on the headlights. At that time, officers

activated their emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. When defendant exited the Nissan, he

was wearing the fanny pack that had been next to the firearm on the floorboard. After defendant

was taken into custody, officers searched the vehicle and saw that the firearm had been moved

completely under the passenger seat.

¶ 10 The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. The court found that

defendant was the sole occupant of a vehicle with a firearm that had been on the floorboard, which

officers saw was uncased and had a defaced serial number. The court noted that it was illegal to

transport the firearm while uncased and to possess a firearm with a defaced serial number.

Accordingly, the court found that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant.

¶ 11 B. Bench Trial on AHC and UUWF

¶ 12 On October 7, 2021, defendant filed a motion to sever the AHC and UUWF counts

from the remaining counts, and the trial court granted that motion on October 21, 2021.

¶ 13 A bench trial on the AHC and UUWF counts commenced on January 19, 2022. The

State first called Yalden, whose testimony was substantially like his testimony from the motion to

suppress hearing. Yalden testified, inter alia, that he was patrolling the area near the Aragona at 1

a.m. and saw Johnson talking to defendant, who was in a Nissan. After defendant and Johnson left

-4- in a nearby Hyundai, Yalden approached the Nissan and shined a light through the front passenger

window. Yalden observed a handgun in plain view next to a black fanny pack on the passenger-side

floorboard. Yalden could “see plainly” that the handgun’s serial number had been scratched or

filed off. After additional officers arrived, they conducted surveillance on the Nissan until the

Hyundai returned. Defendant exited the rear driver’s door of the Hyundai and entered the Nissan.

Once defendant got into the Nissan, the officers converged and arrested defendant. On

cross-examination, Yalden acknowledged that “there were a lot of people” outside the Aragona

and that it was busy.

¶ 14 Cizerle’s testimony also mirrored his testimony from the motion to suppress

hearing. Cizerle testified, inter alia, that he met with Yalden at the Nissan and, upon looking

inside, observed a black handgun on the front passenger-side floorboard, inches away from a black

fanny pack. The serial number of the handgun was scratched off, and the barrel was facing the

passenger-side door. After surveilling the Nissan for about 20 minutes, another vehicle arrived,

which defendant exited before getting into the driver’s seat of the Nissan. Cizerle “observed the

headlights come on, the vehicle came on,” and the officers activated their emergency lights and

initiated a traffic stop. Defendant exited the Nissan and was wearing the black fanny pack that had

been on the passenger-side floorboard. Defendant was detained, and when Cizerle informed

defendant that officers had located a gun, defendant said the gun was Johnson’s. Upon searching

the Nissan, Cizerle observed that the fanny pack was no longer there, and the gun was moved to

underneath the passenger seat. The gun was a loaded Taurus G3 9-millimeter with its serial number

scratched off. The handgun was admitted into evidence. The State also introduced photographs of,

inter alia, the interior of the Nissan and the handgun as it appeared under the passenger seat when

officers located it after defendant’s arrest.

-5- ¶ 15 Detective Nicholas Weber testified that he was a crime scene detective who assisted

in the recording and processing of evidence. Weber test-fired the handgun and found it was

operational. Weber attempted to collect forensic evidence from the firearm, such as DNA or

fingerprints, but he was unable to develop any latent evidence of comparable value.

¶ 16 The State introduced certified copies of defendant’s prior convictions for

possession of a firearm by a felon, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, residential burglary, and

conspiracy to commit armed robbery.

¶ 17 Defendant testified in his own defense to the following. On February 13, 2021, he

went to a friend’s house, where there were 10 to 15 people. The group decided to go to the Aragona,

and Johnson asked to ride with defendant because another car was full. Defendant, who was

driving his cousin’s Nissan, agreed. When they arrived at the Aragona, defendant parked and got

out of the Nissan. He realized that he still had his bag on, and because bags were not allowed in

the Aragona, he took it off and threw it back into the Nissan. Johnson also exited. Defendant saw

Johnson speaking with people in a Hyundai that had pulled up. Johnson got into the rear passenger

seat of the Hyundai. Defendant approached the Hyundai and asked for a ride to the liquor store,

and the driver agreed.

¶ 18 After spending five to seven minutes at the liquor store, defendant asked to be taken

back to the Aragona, but Johnson did not want to leave. Despite this, the driver agreed to drive

them back. Johnson sat next to defendant in the back seat of the Hyundai, and when they arrived,

defendant got out and went back to the Nissan. Defendant got into the Nissan but did not start it.

Defendant saw his fanny pack on the floor. As he grabbed it, he felt a hard object next to it.

Defendant determined that the object was a firearm and noted that it was on the side of the vehicle

where Johnson had been sitting. Defendant said he had no knowledge of the firearm when he

-6- entered the Nissan. Defendant explained that the only thing he brought with him was a fanny pack,

and he was the only person in the vehicle. The firearm was in “plain sight,” and he decided that

the “best thing” was not to leave the firearm showing. Defendant “scooted it back with my fanny

pack,” without touching the gun himself. Defendant did not try to take physical control of the

firearm. He exited the Nissan with his fanny pack over his shoulder, and after closing the door, he

saw lights “everywhere.”

