People v. Bowman

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 241722-U No. 1-24-1722

Order filed August 21, 2026

Sixth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT

)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County.

Plaintiff-Appellee, )

)

v. ) No. 97 CR 05163 )

CARLOS BOWMAN, ) The Honorable ) James Michael Obbish, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

)

JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Pucinski and Gamrath concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Leave to file successive postconviction petition was properly denied where eyewitness affidavit memorialized no newly discovered information sufficient to support a colorable claim of actual innocence.

¶2 Carlos Bowman appeals the denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition asserting a claim of actual innocence based on an affidavit from a friend who claims he witnessed a consensual sexual encounter between Bowman and the victim. We affirm the dismissal as nothing in the affidavit is new. The affidavit repeats the theory Bowman presented at trial and Bowman relied on the same account in earlier postconviction proceedings.

¶3 Background

¶4 In 1999, a jury found Carlos Bowman guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive 30-year prison terms. We affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Bowman, 325 Ill. App 3d 411 (2001).

¶5 Bowman filed an initial postconviction petition in 2019, alleging actual innocence. The postconviction court summarily dismissed it, and this court affirmed. People v. Bowman, 1-19- 2585 (2021).

¶6 In early 2022, Bowman sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition supported by a 2021 affidavit from Bernard Gaines, who avers he witnessed the encounter and corroborates Bowman’s trial testimony that it was consensual. Gaines states police threatened to charge him as an accomplice unless he changed his account, causing him to remain silent for years. The postconviction court denied leave to file, finding that the affidavit failed to contain newly discovered evidence and was cumulative.

¶7 Trial evidence

¶8 We recite those facts necessary to resolve the appeal.

¶9 At trial, University of Chicago police officer Earl Robertson testified that on the evening of January 15, 1997, he was on duty at the emergency room desk at the Bernard Mitchell Hospital when the victim, S.A., reported that she had been sexually assaulted. She appeared “shook up” and had bruises on her face. She described her assailant and his car. An emergency room evaluated S.A. A nurse testified that S.A. appeared upset and had fresh abrasions on her face and neck. The

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sexual assault nurse examiner performed a sexual assault kit and testified that S.A.’s injuries were consistent with forcible sexual intercourse. S.A. committed suicide days later.

¶ 10 At the location S.A. had provided, police found a car matching her description. Bowman and the other occupants were ordered out and asked to lift their shirts. Bowman had a heart tattoo consistent with S.A.’s description. Police arrested Bowman and recovered in the car S.A.’s school identification card and books.

¶ 11 Bowman testified that the encounter was consensual. On the afternoon of the alleged offense, he was outside a building on South Berkeley with his father, his cousin Layel Martin, and several friends. Bernard Gaines arrived in a car and shortly afterward S.A. arrived on foot. Although Bowman did not know S.A., she appeared to know Gaines. S.A. followed Bowman inside the building, where they talked before she voluntarily removed both of their clothing and engaged in sexual intercourse. Bowman denied forcing or threatening S.A. and testified he later dropped her off at 53rd and Ellis Ave.

¶ 12 Martin testified for the defense that he was outside the building with Bowman when S.A. arrived on foot. He saw S.A. enter the building with Bowman. Martin and Gaines went upstairs out of curiosity and looked through a peephole. They did not enter the room. Martin testified that he neither saw nor heard anything suggesting that S.A. was forced to remain with Bowman.

¶ 13 The jury found Bowman guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive 30-year prison terms.

¶ 14 Bowman filed a pro se motion for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call four witnesses, including Gaines. At the hearing on the ineffective assistance claim, his trial counsel testified that he knew about Gaines and considered calling him as a witness,

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but chose not to because Gaines could be impeached by a prior inconsistent statement he had made to police. The circuit court rejected the ineffective assistance claim.

¶ 15 Direct Appeal

¶ 16 On direct appeal, Bowman argued that (i) the trial court erred during jury selection, (ii) his trial counsel was ineffective, (iii) he was entitled to additional presentence custody credit, and (iv) the court improperly imposed consecutive sentences. We affirmed the judgment and modified the mittimus. Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d 411. We rejected a plain error argument because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and Bowman did not argue the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 429.

¶ 17 In September 2019, Bowman filed pro se a postconviction petition maintaining actual innocence based on Gaines’s anticipated testimony. Bowman alleged that Gaines described the encounter during a pretrial jail visit and again in a posttrial telephone call. Bowman stated that Gaines was unwilling to provide an affidavit.

¶ 18 In the petition, Bowman included this statement: “In support of a motion for a new trial, Mr. Bowman testified that he informed his defense attorney about Bernard Gaines. His attorney testified that he opted not to call Mr. Gaines as a witness because Mr. Gaines gave a written statement to an Assistant State's Attorney which inculpated Mr. Bowman.”

¶ 19 The postconviction court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that Bowman could not establish actual innocence. On appeal, appointed counsel moved and was granted leave to withdraw under Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). People v. Bowman, 1-19-2585 (2021).

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¶ 20 In 2022, Bowman sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition, asserting four claims, including, for purposes of this appeal, an actual innocence claim supported by an affidavit from Gaines.

