2023 IL App (1st) 220318-U FOURTH DIVISION Order filed April 13, 2023
No. 1-22-0318 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Cook Plaintiff-Appellee, ) County. ) v. ) No. 19 CR 5791 ) CHARLIE BOOKER ) Honorable ) Stanley J. Sacks, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Lampkin and Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: We affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence where the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of other crimes, and the defendant forfeited review of his argument that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of a statement by the victim to an emergency department physician by inviting the error.
¶2 The defendant, Charlie Booker, appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook
County finding him guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11- No. 1-22-0318
1.30(a)(3) (West 2018)) and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 35 years’ incarceration. On
appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of
other crimes committed by the defendant in Memphis, Tennessee, three months after the alleged
conduct in this case, and that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed a physician to
testify regarding statements the victim made in an emergency room when she sought treatment
following the alleged sexual assault. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 The defendant was charged in a 19-count indictment with, inter alia, aggravated criminal
sexual assault (penis to mouth) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(a)(3) (West 2018)), aggravated criminal sexual
assault (penis to sex organ) (720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(a)(3) (West 2018)), and aggravated battery
(strangling) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(5) (West 2018)). The State elected not to proceed on the
remaining 16 counts. Following a jury trial, during which he appeared pro se, the defendant was
found guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count of aggravated battery.
Counsel was appointed to assist the defendant with post-trial motions and filed a motion for a new
trial. That motion was denied, and the trial court entered judgment on the aggravated criminal sexual
assault charges and sentenced the defendant to two 17½-year terms of imprisonment for an aggregate
term of 35 years. The trial court vacated the aggravated battery count “deeming” it the force used in
the other two offenses. The defendant moved to reconsider his sentence and the trial court denied
the motion. This appeal follows.
¶4 The following facts are taken from the report of proceedings and common law record. On
May 2, 2019, the grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendant with, among other things,
two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The defendant was initially represented by a public
defender but elected to proceed pro se and demand trial.
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¶5 Before trial, the State moved to admit evidence of other crimes arguing that the evidence
would demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to commit sex crimes and lack of consent. The State
alleged that the defendant had been involved in two additional sexual assaults, one in Chicago and
one in Memphis. On December 9, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion. After
describing the expected evidence, the State argued that the assaults were similar because: they all
involved African American women in their twenties; the assaults occurred between midnight and
4:30 am; the defendant lured the women to a secluded area using false pretenses; he vaginally and
orally raped all three women using a threat of force; and, in the case being tried and in the Memphis
case, the defendant actually used force. The State further argued that in the Memphis case and the
case being tried, the defendant stole the victims’ belongings and drove away from the scene.
¶6 The defendant responded arguing that the Memphis case should not be used because
although there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest “[t]here’s not no official charge.”
¶7 After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court ruled that the other crimes evidence
would be admitted, finding that it was relevant to show propensity, identification, and a lack of
consent.
¶8 At trial, C.C. testified that she was 24 years old, and had two young children. C.C. testified
that in April 2018, she lost her job and was unsuccessfully looking for work. After speaking with a
friend, she decided to try prostitution to earn some money. On April 19, 2018, C.C. and two other
women went to the west side of Chicago. C.C. had two “dates” that “went well.” During each date
she met a man who paid her for sexual acts. C.C. placed half of the money she received in her pocket
and half in her boot.
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¶9 At approximately 4:30 a.m., a man, identified as the defendant, pulled up in a car. They
spoke and C.C. agreed to give the defendant oral sex in exchange for $60. C.C. got into the
defendant’s car, and they drove “out of the league,” further from the spot where he picked her up
than C.C. felt comfortable with. The defendant parked in an alley. C.C. told the defendant that she
did not feel comfortable because it was too dark. The defendant circled the block but returned to the
same alley. He did not, however, pull as far into the alley.