¶ 19 On cross-examination, defendant testified that Johnson never spoke with him at

defendant’s driver’s-side window; Johnson was speaking with someone from a different vehicle.

The first time defendant observed the firearm was when he returned to the Nissan, and he did not

know what to do with it. Defendant did not call the police to tell them that there was a firearm in

his car because he had no time. Defendant felt that pushing it under the seat was “the best thing”

to avoid it being seen by others. After the officers activated their lights and approached, defendant

“shouted a lot of stuff” and asked why he was being arrested. Defendant acknowledged that he did

not immediately inform the police that he had a handgun and only told police the gun was

Johnson’s after they told him he was being arrested for “the gun in your car.”

¶ 20 At the conclusion of the evidence, defendant argued that he was entitled to raise the

defense of necessity because he did not know about the firearm until he saw it on the floorboard

of the Nissan. He argued that, because the firearm was in plain view in a busy area, he believed

the best option was to push it under the passenger seat and out of sight. The trial court denied

defendant’s request to raise a necessity defense, concluding that it had “some concerns” about

defendant’s testimony. Among the concerns was that, although defendant claimed to push the

firearm under the passenger seat with his bag, the firearm looked to have been flipped over in the

photograph showing it under the passenger seat, suggesting to the court “more than a quick push

-7- with an encumbered hand.” The court further found that defendant failed to define a “specific and

immediate threat” to him that required him to act as he did. The court also noted that, even if no

such threat needed to be shown, defendant was not entitled to a necessity defense under these

circumstances because there “were other options available to him other than shoving the gun under

the seat and other ways he could have handled the situation.”

¶ 21 The trial court found defendant guilty of UUWF and, initially, AHC. Defendant

subsequently argued, however, that the court’s guilty verdict on the AHC count was erroneous

because the predicate offense of conspiracy to commit armed robbery was not a forcible felony.

The court agreed and ultimately entered a not guilty finding on the AHC count.

¶ 22 C. Bench Trial on the Remaining Counts

¶ 23 On December 16, 2022, the matter proceeded to a bench trial on the remaining

counts of armed violence, possession with intent to deliver cannabis, possession of a firearm with

a defaced serial number, and possession of a controlled substance. The following relevant evidence

was adduced.

¶ 24 Cizerle testified that, after he and other officers activated their vehicles’ emergency

lights, defendant stepped out of his Nissan wearing a black fanny pack across his chest. After

detaining defendant, officers searched the bag and found 85 grams of suspected cannabis. Cizerle

then searched the Nissan and found (1) a bag of suspected cannabis and a digital scale by the shifter

and (2) another bag of suspected cannabis and a bag containing a substance that tested positive for

cocaine inside the center console. Cizerle explained that officers transported defendant to the

police department to interview him. A video of the interview was entered into evidence. This court

has reviewed the video, though portions of the audio are difficult to hear.

-8- ¶ 25 During the interview, defendant told officers that, after returning from the liquor

store, Johnson asked him to “get my stuff” and to “get me my drugs” from the Nissan. Defendant

stated that he only sold “weed” and admitted that he had “weed” in his bag. Defendant stated that

he knew Johnson sold cocaine. An officer then asked where the “crack” was. Defendant’s response

is difficult to hear, but he seems to respond, “I’m not sure, under the armrest it was there. That’s

what I was grabbing to take to him.” To clarify, the officers asked whether, by “armrest,” defendant

meant “where you put your arm, or, like, what you lift up.” Defendant responded that he could not

remember if it was “in the second part or the first part,” but noted that he “grabbed it.” To further

clarify, the officers asked whether it was “inside the center console,” and defendant answered,

“Yeah, that’s where it was at.” The officers asked what defendant did after he grabbed the bag,

and defendant responded, “[Y]ou guys pulled up just then. I was going to take it to him.”

¶ 26 The parties stipulated that the substances recovered from the Nissan were cannabis

and cocaine.

¶ 27 The parties agreed to incorporate defendant’s testimony from his first bench trial.

Defendant also testified again in his own defense. Defendant explained that after returning to the

Nissan from the liquor store, he intended to grab his mask and go into the Aragona. When officers

detained him, he was outside the vehicle and was wearing his fanny pack, which contained

marijuana. Defendant was upset and asked the officers why he was being arrested. On

cross-examination, defendant explained that when he reached for his mask, he noticed his fanny

pack on the floor and grabbed it. At that point, he observed a gun. Defendant “pushed the gun

under the seat” and “just grabbed what belonged” to him before exiting the car. Defendant

acknowledged that Johnson asked him to “get his stuff” when defendant went back to the Nissan.

Defendant further acknowledged that he “believe[d]” that Johnson’s “stuff” was cocaine, but he

-9- was not positive. Defendant testified that he picked up and dropped what he thought was cocaine

from the top of the shifter but claimed he later determined he had only picked up marijuana.

¶ 28 During closing arguments, the State argued that defendant was ultimately in control

of the Nissan and its contents. Further, contrary to defendant’s claims, the cocaine was defendant’s,

and he knew that it was in the center console. The State asserted that during defendant’s interview

with the police, he noted that Johnson asked him to “go get his stuff out of the car, which he knew

to mean either a gun or cocaine, and that he was going to go retrieve those items.” Additionally,

defendant admitted “that he picked up the bag of cocaine” and dropped it “once he realized that

the police were present.” The State explained that defendant “had immediate access to the firearm,

as he had just touched it and he had just moved it underneath the passenger seat.”

