People v. Borja

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2

3 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) Criminal Case no. CM12.97_U ',,/' v "k'/

4 ) ) 5 v. ) DECISION AND ORDER ) re: Motion to Dismiss 6 GREGORIO CONCEPCION BORJA, ) 7 ) ) 8 Defendant. 9

10 INTRODUCTION

11 This matter came before the Honorable Judge Michael J. Bordallo on April 11, 2012. 12 The People were represented by Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins. The Defendant 13 was represented by Assistant Public Defender Maria G. Fitzpatrick. After considering the 14 matter presented, the Court now issues the following decision and order denying the 15

16 Defendant's motion to dismiss because the People have shown good cause for the delay in the

17 arraignment of the Defendant. 18 BACKGROUND 19 On December 28, 2011, a complaint was filed which charged the Defendant with four 20 (4) counts of Assault (As a Misdemeanor). On March 26, 2012, Defendant filed a motion to 21

22 dismiss the complaint arguing that he was not promptly arraigned.

24 Under Guam law, a "defendant shall be arraigned promptly after the indictment or 25 information is filed or after the complaint is filed where prosecution by complaint is required 26 by § 1.15." 8 GCA § 60.10(a). Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Guam held, "unless good 27

28 cause is shown, a complaint shall be dismissed where a defendant is not promptly arraigned

Page lof4 within 60 days of the filing of the complaint." People v. Rasauo, 2011 Guam 14,-r 14 ("Rasauo 2 IF'). The Court also held that the "standard continues to require a case by case analysis of 3 whether or not the "specific circumstances" of any given case show good cause for delay 4

beyond the 60-day period normally required to comply with the law." Id. 5

6 Defendant argues the complaint should be dismissed because the Defendant was

7 arraigned approximately seventy-seven (77) days after the complaint was filed. Defendant also 8 argues there is no showing of "good cause" for the delay in the arraignment. On the other hand, 9 the People argue there was "good cause" for the delay for the following reasons: (1) the People IO

II retain no control over the Court's decision about when to calendar the date of Defendant's

12 return to Court; and (2) the Defendant needed to consult with his attorney. 13 The complaint in this case was filed December 28,2011; a Summons was filed January 14 4,2012. The Summons required the Defendant to appear for his initial arraignment on February 15 15,2012. The Defendant appeared on that date, but the hearing was continued until March 14, 16

17 2012. The delay from the time the complaint was filed and the date of arraignment was

18 approximately seventy-seven (77) days. The Court notes however the initial arraignment date 19 was within the 60-day requirement established by Rasauo II and the Defendant implicitly 20 waived his right to a prompt arraignment. 21 Prior to Rasauo II there was not a statutory provision for arraignment that provided an 22

23 express time limit on when the Defendant must be promptly arraigned after a complaint was

24 filed. The Supreme Court of Guam however set a 60-day limit and essentially mirrored the 25 statutory speedy trial time period of forty-five to sixty (45-60) days. 2011 Guam 14,-r 13. The 26 Court finds similar to applying the time speedy time period to calculate prompt arraignment, it 27

Page 2 of4 is not unreasonable to apply the same rule used for waiving a speedy trial with waiving a later 2 arraignment date. 3 The Supreme Court in Quinata v. Superior Court of Guam adopted the rule, "a 4 defendant's consent to a postponement may be implied by the failure of defense counselor 5

6 defendant to object at the time the trial is postponed outside the statutory period." 2010 Guam 8

7 ~ 30. (emphasis added). In Quinata, the Defendant was arraigned and asserted his right to a 8 speedy trial. However, during a later bail hearingl,for which the Defendant was present, the 9 Court advised the parties it would postpone the matter at a later date, beyond the statutory 10

11 period. 2010 Guam 8 ~ 12 - 13. The Court ruled, "When the court notified the defense counsel

12 in [the Defendant'S] presence ... his pretrial conference would be postponed ... and the defense 13 counsel failed to object to the postponement, [the Defendant] was deemed to have consented to 14 the postponement. 2010 Guam 8 ~ 30. (emphasis added). Similarly in this case, the Defendant 15 was present during his initial arraignment, February 15,2012, and the Court notified him of the 16

17 later arraignment date, March 14,2012, which was beyond the statutory period. The Defendant

18 however failed to assert to be promptly arraigned. Thus, the Court finds he consented to the 19 later court date; therefore, waiving his right to a speedy arraignment. 20 Furthermore, the denial of opportunity to consult with counsel on any material step after 21 indictment or similar charge violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 22

23 278 (1945). Also, the accused in a case requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in

24 the proceedings against him. Hamilton v. State of Ala., 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961). Without it, 25 though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to 26 establish his innocence. Id. In this case, the Defendant needed time to consult with his attorney 27

1 The date of this hearing was three (3) days prior to the speedy trial deadline. See, 2010 Guam 8~ 12.

Page 3 of4 before he could be formally arraigned. The Court finds this to be "good cause" for the delay in 2 the arraignment of the Defendant because he needed an opportunity to consult with counsel. 3

5 Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the Defendant waived his right to a speedy 6

7 arraignment and that the People have shown good cause for the delay of the Defendant's

8 arraignment. Thus, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. 9 Further Proceedings shall be held on -'c-~----;!4-----"--+--'---'--J,~ 10

12 SO ORDERED, this;?? day ~_-==-_ _ _ 2012.

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