¶ 10 C.C. tried to give the defendant oral sex in the front seat but decided the car was too small
and got into the back seat. The defendant got out, walked to the back, and got back into the car. As
C.C. turned toward the defendant to perform oral sex on him, he put his hands around her neck, and
began squeezing. C.C. had trouble breathing and felt helpless and scared. The defendant told C.C.
to do what he told her, or he would hurt her. C.C. told the defendant that it was not necessary because
she was already out doing anything for money. C.C. reached for the door handle, but the defendant
tightened his grip on her neck and repeated his warning that if she did not comply, he would hurt
her.
¶ 11 C.C. told the defendant that she would do whatever he wanted if he would just let her go.
The defendant told her to turn around and put his penis in her mouth. When C.C. would not do so
voluntarily, the defendant forced his penis into her mouth. The defendant placed one hand on C.C.’s
head and one hand on her neck and forced her to move her head giving him oral sex. The defendant
asked C.C. to take her pants off, and she complied because she “had to.” The defendant inserted his
penis into her vagina from behind. The defendant was not wearing a condom. C.C. was crying and
tried to look at the defendant “so that he could see the hurt.” The defendant told her not to look at
him and continued assaulting her until he ejaculated.
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¶ 12 After the defendant finished assaulting C.C., he asked her what she had on her, how much
money she had made. She told him that she had a phone, money, and a benefits card. The defendant
went through her pockets and took those items. The defendant also took the money she had in her
boot. The defendant told C.C. to crawl out of the car and not move until he drove away. C.C. was
only wearing one boot at this time; the defendant kept her other boot and belongings with him as he
drove away. C.C. got up and began running until she reached a gas station. There she asked to borrow
a stranger’s phone and called her “mom-in-law,” Laskieuse Whiting, the grandmother of one of her
children. C.C. told Whiting that she had been raped and asked her to meet her. C.C. was taken to
Rush Hospital, and Whiting met her there.
¶ 13 At the hospital, C.C. did not tell the first nurse she met that she had been working as a
prostitute because “I would be ashamed of what they would think and that they wouldn’t believe
me.” C.C. told that nurse that she was hanging with someone and that he took advantage of her. C.C.
admitted that that statement was not true. After Whiting arrived, she told C.C. she had to tell the
truth, and C.C. told the medical personnel “what really happened.” A doctor examined her,
performed a “rape kit,” and prescribed medications.
¶ 14 A male police officer arrived, but C.C. did not speak to him because she felt more
comfortable speaking with a female officer. A female police officer arrived, and C.C. spoke to her,
and later to detectives. In March 2019, she identified the defendant from a photo array.
¶ 15 Laskieuse Whiting testified that C.C. was the mother of one of her grandchildren. On April
20, 2018, at approximately 4 a.m., she received a call from C.C. on a number she did not recognize.
C.C. told Whiting that she had been raped and was at a gas station near the expressway. Whiting
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started to go to the gas station but received another phone call from C.C. telling her to go to Rush
Hospital.
¶ 16 At the hospital, Whiting saw C.C. lying on a bed in a treatment room. A nurse was with her.
C.C. was balled up on the bed and crying. A female police officer arrived and spoke to C.C. with
Whiting in the room. Whiting left while C.C. was still speaking with the police officer.
¶ 17 Clare Elfayer, a Chicago police officer, testified that at approximately 6 a.m. on April 20,
2018, she was dispatched to Rush Hospital because the victim in a crime was requesting a female
officer. She met C.C. at the hospital. C.C. was in bed, curled in a fetal position, and had a blanket
pulled up over her face. C.C. reported that she had been raped and robbed of an iPhone. Elfayer took
the details of the incident, notified detectives, and ensured that a “rape kit” was completed by the
¶ 18 Dr. Sobia Ansari testified that she is an emergency department physician at Rush University
Hospital. On April 20, 2018, she treated C.C. The State requested that Dr. Ansari be allowed to refer
to her notes during her testimony. Defendant objected, and the trial court overruled his objection.
Dr. Ansari testified that she recorded a summary of what C.C. told her in her medical records. Dr.