¶ 29 The trial court found defendant not guilty of the armed violence counts. The court

found defendant guilty of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, possession of a firearm

with a defaced serial number, and possession of a controlled substance. The court explained that

the evidence established defendant was driving and had primary responsibility for the vehicle.

Additionally, the court noted that there was no evidence that Johnson, who was the only other

individual in the Nissan, went “into the console.” The court sentenced defendant to prison for

concurrent terms of (1) 11 years for UUWF, (2) 8 years for possession with intent to deliver

cannabis, (3) 8 years for possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number, and (4) 5 years for

possession of a controlled substance.

¶ 30 This appeal followed.

¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 32 On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to

suppress evidence, (2) the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of possession

- 10 - of a controlled substance and possession of a defaced firearm, (3) the court erred in finding

defendant was not entitled to a necessity defense as to the UUWF charge, and (4) defendant’s

conviction for UUWF violates the second amendment to the United States Constitution.

¶ 33 A. Motion to Suppress Evidence

¶ 34 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence obtained from the Nissan because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain

¶ 35 We employ a two-part standard of review of a ruling on a motion to suppress.

People v. Fields, 2024 IL App (4th) 210194-B, ¶ 33. We will reverse the trial court’s findings of

fact if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Fields, 2024 IL App (4th) 210194-B,

¶ 33. A finding is deemed against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion

is clearly evident or if the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence that was

presented. People v. Patton, 2022 IL App (4th) 210561, ¶ 88. By contrast, the court’s conclusions

of law are reviewed de novo. Fields, 2024 IL App (4th) 210194-B, ¶ 33.

¶ 36 Both the United States and Illinois Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches

and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. The touchstone of fourth

amendment analysis is reasonableness, which balances the interest in enforcing the law against the

invasion of a citizen’s privacy. Fields, 2024 IL App (4th) 210194-B, ¶ 34. Typically,

reasonableness requires a warrant supported by probable cause. Fields, 2024 IL App (4th)

210194-B, ¶ 34. However, “a police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of an individual

if the officer has a reasonable belief the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime.”

Fields, 2024 IL App (4th) 210194-B, ¶ 35. The stop must be supported by the officer’s reasonable,

articulable suspicion, i.e., more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion of criminal

- 11 - activity. Fields, 2024 IL App (4th) 210194-B, ¶ 34. Additionally, the stop must be justified at its

inception, and the officer must point to specific, articulable facts which, along with rational

inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant the government invading a private citizen’s

constitutionally protected interests. Fields, 2024 IL App (4th) 210194-B, ¶ 35. We judge the

officer’s conduct by an objective standard, considering whether the facts available would lead a

reasonable person to believe that the action taken was appropriate. Fields, 2024 IL App (4th)

210194-B, ¶ 35. Moreover, we assess the validity of the stop in light of the totality of the

circumstances. Fields, 2024 IL App (4th) 210194-B, ¶ 35.

¶ 37 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him. Specifically,

defendant contends that whether the officers had reasonable suspicion “hinged on the officers’

bare testimony that they were able to see, in plain view prior to the search, that the firearm’s serial

number was defaced.” Defendant asserts Yalden’s and Cizerle’s testimony that they could see a

defaced serial number was unbelievable because the officers’ purported observation occurred

while it was dark, and the officers were looking through the passenger window of the Nissan at a

black handgun on the black floorboard. Given our deferential standard of review of factual

findings, this argument is unpersuasive.

¶ 38 “When ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court often must choose

between competing versions of fact and weigh the credibility of witnesses.” People v. Lashmet,

372 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1040 (2007). We thus give “great deference” to the trial court’s ruling on a

motion to suppress, as the trial judge “is in the best position to determine the credibility of

witnesses and to resolve any conflict in their testimony.” People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 219

(2000).

- 12 - ¶ 39 Here, Yalden testified that he observed defendant sitting in the driver’s seat of the

Nissan until defendant eventually left with Johnson in another vehicle. After walking up to the

Nissan, Yalden shined his light through the front passenger-side window. Yalden saw in plain

view a handgun on the passenger-side floorboard. The handgun was uncased, and Yalden explicitly

testified that he was able to observe that the serial number of the firearm had been filed off. In

turn, Cizerle testified that Yalden directed him to the passenger floorboard, and when he looked,

he also saw a black handgun with the serial number scratched off. Defendant is correct that the

evidence showed that Cizerle’s and Yalden’s observations occurred around 1 a.m. and that the

handgun was black against the black floorboard of the Nissan. Despite this, the trial court was in

the best position to assess the credibility of Yalden’s and Cizerle’s testimonies that they could see

a defaced serial number on the handgun. The court reasonably determined that their testimony was

credible, and we defer to that determination. Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s finding

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. As it is illegal to possess a firearm with an

altered, removed, or obliterated serial number (720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2020)), the court

properly found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant, whom they observed

in the driver’s seat of the Nissan where the handgun was found. Thus, we hold that the court did

not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.

¶ 40 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 41 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

of both possession of a controlled substance and possession of a defaced firearm.