¶ 21 Gaines averred that S.A. flagged him down as he drove toward Bowman’s building, they flirted, and she asked for a ride. Gaines declined, but directed her to a building. Gaines arrived at by car shortly before S.A., who then accompanied Bowman inside the building. Gaines and Martin snuck upstairs, and Gaines entered Bowman’s bedroom and saw S.A. straddling Bowman. Both were naked. Bowman noticed Gaines and “shooed” him away. Gaines returned downstairs and, about 45 minutes later, saw Bowman and S.A. leave together. After Bowman’s arrest, Gaines went to the police to report what he saw, but officers threatened to charge him as an accomplice unless he changed his account. Gaines claimed the threats prevented him from coming forward, and no one contacted him about Bowman’s case. Gaines also stated he and Martin visited Bowman in the Cook County Jail to tell him what police said to him and that he “would help” Bowman.

¶ 22 The postconviction court denied Bowman’s leave to file the successive petition. The court found that Gaines’s affidavit did not amount to newly discovered evidence because Bowman knew the substance of the proposed testimony before trial. The court further found that the affidavit was cumulative by largely repeating the version of events presented at trial by Bowman and Martin.

¶ 23 Analysis

¶ 24 The Postconviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2006), provides a statutory remedy for defendants whose substantial constitutional rights were violated. People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 42. The Act contemplates only one postconviction proceeding. Id. A defendant seeking leave for a successive proceeding must either establish (i) “cause and prejudice

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for the failure to assert a postconviction claim in an earlier proceeding,” or (ii) present a colorable claim of actual innocence. Id.

¶ 25 Leave to file a successive postconviction petition should be denied when “it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the documentation submitted by the petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petitioner fail as a matter of law or where the successive petition with supportive documentation is insufficient to justify further proceedings.” People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. This court reviews the denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition de novo. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 40.

¶ 26 The State argues that res judicata, collateral estoppel, and forfeiture bar this successive petition. We need not decide those issues. Even assuming Bowman’s claim is not procedurally barred, he cannot establish a colorable claim of actual innocence because Gaines’s affidavit does not qualify as newly discovered evidence.

¶ 27 Actual Innocence

¶ 28 The supporting evidence to establish a colorable claim of actual innocence must be (i) newly discovered, (ii) material and not cumulative, and (iii) “of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47. Bowman cannot satisfy the first requirement.

¶ 29 Newly discovered evidence means it was discovered after trial and could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 334 (2009). At the leave-to-file stage, we accept the petition’s well-pleaded allegations and supporting documents as true unless the record affirmatively demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could accept them. Robinson. 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 60.

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¶ 30 Bowman contends that Gaines’s affidavit is newly discovered because police threats made Gaines unavailable to testify at trial. He relies on People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 38, and People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 135 (1984), which recognize that a witness known at trial may nevertheless provide newly discovered evidence if unavailable despite due diligence. Bowman argues People v. Ayala extends this holding to witnesses unavailable due to police coercion. People v. Ayala, 2022 IL App (1st) 192484, ¶ 137. According to Bowman, Gaines’s fear of retaliation made him unavailable regardless of counsel’s actions, and Bowman could not have obtained his affidavit sooner.

¶ 31 The State responds that Bowman and his counsel knew Gaines and the substance of his proposed testimony before trial. The State contends that the record refutes Bowman’s claim that police coercion prevented Gaines from coming forward in that trial counsel had testified at a hearing to making a strategic decision not to call Gaines.

¶ 32 We agree with the State.

¶ 33 Edwards and Molstad are distinguishable. In both cases, codefendants had a valid Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination that made them unavailable to testify, regardless of counsel’s efforts. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 38; Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 135 (1984). By contrast, Gaines faced no comparable constitutional impediment. Bowman knew before trial what Gaines claimed to have seen, and his trial counsel also knew of Gaines and Gaines’s proposed testimony. Bowman admitted that Gaines visited him in jail, described what he had observed, explained the circumstances of the police statement, and agreed to help the defense.

¶ 34 Bowman’s counsel testified posttrial that he considered calling Gaines but decided not to because Gaines’s prior statement to police would have provided substantial impeachment. Indeed, neither Bowman nor counsel attributed Gaines’s absence from trial to police coercion. So, Gaines’s

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affidavit added no newly discovered factual information; it put in affidavit form an account Bowman had known and asserted years earlier.

¶ 35 Bowman nevertheless insists police coercion rendered Gaines unavailable. Under Ayala, allegations of police threats may warrant an evidentiary hearing when they explain a witness’s unavailability. Ayala, 2022 IL App (1st) 192484, ¶ 137. But the record shows that when Bowman first described Gaines’s proposed testimony, he said Gaines had visited him before trial, recounted what he had observed, and agreed to help. Bowman did not then attribute Gaines’s absence to police threats. Thus, the affidavit memorialized an account Bowman and his counsel had previously asserted rather than reveal anything unknown.

¶ 36 Having found the affidavit is not newly discovered evidence, we need not address the remaining elements of Bowman’s actual innocence claim.

¶ 37 Affirmed.

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