Ansari testified that C.C. told her:
“She was picked up by a man in a green car. They drove for about six minutes. After they
stopped, they both got into the back of the car. He started to choke her. She told him he could
take her money and belongings in order to avoid getting hurt. He forced her to have vaginal
intercourse, then oral intercourse, then vaginal intercourse again. He was not wearing a
condom. His penis touched her anus but did not penetrate her anus. She does not think he
ejaculated in her vagina or mouth. He tried to choke her a second time. She did not pass out.
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He pulled her from the car, told her to get on her knees, to face the other direction, and then
he drove away.”
Dr. Ansari testified that knowing what happened to C.C. was important in order to give her proper
medical care.
¶ 19 Dr. Ansari further testified that she examined C.C. and performed a criminal sexual assault
kit on her. During the examination, Dr. Ansari noticed red marks on both sides of C.C’s neck. She
testified that the marks were consistent with C.C.’s report of being strangled. Dr. Ansari noted
injuries to C.C.’s genitalia, redness and bleeding around the os, the opening to the uterus. Dr. Ansari
used swabs to collect samples from C.C.’s vagina, anus, and mouth for a criminal sexual assault kit.
¶ 20 During cross examination, the defendant asked to “read your report over again and tell me
exactly what she–you said that she stated to you.” Dr. Ansari complied and read the statement again.
The defendant asked several more questions about the statement.
¶ 21 The State presented the testimony of several forensic scientists. They testified that the
vaginal and oral swabs were tested using a technique that separates sperm cells from non-sperm
cells. The non-sperm fraction of the vaginal and oral swabs yielded a DNA profile consistent with
the victim’s DNA. The sperm fraction of the vaginal swab revealed one distinguishable male DNA
component. The sperm fraction of the oral swab indicated three individuals with at least one male
DNA component, however, the DNA was not suitable for comparison because it was too low. The
DNA analysis of the distinguishable male component was compared with a national database and
was associated with the defendant, and with a sample collected from a criminal sexual assault kit
collected in Memphis, Tennessee. A confirmatory sample was collected from the defendant and
analyzed. Testing revealed that the defendant was included as a possible contributor to the DNA
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collected from C.C.’s vaginal swabs and that the frequency of that genetic profile was one in 3.3
nonillion individuals. 3.3 nonillion is a 3 followed by 30 zeros, or about 440 quintillion times the
population of the earth.
¶ 22 The State called A.M. as a witness to testify about conduct that occurred in Memphis. Before
she testified, the trial court instructed the jury that the evidence would be received on the issue of
the defendant’s intent, lack of consent, potential to commit sexual assault, and considered by the
jury only for the limited purpose. Defendant did not object to A.M.’s testimony at that time.
¶ 23 A.M. testified that she lived in Tennessee and worked for a company that prints W-2s and
payroll checks. In July 2018, she knew the defendant by the name of L.C. On the night of July 17,
2018, she agreed to drive the defendant, his cousin, and his cousin’s “baby mama” to a location in
Memphis where they ran errands and “hung out.” They all got out of the car. After midnight, the
defendant asked A.M. to drive him to a fast-food restaurant.
¶ 24 On the way to the restaurant, the defendant stated that he needed to relieve himself. A.M.
stopped by a viaduct and the defendant relieved himself in a field. She then drove him to the
restaurant. When they got there, the defendant said he could not find his “pay card,” and asked to go
back where he had relieved himself to look for it. When they got there, the defendant got out to look
for his card, and A.M. got out to smoke a cigarette. She turned around and the defendant was pointing
a handgun at her head.
¶ 25 The defendant told A.M. to take off her clothes. She complied, and he took her by the arm,
picked up her clothes, and told her to walk into the field. In the field, he made her get on the ground.
The defendant held the gun against her head and made her perform oral sex. The defendant then
ordered A.M. to turn around and get on her knees. The defendant forced his penis into her anus and
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then told her to flip over and forced his penis into her vagina. He kept the gun pointed at her while
he assaulted her. After penetrating her vagina, the defendant told A.M. to flip over and placed his
penis in her mouth again. He then ordered her to turn over and penetrated her anus again. The
defendant repeated the cycle penetrating A.M. orally, anally, and vaginally.
¶ 26 The defendant told A.M. that if she told anyone what had happened, he would kill her family.
