People v. Borcsok

114 Misc. 2d 810, 452 N.Y.S.2d 814, 1982 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3570
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJune 30, 1982
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 114 Misc. 2d 810 (People v. Borcsok) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Borcsok, 114 Misc. 2d 810, 452 N.Y.S.2d 814, 1982 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3570 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1982).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Duncan S. McNab, J.

Defendant and codefendant Jordan Marcus stand charged with the clawhammer murder of David Moriarty on April 16,1981. Separate trials were previously ordered. During the trial of defendant Borcsok, a question arose, apparently of first impression in this State, concerning certain tests conducted on various bloodstains found hear the scene and from within defendant’s car following his apprehension on April 25, 1981, and upon samples of the victim’s blood taken during his autopsy. Specifically, the People sought to offer evidence of blood typing, not by way of the customary ABO system, but rather, by way of enzyme analysis of the blood, for the stated purpose of showing that the blood of a relatively small percent of the white population (i.e., 10%-11%), including the victim, Mr. Moriarty, contains both enzymes found in certain of the recovered bloodstains.

[811]*811Upon an evidentiary hearing, held outside the presence of the jury, the court heard testimony from Mr. Fred Drummond, the assistant chief at the Westchester County Department of Labs and Research, and the head of their serology department. Mr. Drummond was qualified, without objection, as an expert in the field of serology. (Also incorporated as part of the hearing was the testimony given before the jury by Mr. Drummond’s assistant, Mr. Robert Adamo, largely confined to rather innocuous background information.) Collectively, the two serologists testified in substance that commencing in 1979, they participated in a yearlong population study of Westchester County, wherein some 481 blood samples were analyzed and “typed” in order to isolate three particular enzymes, or genetic “markers”, identified for purposes of brevity as PGM, ESD, and EAP. Other identifiable enzymes, such as carbonic anhydrase (CA), were not tested for. All samples were taken under clinical conditions by various physicians from what was hoped to be a representative cross section of various segments of the county population, i.e., whites, blacks and Hispanics. No sample of blood included in the test samples was more than seven days old. Nor were any samples taken from inanimate objects or otherwise obtained from the field. Using a technique known as electrophoresis Mr. Drummond testified that certain percentages of the white, black and Hispanic populations of this county possess blood containing certain subtypes of the three enzymes analyzed. The Westchester study, as yet, has not been published.

Drummond also testified that previous enzyme studies have been conducted nationwide which have received general acceptance in the scientific community. The results of these studies, conducted in Miami, Detroit, Los Angeles, Seattle, Austin (Texas), Pittsburgh, and England, were received in evidence at this hearing. Drummond testified that the results of those published tests, in terms of frequency of population containing a particular enzyme, were very close to the results achieved in Westchester, despite the fact that the size of the sample pool in certain of the tests exceeded that used here (i.e., in the test for EAP there was a sample pool of 1,239 Caucasians in Pittsburgh, as [812]*812compared to 503 in Detroit), while in other areas, the sample pool was less (i.e., the sample pool in Miami contained 350 Caucasians; in Los Angeles, 219; and in Seattle, 193). The court’s independent examination of the various published test results served to confirm Mr. Drummond’s contention that the results of the Westchester study were close to those obtained elsewhere.

Drummond further testified that he received the complied statistical data pertaining to these prior enzyme population studies from Dr. Robert Shaler, the head of serology in the New York City Medical Examiner’s office, and under whose tutelage Mr. Adamo had completed his internship. Dr. Shaler, in Mr. Drummond’s opinion, had been an instrumental figure in the earlier studies; additionally, Drummond testified that the methodology used here in the Westchester study was essentially a modification of techniques previously employed by Dr. Shaler, techniques which are now accepted in the field of forensic serology, the basic research on the subject having been done some 15 years ago.

At the threshold, the court held, as a procedural matter, that these various prior studies were properly admissible into evidence at this hearing under the authority of People v Sugden (35 NY2d 453), and People v Stone (35 NY2d 69). As the court held in Sugden (supra, p 460), an expert witness (there, a psychiatrist), “may rely on material, albeit of out-of-court origin, if it is of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable in forming a professional opinion.” As Mr. Drummond testified, the methodology employed in those prior studies which he relied on here has now gained general acceptance in its particular field; hence, under Sugden (supra), the results of the previous enzyme tests, as compiled by Dr. Shaler, like Drummond an expert in this highly specialized area, are admissible.

Turning to the merits of the issue, this court has, on a prior occasion, found the results of a certain scientific test known as the “trace metal detection test” to be inadmissible. (See People v Lauro, 91 Misc 2d 706.) However, in this court’s view, the facts in Lauro were greatly different from those presented here. In Lauro (supra), the court was faced with the testimony of a patrolman with the White Plains [813]*813Police Department, who had actually performed the trace metal test himself for the very first time; moreover, the court in Lauro had absolutely no testimony that such a test had heretofore been recognized in any jurisdiction or in any of the literature. Here, to the contrary, the court has the testimony of Mr. Drummond, an acknowledged expert in his field; the testimony that the prior enzyme analysis studies have gained acceptance in the scientific community,1 and the further testimony that the criteria and methodology employed in the Westchester study, with certain modifications, largely paralleled the techniques used in the earlier studies. Thus, Lauro (supra) would appear to be fully distinguishable, as would the holding of People v Cohen (50 NY2d 908, 910) where the Court of Appeals found certain test results involving “other suicides purporting to show, statistically, how far from his body a suicide victim holds The gun’ ”, to have been improperly received into evidence, where there was “nothing in the record * * * to indicate that the sampling was representative, that reliable criteria were employed, or that the conclusions on which the statistics were based were in fact accurate.” Here, on the other hand, the record does reflect that the instant study drew from a representative sample, comparing favorably with several of the prior studies nationwide, and that the samples were selected based upon various criteria. Thus, the People have established, in this court’s view, a sufficient foundation, bearing in mind the general acceptance accorded to the prior studies and the particular techniques used in the present study.

Moreover, the court here is not faced with the unique problem which confronted the court in People v Alston (79 Misc 2d 1077). There, in a well-reasoned opinion, the court, Judge Kapelman, ruled that the results of scientific tests [814]

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Bluebook (online)
114 Misc. 2d 810, 452 N.Y.S.2d 814, 1982 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3570, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-borcsok-nysupct-1982.