¶ 42 When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court will not

retry the defendant. People v. Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 28. Instead, we ask whether, “viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

- 13 - the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.) Jones, 2023

IL 127810, ¶ 28. We will not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s on issues regarding the

weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 28. Additionally,

we will draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State. Jones, 2023 IL

127810, ¶ 28. We will not overturn a criminal conviction “unless the evidence is so unreasonable,

improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Jones, 2023

IL 127810, ¶ 28.

¶ 43 1. Possession of a Controlled Substance

¶ 44 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

possessed the cocaine recovered from the vehicle.

¶ 45 To prove defendant guilty of possessing a controlled substance, the State must

prove that he knowingly possessed a controlled substance. 720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2020).

Possession falls into two categories, actual and constructive. People v. Johnson, 2013 IL App (4th)

120162, ¶ 24. “ ‘Actual possession exists where the defendant exhibits some form of dominion

over the unlawful substance, such as trying to conceal it or throw it away.’ ” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Johnson, 2013 IL App (4th) 120162, ¶ 24 (quoting People v. Scott, 2012 IL App

(4th) 100304, ¶ 19). A defendant exercises constructive possession where he or she has “ ‘no actual

personal present dominion over the narcotics, but there is an intent and a capability to maintain

control *** over them.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson, 2013 IL App (4th) 120162,

¶ 24 (quoting Scott, 2012 IL App (4th) 100304, ¶ 19). “To establish constructive possession, the

State must prove that the defendant knew contraband was present and that the defendant exercised

immediate and exclusive control over the area where the contraband was found.” Jones, 2023 IL

127810, ¶ 30. “The rule that possession must be exclusive does not mean, however, that the

- 14 - possession may not be joint.” People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 335 (2010). If several individuals

intend to exercise control over an object, then each has possession. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 335.

¶ 46 Knowledge is rarely shown by direct proof, and therefore, it is typically proved by

circumstantial evidence. People v. Sanchez, 375 Ill. App. 3d 299, 301 (2007). Knowledge can be

proved where the State presents sufficient evidence from which the fact finder can reasonably infer

that the defendant knew of the controlled substance’s existence at the place officers found it.

Sanchez, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 301. Such evidence can include the defendant’s acts, conduct, or

statements, as well as the surrounding facts and circumstances. Sanchez, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 301.

Additionally, “proof that a defendant had control over the premises where contraband is located

gives rise to an inference of knowledge and possession of that contraband.” Jones, 2023 IL 127810,

¶ 30.

¶ 47 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the

trial court reasonably concluded that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine recovered

from the Nissan. The evidence showed that defendant was driving the Nissan the night the cocaine

was discovered. Thus, defendant had control of the vehicle. While the evidence showed that

Johnson accompanied defendant in the Nissan at one point, there was no indication that Johnson

accessed the console. Further, defendant admitted during his police interview that he knew Johnson

sold cocaine, Johnson asked defendant to return his “stuff,” and defendant believed Johnson’s

“stuff” was cocaine. Moreover, after officers asked defendant where the “crack” was, he responded

that it was in the center console and that he grabbed it.

¶ 48 On appeal, defendant contends the video of his police interview does not

definitively show that he knew cocaine was in the Nissan. He argues that, immediately after being

asked where the “crack” was, he stated he was not “sure,” and this, coupled with his testimony that

- 15 - he initially thought he grabbed a bag of cocaine from the console but, instead, grabbed a bag of

marijuana, established that he had no knowledge of the cocaine in his vehicle. The audio of

defendant’s immediate response when asked where the “crack” was is difficult to discern, but it

sounds as if defendant responds, “I’m not sure, on the armrest it was there. That’s what I was

grabbing to take to him.” Contrary to defendant’s claim, this statement could be interpreted to

establish that defendant had knowledge of the cocaine.

¶ 49 Even if we disregarded that specific comment because it is difficult to discern, the

subsequent questioning also suggested that defendant had knowledge of the cocaine. Specifically,

the officers asked additional questions, such as whether by “armrest” defendant meant the interior

of the center console. Each of these questions followed the officers asking specifically about

“crack,” and they did not reference any other drugs during this portion of the questioning.

Defendant, in turn, did not seek clarification about what drugs the officers were asking about or

inform the officers that he had no knowledge of the cocaine. The trial court, therefore, could

reasonably conclude that defendant understood the officers’ questioning at this point in the

interview to be specifically about cocaine, i.e., whether there was cocaine in the center console. In

response to this questioning, defendant explained that by “armrest,” he meant the interior of the

center console, and he admitted that he “grabbed it.” Given this context, the court could reasonably

conclude that defendant admitted to knowing that there was cocaine in the center console and

grabbing it. “It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of witnesses and

the weight given to their testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from that evidence.” People v. Johnson, 334 Ill. App. 3d 666, 678 (2002). The court

observed the video of defendant’s interrogation, and as it was in the best position to weigh the

evidence, it was free to resolve any inconsistencies and to accept or reject as much of defendant’s

- 16 - testimony as it pleased. People v. Love, 404 Ill. App. 3d 784, 787 (2010). Based upon defendant’s

admissions during his police interview, the court was free to disregard his claims at trial that he

did not know there was cocaine in the Nissan and that he only picked up a bag of marijuana.