He also asked if A.M. had any cash. She told him that she only had a food stamp card. The defendant
told A.M. to get dressed and then told her to lie on the ground again and wait until she heard the car
pull away. The defendant never left, and A.M. turned to look at him. The defendant said, “I’m sorry”
and fired a shot at her. The bullet went through her left wrist. A.M. pushed the defendant and ran
across the field toward some houses. The defendant followed her. As he ran towards her, he fired
five more shots. One shot struck A.M. in the chin and another in the right arm. The defendant ran
back to A.M.’s car and drove away. A.M. banged on doors, but no one answered. Eventually
emergency medical personnel arrived and took her to a hospital.
¶ 27 At the hospital, A.M. was treated for her wounds and a criminal sexual assault kit was
collected. In addition to her car, the defendant also left with A.M.’s phone, identification, food stamp
card, and purse. A.M. later learned that her car was recovered in Illinois.
¶ 28 The State rested, and the defendant rested without testifying or presenting evidence.
¶ 29 During a discussion of the jury instructions, defendant objected to an instruction regarding
A.M.’s testimony saying, “I object to that *** because clearly this is a crime, an alleged crime that
happened after a crime I was charged with and other crimes used should be crimes that was
previously alleged done than something that happened after a crime was committed.”
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¶ 30 Following closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury. The jury found the defendant
guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count of aggravated battery. The
case was continued several times while the defendant alternatively requested the assistance of
counsel and requested to proceed pro se. Ultimately, counsel was appointed for defendant and filed
a posttrial motion alleging various errors including, an allegation that the court erred in allowing the
State to present evidence of other crimes, specifically the sexual assault on A.M., and that the trial
court erred when it allowed Dr. Ansari to testify regarding C.C.’s statements to her regarding the
sexual assault. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial and, after a hearing, sentenced the
defendant to two consecutive terms of 17½ years for each aggravated criminal sexual assault
conviction and vacated the conviction for aggravated battery. The defendant moved to reconsider
the sentence and the trial court denied the motion. This appeal follows.
¶ 31 The defendant first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed
evidence of other crimes committed in Memphis. The State responds that the defendant waived this
error by failing to object on the same grounds argued on appeal. In reply, the defendant argues that
the error was not waived and that, if waived, it should be considered as plain error.
¶ 32 Generally, to preserve an error for review, a defendant must object to the error at trial and
raise the error in a posttrial motion. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48. Failure to do either
results in forfeiture. Id. In criminal cases where the admissibility of evidence has been litigated in a
motion in limine, a contemporaneous trial objection is not required. People v. Denson, 2014 IL
116231, ¶ 18. A specific objection at trial forfeits all grounds not specified. People v. Lovejoy, 235
Ill. 2d 97, 148 (2009). However, the issue raised by a defendant on appeal need not be identical to
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the issue raised at trial, and we will not find that a claim has been forfeited when it is clear that the
trial court had the opportunity to review the same essential claim. Id.
¶ 33 In this case, the defendant responded to the State’s motion in limine, arguing that the
evidence should not be admitted because there was “no official charge.” The defendant has
abandoned this basis on appeal, arguing instead that the two offenses were not sufficiently similar
to one another and that an examination of the legislative history requires us to conclude that only
prior offenses may be considered. We find that these arguments have no connection to the limited
basis raised by the defendant during the State’s motion in limine. We note that the defendant raised
his objection based on the timing of the offense during the conference on the jury instructions.
However, this untimely objection gave the trial court no opportunity to review the issue before
allowing the testimony. Therefore, we conclude that the arguments have been forfeited. See Lovejoy,
235 Ill. 2d at 148. The defendant, however, alternatively urges us to consider the arguments under
the second prong of the plain-error doctrine.
¶ 34 Even where a defendant has forfeited an error it may still be considered under the plain-error
doctrine. In re N.H., 2016 IL App (1st) 152504, ¶ 74. “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” Ill. S. Ct.
R. 615 (eff. Jan 1, 1967).
“[T]he plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1)
a clear or obvious error occurs and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone
threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of
the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurs and that error is so serious that it affected the
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fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless
of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007).
