2026 IL App (2d) 250239-U No. 2-25-0239 Order filed February 26, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. LAYTH BLOCK, Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kendall County. Honorable Lisa F. Accardi, Judge, Presiding. No. 23-DV-172
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Kennedy and Justice Jorgensen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for domestic battery by insulting or provoking contact; affirmed.
¶2 After a bench trial, defendant Layth Block was found guilty of misdemeanor domestic
battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2022) (insulting or provoking contact)) and was sentenced
to 12 months’ court supervision. He appeals and contends that the State’s evidence did not disprove
that he acted in self-defense and was insufficient because the complaining victim “was not a
reliable witness.” We affirm. ¶3 At trial, Brian Kapp testified that he rented a room to defendant inside a single-family home
in Joliet. Kapp also lived in the house. At some time in the late evening on December 13, 2025,
Kapp heard a commotion in the garage and went to investigate. Kapp saw defendant by the garage
door. Earlier, Kapp had moved defendant’s belongings outside in front of the garage. Defendant
confronted Kapp in the living room about “messing with [his] stuff ***.” Kapp responded that it
was because defendant wasn’t paying his rent and was causing “too many issues” with the other
tenants. Defendant put his hand on Kapp’s throat and forced Kapp to the ground while choking
him. Defendant made statements about people messing with his things, and repeatedly asked Kapp
if he wanted defendant “to spare [his] life.” While Kapp was on the ground, defendant briefly took
his grip off of Kapp’s throat. Kapp yelled out for help and defendant said, “oh, no, you don’t want
to do that,” and pulled out a knife and pointed it at Kapp’s face. One of the tenants, Regina, turned
on a light in the kitchen, and defendant got off of Kapp and left. Kapp was scared for his life, and
his neck was red where defendant’s fingers had been.
¶4 Defendant testified that he came home from work late at night, saw his stuff in front of the
garage, and entered the home through the “doggie door.” Inside the house, defendant recognized
Kapp in the darkness by his stature. Per defendant, Kapp was holding something in his left hand;
“it ended up being a phone” but “[a]t the time [defendant] didn’t know if it was a taser, if it was a
gun, [or] if it was a knife.” Defendant was scared and stated that Kapp moved towards defendant
in an aggressive manner without saying anything. Defendant then “brought [Kapp] down to the
ground” in a “[j]ujitsu style *** controlled manner.” More specifically, defendant “wrapped [his]
leg around, like taking control of [Kapp’s] arms” and defendant also “wrapped [his] leg around
[Kapp’s] back leg, tripping him down to the ground and controlling him so nobody was hurt.” This
is called a “leg trap or something like that” and defendant was particularly careful so that Kapp
-2- did not hit his head on the ground. Defendant told Kapp to “relax” while defendant attempted to
determine if Kapp “had a gun or if he had a knife or a taser.” Defendant conceded that he was
carrying a knife in his coat, but claimed he never brandished it. Defendant admitted that he might
have touched Kapp’s throat when he was “bringing [Kapp] down to the ground” but denied
choking him. Defendant also admitted that he had “pinn[ed]” Kapp and may have been kneeling
on him, but defendant denied using his body weight to secure Kapp. When asked why he took
Kapp down to the floor, defendant stated his rationale: “Because I was in immediate danger at least
is what I assumed.” According to defendant, when Regina turned on the kitchen light, the police
also “happened to be there” and defendant was arrested. Defendant estimated that he held Kapp
on the ground for between five and 30 seconds.
¶5 On cross-examination, defendant stated that he could not see Kapp because it was dark,
but paradoxically defendant could tell that Kapp’s “demeanor” was aggressive like “a UFC
fight[er]” after the bell rings to start the round. After he pinned Kapp to the ground, defendant
attempted to “mitigate the weapon” in Kapp’s possession. Instead, defendant determined the object
in Kapp’s hand was a cell phone. Then, defendant said, “[b]efore I knew it, I was in handcuffs and
on my way to the police station.” The trial court found that Kapp was credible and a household
member, and that defendant was not credible; the court entered a judgment of conviction
accordingly.
¶6 On appeal, defendant contends the evidence was insufficient. He claims that he
“subdue[d]” Kapp “without injury,” that he “reasonably perceived an armed threat in the
darkness,” and that Kapp’s “more damning account was unreliable and uncorroborated.” These
arguments are unpersuasive.