¶ 50 Defendant argues People v. Gore, 115 Ill. App. 3d 1054 (1983), and People v.

Hampton, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1029 (2005), establish that the trial court erred in concluding that he

had knowledge and control of the cocaine, because he did not own the Nissan and Johnson was in

the Nissan for the “vast majority” of the time. However, both cases are distinguishable.

¶ 51 In Gore, the defendant borrowed a vehicle and drove to a tavern with two other

individuals. Gore, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 1055-56. At the time the defendant borrowed the vehicle,

there were beer cans on the floorboard. Gore, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 1055. After leaving the tavern,

the defendant’s vehicle was stopped due to erratic driving, and a search of the vehicle revealed

open beer cans and a bag of cannabis under the front passenger’s seat. Gore, 115 Ill. App. 3d at

1056-57. The defendant was convicted of, inter alia, unlawful possession of cannabis, and he

appealed, arguing the State did not prove he possessed the bag of cannabis. Gore, 115 Ill. App. 3d

at 1055-56. The appellate court agreed, determining that, because the defendant was traveling with

passengers and there was no evidence he ever had exclusive control of the place where the cannabis

was discovered, any of the passengers could have been responsible for the cannabis, and therefore,

defendant’s guilt was not established beyond a reasonable doubt. Gore, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 1058.

¶ 52 In Hampton, the defendant was driving, for the first time, a vehicle that was

registered to his brother, who had passed away a month prior. Hampton, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1030.

An officer pulled over the defendant, who was the sole occupant of the vehicle, because the

vehicle’s temporary registration was expired. Hampton, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1030. A subsequent

search of the vehicle revealed a firearm inside the glove compartment. Hampton, 358 Ill. App. 3d

- 17 - at 1030. Defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, and the defendant

appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove that he knew there was a weapon in the vehicle.

Hampton, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1030-31. The appellate court agreed, concluding that, because the

evidence showed the defendant did not have regular and ongoing control of the vehicle, the State

could not rely on an inference of knowledge stemming from the defendant’s mere presence in the

vehicle. Hampton, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1032-33. Additionally, because the State presented no other

evidence of knowledge, the State failed to establish that the defendant knowingly possessed the

handgun. Hampton, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1032-33.

¶ 53 Unlike Gore, the State presented evidence that defendant had exclusive control of

the Nissan. The evidence established that, although defendant drove to the Aragona with Johnson,

after they left in another vehicle and returned from a liquor store, defendant was the only individual

to return to and enter the Nissan. Further, unlike Hampton, the State presented evidence from

which a rational fact finder could find that defendant had knowledge of the cocaine. As explained

above, the evidence established that Johnson had asked defendant to get his “stuff,” which

defendant believed included cocaine. Defendant went back to the Nissan intending to retrieve it,

and defendant admitted during his police interview that he grabbed a bag of cocaine from the center

console.

¶ 54 We conclude that, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

State, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable fact finder to conclude that defendant knowingly

and constructively possessed cocaine.

¶ 55 2. Possession of a Defaced Firearm

¶ 56 Defendant also argues the State failed to prove that he knew the serial number on

the handgun was defaced.

- 18 - ¶ 57 Defendant was convicted of section 24-5(b) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code)

(720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2020)). Section 24-5(b) provides, “A person who possesses any firearm

upon which any such importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number has been changed, altered,

removed or obliterated commits a Class 3 felony.” 720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2020).

¶ 58 Relying on People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, defendant argues the State had to

prove that he knew that the firearm was defaced. Defendant contends that, per Ramirez, his

conviction for possession of a defaced firearm should be vacated and the matter remanded for a

new trial on that count.

¶ 59 In Ramirez, police executed a search warrant at the defendant’s residence and

recovered a shotgun from under the defendant’s mattress with its serial number scratched off.

Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶¶ 3-4. The defendant was charged with possession of a firearm with a

changed, altered, removed, or obliterated serial number, and while the parties stipulated that the

serial number had been defaced, the State presented no direct evidence that the defendant knew of

the defacement. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶ 6. Following his conviction, the defendant appealed

to the Illinois Supreme Court, arguing that the State needed to prove that he knew the firearm was

defaced. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶¶ 7, 12. The court agreed, concluding that a person must

knowingly possess a defaced firearm and know such firearm is defaced to be convicted under

section 24-5(b). Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶ 23. The court reasoned that section 24-5(b) is a

possessory offense for which knowledge is the appropriate mental state and that the mental state

of knowledge applied to both the possession and defacement elements of the offense. Ramirez,

2023 IL 128123, ¶¶ 22-23. Accordingly, the court determined the State was required to prove that

the defendant knew the firearm was defaced to convict him of violating section 24-5(b). Ramirez,

- 19 - 2023 IL 128123, ¶ 23. Because the reversal of the defendant’s conviction was due to a posttrial

change in the law, the court remanded the case for a new trial. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶¶ 29-31.

¶ 60 Given Ramirez’s holding, the State concedes that defendant is entitled to a new trial

on the possession of a defaced firearm charge. The State asserts the record established that the

handgun’s defaced serial number was in plain view, and had the prosecution known that it needed

to prove defendant knew of the defacement, it would have introduced the handgun into evidence

at the second bench trial “to show that the defacement was so clear that it could not have escaped

defendant’s notice.” Under these circumstances, we accept the parties’ agreement that the proper

remedy is to vacate defendant’s conviction for possession of a defaced firearm and remand for a

new trial on that charge. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶¶ 30-31.

¶ 61 C. Necessity Defense

¶ 62 Defendant argues the trial court erred in determining that he was not entitled to

raise a necessity defense to the UUWF charge.

¶ 63 The necessity defense is outlined in section 7-13 of the Code, which provides:

“Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity

if the accused was without blame in occasioning or developing the situation and

reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury

greater than the injury which might reasonably result from his own conduct.” 720

ILCS 5/7-13 (West 2020).

To raise the defense of necessity, the defendant must show some evidence that he (1) “was without

blame in occasioning or developing the situation” and (2) “reasonably believed that his conduct

was necessary to avoid a greater public or private injury than that which might reasonably have

resulted from his conduct.” People v. Janik, 127 Ill. 2d 390, 399 (1989). A necessity defense is

- 20 - viewed as a “choice between two admitted evils where other optional courses of action are

unavailable [citations] and the conduct chosen must promote some higher value than the value of

literal compliance with the law.” Janik, 127 Ill. 2d at 399.

¶ 64 The parties dispute whether a necessity defense also requires a showing that the

defendant faced an immediate threat of harm. In particular, defendant argues, while People v. Kite,

153 Ill. 2d 40, 45 (1992), referenced a “specific and immediate threat” in the context of the

defendant raising a necessity defense, that requirement applies only to inmates raising the defense

in the context of prison escapes. The State responds that defendant’s interpretation of Kite is too

narrow.

¶ 65 In Kite, after the defendant, an inmate at a corrections facility, was found to possess

a knife in 1989, the defendant was charged with possession of a knife by a person in custody of a

corrections facility. Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 42. At trial, the defendant testified that in 1987 and 1988,

prison officials conspired to have him slain by other inmates, and though he claimed officials

passed weapons to other inmates to do so, the defendant named neither the officials nor the inmates

involved. Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 43. The defendant tendered jury instructions on the affirmative

defense of necessity. Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 43. The trial court denied the instruction, and after the

defendant was convicted, the appellate court reversed his conviction. Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 43. The

State appealed, and the supreme court reversed the appellate court, concluding the trial court could

have properly found that a necessity instruction was unwarranted due to a lack of credible evidence

warranting it. Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 48. In reaching that conclusion, the court explained that case law

had established three factors “to determine when an inmate may be entitled to a necessity defense

instruction in the context of a case involving the possession of a weapon in prison.” Kite, 153 Ill.

2d at 45. Those factors were: (1) the prisoner is faced with—in the immediate future—a specific

- 21 - threat of death, forcible sexual attack, or substantial bodily injury; (2) there is no time to complain

to authorities or there is a history of complaints being futile; and (3) the inmate has no time or

opportunity to resort to the courts. Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 45. In opining on these factors, the court

noted that a “specific and immediate threat, however, constitutes the very nature of a necessity

defense; thus, proof of that factor is a threshold requirement for its establishment. Failure to prove

the existence of a specific and immediate threat obviates the need to conduct an inquiry into the

second and third factors.” Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 45. The court continued, “the defense of necessity

arises when a person reasonably believes his conduct, which would otherwise constitute an

offense, was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury which might have

resulted from his conduct.” Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 46. Accordingly, “[a]bsent a specific and immediate

threat, an inmate is not faced with such a choice.” Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 46. The supreme court

concluded that the defendant’s “vague, uncorroborated testimony, coupled with the length of time

between the alleged events, do not support a finding of a specific and immediate threat.” Kite, 153

Ill. 2d at 47.

¶ 66 Defendant seizes on the supreme court’s language that, “[a]bsent a specific and

immediate threat, an inmate is not faced with such a choice” to argue that Kite’s requirement of

proof of a specific and immediate threat was intended to apply only in the “prison escape context.”

(Emphasis added.) Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 46. Defendant, however, disregards other language from

Kite suggesting that the requirement of such proof was not intended to apply in such limited

circumstances. For example, defendant disregards that the court stated, without qualification, that

a “specific and immediate threat *** constitutes the very nature of a necessity defense.” Kite, 153

Ill. 2d at 45. Similarly, the court explained that “[p]roof of a specific and immediate threat

- 22 - continues to be the threshold requirement for the establishment of a necessity defense.” Kite, 153

¶ 67 Defendant responds that the First District, in People v. Crowder, 2018 IL App (1st)

161226, ¶ 33, stated, “Necessity does not require the defendant to show any imminent risk of

harm.” However, that assertion was unsupported by any case law, including Kite, which the First

District had cited elsewhere in the opinion. See Crowder, 2018 IL App (1st) 161226, ¶¶ 23, 33.

Indeed, this court has previously affirmed the requirement that a threat of immediate harm is

necessary to raise a necessity defense. See People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220399, ¶ 27 (“A

necessity defense requires that ‘the threat of harm was immediate and defendant’s conduct was the

sole option to avoid injury.’ ” (quoting People v. Boston, 2016 IL App (1st) 133497, ¶ 39)).