The first step in the plain-error analysis is to determine whether an error occurred. Id.
¶ 35 The defendant raises two arguments regarding the admission of other crimes, evidence. First,
he argues that the trial court abused its discretion because there was a lack of similarity, and the
details far exceeded any legitimate purpose. Second, he argues that the statute is ambiguous and
should be construed to allow only evidence of prior conduct. We address each argument in turn.
¶ 36 Under the common law rules in Illinois, evidence of other crimes was inadmissible to show
a defendant’s propensity for criminal behavior. See, e.g., People v. Richee, 355 Ill. App. 3d 43, 50-
51 (2005). Section 115-7.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2018)),
however, provides an exception to this rule for defendants accused of certain—primarily sexually
motivated—offenses, including aggravated criminal sexual assault. 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(a)(1) (West
2018). Subsection (b) reads:
“If the defendant is accused of an offense set forth in paragraph (1) or (2) of
subsection (a) or the defendant is tried or retried for any of the offenses set forth in paragraph
(3) of subsection (a), evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses
set forth in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a), or evidence to rebut that proof or an
inference from that proof, may be admissible (if that evidence is otherwise admissible under
the rules of evidence) and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant.” 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(b) (West 2018).
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The key issue is whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. See People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 182–83 (2003). Section 115-7.3 specifies
that a trial court should consider the following in making that determination:
“(1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate offense;
(2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged or predicate offense; or
(3) other relevant facts and circumstances.” 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(c) (West 2018).
We review the trial court's determination for an abuse of discretion. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 182. An
evidentiary ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion only when it is arbitrary, fanciful, or
unreasonable. People v. Irwin, 2017 IL App (1st) 150054, ¶ 27.
¶ 37 Here, we find no abuse of discretion. First, the proximity in time was close; A.M. testified
that the defendant assaulted her approximately three months after he allegedly assaulted C.C.
Second, there was a high degree of similarity between the two offenses. In both cases, the victim
was a young woman whom the defendant did not know or had known for only a short period of time.
In both cases, a car was used to place the victim in a secluded area. In each case, the defendant used
false pretenses to lure the victim to the scene of the crime. C.C. falsely believed that she was being
taken to the alley for an act of prostitution. A.M. falsely believed that the defendant needed to return
to the field to look for a lost card. The defendant used force or a threat of force to compel compliance
with his sexual demands in both cases. In both crimes, the defendant assaulted the victim orally and
vaginally. In both cases, the defendant took the victims’ money and personal property after the
sexual assault. After the defendant completed his assaults, he told the victim in each case to kneel
or lie on the ground while he made his escape in a car. Given the proximity in time and degree of
similarity between the offenses, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.
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¶ 38 The defendant argues that this case is similar to People v. Johnson, 406 Ill. App. 3d 805
(2010), and urges us to find the differences between the two offenses “stark.” We disagree. In
Johnson, this court found “telling differences” between the charged and uncharged offenses where
one offense involved two attackers and the other a solo attack, one offense involved a car and the
other did not, and in only one case the attacker gave the victim alcohol and blew cocaine in her face.
Id. at 811. However, the differences here are not so stark. Although only one offense involved
prostitution, both offenses involved young women who had only recently met the defendant. The
length of the assault differed in each case, but we do not find this a significant difference, in light of
the fact that both occurred in the early hours of the morning. Although one offense occurred in a car
in an alley while the other occurred in a field, both involved using a car to take the victim to a
secluded area. Finally, although only the attack on A.M. involved the use of a firearm, both offenses
involved the use of force. Having carefully reviewed the record in this case, we find no support for
the defendant’s contention that the trial court “ignored” the differences between the two cases when
weighing the probative value against the possibility of undue prejudice.