-3- ¶7 We confess that we are not certain what defendant means when he says Kapp’s retelling
was “more damning,” but we understand defendant’s general point: he disputes Kapp’s version of
events and believes that “rejecting [defendant’s] testimony as incredible was an error.” Defendant’s
arguments all orbit the same premise, urging that we should disbelieve Kapp, and in so doing,
defendant reveals his arguments to be misguided. As is often said, we are a court of review, not
first view, and we are not free to reweigh the evidence at defendant’s invitation. That is:
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the function of
a reviewing court to retry the defendant. Rather, in a bench trial, it is for the trial judge,
sitting as the trier of fact, to determine the credibility of witnesses, to weigh evidence and
draw reasonable inferences therefrom, and to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. A
reviewing court will not reverse a conviction simply because the evidence is contradictory
or because the defendant claims that a witness was not credible.” (Citations omitted.)
People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009).
Likewise, “[i]t remains the firm holding of [our supreme] court that the testimony of a single
witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to convict, even though it is contradicted by the
defendant.” Id.
¶8 Unlike defendant, we find nothing inherently improbable in our reading of the transcript of
Kapp’s testimony, and therefore we can only defer to the trial court’s credibility findings, as it,
unlike us, saw and heard the victim’s testimony alongside defendant’s. To the extent defendant
claims that the trial court failed to fully consider his self-defense claim, the trial court is presumed
to know the law and to have applied it properly and we find nothing unreasonable in its analysis.
See generally People v. Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 32 (1997). The trial court’s explanation indicates
that it found defendant was the initial aggressor, not Kapp, and that defendant’s use of force—by
-4- his own admission, restraining Kapp by the neck—was objectively unreasonable.
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2026 IL App (2d) 250239-U No. 2-25-0239 Order filed February 26, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. LAYTH BLOCK, Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kendall County. Honorable Lisa F. Accardi, Judge, Presiding. No. 23-DV-172
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Kennedy and Justice Jorgensen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for domestic battery by insulting or provoking contact; affirmed.
¶2 After a bench trial, defendant Layth Block was found guilty of misdemeanor domestic
battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2022) (insulting or provoking contact)) and was sentenced
to 12 months’ court supervision. He appeals and contends that the State’s evidence did not disprove
that he acted in self-defense and was insufficient because the complaining victim “was not a
reliable witness.” We affirm. ¶3 At trial, Brian Kapp testified that he rented a room to defendant inside a single-family home
in Joliet. Kapp also lived in the house. At some time in the late evening on December 13, 2025,
Kapp heard a commotion in the garage and went to investigate. Kapp saw defendant by the garage
door. Earlier, Kapp had moved defendant’s belongings outside in front of the garage. Defendant
confronted Kapp in the living room about “messing with [his] stuff ***.” Kapp responded that it
was because defendant wasn’t paying his rent and was causing “too many issues” with the other
tenants. Defendant put his hand on Kapp’s throat and forced Kapp to the ground while choking
him. Defendant made statements about people messing with his things, and repeatedly asked Kapp
if he wanted defendant “to spare [his] life.” While Kapp was on the ground, defendant briefly took
his grip off of Kapp’s throat. Kapp yelled out for help and defendant said, “oh, no, you don’t want
to do that,” and pulled out a knife and pointed it at Kapp’s face. One of the tenants, Regina, turned
on a light in the kitchen, and defendant got off of Kapp and left. Kapp was scared for his life, and
his neck was red where defendant’s fingers had been.
¶4 Defendant testified that he came home from work late at night, saw his stuff in front of the
garage, and entered the home through the “doggie door.” Inside the house, defendant recognized
Kapp in the darkness by his stature. Per defendant, Kapp was holding something in his left hand;
“it ended up being a phone” but “[a]t the time [defendant] didn’t know if it was a taser, if it was a
gun, [or] if it was a knife.” Defendant was scared and stated that Kapp moved towards defendant
in an aggressive manner without saying anything. Defendant then “brought [Kapp] down to the
ground” in a “[j]ujitsu style *** controlled manner.” More specifically, defendant “wrapped [his]
leg around, like taking control of [Kapp’s] arms” and defendant also “wrapped [his] leg around
[Kapp’s] back leg, tripping him down to the ground and controlling him so nobody was hurt.” This
is called a “leg trap or something like that” and defendant was particularly careful so that Kapp
-2- did not hit his head on the ground. Defendant told Kapp to “relax” while defendant attempted to
determine if Kapp “had a gun or if he had a knife or a taser.” Defendant conceded that he was
carrying a knife in his coat, but claimed he never brandished it. Defendant admitted that he might
have touched Kapp’s throat when he was “bringing [Kapp] down to the ground” but denied
choking him. Defendant also admitted that he had “pinn[ed]” Kapp and may have been kneeling
on him, but defendant denied using his body weight to secure Kapp. When asked why he took
Kapp down to the floor, defendant stated his rationale: “Because I was in immediate danger at least
is what I assumed.” According to defendant, when Regina turned on the kitchen light, the police
also “happened to be there” and defendant was arrested. Defendant estimated that he held Kapp
on the ground for between five and 30 seconds.
