People v. Bones

2025 IL App (4th) 241277-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 12, 2025
• Docket: 4-24-1277
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (4th) 241277-U NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under NO. 4-24-1277 November 12, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) McLean County JAYLIN BONES, ) No. 23CF143 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) J. Jason Chambers, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding (1) defendant failed to show the unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon statute is facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied to him and (2) defendant did not receive ineffective assistance when trial counsel did not object to testimony regarding a forensic lab report.

¶2 After a jury trial, defendant, Jaylin Bones, was convicted of two counts of

unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)) for

unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon. He was sentenced to two concurrent

terms of 10 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the UPWF statute under which

he was convicted is facially unconstitutional pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s

decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and unconstitutional

as applied to him and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel did not

object to testimony regarding an Illinois State Police (ISP) forensic lab report, where the testimony was allegedly inadmissible hearsay and purportedly violated defendant’s rights under

the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Cont.,

amend. VI). We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On February 2, 2023, the State charged defendant with two counts of UPWF for

unlawfully possessing a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)) and unlawfully possessing

firearm ammunition (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)), alleging he possessed a .40-caliber

pistol and .40-caliber ammunition and was previously convicted of aggravated fleeing or

attempting to elude a peace officer.

¶5 The matter proceeded to a jury trial. Sergeant Paul Jones of the Bloomington

Police Department testified he helped transport defendant to the McLean County jail. During the

process of booking defendant into the jail, Sergeant Jered Cook asked defendant to walk through

a metal detector. Defendant began to approach the metal detector, but then he paused, “raised his

hands up, and then began *** smiling and saying, [‘J]ust don’t shoot me, just don’t shoot

me.[’ ]” After defendant was secured, Cook “removed a firearm from the crotch area” of

defendant’s pants. Cook removed the firearm’s magazine and pulled back its slide, which ejected

a cartridge from the chamber. Cook then handed the firearm to Jones, who placed it in an

envelope and remained in possession of it until he returned to the police department, at which

point he secured it in an evidence locker. Jones testified the firearm was a Smith & Wesson

M&P Shield handgun, which held seven .40-caliber cartridges in its magazine and an additional

cartridge in its chamber.

¶6 Cook testified he helped process defendant when he was brought to the McLean

County jail. During a pat-down search, Cook felt something “alongside [defendant’s] right leg,”

-2- which he believed would be found during the subsequent strip search. However, when Cook

ordered defendant to walk through the metal detector, defendant “paused before the metal

detector and said something along the lines of [‘]don’t shoot, don’t shoot.[’ ]” Officers secured

defendant, and Cook discovered a handgun “right below [defendant’s] waistband.” When

presented with People’s exhibit No. 1, Cook testified it was the Smith & Wesson .40-caliber

handgun he discovered in defendant’s pants. On cross-examination, Cook specified the firearm

was “an M&P Shield.”

¶7 David Ashbeck, a crime scene detective with the Bloomington Police Department,

testified he received special training regarding evidence handling, packaging procedures, and

evidence collection. When presented with People’s exhibit No. 1, Ashbeck testified, “This is a

firearm that was submitted to me *** that I later packaged after taking photographs of it.”

Ashbeck described the firearm as “a Smith & Wesson [.]40[-]caliber semiautomatic pistol,” with

a magazine that held seven cartridges plus one in the chamber. When Ashbeck was given the

firearm, he confirmed the magazine was loaded before emptying the magazine and

photographing the ammunition. Ashbeck removed seven cartridges from the magazine, and there

was a single cartridge that was turned in with the firearm. Ashbeck testified the ammunition was

“all [.]40[-]caliber cartridges which match the firearm, and they are a combination of full metal

jacket and hollow points.” During Ashbeck’s testimony, the State entered photographs of the

firearm and ammunition into evidence.

¶8 Ashbeck testified all of the ammunition was .40-caliber, and the firearm was a

.40-caliber handgun, but he did not personally put any of the ammunition into the firearm to

confirm it would fire the ammunition successfully. Ashbeck asserted he knew the firearm had

been test-fired, and it did fire ammunition. However, Ashbeck did not personally observe the

-3- test-firing. Instead, his knowledge was based on the ISP forensic lab report.

¶9 After the State rested, trial counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing the State

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the firearm in question was a real firearm or the

ammunition was live firearm ammunition. Counsel argued the State merely presented hearsay

evidence regarding whether the firearm actually fired, and counsel insisted the testimony

asserting the exhibit entered into evidence was the same firearm discovered in defendant’s pants

was partially impeached. In response, the State argued the testimony presented showed the

witnesses were familiar with both the firearm’s model and the ammunition, and it was a real

firearm. The State emphasized it did not have to show the firearm successfully fired live

ammunition to prove defendant guilty of UPWF.

¶ 10 The trial court denied the motion for a directed verdict, saying:

“I recognize there was the testimony from [Ashbeck] that

now when he said, he testified he was aware that it had been fired,

it turns out that that was possibly through hearsay. I don’t know if

there’s an exception to that or not. There was no objection to it at

the time, so that testimony came in as it was. And based on

everything in the light most favorable to the State, I think the State

has met their burden at this point and the motion for directed

verdict will be denied.”