¶ 39 The defendant also argues that the offenses committed against A.M. were more heinous than
the ones committed against C.C. and, therefore, the jury was likely to convict based upon the other
sex crime evidence. See People v. Smith, 406 Ill. App. 3d 747 (2010). We find the defendant’s
reliance on Smith misplaced. First, and very significantly, Smith involved an appeal by the State
where the trial court had barred the other crimes evidence. Accordingly, the burden was on the State
to show an abuse of discretion. Id. at 751. Moreover, the other crimes evidence barred in Smith
occurred 25 to 40 years before the charged offense and involved no less than five other victims. Id.
at 753. This is dissimilar to the case at bar which involved only a single additional victim and where
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the two assaults occurred within a few months of each other. Accordingly, we find that Smith
warrants no further discussion.
¶ 40 The defendant argues that the other crimes evidence went beyond what was necessary to
illuminate the issue of identity. The defendant argues that he “acknowledged” the sexual encounter
with C.C. It is unclear what the defendant means by acknowledging the encounter, since he never
filed an answer to the State’s discovery request identifying his defense and did not testify. However,
even assuming, arguendo, that the defendant acknowledged the encounter, the issue of consent
remained. C.C. admitted that she was engaged in prostitution when she encountered the defendant.
Evidence that the defendant engaged in a similar attack on another woman was relevant to
demonstrate C.C.’s lack of consent. Moreover, we find no abuse of discretion where the trial court
limited the evidence of the other encounter to a single witness, and her testimony was relevant to
issues in the case. A.M.’s testimony regarding the length of the encounter and the force used during
the encounter were relevant to establish her lack of consent and by implication the propensity of the
defendant to use force to overcome resistance in his victims. Therefore, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's admission of this evidence.
¶ 41 The defendant also argues that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, because the statute
only allows the admission of prior offenses to show propensity, and the assault of A.M. occurred
subsequent to the assault on C.C. The defendant urges us to consider the legislative history, arguing
that the statute is ambiguous. We disagree.
¶ 42 The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature’s intent. People v. Jurisec, 199 Ill. 2d 108, 118 (2002). The best indicator of the
legislative intent is the language of the statute. Id. Where intent can be ascertained from the plain
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language of the statute, it will be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction. People
v. Lemons, 191 Ill. 2d 155, 159 (2000). Statutory construction is a matter of law that we review de
novo. People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 21.
¶ 43 Here, we find no ambiguity in the statute. The plain language of section 115-7.3 reads
“another offense or offenses.” The statue contains no temporal element saying neither “prior,” nor
“subsequent.” We find no ambiguity requiring interpretation, and therefore, there is no need to look
at the legislative history as the defendant suggests. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not
err when it allowed other crimes evidence, simply because that evidence involved conduct occurring
after the charged offense.
¶ 44 Having carefully considered all of the defendant’s arguments regarding other crimes
evidence, we conclude that the trial court neither erred in its interpretation of the statute nor abused
its discretion in its application of that law to the facts of this case. Because there was no error there
can be no plain error. See People v. Ali, 2019 IL App (2d) 161016, ¶ 13.
¶ 45 Next, the defendant contends that the trial court erred when it allowed Dr. Ansari to read, in
its entirety, the statement given to her by C.C. The defendant argues that he preserved this error by
objecting at the trial level. The State, on the other hand, argues that the defendant not only failed to
raise this specific objection but invited the error when he asked the doctor to read the statement
again. We agree with the State.
¶ 46 As we observed above, a specific objection at trial forfeits all grounds not specified. Lovejoy,
235 Ill. 2d at 148. At trial, the defendant objected only to the fact that Dr. Ansari was using her notes
to aid her recollection. We find the defendant’s contentions on appeal that he objected on any other
basis unfounded and unsupported by the record. Moreover, we find that the defendant invited the
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error he complains of. Invited error, or acquiescence, is a procedural default sometimes described as
estoppel. In re Detention of Swope, 213 Ill. 2d 210, 217 (2004). “Simply stated, a party cannot
complain of error which that party induced the court to make or to which that party consented.” Id.
In this case, the defendant did not merely fail to object when the State asked Dr. Ansari to read the
statement, he asked her to read it again during cross-examination. Accordingly, we find that this is
invited error and that the defendant has forfeited review on appeal.
¶ 47 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 48 Affirmed.
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