¶ 68 Applying Kite and Brown, we conclude that defendant was required to show the

existence of a specific and immediate threat for a necessity defense to be warranted. Defendant,

however, failed to do so. Defendant argued there was a threat to the public if the firearm was not

moved under the passenger seat in the Nissan, because it was in plain view in a crowded area and

someone could have stolen it. This vague assertion, which alleged only the possibility that an

unidentified individual might attempt to steal the firearm, fails to support a finding of a specific

and immediate threat. See Kite 153 Ill. 2d at 47 (noting that “vague, uncorroborated testimony”

failed to establish a specific and immediate threat). Having failed to meet this threshold

requirement, a necessity defense was not warranted.

¶ 69 However, even if defendant had established the existence of a specific and

immediate threat, his argument would still fail, as defendant had other options available to him,

such as contacting the police. In an effort to argue against that conclusion, defendant relies on

People v. Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, but that case is distinguishable. In Gullens, the

- 23 - defendant was on conditional discharge for a prior theft conviction, which prohibited him from

possessing a firearm. Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶ 3. The State filed a petition to revoke

the defendant’s conditional discharge after learning that the defendant had possessed a stolen

firearm while returning it to the retailer. Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶ 3. At the hearing on

the petition to revoke, evidence was adduced that, inter alia, the defendant accompanied a group

to a firearm retailer where someone in the group stole a gun without the defendant’s knowledge.

Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶¶ 5-6. When the defendant learned this, he took the firearm—

possessing it for about 10 minutes—and returned it to the store, informing the clerk that “his

younger brother had stolen the gun.” Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶¶ 1, 5-6, 11. A detective

who investigated the theft of the firearm agreed on cross-examination that (1) prior to the

defendant’s possession of the firearm, the defendant could not have been sure that, if he contacted

the police, the person who stole the firearm would still be present by the time the police arrived,

(2) the defendant faced potential violence if he contacted the police, and (3) it was better that the

firearm was returned to the store than being “out on the street.” Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668,

¶ 7. The defendant argued the evidence supported a necessity defense because he took the gun to

return it to the store and keep it out of the public. Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶ 9. The trial

court determined that the necessity defense did not apply and resentenced the defendant to three

years’ imprisonment. Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶¶ 15-16.

¶ 70 The appellate court reversed the revocation of the defendant’s conditional

discharge, concluding that, because a stolen firearm was “out on the street,” there was a specific

and immediate threat to public safety. Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶ 25. The court also

concluded that the defendant had no option other than to possess the gun and return it to the store,

because the evidence showed there was no guarantee that police would be able to return the firearm

- 24 - if called, and the defendant reasonably believed that the individual who possessed the firearm at

the time would not return it, as he had stolen it. Gullens, 2017 IL App (3d) 160668, ¶ 24.

¶ 71 Unlike Gullens, there is no indication here that the police, had they been informed

of the firearm, would have been unable to secure it before some greater harm came to the public.

The evidence showed that the firearm was inside the Nissan with defendant, albeit in plain view.

There was no evidence suggesting it was likely that another individual would abscond with this

firearm while defendant was still in the car. Instead of calling the police and waiting for officers

to arrive, defendant merely pushed the firearm underneath the passenger seat, which left it

accessible to either defendant or Johnson later. Thus, defendant’s action did not alleviate the threat

of the defaced firearm being “on the streets.” This is unlike Gullens, where the defendant possessed

the stolen firearm only to return it to its lawful possessor. Moreover, the evidence showed that

when police officers encountered defendant, he did not immediately inform them about the

presence of the firearm or that it belonged to Johnson.

¶ 72 Accordingly, even if the firearm being in plain view inside the Nissan posed a

specific and immediate threat, defendant had other options that did not require him to push the

firearm underneath the passenger seat. Thus, a necessity defense would still be unwarranted. As a

result, defendant is entitled to no relief on this issue.

¶ 73 D. Whether Defendant’s Conviction for UUWF Violates the Second Amendment

¶ 74 Finally, defendant argues his conviction for UUWF violates the second amendment

on its face as a result of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle &

Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

¶ 75 The second amendment provides, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the

security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S.

- 25 - Const., amend. II. “[T]he Second and Fourteenth Amendments [(U.S. Const., amends. II, XIV)]

protect the right of an ordinary, law-abiding citizen to possess a handgun” both inside and outside

one’s home “for self-defense.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 8-9; see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.

570, 595 (2008) (holding that the second amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear

arms); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (holding that the fourteenth

amendment incorporates the second amendment such that the second amendment applies to the

states).

¶ 76 The Supreme Court recently announced a test in Bruen to be applied when assessing

the constitutionality of laws meant to regulate conduct protected by the second amendment. The

Court first provided that, “when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s

conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. To regulate

such protected conduct, “the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with

this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. As such, “[o]nly if

a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that

the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualified command.’ ” Bruen,

597 U.S. at 17 (quoting Konigsbery v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 50, n.10 (1961)).

Pursuant to this test, the Bruen Court struck down a New York firearm licensing regime that

required individuals to show a “special need for self-defense” to carry a firearm in public, holding

that the regime violated citizens’ rights to bear arms. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 71. In reaching that

determination, the Court analyzed the country’s history of regulating the public carrying of

weapons and concluded that New York’s firearm licensing regime was not supported by “an

American tradition justifying” it. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 11, 70.