¶ 11 After the trial concluded, the jury found defendant guilty of both counts of

UPWF. Defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial, which the trial court

denied after a hearing. The court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of 10 years’

imprisonment, to run consecutively to his sentence in McLean County case No. 23-CF-135.

-4- ¶ 12 This appeal followed.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the UPWF statute is unconstitutional both

facially and as applied to him and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel where trial

counsel did not object to Ashbeck’s testimony regarding the ISP forensic lab report. We affirm.

¶ 15 A. The UPWF Statute

¶ 16 First, defendant argues the UPWF statute is unconstitutional both on its face and

as applied to him. While defendant raises these challenges for the first time on appeal, “a

challenge to the constitutionality of a statute may be raised at any time.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 39. “Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the

party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of clearly establishing its

invalidity. A court must construe a statute so as to uphold its constitutionality if reasonably

possible.” People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 57. “The constitutionality of a statute is a question

of law subject to de novo review.” Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 57.

¶ 17 1. Defendant’s Facial Challenge

¶ 18 Defendant contends the UPWF statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)) is

facially unconstitutional. “A statute will be deemed facially unconstitutional only if there is no

set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid.” People v. Bochenek, 2021 IL

125889, ¶ 10. Relying on the test articulated in Bruen, defendant claims his conduct is covered

by the text of the second amendment (U.S. Const., amend. II), and the statute is not consistent

with our nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Specifically, defendant insists the

second amendment’s plain text encompasses his possession of a weapon (see People v. Brooks,

2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 33), and there is a “strong presumption” that the right to keep and

-5- bear arms belongs to “all Americans.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008).

Defendant then asserts our nation has no historical tradition of prohibiting felons from

possessing firearms.

¶ 19 This court has found the UPWF statute facially constitutional in People v. Burns,

2024 IL App (4th) 230428, ¶¶ 18-22. In Burns, the defendant raised both a facial and an as-

applied constitutional challenge to the UPWF statute, relying on the test articulated in Bruen.

Burns, 2024 IL App (4th) 230428, ¶¶ 15-16. Specifically, the defendant argued “his conduct of

possessing firearm ammunition in his home was covered by the plain text of the second

amendment,” and the statute was “unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him because the

State cannot prove that the statute is consistent with the United States’s historical tradition of

firearm regulation.” Burns, 2024 IL App (4th) 230428, ¶ 16. We rejected the defendant’s facial

challenge, finding “the second amendment does not encompass felons,” and therefore, “ ‘the

Bruen decision does not apply to felons.’ ” Burns, 2024 IL App (4th) 230428, ¶ 20 (quoting

People v. Boyce, 2023 IL App (4th) 221113-U, ¶ 16); see People v. Gardner, 2024 IL App (4th)

230443, ¶ 68 (relying on the rationale in Burns and Boyce to find Bruen does not apply to felons

because they fall outside the second amendment’s protections). Felons have been historically

prohibited from possessing firearms. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (“[N]othing in our opinion

should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by

felons.”). “Thus, the defendant cannot show that his conduct was presumptively protected by the

second amendment, and therefore, he does not fall within the scope of Bruen.” Burns, 2024 IL

App (4th) 230428, ¶ 21. This court has repeatedly reaffirmed our Burns holding. See People v.

Huff, 2025 IL App (4th) 240762, ¶ 16 (“This court has already determined the UPWF statute is

facially constitutional.”); People v. Bruce, 2025 IL App (4th) 240706-U, ¶ 25 (“We continue to

-6- adhere to our holding in Burns.”); People v. Pruitte, 2024 IL App (4th) 240013-U, ¶ 36 (“We

decline defendant’s invitation to reconsider Burns.”); People v. Dillard, 2024 IL App (4th)

231090-U, ¶ 27 (“In sum, we continue to adhere to our prior analysis.”).

¶ 20 We continue to adhere to our decision in Burns. Defendant’s facial challenge here

echoes the facial challenge raised in Burns, and it fails for the same reasons. As we found in that

case, “Bruen simply does not apply to defendant.” Burns, 2024 IL App (4th) 230428, ¶ 21. The

same is true here. As a felon, defendant does not fall within the scope of the Bruen historical-

tradition test. See Burns, 2024 IL App (4th) 230428, ¶ 21; Bruen, 597 U.S. at 71 (finding the

New York statute at issue unconstitutional because it prevented “law-abiding citizens with

ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms”). Thus, we reject

defendant’s argument that the UPWF statute is facially unconstitutional. See Burns, 2024 IL App

(4th) 230428, ¶ 21; see also Dillard, 2024 IL App (4th) 231090-U, ¶¶ 20-27; Pruitte, 2024 IL

App (4th) 240013-U, ¶¶ 32-36; People v. Mallery, 2024 IL App (4th) 231397-U, ¶¶ 20-27;

People v. Stokich, 2024 IL App (4th) 240192-U, ¶¶ 41-45.

¶ 21 2. Defendant’s As-Applied Challenge

¶ 22 Defendant also argues the UPWF statute is unconstitutional as applied to him.

