People v. Bonds

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Bonds

85 A.D.3d 1195, 926 N.Y.S.2d 299

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 28, 2011

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 85 A.D.3d 1195 (People v. Bonds) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Bonds, 85 A.D.3d 1195, 926 N.Y.S.2d 299 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2011).

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Opinion

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Hudson, J.), rendered October 10, 2008, convicting him of criminal trespass in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d-484, 491-492 [2008]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19-20 [1995]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see generally Matter of Jeffery M., 309 AD2d 937, 938 [2003]; cf. Matter of Paul N., 244 AD2d 489, 490 [1997]).

Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an inde[1196]*1196pendent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]; People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The defendant further contends that he was deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor’s tactic of asking him on cross-examination whether he believed two of the prosecution’s police witnesses were lying. Although we have repeatedly disapproved of this type of questioning (see e.g. People v Berrios, 298 AD2d 597 [2002]; People v Webb, 68 AD2d 331, 333 [1979]; People v Yant, 75 AD2d 653, 653 [1980]), any error committed here was harmless as there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt and no significant probability that the impropriety in the prosecutor’s cross-examination affected the verdict (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]; People v Gonzalez, 15 AD3d 594, 594-595 [2005]; People v Lawrence, 4 AD3d 436, 437 [2004]; People v McGlone, 222 AD2d 529 [1995]; People v Calada, 154 AD2d 700, 700 [1989]). Covello, J.P., Leventhal, Lott and Miller, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Hudson, J.), rendered October 10, 2008, convicting him of criminal trespass in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d-484, 491-492 [2008]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19-20 [1995]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see generally Matter of Jeffery M., 309 AD2d 937, 938 [2003]; cf. Matter of Paul N., 244 AD2d 489, 490 [1997]).

Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an inde[1196]*1196pendent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]; People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The defendant further contends that he was deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor’s tactic of asking him on cross-examination whether he believed two of the prosecution’s police witnesses were lying. Although we have repeatedly disapproved of this type of questioning (see e.g. People v Berrios, 298 AD2d 597 [2002]; People v Webb, 68 AD2d 331, 333 [1979]; People v Yant, 75 AD2d 653, 653 [1980]), any error committed here was harmless as there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt and no significant probability that the impropriety in the prosecutor’s cross-examination affected the verdict (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]; People v Gonzalez, 15 AD3d 594, 594-595 [2005]; People v Lawrence, 4 AD3d 436, 437 [2004]; People v McGlone, 222 AD2d 529 [1995]; People v Calada, 154 AD2d 700, 700 [1989]). Covello, J.P., Leventhal, Lott and Miller, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

85 A.D.3d 1195, 926 N.Y.S.2d 299, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-bonds-nyappdiv-2011.

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