- 26 - ¶ 77 Defendant argues that section 24-1.1(a) of the Code violates the second amendment

on its face pursuant to Bruen. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2020). Section 24-1.1(a) provides, in

part:

“It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or about his person or on his

land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any weapon prohibited under

Section 24-1 of this Act or any firearm or any firearm ammunition if the person has

been convicted of a felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction.”

720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2020).

Defendant first asserts his possession of the firearm was presumptively protected by the second

amendment because the right to keep and bear arms is an individual right that belongs to all

Americans. Defendant continues that the State cannot show the practice of permanently disarming

individuals based upon their status as felons is consistent with the United States’s historical

tradition of firearm regulation. Thus, defendant contends, pursuant to the framework outlined in

Bruen, section 24-1.1(a) violates the second amendment. The State responds that defendant’s

conduct was not constitutionally protected because he is a felon and the second amendment

protects only law-abiding citizens’ possession of firearms.

¶ 78 We find People v. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, instructive. In Baker, the

defendant argued that section 24-1.1(a) violated the second amendment as applied to him under

the framework announced in Bruen. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶¶ 33, 37. The appellate

court determined the defendant could not challenge section 24-1.1(a) as a violation of the second

amendment, because, as a felon, “Bruen just does not apply to him.” Baker, 2023 IL App (1st)

220328, ¶ 37. According to the court, Bruen “could not have been more clear that its newly

announced test applied only to laws that attempted to regulate the gun possession of ‘law-abiding

- 27 - citizens,’ and not felons like defendant.” Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37 (quoting Bruen,

597 U.S. at 71). The court emphasized that the phrase “law-abiding” was used extensively

throughout the majority opinion in Bruen. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37. Further, Justice

Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Bruen, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, provided,

“ ‘[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the

possession of firearms by felons ***.’ ” Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37 (quoting Bruen,

597 U.S. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.)). The court explained that,

because Bruen limited the application of its test to laws seeking to regulate the possession of

firearms by “ ‘law-abiding citizens,’ ” the defendant was “simply outside the box drawn by

Bruen.” Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37.

¶ 79 Defendant responds that whether felons are encompassed by the second amendment

“is not settled,” and “the decision in Baker is not binding” on this court. We reject the notion that

the law is unsettled. We note, initially, that in Heller, the Supreme Court held the second

amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms and “elevate[d] above all other

interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”

(Emphasis added.) Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 635. The Court made clear, however, that “nothing in

our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of

firearms by felons.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. Thereafter, in McDonald, the Court held that the

second amendment was “fully applicable to the States” (McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750), and Justice

Alito “repeat[ed] those assurances” that prohibitions on possession of firearms by felons were not

to be questioned. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 (opinion of Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and

Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.). Bruen did not contradict the Court’s determinations that the second

amendment protects the rights only of law-abiding citizens to bear arms and that states may

- 28 - prohibit felons from being in possession of firearms. Accordingly, Baker comports with second

amendment jurisprudence, and we decline to disregard it.

¶ 80 In fact, this court reached the same conclusion as Baker in People v. Boyce, 2023

IL App (4th) 221113-U, ¶ 16, an unpublished order. In Boyce, the defendant was a felon who

argued that section 24-1.1 of the Code was unconstitutional on its face pursuant to Bruen. Boyce,

2023 IL App (4th) 221113-U, ¶ 11. We relied on Baker and similarly concluded that use of the

phrase “law-abiding” throughout Heller and Bruen confirmed the second amendment does not

encompass felons. Boyce, 2023 IL App (4th) 221113-U, ¶ 15 (“However, the Court’s language in

Bruen supports the validity of its dictum in Heller.”). As a result, we concluded “the Bruen

decision does not apply to felons” and held that the defendant “failed to show section 24-1.1 is

unconstitutional on its face under that decision.” Boyce, 2023 IL App (4th) 221113-U, ¶ 16.

¶ 81 Accordingly, we hold that Bruen does not apply to defendant, as the second and

fourteenth amendments protect the right of “law-abiding citizens” to possess handguns. Bruen,

597 U.S. at 9-10. Thus, Bruen’s historical-tradition test applies to regulations affecting

law-abiding citizens’ possession of firearms. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 71 (holding that New York’s

proper-cause requirement was unconstitutional where it prevented “law-abiding citizens with

ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms”); Baker, 2023 IL

App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37 (concluding that Bruen applies only to law-abiding citizens); Boyce, 2023

IL App (4th) 221113-U, ¶ 16 (same). Because defendant is a felon, he is, by definition, not a

law-abiding citizen. Therefore, defendant cannot establish that the second amendment protected

his conduct of possessing a firearm, and thus, he does not fall within the scope of Bruen. As a

result, defendant cannot show that section 24-1.1(a) of the Code violates the second amendment

- 29 - on its face under the Bruen framework. See Boyce, 2023 IL App (4th) 221113-U, ¶ 16 (rejecting

facial challenge).

¶ 82 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 83 For the reasons stated, we vacate defendant’s conviction for possession of a defaced

firearm and remand for a new trial on that charge, and we affirm on all other grounds.

¶ 84 Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.

- 30 -