People v. Bordies
Opinion
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Bureau Thomas J.K. Smith, State Reporter
People v Bordies
2026 NY Slip Op 04640
July 24, 2026
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
v
AMIR BORDIES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
Decided on July 24, 2026
446 KA 22-00748
Present: Curran, J.P., Bannister, Montour, Greenwood, And Hannah, JJ.
FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (PHILIP ROTHSCHILD OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (DAVID D. BASSETT OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Thomas J. Miller, J.), rendered July 15, 2021. The judgment convicted defendant upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (four counts).
[*1]It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]) and four counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03 [1] [b]; [3]) arising out of his participation in a drive-by shooting. We affirm.
Initially, we reject defendant's contention that County Court erred in declining to sever his trial from that of his codefendant, who unsuccessfully raised the same issue on his own appeal (see People v Everson, 44 NY3d 488, 492-493 [2025]).
Defendant contends that the People committed a Brady violation and a violation of CPL 245.20 (2) by failing to disclose the existence of a pole camera in the vicinity of a prosecution witness's residence and failing to preserve and disclose all of the video footage captured by that camera. We reject that contention. "To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching in nature; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; and (3) prejudice arose because the suppressed evidence was material" (People v Fuentes, 12 NY3d 259, 263 [2009], rearg denied 13 NY3d 766 [2009]; see People v Garrett, 23 NY3d 878, 885 [2014], rearg denied 25 NY3d 1215 [2015]). We conclude that defendant failed to demonstrate that the undisclosed video footage constituted Brady material inasmuch as defendant's theory that the video may have provided impeachment material showing a prosecution witness engaging in gang activity is purely speculative (see People v Ruple, 239 AD3d 1040, 1044 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 1013 [2025]; People v Scott, 309 AD2d 573, 574 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 806 [2004]; see generally People v Smith, 306 AD2d 861, 862 [4th Dept 2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 599 [2003]). We further conclude that the People did not violate their disclosure obligations with respect to the video footage recorded by the pole camera. Rather, they met their obligation to provide "[a]ll tapes or other electronic recordings . . . made or received in connection with the alleged criminal incident" (CPL 245.20 [1] [g]) by providing defendant with video from the day before, the day of, and the day after the incident.
We reject defendant's contention that the court erred in admitting evidence of prior violence between feuding groups of individuals who reside in the vicinity of the park where the shooting occurred, as well as evidence that defendant and his codefendant were affiliated with one of those groups. "Evidence regarding gang activity can be admitted to provide necessary [*2]background, or when it is 'inextricably interwoven' with the charged crime[ ], or to explain the relationships of the individuals involved" (People v Kims, 24 NY3d 422, 438 [2014]; see People v Tatum, 204 AD3d 1400, 1402 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1074 [2022]). Here, the testimony regarding defendant's affiliation with certain individuals provided necessary background information to explain his relationship to his codefendant and his motive for shooting from a moving car into a crowd of people in the park (see People v Savery, 209 AD3d 1268, 1269 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 1075 [2023]), and the prejudicial effect of that testimony did not outweigh its probative value (see People v Haygood, 201 AD3d 1363, 1364 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 951 [2022]).
Contrary to defendant's contention, the court did not err in instructing the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent. "The doctrine of 'transferred intent' serves to ensure that a person will be prosecuted for the crime he or she intended to commit even when, because of bad aim or some other 'lucky mistake,' the intended target was not the actual victim" (People v Fernandez, 88 NY2d 777, 781 [1996]; see People v Dubarry, 25 NY3d 161, 171 [2015]). Here, because defendant was charged with violating Penal Law § 125.25 (1), which "provides that a defendant is guilty of murder in the second degree when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person, an instruction on transferred intent was appropriate" (People v Jeffrey, 164 AD3d 604, 605 [2d Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1065 [2018]; see People v Blackshell, 178 AD3d 1355, 1356 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 35 NY3d 968 [2020]; see generally People v Jones, 41 AD3d 507, 508 [2d Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 877 [2007]). We further conclude that the transferred intent instruction did not impermissibly alter the theory of the prosecution (see People v Lee, 183 AD3d 1183, 1189-1190 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1114 [2020]).
Defendant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction of murder in the second degree because the People failed to establish that he possessed the requisite mental state for the commission of that crime. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Delamota, 18 NY3d 107, 113 [2011]; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient with respect to the murder conviction (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when, "[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person" (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]). A defendant's intent to kill may be inferred from their conduct as well as from the circumstances surrounding the crime (see People v Price, 35 AD3d 1230, 1231 [4th Dept 2006], lv denied
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