“[A]n ‘as-applied’ challenge protests against how a statute was applied in the particular context

in which the challenging party acted or proposed to act.” Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 58. “An as-

applied challenge requires a showing that the statute violates the constitution as it applies to the

facts and circumstances of the challenging party.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 36.

Because such challenges are necessarily dependent on the specific facts and circumstances of the

person raising the challenge, “it is paramount that the record be sufficiently developed in terms

of those facts and circumstances for purposes of appellate review.” (Internal quotation marks

-7- omitted.) People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 39. “A court is not capable of making an ‘as

applied’ determination of unconstitutionality when there has been no evidentiary hearing and no

findings of fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 39. Absent such

an evidentiary record, a finding of unconstitutionality in the as-applied context “is premature.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 39.

¶ 23 Once again, we find our decision in Burns instructive. There, we found the record

was insufficiently developed to address the defendant’s as-applied challenge because he raised it

for the first time on appeal, and “no factual findings were made related to [the] defendant’s prior

conviction or how it pertained to his present claim relating to Bruen.” Burns, 2024 IL App (4th)

230428, ¶ 17. The same is true here. Defendant raises his as-applied challenge for the first time

on appeal, and the trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing on this specific claim, nor

did it make any factual findings regarding defendant’s particular circumstances. See Burns, 2024

IL App (4th) 230428, ¶ 17; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 40. Accordingly, we find any

determination regarding the constitutionality of the UPWF statute as it applies to defendant

would be premature, and we decline defendant’s invitation to consider the merits of his

argument. See Burns, 2024 IL App (4th) 230428, ¶ 17; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 39.

¶ 24 B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

¶ 25 Next, defendant argues he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel where

counsel did not object when Ashbeck testified he knew the firearm taken from defendant was

successfully test-fired based on the ISP forensic lab report. Defendant asserts counsel could have

argued the testimony was inadmissible hearsay or that the testimony violated defendant’s right to

confront witnesses against him under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution

(U.S. Const., amend. VI). “To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

-8- show that (1) the attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and

(2) the attorney’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant in that, absent counsel’s

deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 90. “Because the defendant must

satisfy both prongs of this test, the failure to establish either is fatal to the claim.” Jackson, 2020

IL 124112, ¶ 90.

¶ 26 Defendant contends trial counsel’s failure to object constituted deficient

performance, and he suffered prejudice because the evidence was closely balanced, such that

there is a reasonable probability that the trial’s result would have been different but for counsel’s

allegedly deficient performance. We disagree with defendant’s prejudice claim and affirm the

trial court’s judgment without addressing whether counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness.

¶ 27 Importantly, the State did not need to establish the firearm in question could fire

ammunition successfully to prove defendant guilty of UPWF. See People v. Halley, 131 Ill. App.

2d 1070, 1073 (1971) (“To establish a violation of the statute prohibiting the carrying of a

firearm, it is sufficient to show that the weapon possessed the outward appearance and

characteristics of such pistol, revolver or other firearm.”); People v. White, 253 Ill. App. 3d 1097,

1098 (1993) (“[I]t is sufficient to support a [UPWF] conviction that the object possessed the

outward appearance and characteristics of a firearm, even if inoperable.”). Both Jones and Cook

testified the firearm removed from defendant’s person was a Smith & Wesson M&P Shield

handgun that fired .40-caliber ammunition. Cook testified he was “comfortable” with the type of

firearm in question. When Cook retrieved the firearm, he removed its magazine and “put the gun

slide to the rear,” causing a cartridge to fall to the ground. Cook testified he “distinctly

-9- remember[ed] what the gun looked like.” Ashbeck testified the firearm was “a Smith & Wesson

[.]40[-]caliber semiautomatic pistol.” He confirmed the magazine fit in the handgun, and he

removed the ammunition from the magazine to take pictures of it. Based on his training and

experience, Ashbeck testified the ammunition was “all [.]40[-]caliber cartridges which match the

firearm, and they are a combination of full metal jacket and hollow points.” Ashbeck also

testified regarding both the firearm’s and the ammunition’s respective distinguishing

characteristics, and photographs of the firearm, magazine, and ammunition were entered into

evidence during his testimony. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 123 Ill. App. 2d 115, 122 (1970)

(finding the State was not required to show the firearm “was in an operable condition” to prove

the defendant guilty of unlawfully possessing a firearm).

¶ 28 Even assuming, arguendo, trial counsel made a timely objection to Ashbeck’s

testimony regarding his reliance on the ISP forensic lab report and the trial court sustained the

objection, there is not a reasonable probability the trial’s result would have been different. See

Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 90. The State presented evidence defendant had previously been

convicted of a felony, and multiple witnesses testified defendant possessed a Smith & Wesson

M&P Shield handgun loaded with .40-caliber ammunition in his pants. The State did not need to

present evidence showing the firearm was tested to determine whether it successfully fired

ammunition to prove defendant guilty of UPWF. See Halley, 131 Ill. App. 2d at 1073.

Defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim fails because he was not prejudiced when counsel did

not object to the testimony at issue. See Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 90.

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 31 Affirmed.

- 10 -