¶5 On cross-examination, defendant stated that he could not see Kapp because it was dark,
but paradoxically defendant could tell that Kapp’s “demeanor” was aggressive like “a UFC
fight[er]” after the bell rings to start the round. After he pinned Kapp to the ground, defendant
attempted to “mitigate the weapon” in Kapp’s possession. Instead, defendant determined the object
in Kapp’s hand was a cell phone. Then, defendant said, “[b]efore I knew it, I was in handcuffs and
on my way to the police station.” The trial court found that Kapp was credible and a household
member, and that defendant was not credible; the court entered a judgment of conviction
accordingly.
¶6 On appeal, defendant contends the evidence was insufficient. He claims that he
“subdue[d]” Kapp “without injury,” that he “reasonably perceived an armed threat in the
darkness,” and that Kapp’s “more damning account was unreliable and uncorroborated.” These
arguments are unpersuasive.
-3- ¶7 We confess that we are not certain what defendant means when he says Kapp’s retelling
was “more damning,” but we understand defendant’s general point: he disputes Kapp’s version of
events and believes that “rejecting [defendant’s] testimony as incredible was an error.” Defendant’s
arguments all orbit the same premise, urging that we should disbelieve Kapp, and in so doing,
defendant reveals his arguments to be misguided. As is often said, we are a court of review, not
first view, and we are not free to reweigh the evidence at defendant’s invitation. That is:
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the function of
a reviewing court to retry the defendant. Rather, in a bench trial, it is for the trial judge,
sitting as the trier of fact, to determine the credibility of witnesses, to weigh evidence and
draw reasonable inferences therefrom, and to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. A
reviewing court will not reverse a conviction simply because the evidence is contradictory
or because the defendant claims that a witness was not credible.” (Citations omitted.)
People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009).
Likewise, “[i]t remains the firm holding of [our supreme] court that the testimony of a single
witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to convict, even though it is contradicted by the
defendant.” Id.
¶8 Unlike defendant, we find nothing inherently improbable in our reading of the transcript of
Kapp’s testimony, and therefore we can only defer to the trial court’s credibility findings, as it,
unlike us, saw and heard the victim’s testimony alongside defendant’s. To the extent defendant
claims that the trial court failed to fully consider his self-defense claim, the trial court is presumed
to know the law and to have applied it properly and we find nothing unreasonable in its analysis.
See generally People v. Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 32 (1997). The trial court’s explanation indicates
that it found defendant was the initial aggressor, not Kapp, and that defendant’s use of force—by
-4- his own admission, restraining Kapp by the neck—was objectively unreasonable. There was also
no evidence that Kapp was a dangerous character who quickly resorted to violence or was known
to carry deadly weapons such as a gun, or a knife, or a taser. Cf. People v. Heintz, 2026 IL
131340, ¶ 53. Regardless, none of defendant’s analysis disputes either of the essential elements of
this offense, namely (1) that Kapp was a household member, and (2) that the conduct Kapp
described was clearly contact of an insulting and provoking nature. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2).
Defendant’s notation that Kapp did not suffer any serious injury is beside the point. See, e.g.,
People v. Green, 2011 IL App (2d) 091123, ¶ 23 (“[t]he domestic battery statute’s plain language
defines the offense in terms of contact that insults or provoked the victim, and the contact does not
need to cause physical injury”). The reason the law punishes even minimal conduct of this type is
because of its potential to escalate into much more serious and violent offenses, especially between
family and household members.
¶9 Defendant points out that there were no other witnesses who testified, but he also notes,
citing People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999), that one witness’s testimony is adequate to
sustain a criminal conviction. Kapp’s testimony was positive and clear, and the trial court found
him credible. After carefully reviewing the record, we determine that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the act of choking and restraining the victim (and, further, brandishing a knife and
asking the victim if he wished his life to be “spare[d]”) was contact of an insulting and provoking
nature to a household member. See People v. Davidson, 2023 IL 127538, ¶ 16. In sum, we affirm
the judgment of the circuit court of Kendall County.
¶ 10 Affirmed.
-5-